The Nature, Conditions, and Development of Bureaucratic Herrschaft

The Leveling of Economic and Social Difference
The fact is that, even though bureaucracy is evidently technically superior to all other systems, it developed relatively late. This is because previously it was inhibited in its development. These inhibitions recede only under particular social and political conditions. The bureaucratic organization regularly became the dominant system when the relative economic and social differences were leveling, so that social and economic position became less important for holding an administrative position.
Bureaucracy is particularly an inevitable side effect of modern mass democracy and is inherently hostile to the democratic self-government of small homogeneous entities. First of all, a characteristic principle of bureaucracy is that it is an expression of a regularized governance with abstract rules. In both a subjective and objective sense, regularized governance springs from the desire for “equality before the law,” and looks at privileges as abominations and, in particular, rejects the case-by-case management of tasks. Second, the emergence of bureaucracy in a mass democracy is also a product of social preconditions. Every non-bureaucratic administration in a quantitatively large social entity relies, in one way or another, on a preexisting social, material, or honor-based system of rank that is tied to administrative functions and duties.
Frequently this results directly or indirectly in the economic or “social” exploitation of the position. Every type of administrative position entails this because it serves as a compensation for performing the position’s duties and tasks. Therefore, bureaucratization and democratization imply an increase in the cash expenses charged to the state coffers, even though this kind of public administration is usually more “economical” than the other types of administrative systems discussed earlier. In such a context, until recently, the cheapest way to cover the needs of the administration in Eastern Prussia—at least from the state’s treasury point of view—was to let the landlords manage nearly all the local administration and the lower jurisdictions. The same applied to the system of “Justice of the Peace”⁴³ in England.
Mass democracy, which strives to end the feudal, patrimonial, and (at least this is the intention) plutocratic privileges within an administration, must inevitably replace the outdated “side-job” administration by part-time Honoratioren with professional and salaried jobs done by professionals. This does not only apply to states [but also to parties].
It is no coincidence that, specifically, the large democratic mass parties⁴⁴ broke away from the outdated Herrschaft rule by Honoratioren and organized their parties bureaucratically. The Herrschaft by Honoratioren is still frequently in place not only in the traditional conservative parties, but also in the traditional liberal parties, which still rely on personal relationships and personal honors. In contrast, the democratic mass parties are organized bureaucratically under the command of party Beamte, professional party, and union secretaries, etc. Examples in Germany are the social democracy and the “agrarian mass movements”; in England, examples include the “Gladstone-Chamberlain Caucus Democracy” organized in Birmingham in the 1870s; and in the United States both parties organized since the Jackson administration [of 1829–1837].
In France, the attempt to introduce an election system that forced the political parties to adopt a strict organization failed again and again. This was mainly due to the local circles of Honoratioren who feared their influence would dwindle. However, in the long run, this resistance against party bureaucratization across the whole country was futile and the Honoratioren influence was broken. This is because in the end, every progress within the simple, number-based voting system, such as the proportional representation system⁴⁵ (at least under the conditions of large states), requires a strict, interregional bureaucratic organization, and therefore requires an increasing rule by a disciplined party bureaucracy while eliminating Honoratioren circles. In France, North America, and now England, it has become apparent that within the governmental administrations themselves, democracy and bureaucratization are parallel phenomena.
Of course, attention should be paid since the word “democratization” can be misleading, because the Demos,⁴⁶ in the sense of an unstructured mass, never really “administrates” in bigger groups. Rather, the Demos is administered. The Demos only changes the way a governing head of an administration is selected and changes the degree of influence that the Demos (or more correctly, other groups of people from its midst) are able to direct administrative activity by using so-called public opinion. “Democratization,” as defined here, does not necessarily mean that the percentage of governed people who participate actively in the governance of a particular social entity increases.
This can be a consequence of such “democratization,” but does not have to be.
In fact, in this context, one has to very clearly keep in mind that the political term “democracy” evokes two other postulates from the principle of equality before the law, which also applies to the governed:
1. The development of a closed “Stand of the Beamte” should be hindered in favor of universal accessibility of the government offices [Ämter] for everybody.
2. Minimization of the Beamte’s power in the interest of broadening the influence of the “public opinion” should be pursued.
Thus, wherever possible, democracy strives for short-term staffing of the Amt by revocable election, without binding the Amt to any professional qualification.
