Michael Collins Dunn

Michael Collins Dunn

Dr. Dunn is editor of The Estimate, a biweekly newsletter providing political and security intelligence analysis of the Islamic world since 1989, and president of The International Estimate, Inc., a Washington consultancy. He has taught at Georgetown and Utah State universities and writes and lectures widely on Middle Eastern and Islamic issues, including risk analysis.

The Middle East is often described as an unstable region, but this is certainly not the case in terms of overall regime survival. An Arab summit meeting 25 years ago would have included several of the same faces who would attend one today. The long tenure of many leaders in the Arab world and the durability of their regimes (uncharacteristic of earlier history), combined with their natural mortality and the dramatic demographic shifts in the region, almost guarantee that the next 10 to 20 years will be a period of dramatic change throughout the Arab world.

 

Intelligence analysts and assessors of political risk often speculate about individual succession problems in a given country. But, with only a handful of exceptions, there is bound to be leadership change in almost every Arab country within the next two decades, regardless of its constitutional structure or political evolution, simply because the present ruling elites are aging. A sort of generational revolution is inevitable, even if its timing and characteristics are impossible to discern precisely. It will have an impact on almost every Arab country and on all other issues, from economic development to political liberalization to Islamist politics, in ways that will differ from country to country but which cannot be ignored.

 

The Arab world is not led by very old men, at least by East Asian standards; these are not Chinese-style gerontocracies. But a significant number of leaders are now in their mid- to late-60s, some in questionable health. The real issue is not merely age, but the durability of their rule. In a great many instances, the majority of young Arabs cannot remember a time when their country had a different leadership than the one it enjoys today. King Hussein of Jordan has been on the throne since 1953, King Hassan II of Morocco since 1961. There are long-surviving republican leaders as well: Hafiz al-Asad has been president of Syria since 1971 (and effectively in charge since 1970). Muammar Qadhafi of Libya, once the region's enfant terrible, has been in place since 1969. Husni Mubarak of Egypt, once dismissed by some as a transitional figure, has been president for 16 years, five years longer than Anwar Sadat's rule, and soon to surpass Gamal Abdel Nasser's.

 

There is nothing inherently wrong with long tenure, of course, and for most outside observers (friendly governments, potential investors, etc.) stability and continuity of leadership are major assets. Certainly no U.S. policy maker or international businessman would look forward to the day when King Hussein or King Hassan leaves the scene. But eventually they will.

 

At the moment, great age is not itself a major issue in any specific country, not since the removal in 1987 of Habib Bourguiba as president of Tunisia, at a time when he was officially about 84 but probably a few years older. There are no Arab leaders currently so old as to be incapacitated, although King Fahd's stroke has limited the Saudi monarch's activities and set in motion the beginnings of a succession process. The oldest Arab leader at the moment is Sheikh Zayed, ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of the United Arab Emirates, who will be 80 next year. A number of leaders will reach 70 in the next two or three years: Asad, Hassan, Mubarak and Yasser Arafat.

 

There are several reasons (and they vary by country) for the longevity of Arab regimes at the moment. In the monarchies, of course, one expects a ruler to serve for all or most of his life. In many of the Arab republics, this has also been the practice for presidents, because there is neither a clear line of succession nor guaranteed security in retirement. This has combined with the fact that many of the present leadership generation came to power relatively young. Qadhafi came to power in Libya at age 27 and recently celebrated the twenty-eighth anniversary of his revolution: only in his mid-50s, he has led his country for more than half his life. King Hussein, approaching 45 years in power, is still only 62.

 

Added to this has been the absence, series of successful coups during the 1950s and 1960s that led to rotating juntas in many Arab countries. Except for the 1989 coup in the Sudan, and "palace coups" within the system such as the deposition of Bourguiba in Tunisia or of the ruler of Qatar by his son in 1995, this means of leadership adjustment has not been a feature of the Arab political landscape in the 1980s and 1990s.

 

Between 1945 and 1971, a period of 26 years, Syria had more than 20 changes of government. From 1971 to the present, another period of 26 years, it has had only one government, that of Hafiz al-Asad. From 1962 until 1978, Yemen had several coups and two presidents assassinated. Since Ali Abdullah Salih took over in 1978, Yemen has survived unification with former South Yemen and a brief civil war, but Salih remains in power. Iraq's series of coups from 1958 to 1968 has been followed by an unbroken, if hardly placid, rule by the Baath, and dominance by Saddam Hussein since 1979, though he was a powerful figure in the regime much earlier. Mauritania, torn by coups during the 1970s, has had the same leader since 1984.

 

Does this mean that the coup as a political instrument is a thing of the past in the Arab world, except perhaps for Sudan? That would certainly be a premature judgment, for only in a few cases (perhaps Yemen for example) has there been a genuine structural change. It is not some new political system that ended coups in Syria, but the strong personal leadership of Asad. And there have been no end of attempts against Saddam Hussein.

 

 

 

THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR

 

Another element to be considered in over most of the past quarter century, of the anticipation of the leadership changes that will occur over the next decade or two is the gap between the present leadership and the masses of their people.

 

It is a mistake to assume that Arab regimes are oblivious to public opinion, despite the fact that, rhetoric aside, no Arab country is currently a Western-style democracy. Even those with competitive parliamentary elections, opposition parties and a critical opposition press still have enormously powerful presidents and dominant ruling parties. But, with one or two exceptions, no Arab regime is immune to pressure from the street either. Public outrage, demonstrations and strikes can force even strict authoritarian governments to change policies. (The most obvious exception is Iraq, a garrison state where the regime has defiantly circled the wagons. But even Saddam Hussein takes pains to deflect the anger of his own people by blaming the United States for the privations Iraqis have had to endure since 1991).

 

If most regimes are vulnerable to pressures from the street, however, it is striking how different that street looks from the salons of the presidential or royal palaces. The leaders are men born in the 1920s, 1930s or 1940s. (Sheikh Hamad of Qatar, who overthrew his father in 1995, was born in 1950 and appears to be the only Arab leader born in the Fifties.) But in many Arab countries, half or more of the population is under 25 years of age, and in several, 40 percent is under 15. Men born in the 1930s and 1940s lead countries half of whose people were born in the 1970s and 1980s.

 

This can lead to some obvious differences of perspective. Egypt's aging leadership cadres may remember the 1952 revolution; the masses in the street are barely old enough to remember Anwar Sadat. Regimes celebrating great "revolutions" of the 1960s have trouble capturing the imaginations of people who do not remember the anticolonial struggle.

