RT3340X half title 6/22/06 11: 41 am page 1 The Disability
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tells us how to begin but not how to terminate. Given what both the stigmatized and we normals introduce into mixed social situations, it is un- derstandable that all will not go smoothly. We are likely to attempt to carry on as though in fact he wholly fi tted one of the types of person naturally available to us in the situation, whether this means treating him as someone better than we feel he might be or someone worse than we feel he probably is. If neither of these tacks is possible, then we may try to act as if he were a “non-person,” and not present at all as someone of whom ritual notice is to be taken. He, in turn, is likely to go along with these strategies, at least initially. In consequence, attention is furtively withdrawn from its obligatory targets, and self-conscious- ness and “other-consciousness” occurs, expressed in the pathology of interaction—uneasiness. 39 As described in the case of the physically handicapped: Whether the handicap is overtly and tactlessly responded to as such or, as is more commonly the case, no explicit reference is made to it, the underlying condition of heightened, narrowed, awareness causes the interaction to be articulated too exclusively in terms of it. Th is, as my informants described it, is usually accompanied by one or more of the familiar signs of discomfort and stickiness: the guarded references, the common everyday words suddenly made taboo, the fi xed stare elsewhere, the artifi cial levity, the compulsive loquaciousness, the awkward solemnity. 40 In social situations with an individual known or perceived to have a stigma, we are likely, then, to employ categorizations that do not fi t, and we and he are likely to experience uneasiness. Of course, there is oft en signifi cant movement from this starting point. And since the stigmatized person is likely to be more oft en faced with these situations than are we, he is likely to become the more adept at managing them. RT3340X_C010.indd 138 RT3340X_C010.indd 138 7/11/2006 9:50:43 AM 7/11/2006 9:50:43 AM 139 Selections from Stigma Notes 1. T. Parker and R. Allerton, Th e Courage of His Convictions (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1962), p. 109. 2. In this connection see the review by M. Meltzer, “Countermanipulation through Malingering,” in A. Biderman and H. Zimmer, eds., Th e Manipulation of Human Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961), pp. 277–304. 3. In recent history, especially in Britain, low class status functioned as an important tribal stigma, the sins of the parents, or at least their millieu, being visited on the child, should the child rise improperly far above his initial station. Th e management of class stigma is of course a central theme in the English novel. 4. D. Riesman, “Some Observations Concerning Marginality,” Phylon, Second Quarter, 1951, 122. 5. Th
e case regarding mental patients is represented by T. J. Scheff in a forthcoming paper. 6. In regard to the blind, see E. Henrich and L. Kriegel, eds., Experiments in Survival (New York: Associatino for the Aid of Crippled Children, 1961), pp. 152 and 186; and H. Chevigny, My Eyes Have a Cold Nose (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, paperbound, 1962), p. 201. 7. In the words of one blind woman, “I was asked to endorse a perfume, presumably because being sightless my sense of smell was super-discriminating.” See T. Keitlen (with N. Lobsenz), Farewell to Fear (New York: Avon, 1962), p. 10. 8. A. G. Gowman, Th e War Blind in American Social Structure (New York: American Foundation for the Blind, 1957), p. 198. 9. For examples, see Macgregor et al., op. cit., throughout. 10. Th e notion of “normal human being” may have its source in the medical approach to humanity or in the tendency of large-scale bureaucratic organizations, such as the nation state, to treat all members in some respects as equal. Whatever its origins, it seems to provide the basic imagery through which laymen currently conceive of themselves. Interestingly, a convention seems to have emerged in popular life-story writing where a questionable person proves his claim to normalcy by citing his acquisition of a spouse and children, and, oddly, by attesting to his spending Christmas and Th anksgiving with them. 11. A criminal’s view of this nonacceptance is presented in Parker and Allerton, op. cit., pp. 110–111. 12. K. B. Hathaway, Th e Little Locksmith (New York: Coward-McCann, 1943), p. 41, in Wright, op. cit., p. 157. 13. Ibid., pp. 46–47. For general treatments of the self-disliking sentiments, see K. Lewin, Resolving Social Confl icts, Part III (New York: Harper & Row, 1948); A. Kardiner and L. Ovesey, Th e Mark of Oppression: A Psychological Study of the American Negro (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1951); and E. H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1950). 14. F. Warfi eld, Keep Listening (New York: Th e Viking Press, 1957), p. 76. See also H. von Hentig, Th e Criminal and His Victim (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 101. 15. Keitlen, op. cit., Chap. 12, pp. 117–129 and Chap. 14, pp. 137–149. See also Chevigny, op. cit., pp. 85–86. 16. Henrich and Kriegel, op. cit., p. 49. 