Renegotiating Identities and Cultural Legacies Chapter Twelve Be(com)ing Uzbek

The Ideology of National Independence
Post-Soviet Uzbekistan rapidly and effectively built a state-sponsored discourse to replace the discredited Marxist-Leninist ideology, with the goal of preventing an “ideological vacuum.” It aimed to neutralize any external influence that could divide the country, whether Islamic, ethnonationalist, or Western liberal democratic. The Uzbek regime maintained the previous epistemological perception that ideology is not only above politics, but is also objective and neutral because it is based on uncontestable realities. The communist-era rhetoric of class struggle has been replaced by a discourse that viewed the new state as the natural culmination of the Uzbek nation’s century-old drive for independence. This consciously formulated ideology is intrinsically articulated alongside the regime’s legitimacy. In Karimov’s own words, “It is natural that the state system, its operation, and accompanying policies should above all be constructed on the basis of a concretely formulated ideology.”⁷
In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Karimov tried to revive the historical name of Turkestan and promoted a regional identity based on Turkic and Muslim values, which he dubbed “Turanism.”⁸ He was therefore in direct ideological competition with Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who put forward the rival concept of Eurasia, which situates Central Asia at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. However, while the notion of Turkestan as the new Central Asia, with Uzbekistan at its heart, did not resonate internationally, the Uzbek opposition had already embraced it domestically. This was the case for Muhammad Salih (b. 1949) of the Erk movement and Abdurakhim Polatov (b. 1944) of Birlik, both men belonging to a semidissident literary tradition that took form in the 1960s and 1970s and called for a more Islamo-nationalist orientation.⁹ The reference to Turkestan was rapidly replaced by a more Uzbekistan-centric narrative that posits the existence of unique national pathways to development.
This “Uzbek path” under the “wise leadership” of President Karimov took several forms. The first manifestation was Tashkent’s refusal of any shock therapy as promoted by international organizations and Western donors, and the decision to instead move slowly, gradually, toward a market economy. This resulted in the so-called Five Principles of Uzbek economics that the country has officially followed since then.¹⁰ The second effect was to anchor the “Uzbek path” into a longue durée perspective, as the result of centuries, even millennia, of history, and to personalize this historical trajectory of the nation-state by the president himself. Karimov’s cult of personality was less extreme than the one around Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan.¹¹ Karimov was not exalted for his personal, almost supernatural, powers, but for embodying the state and the nation—for being, according to March, the “Great Uzbek Statebuilder.”¹² In the 1990s, in particular, the urban landscape was covered by billboards with pictures of Karimov in the role of the “father of the nation” and with slogans celebrating the homeland (vatan), which he personified.
The ideology of national independence took form through a meticulous process of creating a consistent corpus of texts, some published immediately, as noted by Sarah Kendzior, others held in reserve to respond to events happening in the country. Several books, supposedly written by the president himself, promoted a vision of the uniqueness of Uzbekistan’s path: Uzbekistan: National Independence, Economic Policy and Ideology (O’zbekiston: milliy Istiqlol, iqtisod, siyosat, mafkura) was published in 1993. In 2000, it was complemented by Our Highest Goal: Independence and Blossoming of the Nation, Freedom and Prosperity of the People (Ozod va obod Vatan, erkin va farovon hayot—pirovard maqsadimiz), and in 2003 by The Idea of National Independence. Main Aspects and Criteria (Milliy istiqlol g’oyasi: asosiy tushuncha va tamoyillar), all works that became mandatory reading on school and university curricula. They all celebrate the nation as a fait accompli of Uzbek history. As Karimov stated, “The ideology must first reflect the spiritual particularity and uniqueness of the sacred traditions and aspirations of our nation, formulated over many centuries and millennia.”¹³ A long list of clichéd values is presented as comprising the “core” of the Uzbek national consciousness: respect for family, respect for elders and traditional values, friendship, peace and tolerance, openness to other civilizations, patience, hospitality, and industriousness.¹⁴
Several ideologists or court writers have shaped this grand narrative, including Karimov’s advisers Rustam Zhumaev¹⁵ and Habibullah Tadzhiev,¹⁶ as well as, more importantly, academic Ozod Sharafidinov (1929–2005), a former secretary for ideological issues of the Uzbek Communist Party. The first two men mainly advanced the discourse of the millennia-long struggle of Uzbekistan for its independence and national identity, while Sharafidinov became the official ideologist of Ma’naviyat.
As noted previously by March, Megoran, and Rasanayagam, the Uzbek state ideology has been obsessed with “alien” influences—particularly liberal values, Western consumerism, ethnonationalism, and Islamism—and hoped to provide “ideological immunity” (mafkuraviy immunitet) to them. This immunization is embodied by the notion of Ma’naviyat: that is, spirituality or morality (meaning, in Islamic tradition, the acceptance of God’s word) elevated to the status of cultural flagship for the nation. Beginning in 1994, Karimov’s regime used the term Ma’naviyat on several occasions, launching a television channel and publishing house with the same name. Classes on Ma’naviyat va Ma’rifat (Spirituality and Enlightenment) were introduced to school curricula. In 2004, Ma’naviyat reached a new step in institutionalization through the creation of a Republican Center for Spiritual Propaganda (Respublika Ma’naviyat va Ma’rifat Kengashi), essentially a “Ministry of Ideology.” Among its responsibilities, the Center oversees the hiring of a vice-dean for Ma’naviyat in each higher education institution. This vice-dean supervises not only the teaching of the discipline, but also inspects the clothing worn by young men and women at the university to be sure they reflect the norms of morality and “humble” behavior.¹⁷
In 2008, Karimov published the book High Spirituality: An Invisible Force (Yuksak ma’naviyat yengilmas kuch), encapsulating the quintessence of Ma’naviyat. The volume touts high morality as an intrinsic quality of the Uzbek people, which has been under threat over centuries of external interference. It also defends state paternalism, patriotism, and respect for traditional hierarchy and elders; celebrates mahalla (neighborhood solidarity) as the Uzbek version of “civil society”; advances conservative social mores, especially male superiority; ¹⁸ protects younger generations from Western values and mass culture; and integrates Islamic references into the Ma’naviyat doctrinal corpus.¹⁹
Through the structured doctrine of Ma’naviyat, the Uzbek regime positions itself as the bearer of moral authority for the whole country. Ideology has therefore been closely associated with social and cultural control. It allows for the delegitimization of the political opposition, which is accused of colluding with the enemies of the nation and of not respecting any of the principles of Uzbekness; for instance, the Andijon violence of May 2005 has been framed as being orchestrated by people who were not authentically Uzbek.²⁰ It also justifies the establishment of a censorship code based on the “morality” narrative: the state agency for arts, Uzbeknavo, for instance, took away the licenses to perform of pop singers such as Lola Yuldasheva and film directors such as Zulfikar Musakov for not respecting the principles of Ma’naviyat.²¹ In the early 2000s, the official youth movement, Kamalot, based on the former Soviet Komsomol model, embraced Ma’naviyat by performing symbolic collective actions and demonstrating loyalty toward the regime.²²
Over a quarter of century, the Uzbek regime succeeded in building a consensus on the traditional values of so-called Uzbekness, which is said to bridge the dichotomy between positive forces that value world peace and a unique national development path for each country, and to oppose negative forces that promote “degenerate” liberal values or destructive Islamist and ethnonationalist ones. It also pioneered a narrative—one that became mainstream across the whole region in the 2010s—insisting on the need to “de-Westernize” the nation’s social and cultural values.