 

The dangers of this divergence between the aging leaderships and the young street may usefully be illustrated with two examples where a leadership crisis has already occurred and passed. Habib Bourguiba was the father of modem Tunisia, though some of the compatriots with whom he later fell out deserve credit as well. But Bourguiba, in effect, never outgrew the role of founding father. He ruled in an autocratic and, with age, increasingly capricious manner, a man of the colonial era who preferred French to Arabic and was an extreme secularist in an age of Islamic revivalism. By the time he was deposed in 1987, the hero of the 1950s was out of touch with his own country. While there are grounds for criticizing the successor regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, it has imparted a stability that was clearly lacking in the last years of Bourguiba.

 

Senility can strike not only leaders but institutions as well. The second illuminating example is the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. Having led the longest and most visible war of independence against a colonial power, transforming France in the process, the FLN soon became the sole ruling party in independent Algeria. There are few surprises in that. But Algeria became independent in 1962, 35 years ago. U.N. and other demographic figures generally agree that about 40 percent of Algeria's population today is under 15 years of age. For them, 1962 is a remote concept. Only about 4 percent of Algeria today is over 65 years of age, old enough to remember the whole eight-year struggle for independence as a major feature of their adult life. This goes far towards explaining why, by the time of the October 1988 riots, which began the processes that have led to the Algerian tragedy, there was so little real support left for the FLN. The party was still trading in the symbols and memories of the struggle with France. Its support was based mostly on patronage and power, not on any set of ideas; these had either be­ come historical relics or had failed entirely.

 

This is not to say that the Algerian failure (or for that matter the Tunisian success) will be repeated elsewhere. But it is a reminder of how out of touch old leaders, or old systems, can become.

 

 

 

SUCCESSION SCENARIOS

 

Another source of uncertainty is the question of who the successor will be. The monarchies, at least, have the advantage of an heir apparent, though sometimes his character and qualities are not well known. The republics are another matter, for presidents tend to mistrust any aide or vice president who becomes too prominent or too popular; therefore, heirs apparent are few. Possible succession scenarios for both the republics and the monarchies may be instructive.

 

There is, first of all, the curious emergence of what might be called republican primogeniture, in which the long-ruling leader seeks to promote his own son to succeed him. Saddam Hussein's indulgence of his son Udayy, and Hafiz al-Asad's fostering of the cult of first, his son Basil, and after Basil's 1994 death, of his son Bashar, are the obvious cases. (Bourguiba had toyed with the idea but fell out with his son long before he was willing to leave office.) These may prove ephemeral. Few people would expect Saddam Hussein to leave office normally, even if he were able to pass his mantle to a chosen successor. Since his serious wounding in an assassination attempt, Udayy's power might also be in question.

 

In the Syrian case, Bashar al-Asad's eagerness for power is not clear (he was trained as an ophthalmologist), and there are plenty of challengers waiting in the wings, some of them from his own family. Certainly the key Alawite generals and intelligence chiefs and the Asad family as a whole will play a role in any succession. When Asad was seriously ill in late 1983 and early 1984, his brother and other potential successors at the time took to the streets with their own private armies; the danger of some internal power struggle is still present (see Robinson in this issue).

 

Another case that prompts considerable speculation is Egypt. The most populous Arab country and vital for its strategic location, there is no obvious heir to Husni Mubarak. Though he seems healthy enough, the assassination attempt against him in Addis Ababa in 1995 reminded the world that unforeseen events can occur, and of course Mubarak himself came to power when Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981. The Egyptian constitution calls for the speaker of the National Assembly (parliament) to take over on an interim basis until that body chooses a new president. When Nasser died in 1970 and Sadat in 1981, the vice president was chosen to move up, though he does not automatically succeed under the constitution. Mubarak has never named a vice president. When Field Marshal Muhammad Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala was his defense minister, he was generally seen as a strong figure waiting in the wings. But Abu Ghazala was ousted from the Defense Ministry in 1989 and in later years suffered disgrace over a personal scandal.

 

Egyptians like to dismiss Western anxiety about succession by saying it concerns others a lot more than it does Egyptians. In part they are right, for most Egyptians assume that the establishment will take care of itself, and a military man or someone fronting for the military will take power. (All four of Egypt's presidents - Naguib, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak - came from military backgrounds.) That much is true enough, though Egyptians themselves were certainly shaken by the 1995 assassination attempt, and outside analysts or potential investors may be forgiven for preferring a bit more certain about who the successor might be. The dramatic shifts in policy that followed Sadat's assumption of power, and the less dramatic but real shifts that followed Mubarak's, are reminders that the personality of the leader does matter.

 

Another quasi-republic in the Arab world where there is no clear successor in sight is the Palestinian Authority. Yasser Arafat took over the PLO in 1968; he is now 68 and showing his years. When he reportedly fainted at a meeting in Cairo on September 19, 1997, Arab and Israeli press reports suggested that he is suffering from some serious ailment, perhaps Parkinson's disease. This has been denied by the Palestinian Authority, but it is a reminder that Arafat too is not immortal. He has plenty of critics and potential rivals but no clear successor.

 

Libya is another curious case. Since Muammar Qadhafi claims to hold no official office, in theory at least no successor is needed, but of course Qadhafi is in fact the leader of the country. Though only 55, his face looks somewhat haggard, and he has survived several assassination attempts, including a number of close calls. Analysts usually assume that one of the surviving original Free Officers who joined Qadhafi in the 1969 Revolution would succeed him, but they are dwindling in number and are often in eclipse or disfavor. The ups and downs of longtime second-in-command, Abdel Salam Jalloud, are notorious. There are also potent opposition forces within the country. Disarray, internal conflict or a coup by some now-unknown officer would certainly be possibilities if Qadhafi were removed from the scene.

 

Of the Arab republics, Yemen is particularly interesting because it is evolving a genuine multiparty system and has a vigorous press. It still has a powerful presidency, however, and President Ali Abdullah Salih is firmly in control. Should he be removed from the scene, the army, as in Egypt, would play a key, but perhaps not a visible, role in the selection of a successor.

 

Tunisia has, in a sense, already undergone its leadership crisis with the removal of Bourguiba in 1987. But Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, ten years in power as of November 7, 1997, is now a familiar figure in his own right. After Bourguiba, the constitution was amended to put an upper age limit of 70 on the president (at the time of his election), and Ben Ali still has nearly a decade to go before hitting it. The constitution as amended after Bourguiba also said that the president may only be "re-elected twice," apparently meaning a three-term limit. That would have Ben Ali leaving office in the first decade of the new century, but it may be worth noting that he has also recently moved to make it possible to amend the constitution through popular referendum.

 

The Lebanese political system was altered to allow President Elias Hrawi to continue in office, but in a real sense the key leaders (the Maronite president, Sunni prime minister and Shiite speaker of Parliament) are all kept in balance by the country's Syrian protectors (or overseers, depending on one's perspective). The question of whether Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri will remain in his post (he frequently threatens to quit) is probably more important to investors than the future of Hrawi. And of course the future of Syria will play a major role in the future of Lebanon.