17. W. Y. Baker and L. H. Smith, “Facial Disfi gurement and Personality,” Journal of the American Medical Association, CXII (1939), 303. Macgregor et al., op. cit., p. 57ff ., provide an illustration of a man who used his big red nose for a crutch. 18. Henrich and Kriegel, op. cit., p. 19. 19. Ibid., p. 35. 20. Chevigny, op. cit., p. 154. 21. F. Carlin, And Yet We Are Human (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), pp. 23–24. 22. For one review, see G. W. Allport, Th e Nature of Prejudice (New York: Anchor Books, 1958). 23. Macgregor et al., op. cit., pp. 91–92. 24. From Clinical Studies in Psychiatry, H. S. Perry, M. L. Gawel, and M. Gibbon, eds. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1956), p. 145. 25. R. Barker, “Th e Social Psychology of Physical Disability,” Journal of Social Issues, IV (1948), 34, suggests that stigmatized persons “live on a social-psychological frontier,” constantly facing new situations. See also Macgregor et al., op. cit., p. 87, where the suggestion is made that the grossly deformed need suff er less doubt about their reception in interaction than the less visibly deformed. 26. Barker, op. cit., p. 33. 27. Parker and Allerton, op. cit., p. III. 28. Th is special kind of self-consciousness is analyzed in S. Messinger, et al., “Life as Th eater: Some Notes on the Dramaturgic Approach to Social Reality,” Sociometry, XXV (1962), 98–110. 29. Parker and Allerton, op. cit., p. III. 30. Chevigny, op. cit., p. 140. 31. L. A. Dexter, “A Social Th eory of Mental Defi ciency,” American Journal of Mental Defi ciency, LXII (1958), 923. For another study of the mental defective as a stigmatized person, see S. E. Perry, “Some Th eoretical Problems of Mental Defi ciency and Th eir Action Implications,” Psychiatry, XVII (1954), 45–73. 32. Baker, Out on a Limb (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, n.d.), p. 22. 33. Ibid., p. 73. RT3340X_C010.indd 139 RT3340X_C010.indd 139 7/11/2006 9:50:43 AM 7/11/2006 9:50:43 AM Erving Goffman 140
34. Th is theme is well treated in R. K. White, B. A. Wright, and T. Dembo, “Studies in Adjustment to Visible Injuries: Evalu- ation of Curiosity by the Injured,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLIII (1948), 13–28. 35. For example, Henrich and Kriegel, op. cit., p. 184. 36. See Wright, op. cit., “Th e Problem of Sympathy,” pp. 233–237. 37. S. Zawadski and P. Lazarsfeld, “Th e Psychological Consequences of Unemployment,” Journal of Social Psychology, VI (1935), 239. 38. Hathaway, op. cit., pp. 155–157, in S. Richardson, “Th e Social Psychological Consequences of Handicapping,” unpublished paper presented at the 1962 American Sociological Association Convention, Washington, D. C., 7–8. 39. For a general treatment, see E. Goff man, “Alienation from Interaction,” Human Relations, X (1957), 47–60. 40. F. Davis, “Deviance Disavowal: Th e Management of Strained Interaction by the Visibly Handicapped,” Social Problems, IX (1961), 123. See also White, Wright, and Dembo, op. cit., pp. 26–27. RT3340X_C010.indd 140 RT3340X_C010.indd 140 7/11/2006 9:50:43 AM 7/11/2006 9:50:43 AM 141 11 Stigma An Enigma Demystifi ed Lerita M. Coleman Nature caused us all to be born equal; if fate is pleased to disturb this plan of the general law, it is our responsibility to correct its caprice, and to repair by our attention the usurpations of the stronger. —Maurice Blanchot What is stigma and why does stigma remain? Because stigmas mirror culture and society, they are in constant fl ux, and therefore the answers to these two questions continue to elude social scientists. Viewing stigma from multiple perspectives exposes its intricate nature and helps us to disentangle its web of complexities and paradoxes. Stigma represents a view of life; a set of personal and social constructs; a set of social relations and social relationships; a form of social reality. Stigma has been a diffi cult concept to conceptualize because it refl ects a property, a process, a form of social categoriza- tion, and an aff ective state. Two primary questions, then, that we as social scientists have addressed are how and why during certain historical periods. In specifi c cultures or within particular social groups, some human diff er- ences are valued and desired, and other human diff erences are devalued, feared, or stigmatized. In attempting to answer these questions, I propose another view of stigma, one that takes into account its behavioral, cognitive, and aff ective components and reveals that stigma is a response to the dilemma of diff erence. The Dilemma No two human beings are exactly alike: there are countless ways to diff er. Shape, size, skin color, gen- der, age, cultural background, personality, and years of formal education are just a few of the infi nite number of ways in which people can vary. Perceptually, and in actuality, there is greater variation on some of these dimensions than on others. Age and gender, for example, are dimensions with limited and quantifi able ranges; yet they interact exponentially with other physical or social characteristics that have larger continua (e.g., body shape, income, cultural background) to create a vast number of human diff erences. Goff man states, though, that “stigma is equivalent to an undesired diff erentness” (see Staff ord & Scott). Th e infi nite variety of human attributes suggests that what is undesired or stig- matized is heavily dependent on the social context and to some extent arbitrarily defi ned. Th e large number of stigmatizable attributes and several taxonomies of stigmas in the literature off er further evidence of how arbitrary the selection of undesired diff erences may be (see Ainlay & Crosby; Becker & Arnold; Solomon; Staff ord & Scott). What is most poignant about Goff man’s description of stigma is that it suggests that all human diff erences are potentially stigmatizable. As we move out of one social context where a diff erence is desired into another context where the diff erence is undesired, we begin to feel the eff ects of stigma. RT3340X_C011.indd 141 RT3340X_C011.indd 141 7/11/2006 9:51:40 AM 7/11/2006 9:51:40 AM
