Renegotiating Identities and Cultural Legacies Chapter Twelve Be(com)ing Uzbek

The Fergana Valley
In contrast to Bukhara, the Fergana Valley is not an oasis in the strict sense but a long valley running some one hundred kilometers from west to east and approximately thirty kilometers north to south. Historically a less significant player than the locations further west, it is today of great importance for a number of reasons. One is its population density, with close to one-third of the population of Uzbekistan living here. Other factors are more ambivalent. On the one hand, the Fergana Valley is often considered the bastion of pure Uzbekness in terms of language and culture.²³ At the same time, it was the scene of most of the violent events and Islamist undertakings in recent years.
As in Bukhara, ecology affected the ethnic configuration over time. The Fergana Valley is not surrounded by deserts but encircled by mountain ranges. The mountains have always harbored various pastoral groups, as did the semi-desert in the very center of the valley. Therefore, the sedentary and nomadic groups lived in much closer proximity, resulting in a very complex and interwoven arrangement. Apart from Tajiks and Kyrgyz, who live scattered throughout the valley, there is a strong internal division among local Uzbeks. Some of these, in all likelihood, were at least seminomadic in the past, such as the Qipchaqs and the local Turks, another group that arrived during the pre-Mongol period.²⁴ Others trace their origin to neighboring Xinjiang, and sometimes call themselves Uygurs or Qashgarians.
These internal distinctions do, however, not create linguistic differences. In contrast to the Sharisabz site introduced below, the Qipchaq in the Fergana Valley, or to be more precise in Markhamat district where most of the research was conducted, speak standard Uzbek. So do the Kyrgyz and Tajiks, many of whom have adopted Uzbek as their primary language without necessarily changing their ethnic belonging. Bilingualism is thus less common here, and Uzbek prevails.²⁵ This also implies less switching in the course of a day or a lifetime. If Fergana Valley residents continue speaking Tajik, or teaching it to their children, they are also making more of a political or ethnic statement than is the case in Bukhara. But overall there is a clear trend toward Uzbekization, here also fostered by the government’s alleged belief that Tajiks are particularly susceptible to Islamist movements.
Mixed marriages exist and are quite common as well, but they have a different social standing and different consequences. As in Bukhara, many families prefer their children to marry kin to be better able to judge the mutual background and expectations. The reason is that children of mixed unions will ultimately tend toward becoming Uzbek or, to be more precise, a “pure” (chisto or taza) Uzbek, meaning with no additional attribute. This applies equally to marriages with Tajiks or Kyrgyz as among different types of Uzbeks. In fact, many taza Uzbeks expressed a preference for Tajik in-laws, rather than Turks or Qipchaqs, who are considered less culturally developed.²⁶
The situation in Markhamat and other parts of the Fergana Valley bears thus more signs of a primordial understanding of ethnicity than in Bukhara. Origin and family background play more of a role, although there is still a great deal of flexibility, and intermarriage is very common and even encouraged. What unites all groups is a shared feeling of cultural superiority toward other parts of the country, and indeed all of Central Asia. Within that, as had been the case in Bukhara, some are closer to a “cultural core” than others. Here as well, this would unite (pure) Uzbeks and Tajiks more than it does the Uzbeks with other Turkic groups.