 

Of the other Arab republics, it is rather difficult to prognosticate about Algeria. How (if?) the war there ends will determine the future of Algerian politics far more than any chosen successor to Liamine Zeroual. Sudan's leadership is in the midst of a civil war of a different sort, and subject to periodic coup attempts; it is likely that any change of government will be a violent one. Mauritania is experimenting with multiparty elections and even held a competitive presidential election, but the incumbent won easily; few Arabs, let alone Westerners, think very often about Mauritania.

 

The monarchies generally do not lend themselves to debate about who might succeed: all but one have heirs apparent.

 

Before turning to the other issues that need to be considered, let's have a look at the exception, Oman. Historically the Al Bu Said dynasty has tended to sort out succession issues through power struggles or deference to the strongest candidate. Sultan Qaboos, in power since 1970, has no children and is unlikely to have any. He is apparently healthy and may be around for a long time, but, after he was injured in a 1995 car crash that killed two key advisers, questions were naturally raised about succession. In 1996 the sultan introduced a new constitutional framework under which the sultan will leave a letter to the royal family recommending a successor. The royal family will then make a choice, or, if they cannot, the Defense Council will. In either case the sultan's recommendation will obviously play a role. Qaboos has not indicated who his choice would be, and there are several possibilities among the royal cousins.

 

The other monarchical cases are more clear cut. The earliest likely succession would seem to be in Saudi Arabia, where King Fahd briefly relinquished power to Crown Prince Abdullah in early 1996, then resumed it. Fahd is somewhat disabled since his stroke in late 1995. However, his remaining in power may have helped the other senior princes sort out the boundaries of authority for when Fahd does leave the throne. Crown Prince Abdullah's period as regent seems to have raised the hackles of Defense Minister Prince Sultan (one of Fahd's powerful full brothers) and others.

 

The real issue in the long term in Saudi Arabia is when and how the succession might pass to a younger generation. Abdullah is about the same age as Fahd, both men being in their late 70s. Sultan, considered next in line after Abdullah, is only a bit younger. Every king of Saudi Arabia since the 1950s has been a brother of the others. The next generation is already graying; the generation after that is already mature. Because old King Abdul Aziz "lbn Saud" had so many sons (most estimates are about 48), the present line of succession by younger brothers could still go on for some time. The younger princes will certainly press for more authority in the new century.

 

The smaller monarchies around the Gulf show less uncertainty about the future, which may be surprising, given a long history of troubled successions, of brothers fighting brothers and sons deposing fathers. In 1995 the crown prince in Qatar, Sheikh Hamad, overthrew his father, but peaceably; Hamad had been running the country anyway, and despite early attempts to get back his throne, the deposed ruler has now made his peace, more or less, with his son. Hamad, born in 1950, is young enough to rule for a long time, and he has designated one of his younger sons (not his eldest) as heir, Sheikh Jasim, only 19.

 

In the United Arab Emirates, the long illness of Sheikh Rashid of Dubai, prior to his death in 1991, gave his sons time to parcel out duties among themselves without having to engage in a rivalry after his death. Though Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, the oldest Arab leader at the moment, is still in charge, his sons, too, seem to have a stable relationship, and the succession should be smooth.

 

In both Bahrain and Kuwait, there seems little doubt that the existing crown princes will succeed. In Kuwait the heir is not the most popular member of the royal family, and there has been talk that he might give up the prime ministership while remaining crown prince. The various branches of the Sabah family maintain a delicate balance among themselves.

 

The two Arab monarchies outside the Arabian peninsula, Jordan and Morocco, are well known for the strong personal leadership of their kings. Both have also sought to strengthen their parliaments in recent years, perhaps as an additional legitimization measure for their thrones. In the Jordanian case, Crown Prince Hassan is a highly visible and well-known figure in the West, one with whom foreign leaders are used to dealing. But is he as strong a leader as his brother, King Hussein? There is also a lingering possibility that the king might name one of his sons as his heir in place of his brother, though he has not moved to do this (and the eldest son has an English mother, a possible complication). King Hussein's cancer, despite his apparent recovery, has kept the succession question alive. Hassan would clearly succeed if Hussein were to die soon. The questions have more to do with the longer term, given the fact that the Hashemite throne is a recent, British-colonial-era creation and that Hussein's success stems from his own talent rather than from any deep sense of the legitimacy of the throne.

 

Morocco, on the other hand, is ruled by a dynasty with deep roots. Still, Hassan II had to survive various coup attempts and assassination plots to reach the security he enjoys today, and given various social, demographic and labor problems, there is a sense among many Morocco analysts that the country may see considerable change in the next few years. When Hassan II came down with pneumonia two years ago during the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, his heir, Sidi Muhammad, substituted for his father, and he has also been making high-profile visits to Western countries. Sidi Muhammad has had something of a playboy reputation, but so did Hassan II before his accession, and, for that matter, so do several reigning monarchs elsewhere. Morocco has had two very strong kings since independence, in Muhammad V and Hassan II, and theirs will be difficult shoes to fill. Hassan has moved to create a bicameral legislature and to encourage opposition representation in Parliament, apparently hoping to strengthen the institutional legitimacy of the throne before he leaves the scene.

 

I do not guarantee my crystal ball in any of these scenarios, but over the next 10 to 20 years (in some cases perhaps much sooner) the familiar Arab heads of state, with whom the United States has been dealing for eight presidential terms, will pass from the scene. Their populations have already greatly changed. Every issue facing the region generally - peace with Israel, political Islam, and the politics of water, economic development and democratization - will be intertwined with that inevitable generational change. While many analysts have rightly rejected the tendency to predict imminent change in, for example, Egypt or Saudi Arabia, even in those countries younger men will be in place by the second decade of the new century. Events such as Iran's revolution and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have been embarrassing reminders of the inability of outsiders to predict the future; but leaders are not immortal, no matter how durable their regimes.

Maykl Kollinz Dann

Doktor Dann 1989 yildan beri har ikki yilda bir marta chiqadigan islom dunyosining siyosiy va xavfsizlik ma'lumotlarini tahlil qiluvchi "The Estimate" gazetasining muharriri va " The International Estimate, Inc." kompaniyasining Vashingtondagi maslahatchisi. U Jorjtaun va Utah shtatlaridagi universitetlarda dars bergan va Yaqin Sharq va Islom masalalari, shu jumladan xavf tahlili bo'yicha keng ma'ruzalar va ma'ruzalar qilgan.  