Therefore, democratization conflicts with its self-proclaimed tendencies toward bureaucratization. Inevitably, this conflict is induced because of the struggle against the rule of the Honoratioren. Hence, the term “democratization,” which is imprecise anyway, should not be used when we understand democratization as the minimization of the power of “professional Beamte” in favor of a direct rule [Herrschaft] by the “Demos,” which de facto implies the Herrschaft of party leaders. Rather, the only crucial point in such a case is the leveling of the governed people relative to the Herrschaft of the bureaucratically organized group, which often de facto or even formally as well, possesses an autocratic position.
In Russia, the decimation of the old landholding manorial nobility’s position by introducing the Mjéstnitschestwo (rank order) caused a mixing of the old nobility with “service nobility.” This was a characteristic interim phenomenon on the way toward bureaucratization.
In China, qualification for rank within an Amt was determined by the number of passed examinations. This led, at least theoretically, to an even harsher consequence [than in Russia].
In France, it was the revolution and decisively Bonapartism, which made the bureaucracy all-powerful.
In the Catholic Church, it was first the removal of local feudal powers, then the removal of all independent local powers, and the transformation of these power brokers into pure functionaries of the central authority that caused the advancement of bureaucracy. Pope Gregory VII started this process, which was carried on through the Council of Trent [1545–1563] and the Vatican Council⁴⁷ [1869–1870]. It was finished with the edicts of Pius X [1903–1914]. The advancement of bureaucracy was also connected to the increased de facto importance of the chaplains, which was mainly due to the organization of Catholicism as a political party who were, in a formal sense, totally dependent on the central authority. Thus, bureaucracy was advancing at the same time democratization (in a “passive” kind, in this case) was (i.e., by leveling the governed people).
The replacement of a self-equipped Honoratioren army by a bureaucratic army is also everywhere a process of “passive” democratization. In this sense any formation of an absolute military monarchy that replaces a feudal state or a republic of Honoratioren is.
In principle, this also applied to the governmental development in [Ancient] Egypt, in spite of all its peculiarities.
In the Roman Principate [27 BC–284 AD], the bureaucratization of provinces’ administration (e.g., in the field of tax administration) went hand in hand with the decimation of the plutocracy of the all-powerful capitalistic class of the old Republic. Ultimately, ancient capitalism vanished as well.
Obviously, some kinds of economic conditions nearly always play a role in the democratization process. For instance, new classes emerge quite often due to economic factors.⁴⁸ These new classes can have plutocratic, petty bourgeois, or proletarian characters. These new classes seek to support a political power, whether it is a characteristic of popular legitimate character, or Caesaristic character. Sometimes they need to create a new power, or they reinvigorate an earlier power in order to gain economic or social advantage. However, it is also a possibility and a historical fact that democratization is sometimes initiated “from above” and is typically politically motivated. In that case, the “initiators” exploited the political constellation, especially the international ones. They exploited both the economic and social disparities and class interests, and used them purely for their personal and political means of achieving power. They typically utilized the latent conflicts of interest and threw them out of kilter in a fashion that encouraged them to strike up a battle.
It seems almost impossible to make generalizations about the relationship between the democratization process and the influence of economic conditions. The dimensions and forms played by economic conditions in the democratization process were very diverse. Likewise, so was the extent to which relations of political power played a role.
For instance, during the ancient Hellenic times, it was the transition to disciplined battle by the Hoplites⁴⁹ while in Athens it was the rising importance of military fleets that became the basis for gaining political power. This gave political power to social strata on whose shoulders responsibility for the military rested. However, already in Rome the very same development challenged the rule by Honoratioren of the Amt nobility only temporarily and on the surface. Indeed, in all places the modern mass army was instrumental for breaking the power of the Honoratioren. However, the mass army has, by no means, become an active lever for democratization; it merely passively encourages the process of democratization. However, it is important for understanding this process that the ancient citizen army economically relied on self-equipage, whereas the modern army relies for their supply on a bureaucratic system.
Ultimately, the advancement of the bureaucratic system is based on its “technical” superiority. Hence, as in the whole field of technical innovation, the advancement is slowest where older structural systems functioned well because the systems themselves were elaborately, technically, and appropriately designed. For example, the English Honoratioren administration was effective and was therefore the slowest to succumb to the bureaucratization, which has only partly begun today.
The same phenomenon can be seen in the example of gas-lighting systems or steam trains. In these systems, a large amount of capital is already tied up. Therefore, where such preexisting systems already exist, there is a greater resistance to electrification than in places where new systems are developed.