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Th is conceptualization of stigma also indicates that those possessing power, the dominant group, can determine which human diff erences are desired and undesired. In part, stigmas refl ect the value judgments of a dominant group. Many people, however, especially those who have some role in determining the desired and unde- sired diff erences of the zeitgeist, oft en think of stigma only as a property of individuals. Th ey operate under the illusion that stigma exists only for certain segments of the population. But the truth is that any “nonstigmatized” person can easily become “stigmatized.” “Nearly everyone at some point in life will experience stigma either temporarily or permanently. . . . Why do we persist in this denial?” (Zola, 1979, p. 454). Given that human diff erences serve as the basis for stigmas, being or feeling stigmatized is virtually an inescapable fate. Because stigmas diff er depending upon the culture and the historical period. It becomes evident that it is mere chance whether a person is born into a nonstigmatized or severely stigmatized group. Because stigmatization oft en occurs within the confi nes of a psychologically constructed or actual social relationship, the experience itself refl ects relative comparisons, the contrasting of desired and undesired diff erences. Assuming that fl awless people do not exist, relative comparisons give rise to a feeling of superiority in some contexts (where one possesses a desired trait that another person is lacking) but perhaps a feeling of inferiority in other contexts (where one lacks a desired trait that another person possesses). It is also important to note that it is only when we make comparisons that we can feel diff erent. Stigmatization or feeling stigmatized is a consequence of social comparison. For this reason, stigma represents a continuum of undesired diff erences that depend upon many factors (e.g., geographical location, culture, life cycle stage) (see Becker & Arnold). Although some stigmatized conditions appear escapable or may be temporary, some undesired traits have graver social consequences than others. Being a medical resident, being a new professor, being 7 feet tall, having cancer, being black, or being physically disfi gured or mentally retarded can all lead to feelings of stigmatization (feeling discredited or devalued in a particular role), but obviously these are not equally stigmatizing conditions. Th e degree of stigmatization might depend on how undesired the diff erence is in a particular social group. Physical abnormalities, for example, may be the most severely stigmatized diff erences because they are physically salient, represent some defi ciency or distortion in the bodily form, and in most cases are unalterable. Other physically salient diff erences, such as skin color or nationality, are con- sidered very stigmatizing because they also are permanent conditions and cannot be changed. Yet the stigmatization that one feels as a result of being black or Jewish or Japanese depends on the social context, specifi cally social contexts in which one’s skin color or nationality is not a desired one. A white American could feel temporarily stigmatized when visiting Japan due to a diff erence in height. A black student could feel stigmatized in a predominantly white university because the majority of the students are white and white skin is a desired trait. But a black student in a predominantly black university is not likely to feel the eff ects of stigma. Th us, the sense of being stigmatized or having a stigma is inextricably tied to social context. Of equal importance are the norms in that context that determine which are desirable and undesirable attributes. Moving from one social or cultural context to another can change both the defi nitions and the consequences of stigma. Stigma oft en results in a special kind of downward mobility. Part of the power of stigmatization lies in the realization that people who are stigmatized or acquire a stigma lose their place in the social hierarchy. Consequently, most people want to ensure that they are counted in the nonstigmatized “majority.” Th is, of course, leads to more stigmatization. Stigma, then, is also a term that connotes a relationship. It seems that this relationship is vital to understanding the stigmatizing process. Stigma allows some individuals to feel superior to others. Superiority and inferiority, however, are two sides of the same coin. In order for one person to feel superior, there must be another person who is perceived to be or who actually feels inferior. Stigmatized people are needed in order for the many nonstigmatized people to feel good about themselves. On the other hand, there are many stigmatized people who feel inferior and concede that other persons are superior because they possess certain attributes. In order for the process to occur (for RT3340X_C011.indd 142 RT3340X_C011.indd 142 7/11/2006 9:51:45 AM 7/11/2006 9:51:45 AM 143 Stigma