Yaqin Sharq ko'pincha beqaror mintaqa deb ta'riflanadi, ammo bu umuman tuzumning saqlanib qolishi nuqtai nazaridan aniq emas. 25 yil oldin bo'lib o'tgan Arab sammitida bugun qatnashadigan bir nechta yuzlar bo'lishi mumkin edi. Arab dunyosidagi ko'plab rahbarlarning uzoq vaqt xizmat qilishlari va ularning rejimlarining barqarorligi (oldingi tarixga xos emas), ularning tabiiy o'limi va mintaqadagi dramatik demografik siljishlar keyingi 10-20 yil ichida deyarli bir davr bo'lishiga kafolat beradi. arab dunyosidagi keskin o'zgarish.

 

Razvedka tahlilchilari va siyosiy xavfni baholovchilar ko'pincha ma'lum bir mamlakatda huquqiy vorislik muammolari to'g'risida fikr yuritadilar. Faqat bir nechta istisnolardan tashqari, hozirgi hukmron elita qarib qolganligi sababli, keyingi 20 yil ichida deyarli har bir arab davlatida uning konstitutsion tuzilishi yoki siyosiy evolyutsiyasidan qat'i nazar, rahbariyat o'zgarishi shart . Bir avlod avlodining inqilobi muqarrar, garchi uning vaqtini va xususiyatlarini aniq aniqlashning iloji bo'lmasa ham. Bu deyarli har bir arab davlatiga va boshqa barcha masalalarga, iqtisodiy rivojlanishdan siyosiy liberallashtirishga qadar, islomiy siyosatga qadar, ta'sir qiladi, ammo bu yo'llar mamlakatdan farq qiladi, ammo e'tiborga olinmaydi.  

 

Arab dunyosini juda keksa odamlar boshqarmaydi, hech bo'lmaganda Sharqiy Osiyo me'yorlari; bular xitoycha uslubdagi gerontokratlar emas. Ammo hozirda etakchilarning salmoqli qismi 60 yoshdan 60 yillarning o'rtalarigacha, ayrimlarining sog'lig'i shubhali. Haqiqiy masala nafaqat yoshi, balki ularning qoidalarining mustahkamligi bilan bog'liq. Ko'pgina arab yoshlarining aksariyati, ularning mamlakatlari hozirgi zamonnikidan boshqacharoq etakchilik qilgan vaqtni eslay olmaydilar. Iordaniya qiroli Xuseyn 1953 yildan beri, 1961 yildan beri Marokash qiroli Xassan II taxtni egallab kelmoqda. Shuningdek, uzoq vaqtdan beri mavjud bo'lgan respublika rahbarlari ham bor: Hafiz al-Asad 1971 yildan beri Suriyani boshqarib keladi (va 1970 yildan beri samarali ishlaydi). Liviya rahbari Muammar Qadhafi, mintaqa marta enfant dahshatli, o'tish arbobi sifatida ba'zi tomonidan tugatilgan marta Misr 1969 Husni Muborak buyon joyda bo'ldi, besh yil uzoq Anvar Sadat hukmronligi ko'ra, 16 yil davomida prezident bo'lgan va tez orada uchun qilgan Gamal Abdel Nasserdan ustun keldi.    

 

Albatta, uzoq vaqt xizmat qilishda hech qanday yomon narsa yo'q va tashqi kuzatuvchilarning ko'plari (do'st hukumatlar, potentsial sarmoyadorlar va boshqalar) uchun barqarorlik va etakchilikning davomiyligi asosiy omillardir. Shubhasiz, hech bir AQSh siyosatdori yoki xalqaro biznesmeni Xuseyn yoki King Xasan sahnani tark etish kunini kutishmaydi. Ammo oxir-oqibat ular erishadilar.

 

Hozirgi paytda katta asrning o'zi biron bir mamlakatda katta muammo emas, chunki u 1987 yilda Xabib Burguibani Tunis prezidenti lavozimidan chetlatilganidan beri, u rasman 84 yoshda bo'lgan, ammo ehtimol bir necha yosh katta bo'lgan bir paytda. Hozirgi paytda u qadar ojiz bo'lgan arab rahbarlari yo'q, garchi qirol Faxdning urishi Saudiya qirolining faoliyatini cheklab qo'ygan va vorislik jarayonining boshlanishini harakatga keltirgan. Ayni paytda arablarning eng keksa rahbari Abu-Dabi hokimi va Birlashgan Arab Amirliklarining prezidenti, kelasi yili 80 yoshga to'ladigan shayx Zayddir. Keyingi ikki yoki uch yil ichida bir qator rahbarlar soni 70ga etadi: Asad, Hassan, Muborak va Yasser Arafat.

 

Hozirgi vaqtda arab rejimlarining uzoq umr ko'rishlari uchun bir nechta sabablar mavjud (va ular har xil mamlakatda farq qiladi). Albatta, monarxiyalarda bitta hukmdor umrining ko'pi yoki ko'p qismi uchun xizmat qilishini kutadi. Ko'pgina arab respublikalarida bu ham prezidentlar uchun odat tusiga kirgan, chunki nafaqada aniq merosxo'rlik va xavfsizlik kafolatlanmagan. Bu hozirgi rahbariyat avlodlarining ko'pchiligi hokimiyatga nisbatan yosh bo'lganligi bilan birlashdi. Qaddafiy 27 yoshida Liviyada hokimiyat tepasiga keldi va yaqinda u inqilobning yigirma sakkiz yilligini nishonladi: faqatgina 50-yillarning o'rtalarida u umrining yarmidan ko'prog'ida o'z mamlakatini boshqargan. Qirol Xuseyn, 45 yillik hokimiyat tepasiga kelganida, atigi 62 yoshda.

 

Bunga 1950-1960 yillardagi ko'plab muvaffaqiyatli davlat to'ntarishlarining yo'qligi, ko'plab arab mamlakatlarida juntalarning aylanishiga olib kelgan. 1989 yildagi Sudandagi to'ntarish va "Saroy to'ntarishlari", masalan, Tunisda Burguibani tortib olish yoki Qatarda 1995 yilda uning o'g'li tomonidan hokimiyat tepasiga tushishi bundan mustasno, bu rahbarlikni o'zgartirish vositasi arablarga xos bo'lmagan. 1980 va 1990 yillarda siyosiy manzara.

 

1945-1971 yillarda 26 yil ichida Suriyada 20 dan ortiq hukumat o'zgarishi yuz berdi. 1971 yildan to hozirgi 26 yilgacha Hofiz al-Asadning bitta hukumati bor edi. 1962 yildan 1978 yilgacha Yamanda bir nechta davlat to'ntarishlari bo'lgan va ikkita prezident o'ldirilgan. Ali Abdulloh Solih 1978 yilda hokimiyat tepasiga kelganidan beri Yaman sobiq Yaman bilan birlashuvdan va qisqa muddatli fuqarolik urushidan omon qoldi, ammo Solih hokimiyatda qolmoqda. 1958 yildan 1968 yilgacha Iroqda amalga oshirilgan davlat to'ntarishlari ketidan, agar tinch bo'lsa, Baas tomonidan boshqarilgan va 1979 yildan beri Saddam Xuseyn hukmronlik qilgan. 70-yillarda davlat to'ntarishlari natijasida yirtilgan Mavritaniya 1984 yildan beri xuddi shu rahbarga ega edi.

