M. Iriskulov, A. Kuldashev a course in Theoretical English Grammar Tashkent 2008

Constraints on Direct Causation (constraints on what kind of situations 
(causations) can be encoded by the Caused-Motion Construction): 
I. 
No Mediating Cognitive Decision: no cognitive decision can 
mediate between the causing event and the entailed motion, e.g.: 
Sam frightened (coaxed, lured) Bob out of the room. 
II. The Implication of Actual Motion: if motion is not
strictly entailed, it must be presumed as an implication (implication
can be determined pragmatically), e.g.: Sam asked (invited,
urged)him into  the room. Sam allowed (permitted) him into the
house. 
III. Conventionalized Causations – causations which involve an
intermediate cause, i.e. are indirect, but cognitively packaged as a
single event, i.e. their internal structure is ignored, e.g.: The
invalid owner ran his favorite horse (in the race). The company
flew her to Chicago for an interview.
IV. 
Incidental Motion Causations: incidental motion must be effected 
as a result of the activity causing the change of state which is 
performed in a conventional way or with the intention of causing 
the motion. It means that the path of motion may be specified and 
the causation may be encoded by the Caused-Motion Construction, 
e.g.: The butcher sliced the salami onto the wax paper. Sam 
shredded the papers into the garbage pail. The action performed 
by the agent typically implies some predictable incidental motion.
V. 
Path of Motion: the path of motion must be completely determined 
by the causal force. The causing event must determine the entire 
path of motion, even though actual physical contact is not 
maintained over the entire path. Which paths count as “completely 
determined” is in part a matter of pragmatics. If the action is 
interpreted to be the driving force determining the particular path of 
motion, the motion can be said as “completely determined” by the 
action, e.g.: He shoved the cart down  the incline. They laughed 
the poor guy into his car. 
The semantic constraints have been proposed in an attempt to show principled 
patterns where there seems to be idiosyncrasy. These constraints have been argued 
to involve a combination of lexical semantics and general world knowledge.