The Persistent Character of the Bureaucratic Apparatus

A mature bureaucracy is an almost indestructible social structure.
Bureaucratization is the ultimate specific means to turn a (mutually agreed upon) Gemeinschaft action into a rationally organized Gesellschaft action. Thus, bureaucratization serves as a means to establish Gesellschaft ties [Vergesellschaftung] within the structures of domination [Herrschaft]. Bureaucratization becomes the ultimate means of power for those who dominate the bureaucratic apparatus. This is so, given the same conditions, because a systematically organized and managed Gesellschaft action is superior to any kind of reluctant “mass” or Gemeinschaft action.
Once an administration is fully bureaucratized, a virtually permanent structure of Herrschaft ties are created, and the individual Beamte cannot escape from the apparatus in which he is situated.
In contrast to the professional Honoratioren who adminstrate on a honorary and part-time basis, the professional Beamte is chained to his work with his whole existence, both material and non-material. This holds true for the majority of individual Beamte, since he is only a single cog in a restlessly operating machine and simply entrusted with isolated tasks. This machine is prompted to move or stand still only by the highest level in the bureaucratic hierarchy, not typically by the Beamte himself; thus, this mechanism prescribes the fixed procedures the Beamte takes in approaching his tasks. As a result, and above everything else, the individual Beamte is chained in a “syndicate” to every other functionary who is incorporated into this machine. This syndicate has a vital interest in keeping this operating in order so that this kind of Herrschaft through Gesellschaft ties continues.
On the other hand, the governed people are not able to do without a bureaucratic Herrschaft apparatus once it is established nor can they replace it. This is because the Herrschaft of the bureaucracy is based on the methodical synthesis of specialized training: specialization in one area of the division of labor and fixation on single functions which are brilliantly mastered. If the bureaucratic apparatus ceases to do its work, or if its work is violently obstructed, chaos will erupt. To offset such chaos, it will be hard to come up with replacements for this work from the midst of the [untrained, undisciplined, and unhabituated] governed people. This applies to public administration as well as private business administration.
The masses’ material destinies are more and more bound to continual and precise functioning of the increasingly bureaucratically organized private capitalistic institutions. Hence, any thought to put them out of work becomes more and more utopian. Thus, the “files” on the one hand and the discipline of the Beamte on the other are increasingly the basis for establishing all order in the public as well as in the private sector. This is especially true for “discipline,” no matter how important in practical terms the filing system is for administration. Beamte discipline means precise obedience and submission within their routine daily tasks.⁵⁰
Believing that destruction of the files simultaneously destroys the basis for “acquired” rights and for the underlying Herrschaft, is the naïve idea of Bakuninism.⁵¹ Its reasoning neglects the fact that human beings stick to the norms and regulations that they are used to, independent of the existence of any files.⁵² Any reorganization of defeated and dismissed armies takes place by appealing to habits to obediently submit. The restoration of administrative systems that were destroyed by the instigation of revolts, panics, or other catastrophes work the same way. If such appeals to submission are successful, the defective mechanisms “snaps” back into place.
Once the apparatus is up and running, it becomes objectively indispensable. Together with its inherently “impersonal” character, it prepares the apparatus to be easily co-opted to work for anyone who is able to assert dominion [Herrschaft] over it. This stands in contrast to the feudal system that relied on personal loyalty rooted in piety. Thus, a rationally organized Beamte system still functions flawlessly in case an enemy occupies the territory; the enemy just has to replace the people at the top. This is possible because it is in everyone’s vital interest, and especially in the interest of the occupying enemy, that the Beamte system continues to function.
For instance, during Bismarck’s long period of rule [Herrschaft], he eliminated all independent statesmen and thereby subjected the ministers, who were his colleagues, to a total bureaucratic dependency on himself. Therefore, Bismarck was taken by surprise when he resigned and his colleagues all continued to work blithely and sedulously in their Amt, as if he was not the ingenious creator and owner of these creatures, but was [just] another arbitrary individual figure simply replaced in the bureaucratic mechanism.⁵³ Even in France, the dominion [Herrschaft] of the bureaucratic apparatus essentially stayed the same during the many shifts since the First Empire [of Napoleon Bonaparte].
Wherever this kind of apparatus is in charge of the modern communication and transport systems (the telegraph system), violent changes that lead to new structures of dominion [Herrschaft] are more and more made impossible. This is because the creation of a new Herrschaft becomes technically impossible, and also because of the apparatus’s completely rationalized structure. Hence, in place of “revolutions” we now have “coup d’etat,” as demonstrated by France, where all successful upheavals are of this kind.