 

Bu shuni anglatadiki, to'ntarish siyosiy vosita sifatida arab dunyosidagi o'tmishdagi voqealardir, ehtimol Sudandan tashqari. Bu, albatta, muddatidan oldin hukm bo'lishi mumkin, chunki bir necha holatlarda (ehtimol Yamanda) haqiqiy tarkibiy o'zgarishlar yuz berdi. Bu Suriyadagi to'ntarishni tugatgan yangi siyosiy tizim emas, Asadning kuchli shaxsiy rahbarligi. Saddam Husaynga qarshi qilingan urinishlarning oxiri yo'q edi .  

 

 

 

DEMOGRAFIK FAKT

 

So'nggi chorak asrning ko'p qismida ko'rib chiqilishi kerak bo'lgan yana bir element, keyingi o'n-ikki yilda sodir bo'ladigan etakchilik o'zgarishini kutish. Hozirgi rahbariyat bilan ularning xalqi orasidagi tafovut.

 

Hozirgi paytda ritorikani hisobga olganda, hech bir arab mamlakati G'arb uslubidagi demokratiya emasligiga qaramay, arab rejimlari jamoatchilik fikrini e'tiborsiz deb taxmin qilish xato. Hatto raqobatbardosh parlament saylovlarida ham, muxolifat partiyalarida va tanqidiy muxolifat matbuotida hamon ulkan qudratli prezidentlar va hukmron partiyalar mavjud. Ammo, bitta yoki ikkita istisnosiz, hech bir arab rejimi ham ko'chada bo'lgan bosimga qarshi emas. Ommaviy noroziliklar, namoyishlar va ish tashlashlar hatto qat'iy avtoritar hukumatlarni ham siyosatni o'zgartirishga majbur qilishi mumkin. (Aniq istisno - bu rejim vagonlarni aylanib o'tgan Iroq, garnizon shtati. Ammo Saddam Xusseyn o'z xalqining g'azabini bosish uchun og'riqni boshdan kechirmoqda. AQShni iroqliklar 1991 yildan beri davom etayotgan xususiylashtirishda ayblashmoqda. .

 

Agar aksariyat rejimlar ko'chadagi tazyiqlarga duchor bo'lishsa, u holda bu ko'cha prezident yoki qirol saroylarining salonlaridan qanchalik farq qilishi ajablanarli. Rahbarlar 1920, 1930 yoki 1940 yillarda tug'ilgan erkaklardir. (1995 yilda otasini taxtdan ag'dargan Qatarlik shayx Hamad, 1950 yilda tug'ilgan va ellikinchi yillarda tug'ilgan yagona arab lideri.) Ammo ko'plab arab mamlakatlarida aholining yarmi yoki undan ko'prog'i 25 yoshdan kichiklar. 19-30 va 1940 yillarda tug'ilgan erkaklar etakchi mamlakatlar bo'lib, ularning yarmi 1970-1980 yillarda tug'ilgan odamlar bo'lgan.

 

Bu nuqtai nazarning aniq bir-biridan farqlanishiga olib kelishi mumkin. Misrning keksa etakchilik kadrlari 1952 yilgi inqilobni eslaydilar; ko'chadagi odamlar Anvar Sadatni eslash uchun zo'rg'a qadimgi. 60-yillardagi katta "inqiloblarni" nishonlaydigan rejimlar antikolonik kurashni eslamagan odamlarning tasavvurlarini tortib olishga qiynalmoqda.

 

Qarama-qarshi rahbarlar va yosh ko'chalar o'rtasidagi bu tafovutni, etakchilik inqirozi ro'y bergan va o'tgan ikki misol bilan foydali tarzda ko'rsatish mumkin. Xabib Burguiba Tunisning zamonaviy otasi edi, ammo keyinchalik u bilan birga qolgan ba'zi vatandoshlar ham maqtovga loyiq. Ammo, Borgiba, hech qachon asoschi otaning rolini oshirmagan. U avtokratik va yoshi bilan tobora injiqlik bilan boshqargan, mustamlaka davridagi odam, fransuzchani arabchadan afzal ko'rgan va islomiy uyg'onish davrida ekstremal ilmoniy bo'lgan. U 1987 yilda hokimiyatdan chetlatilgan paytda, 1950 yillarning qahramoni o'z mamlakati bilan aloqada bo'lmagan. Prezident Zine El Abidin Ben Alining vorisi rejimini tanqid qilish uchun asoslar mavjud bo'lsa-da, bu Borguyaning so'nggi yillarida aniq bo'lmagan barqarorlikni keltirib chiqardi.

 

Nogironlik nafaqat rahbarlarga, balki muassasalarga ham ta'sir qilishi mumkin. Ikkinchi yorituvchi misol - Jazoirdagi Milliy ozodlik fronti (FLN). Mustamlaka kuchiga qarshi eng uzoq va ko'zga ko'rinadigan mustaqillik urushini olib borgan va Frantsiyani bu jarayonda o'zgartirgan FLN tez orada mustaqil Jazoirda yagona hukmron partiya bo'ldi. Bunda kutilmagan hodisalar kam. Ammo Jazoir 35 yil oldin 1962 yilda mustaqil bo'ldi. Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti va boshqa demografik raqamlar bugungi kunda Jazoir aholisining qariyb 40 foizini 15 yoshdan kichiklar tashkil etadi. Ular uchun 1962 yil uzoq tushuncha. Bugungi kunda Jazoirning atigi 4 foizi 65 yoshdan katta bo'lib, mustaqillik uchun sakkiz yillik kurashni kattalar hayotining muhim belgisi sifatida eslashga qodir. Bu nima uchun 1988 yil oktyabr oyida Jazoir fojeasiga olib kelgan jarayonlarni boshlagan g'alayonlar paytida FLN uchun real yordam qolmaganligini tushuntirishga to'g'ri keladi. Partiya hanuzgacha Frantsiya bilan kurashning ramzlari va xotiralarida savdo qilar edi. Uni qo'llab-quvvatlash g'oyalarning har qanday to'plamiga emas, balki asosan homiylik va kuchga asoslangan edi; Bu ikkalasi ham bo'lgan tarixiy qoldiqlarni keltiring yoki umuman muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi.  