one person to stigmatize another and have the stigmatized person feel the eff ects of stigma), there must be some agreement that the diff erentness is inherently undesirable. Moreover, even among stigmatized people, relative comparisons are made, and people are reassured by the fact that there is someone else who is worse off . Th e dilemma of diff erence, therefore, aff ects both stigmatized and nonstigmatized people. Some might contend that this is the very old scapegoat argument, and there is some truth to that contention. But the issues here are more fi nely intertwined. If stigma is a social construct, constructed by cultures, by social groups, and by individuals to designate some human diff erences as discrediting, then the stigmatization process is indeed a powerful and pernicious social tool. Th e inferiority/superiority issue is a most interesting way of understanding how and why people continue to stigmatize. Some stigmas are more physically salient than others, and some people are more capable of con- cealing their stigmas or escaping from the negative social consequences of being stigmatized. Th e
ideal prototype (e.g., young, white, tall, married, male, with a recent record in sports) that Staff ord cites may actually possess traits that would be the source of much scorn and derision in another social context. Yet, by insulating himself in his own community, a man like the one described in the example can ensure that his “diff erentness” will receive approbation rather than rejection, and he will not be subject to constant and severe stigmatization. Th is is a common response to stigma among people with some social infl uence (e.g., artists, academics, millionaires). Oft en, attributes or behaviors that might otherwise be considered “abnormal” or stigmatized are labeled as “eccentric” among persons of power or infl uence. Th e fact that what is perceived as the “ideal” person varies from one social context to another, however, is tied to Martin’s notion that people learn ways to stigmatize in each new situation. In contrast, some categories of stigmatized people (e.g., the physically disabled, members of ethnic groups, poor people) cannot alter their stigmas nor easily disguise them. People, then, feel perma- nently stigmatized in contexts where their diff erentness is undesired and in social environments that they cannot easily escape. Hence, power, social infl uence, and social control play a major role in the stigmatization process. In summary, stigma stems from diff erences. By focusing on diff erences we actively create stigmas because any attribute or diff erence is potentially stigmatizable. Oft en we attend to a single diff erent attribute rather than to the large number of similar attributes that any two individuals share. Why people focus on diff erences and denigrate people on the basis of them is important to understanding how some stigmas originate and persist. By reexamining the historical origins of stigma and the way children develop the propensity to stigmatize, we can see how some diff erences evolve into stigmas and how the process is linked to the behavioral (social control), aff ective (fear, dislike), and cognitive (perception of diff erences, social categorization) components of stigma. The Origins of Stigma Th e phrase to stigmatize originally referred to the branding or marking of certain people (e.g., criminals, prostitutes) in order to make them appear diff erent and separate from others (Goff man, 1963). Th e
act of marking people in this way resulted in exile or avoidance. In most cultures, physical marking or branding has declined, but a more cognitive manifestation of stigmatization—social marking—has increased and has become the basis for most stigmas (Jones et al., 1984). Goff man points out, though, that stigma has retained much of its original connotation. People use diff erences to exile or avoid oth- ers. In addition, what is most intriguing about the ontogenesis of the stigma concept is the broadening of its predominant aff ective responses such as dislike and disgust to include the emotional reaction of fear. Presently, fear may be instrumental in the perpetuation of stigma and in maintaining its origi- nal social functions. Yet as the developmental literature reveals, fear is not a natural but an acquired response to diff erences of stigmas. RT3340X_C011.indd 143 RT3340X_C011.indd 143 7/11/2006 9:51:45 AM 7/11/2006 9:51:45 AM
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Sigelman and Singleton off er a number of insightful observations about how children learn to stigmatize. Children develop a natural wariness of strangers as their ability to diff erentiate familiar from novel objects increases (Sroufe, 1977). Developmental psychologists note that stranger anxiety is a universal phenomenon in infants and appears around the age of seven months. Th is reaction to diff erences (e.g., women versus men, children versus adults, blacks versus whites) is an interesting one Download 5.02 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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