Renegotiating Identities and Cultural Legacies Chapter Twelve Be(com)ing Uzbek

Uzbek Diasporas in Central Asia and Beyond
Next, we can check these findings by looking at the manifestations of Uzbekness outside the borders of the corresponding nation-state. For matters of size, indigeneity, and accessibility, we settled on Uzbeks in four neighboring countries: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan.³⁰ Each of these represents a different situation in terms of economic and political status, local ethnic configurations and mutual relations, as well as the existence or nonexistence of conflicts. Thus, these four cases, in addition to the four in Uzbekistan, should shed light on processes of ethnic identification and demarcation. Three of the four sites had seen some sort of conflict during the last decades, in which local Uzbeks were, in one way or another, involved. At the same time, all of them represent cases of long-established ethnic communities, which have been part of the respective society for centuries. It would thus also be possible to study whether the described attractiveness of being Uzbek was and is also valid in a place where they represent a political minority, at least in recent times.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan was a very obvious choice for a project studying Uzbeks abroad. When research started, it had been just a few years since an outburst of violent conflicts in the southern provinces had cost the lives of hundreds of people, the majority of which were Uzbeks. Following earlier clashes in 1990, this violence seemed to confirm an old animosity between the sedentary traders and agriculturalists, on the one hand, and the traditionally pastoralist Kyrgyz, on the other. Political turmoil led to the “Tulip Revolution” in 2005 and economic deprivation in the more marginal rural areas, where ethnic Kyrgyz outnumber ethnic Uzbeks.
These events changed interethnic relations and hierarchies fundamentally, even in locations less affected by confrontations such as Nookat, the main site of research within the project. Of course, the Kyrgyz already had a special status as a titular ethnie controlling much of national and regional politics. But Uzbeks were regarded as more successful economically, and they dominated the market. The short but bloody clashes in Osh and other settlements in the summer of 2010, while internationally blamed on the Kyrgyz, have challenged the prevailing views. Uzbeks are still very much engaged in trade, but if they own a business, they now likely have a Kyrgyz partner. In public and private, Kyrgyz dominance is visible and approved. Uzbeks themselves seem to accept this arrangement as a matter of fact and adapt accordingly. Those with closer ties to Kyrgyz citizens make use of that, threatening others to “call their Kyrgyz friends” to settle an issue. As neighboring Uzbekistan offers no hope for support whatsoever, most Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan seem to have accepted their fate and try to make the best out of it.
This situation also affects language usage. Kyrgyz has been the state language in Kyrgyzstan since independence in 1991, but in everyday life, especially in the marketplace, Uzbek has been equally prominent. This has begun to change, and Kyrgyz are becoming less willing to switch language in mid-conversation, while this seems to be much more common among Uzbeks than it used to be. Also, families have started to send their children to Kyrgyz schools, which they believe will better prepare them for the future. The Uzbek language has, however, regained some of its importance after having almost disappeared from public in the years following the clashes of 2010. Intermarriages have never been uncommon, although they are not frequent, either. Mixed families faced serious problems during and after the conflicts, but with time things have settled and mixed marriages rebounded. Today the government encourages mixed marriages, presumably to reduce segregation in case of renewed violence.
Interestingly, many people of both ethnicities have been reconsidering their identities. While the case of Uzbeks taking on a Kyrgyz identity seems obvious and often results in what people consider “fake ethnicities,” this is less clear for the Kyrgyz. But by all accounts some Kyrgyz are still attracted to “Uzbekness” due to the economic opportunities it entails. What is as striking, returning to the territorial concept introduced earlier, is that this happens by settling in a certain mahalla, or organized neighborhood. To become an Uzbek, one has therefore first to adopt a corresponding local identity and belonging.