 

Bu Jazoir muvaffaqiyatsizligi (yoki bu uchun Tunis muvaffaqiyati) boshqa joyda takrorlanadi degani emas. Ammo bu eski rahbarlar yoki eski tizimlar qanday aloqada bo'lishi mumkinligini eslatib turadi.

 

 

 

MUVAFFAQIYAT SENATLARI

 

Noma'lumlikning yana bir manbai - bu voris kim bo'ladi degan savol. Monarxiyalar, hech bo'lmaganda, vorisning afzalliklariga ega, ammo ba'zida uning xarakteri va fazilatlari yaxshi ma'lum emas. Respublikalar - bu boshqa masala, chunki prezidentlar har qanday yordamchiga yoki vitse-prezidentga ishonmaydilar, chunki ular juda obro'li yoki juda mashhur; shuning uchun, vorislarning ko'rinadiganlari juda oz. Ham respublika, ham monarxlar uchun vorislikning ehtimoliy stsenariylari foydali bo'lishi mumkin.

 

Birinchidan, uzoq vaqt hukmron bo'lgan rahbar o'z o'g'lining o'rnini egallashga intilayotgan respublikaviy primogenizatsiya deb ataladigan narsaning qiziquvchanligi. Saddam Husaynning o'g'li Udayi bilan beparvolik va Hafiz al-Asad birinchi bo'lib, uning o'g'li Bazilga sig'inishini qo'llab-quvvatlashi, 1994 yilda Bazilning vafotidan so'ng uning o'g'li Basharga bo'lgan munosabati yaqqol misoldir. (Bourguiba bu g'oyani o'ylab topdi, lekin o'g'lidan u iste'foga chiqmoqchi bo'lganida ancha oldin chiqib ketdi.) Bu vaqtinchalik bo'lishi mumkin. Saddam Xusseyn o'z lavozimini an'anaviy tanlangan vorisiga topshirishga qodir bo'lsa ham, uning odatdagi lavozimidan ketishini kutadigan odamlar kam. Uning suiqasd paytida jiddiy jarohat olgani sababli, Udayining kuchi ham shubhali bo'lishi mumkin.

 

Suriyadagi vaziyatda Bashar Asadning hokimiyatga intilishi aniq emas (u oftalmolog sifatida o'qitilgan) va qanotlarda ko'plab raqiblar bor, ularning ba'zilari o'z oilasidan. Shubhasiz, alaviylarning asosiy generallari va razvedka rahbarlari va Asad oilasi har qanday merosxo'rlikda rol o'ynaydi. 1983 yil oxirida va 1984 yil boshida Asad jiddiy kasal bo'lganida, uning akasi va boshqa potentsial vorislari o'zlarining shaxsiy armiyalari bilan ko'chaga chiqishgan; ba'zi bir ichki kuchlar kurashining xavfi hanuzgacha mavjud (ushbu sonda Robinsonga qarang).

 

Misrda ko'p mish-mishlar paydo bo'lishiga olib keladigan yana bir holat. Arablarning eng ko'p aholisi bo'lgan va strategik joylashuvi uchun muhim bo'lgan Husni Muborakning aniq merosxo'ri yo'q. Garchi u etarlicha sog'lom bo'lsa-da, 1995 yilda Addis-Abebada unga qilingan suiqasd, kutilmagan voqealar yuz berishi mumkinligini dunyoga eslatdi va, albatta, Muborakning o'zi 1981 yilda Anvar Sadat o'ldirilganida hokimiyatga kelgan. Misr konstitutsiyasi spikerni chaqiradi. Muvaqqat asosda Milliy Majlis (parlament) ushbu organ yangi prezidentni saylamaguncha. Nasser 1970 yilda vafot etganida 1981 yilda va Sadat 1981 yilda vitse-prezident lavozimiga tayinlangan, garchi u avtomatik ravishda Konstitutsiya bo'yicha muvaffaqiyat qozonmasa. Muborak hech qachon vitse-prezidentni tayinlamagan. Dala marshali Muhammad Abdel Halim Abu G'azala uning mudofaa vaziri bo'lganida, u odatda qanotlarda kutib turgan kuchli shaxs sifatida ko'rilgan. Ammo Abu G'azalo 1989 yilda Mudofaa vazirligidan chetlatilgan va keyingi yillarda shaxsiy janjal tufayli sharmandalikka uchragan.

 

Misrliklar G'arbning vorislik haqidagi xavotirini, misrliklarnikidan ko'proq, boshqalarga nisbatan ko'proq tashvishlanishini rad etishni yaxshi ko'radilar. Qisman ular haqdir, chunki ko'pchilik misrliklar muassasa o'z-o'zidan ish olib boradi, harbiy xizmatchi yoki armiya tarafdorlari hokimiyatni o'z qo'llariga olishadi deb taxmin qilishadi. (Misrning to'rtala prezidenti - Naguib, Nosir, Sadat va Muborak - harbiy kelib chiqishi.) Bu juda to'g'ri, garchi 1995 yildagi suiqasd misrliklar o'zlarini larzaga keltirgan bo'lsa, tashqi tahlilchilar yoki potentsial investorlarni afzal ko'rganlari uchun kechirilishi mumkin. voris kim bo'lishi mumkinligi haqida biroz aniqroq. Sadatning hokimiyat tepasiga kelganidan keyin yuz bergan keskin o'zgarishlar va Muborakning orqasida bo'lgan dramatik, ammo haqiqiy siljishlar rahbarning shaxsiyati muhim ahamiyatga ega ekanligini eslatib turadi.

 

Arab dunyosidagi yana bir kvaz respublika - Falastin ma'muriyati. Yasser Arafat PLOni 1968 yilda egalladi; u hozir 68 yoshda va o'z yillarini ko'rsatmoqda. 1997 yil 19 sentyabrda u Qohiradagi yig'ilishda hushidan ketganida, arab va Isroil matbuoti uning jiddiy kasallik, ehtimol Parkinson kasalligi bilan og'riganligi haqida xabar tarqatgan. Buni Falastin ma'muriyati rad etdi, ammo Arafatning ham o'lmas emasligi eslatilmoqda. Uning tanqidchilari va potentsial raqiblari ko'p, ammo aniq vorisi yo'q.

 

Liviya yana bir qiziq ish. Muammar Qaddafiy hech qanday rasmiy lavozimga ega emasligini da'vo qilganligi sababli, nazariyada hech qanday vorisning keragi yo'q, lekin albatta Qaddafiy mamlakat rahbaridir. Atigi 55 yoshda bo'lishiga qaramay, uning yuzi xiyol xunuk bo'lib, u bir necha suiqasd urinishlaridan, shu qatorda yaqin qo'ng'iroqlardan ham omon qolgan. Tahlilchilar odatda 1969 yilda inqilobda Qaddafiyga qo'shilgan omon qolgan asl ozod ofitserlardan biri uning o'rnini egallashadi deb taxmin qilmoqdalar, ammo ular soni kamaymoqda va ko'pincha tushkunlikka tushmoqdalar. Ikkinchi guruh qo'mondoni Abdel Salam Jalludning ko'tarilishlari pastga tushadi. Mamlakat ichida kuchli muxolifat kuchlari ham mavjud. Agar Qaddafiy voqea joyidan olib tashlansa, tartibsizliklar, ichki mojarolar yoki ba'zi noma'lum bir ofitser tomonidan to'ntarish bo'lishi mumkin.