The Economic Consequences of Bureaucratization

It is obvious that the bureaucratic organization of a social entity—and especially of a political entity—regularly has far-reaching economic consequences.
Which consequences are there?
This hinges naturally on the economic and social distribution of power of individual cases. But it also hinges on,the specific field in which the bureaucratic mechanism is created (i.e., the direction the mechanism is given by the powers using it).
In many cases, this results in a crypto-plutocratic distribution of power.
For example, behind the bureaucratic party organizations in England, but particularly in America, hide regular party patrons (like Maecenas⁵⁴) who finance the parties, and therefore are able to influence the parties greatly. The patronage of England’s breweries, the so-called heavy industries with their election funds, and in Germany the Hanseatic League, also with their own election funds, are very well known for this phenomenon. Also, the bureaucratization and the social leveling within political and specifically governmental entities, together with the destruction of opposing local and feudal privileges in modern times, often benefit capitalism in a union with the process of bureaucratization. The great historic alliance of absolute feudal power and capitalistic interest is another example.
In general, the legal leveling and destruction of local and highly organized entities dominated by Honoratioren extends the scope of action for capitalism. Nevertheless, bureaucratization may have a positive impact on the position of the petit bourgeois because it satisfies their interest in secure supply lines. Bureaucratization may also have an effect in the style of socialistic states, where private opportunities for profit are repressed. In other words, bureaucratization has varied and historically far-reaching impacts. This happened especially during antiquity, and perhaps we should expect similar kinds of impacts in our future development.
The case of ancient Egypt shows the various possible economic effects bureaucratization may have. Thus, although the political organization was indeed very similar in times of Pharaonic rule, in Hellenistic, and then in Roman times, the economic significance of bureaucratization varied depending on the effects of other factors. Hence, the mere existence of a bureaucratic organization does not say anything about the concrete direction or of the nature of its economic impact. Indeed, at least as much can be said about the economic effects as about its social impact and, in particular, about its effects on the leveling of society.
And so in light of this historical view, we need to remember that bureaucracy, taken as it is, is just an instrument of precision that can be put to service by purely political, economic, or any other Herrschaft interest. Therefore, the simultaneous development of democratization and bureaucratization should not be exaggerated, no matter how typical the phenomena may be.⁵⁵
After all, even the dominant feudal strata [nobility] have used the instrument of bureaucracy in special circumstances. Also, there was always the possibility to deliberately connect the bureaucratization of the administration with the creation of Stände, or to forcefully intertwine bureaucratization with Stände by the power [Gewalt] of already existing powerful social groups. This happened, for example, in the Roman Principate and some state formations that, in a formal sense, were governed by institutions that had absolute power.
The explicit reservation of an Amt for specific Stände happened very frequently: de facto reservations of Amt for the Stand even more. The democratization of society in its entirety, be it in reality or formally is, in the modern sense of the word, a very attractive basis for every appearance of bureaucratization, but it is by no means the only one. Indeed, bureaucratization seeks only to level authorities that stand in the way in the field that they seek to occupy. Also, attention should be paid to the fact we have already encountered multiple times, and which we have to discuss further: democracy as such—in spite of and because of its inevitable (but involuntary) support of bureaucratization, is an enemy and opponent of bureaucratic rule. As such, democracy establishes in some cases a very noticeable breech and restraint on bureaucratic rule. Thus, in every particular historic case, one must always consider the specific effects bureaucratization has had.

Bureaucracy and Its Authoritative Powers

Because of this ambiguity, it remains unresolved whether states—especially the modern states where bureaucratization progresses rapidly—also always show signs of an universal increase of bureaucracy’s power within the state.