 

Arab respublikalari orasida Yaman ayniqsa qiziq, chunki u ko'p partiyaviylik tizimini rivojlantirmoqda va kuchli matbuotga ega. Ammo u hali ham kuchli prezidentlikka ega va Prezident Ali Abdulloh Solih qat'iy nazoratga ega. Agar u voqea joyidan olib tashlansa, armiya, Misrda bo'lgani kabi, vorisni tanlashda muhim, ammo ko'rinmaydigan rol o'ynaydi.

 

Tunis, qaysidir ma'noda, 1987 yilda Burgibayni hokimiyatdan chetlatish bilan etakchilik inqirozini boshdan kechirgan. Ammo Zayn El Abidin Ben Ali, 1997 yil 7 noyabrda o'n yil hokimiyatda bo'lgan va endi u o'zining taniqli shaxsidir. Borguibadan so'ng, konstitutsiyaga prezidentning yoshi 70 dan yuqori bo'lishi belgilandi (u saylanganda) va Ben Ali uni urishdan oldin deyarli o'n yil yurishi kerak. Borguibadan keyin Konstitutsiyaga kiritilgan o'zgartishlar, shuningdek, prezidentning "faqat ikki marta qayta saylanishi" mumkinligini aytdi, bu, ehtimol, uch yillik chegarani anglatadi. Bu yangi asrning birinchi o'n yilligida Ben Ali iste'foga chiqishiga olib keladi, lekin shuni ta'kidlash kerakki, u yaqinda xalq referendumi orqali konstitutsiyaga o'zgartirish kiritishga imkon yaratdi.

 

Livandagi siyosiy tizim prezident Elias Xroiga o'z lavozimini davom ettirishiga imkon berish uchun o'zgartirildi, ammo haqiqiy ma'noda asosiy rahbarlar (Maronit prezidenti, sunniy bosh vazir va shia parlamentining spikeri) barchasi mamlakatning Suriyadagi himoyachilari tomonidan muvozanatda. nozirlar, kimningdir nuqtai nazariga qarab). Bosh vazir Rafiq Xaririy o'z lavozimida qoladimi yoki yo'qmi degan savol (u tez-tez iste'foga chiqish bilan tahdid qiladi), ehtimol Xrawining kelajagidan ko'ra investorlar uchun muhimroq. Albatta Livanning kelajagi uchun Suriyaning kelajagi katta rol o'ynaydi.

 

Boshqa arab respublikalaridan Jazoir haqida bashorat qilish juda qiyin. Qanday qilib (agar?) Urush tugashi Liamine Zeroualning tanlangan vorisidan ko'ra ko'proq Jazoir siyosatining kelajagini belgilaydi. Sudan rahbariyati turli xil fuqarolik urushi ichida va davriy to'ntarish tashabbuslariga duchor bo'lgan; Hukumatning har qanday o'zgarishi shafqatsiz bo'lishi ehtimoldan holi emas. Mavritaniya ko'p partiyaviy saylovlar bilan tajriba o'tkazmoqda va hatto raqobatbardosh prezidentlik saylovini o'tkazdi, ammo amaldagi prezident osongina g'alaba qozondi; G'arbiylardan tashqari ozgina arablar, Mavritaniya haqida juda ko'p o'ylashadi.

 

Odatda monarxiyalar kimning muvaffaqiyatga erishishi mumkinligi to'g'risida bahslashish uchun qarz bermaydilar: barchasidan bittasi aniq merosxo'rlarga ega.

 

Ko'rib chiqilishi kerak bo'lgan boshqa masalalarga murojaat qilishdan oldin, istisnoni ko'rib chiqaylik, Ummon. Tarixan Al Bu Saidlar sulolasi merosxo'rlik masalalarini hokimiyat kurashlari yoki eng kuchli nomzodga bo'lgan hurmat orqali hal qilishga harakat qilgan. 1970 yildan beri hokimiyatda bo'lgan Sulton Qabusning bolasi yo'q va u bunday bo'lishi ehtimoldan uzoq. U, ehtimol, sog'lom va uzoq vaqt atrofida bo'lishi mumkin, ammo 1995 yilda ikki asosiy maslahatchini o'ldirgan avtohalokatda jarohat olganidan keyin vorislik haqida savol tug'ildi. 1996 yilda sulton yangi konstitutsiyaviy asosni joriy qildi, unga binoan podshoh oilasiga merosxo'rni tavsiya qiluvchi xat qoldiradi. Shunda qirol oilasi qaror qabul qiladi yoki agar ular imkoni bo'lmasa, Mudofaa kengashi qaror qiladi. Ikkala holatda ham sultonning tavsiyasi aniq rol o'ynaydi. Qabus uning tanlovi kim bo'lishini ko'rsatmagan va qirol amakivachchalari orasida bir nechta imkoniyatlar mavjud.

 

Boshqa monarxiya holatlari yanada aniqroq. Eng avvalgi vorislik Saudiya Arabistonida bo'lib tuyulishi mumkin, u erda qirol Faxd taxtga o'tirgan knyaz Abdullohni 1996 yil boshida qisqartirgan va keyin qayta boshlagan. Fahd 1995 yil oxirida jarohat olganidan beri bir oz nogiron bo'lib qolgan. Ammo uning hokimiyatda qolishi boshqa yuqori martabali knyazlarga Faxd taxtdan qachon chiqib ketishi uchun hokimiyat chegaralarini ajratishga yordam bergan bo'lishi mumkin. Valiahd shahzoda Abdullohning regent davri Mudofaa vaziri shahzoda Sulton (Fahdning kuchli to'la aka-ukalaridan biri) va boshqalarning ishg'olini kuchaytirganga o'xshaydi.

 

Saudiya Arabistonida uzoq muddatli istiqbolda haqiqiy masala vorislik yosh avlodga qachon va qanday o'tishi kerak. Abdulloh Fahd bilan bir yoshda, ikkalasi ham 70 yoshga kirgan. Abdullohdan keyingi o'rinda turadigan Sulton biroz yoshroq. Saudiya Arabistonining 1950-yillardagi har bir qiroli boshqalarning ukasi bo'lgan. Keyingi avlod allaqachon kulrang; undan keyingi avlod allaqachon voyaga etgan. Qadimgi qirol Abdul Aziz "lubn Saud" ning o'g'illari juda ko'p bo'lganligi sababli (aksariyat taxminlar 48 ga yaqin), hozirgi yosh aka-ukalarning vorisliklari hali ham bir muncha davom etishi mumkin edi. Yangi asrda yangi knyazlar ko'proq hokimiyat uchun harakat qiladilar.

 

Ko'rfaz atrofidagi kichik monarxiyalar kelajakka nisbatan noaniqliklarni namoyon qilmoqdalar. Bu ajablanarli bo'lishi mumkin, chunki uzoq davom etgan muammoli merosxo'rlar, aka-uka urishayotgan aka-ukalar va otalarni tashlab yuborgan o'g'illari. 1995 yilda Qatarda toj shahzodasi Shayx Hamad otasini ag'darib tashladi, lekin tinchlik bilan; Hamad baribir mamlakatni boshqargan va taxtini qaytarishga avvaldan qilingan urinishlarga qaramay, hokimiyatdan ag'darilgan hokim endi o'g'li bilan tinchlik o'rnatdi. 1950 yilda tug'ilgan Hamad uzoq vaqt hukmronlik qilishga qodir va u o'zining kichik o'g'illaridan birini (katta emas) faqat 19 yoshda bo'lgan shayx Jasimga merosxo'r qilib tayinlagan.

 

Birlashgan Arab Amirliklarida, shayx Rashidning uzoq davom etgan kasalligi, 1991 yilda vafotidan oldin, uning o'g'illariga vafotidan keyin raqobatga aralashmasdan o'z vazifalarini bajarishga vaqt berdi. Garchi hozirgi vaqtda eng qadimgi arab yetakchisi Abu-Dabidan bo'lgan shayx Zayid boshqarayotgan bo'lsa-da, uning o'g'illari ham barqaror munosabatlarga ega va vorislik muammosiz bo'lishi kerak.

 

Bahraynda ham, Quvaytda ham mavjud toj knyazlarining muvaffaqiyatga erishishiga shubha yo'q. Quvaytda merosxo'r qirol oilasining eng mashhur a'zosi emas va u shahzoda qolgan paytda bosh vazirlikdan voz kechishi mumkinligi haqida gap-so'zlar tarqalgan. Sabah oilasining turli xil shoxlari o'zaro nozik muvozanatni saqlaydilar.

 

Arabiston yarim orolidan tashqaridagi ikki Arab monarxiyasi, Iordaniya va Marokash o'z shohlarining kuchli shaxsiy rahbarligi bilan mashhur. Ikkalasi ham so'nggi yillarda o'z parlamentlarini kuchaytirishga harakat qilishdi, ehtimol ularning taxtlarini legallashtirish uchun qo'shimcha chora sifatida. Iordaniya ishida, valiahd shahzoda Hassan G'arbda juda ko'zga ko'ringan va taniqli shaxs bo'lib, u bilan chet el rahbarlari muomalada bo'lishgan. Ammo u ukasi King Xuseyn kabi kuchli etakchimi? Qirol o'z o'g'llaridan birini akasi o'rniga merosxo'r deb nomlashi mumkin, lekin u buni qilishga harakat qilmagan (va katta o'g'lining ingliz onasi bor, bu asorat bo'lishi mumkin). Qirol Xuseynning saraton kasalligi, uning davolanishiga qaramasdan, vorislik masalasini hal qilishda davom etdi. Agar Xuseyn yaqinda vafot etsa, Xassan muvaffaqiyat qozonishi mumkin edi. Savollarning uzoqroq muddatga aloqasi bor , chunki Hoshimiylar taxti yaqinda Britaniya tomonidan mustamlaka qilingan davrda yaratilgan va Xuseynning muvaffaqiyati taxtning qonuniyligini har qanday chuqur ma'nosida emas, balki o'zining iste'dodiga bog'liq.

 

O'z navbatida, Marokashni chuqur ildizlarga ega bo'lgan sulola boshqaradi. Shunday bo'lsa-da, Hassan II bugungi kunda xavfsizlikka erishish uchun turli xil to'ntarish tashabbuslari va suiqasd fitnalaridan omon qolishi kerak edi va turli xil ijtimoiy, demografik va mehnat muammolarini hisobga olgan holda, ko'plab marokashlik tahlilchilar orasida mamlakat keyingi bir necha yil ichida sezilarli o'zgarishlarni ko'rishlari mumkin. yillar. Ikki yil oldin Hasan II pnevmoniya bilan kasallanganida, Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining ellik yilligi paytida otasi o'rnini Sidi Muhammad egalladi va u G'arb mamlakatlariga yuqori martabali tashriflarni amalga oshirdi. Sidi Muhammadning o'ynoqi obro'si bor edi, ammo Xassan II qo'shilishidan oldin ham shunday qilgan va shu sababli boshqa joylarda hukmronlik qiladigan bir necha monarxlar ham shunday qilishgan. Marokash mustaqillikka erishganidan beri ikkita kuchli qirolga ega bo'lgan, Muhammad V va Xassan II-da, va ularning oyoq kiyimlarini to'ldirish qiyin bo'ladi. Hassan, sahnadan chiqib ketishidan oldin taxtning institutsional qonuniyligini kuchaytirishga umid qilib, ikki palatali qonunchilikni yaratishga va parlamentdagi muxolifat vakillarini rag'batlantirishga o'tdi.

 

Men ushbu stsenariylarning har qandayida kristalli to'pimni kafolatlamayman, ammo keyingi 10-20 yil ichida (ba'zi holatlarda, ehtimol tezroq) AQSh sakkiz marta prezidentlik muddatini o'tkazgan arab davlatlari rahbarlari bilan uchrashadi. voqea joyidan o'tish. Ularning aholisi allaqachon ancha o'zgargan. Umuman mintaqa oldida turgan har bir masala - Isroil bilan tinchlik, siyosiy Islom va suv, iqtisodiy rivojlanish va demokratlashtirish siyosati muqarrar avlod o'zgarishi bilan chambarchas bog'liqdir. Garchi Misr yoki Saudiya Arabistonidagi o'zgarishlarni bashorat qilish tendentsiyasini ko'plab tahlilchilar to'g'ri rad etishgan bo'lsa-da, hatto ushbu mamlakatlarda yosh yigitlar yangi asrning ikkinchi o'n yilligiga qadar bo'lishadi. Eron inqilobi va Iroqning Quvaytga bostirib kirishi kabi voqealar tashqi odamlarning kelajakni bashorat qila olmasligini eslatib qo'ydi; ammo rahbarlar, ularning rejimlari qanchalik bardoshli bo'lishidan qat'i nazar, o'lmas emaslar.