Defining Bureaucracy’s Powers
We mentioned earlier that a bureaucratic organization is technically the most advanced means of power in the hands of those who control it. However, this fact tells us nothing about the degree of forcefulness and power the bureaucracy is able to exert in order to implement its views within the context of the respective social entity.
Neither does the steady and continuously increasing “indispensability” of the millions of Beamte increase their influence and power; nor does the economic indispensability of the proletariat determine the extent of their social and political power, as some of the representatives of the proletariat think. If this was indeed true, it follows that the slaves of earlier times would have had massive power. After all, the “free people” resented the work of slaves as dishonorable, and because of this the slaves were at least as “indispensable” as the proletariat or the Beamte today.
So it cannot be determined a priori if the power of bureaucracy increases for these reasons.
Also, the recruitment of interest groups, or specialists who are not Beamte, or lay-representatives for other areas of expertise, furthers the creation of decision making in local and interregional institutions, as well as central parliamentary, representative, or professional (Stand-like) organs. This rather seems to argue against this assertion [that indispensability and power are directly connected]. However, this does not belong in this purely formal discussion about individual cases. The elaboration on the previous remarks belongs in another chapter, which would be used to find out to what extent this “appearance” is actually true.
For here, only the following can be asserted generally: unfailingly, a fully developed bureaucracy is always in a position of great power. Under normal conditions, this power is even paramount.
Rulers and Bureaucratic Power
It does not matter what master a bureaucracy serves. It could be “the people” that are equipped with the “weapons” of legislative initiatives and referendums and are with the power to dismiss Beamte. It could also be a Parliament which is elected on either more autocratic or more “democratic” basis and that has the right (or de facto right) to vote for “no confidence.” Or it can be an aristocratic college which recruits itself in accordance with the law, or simply de facto recruits its own new members. It can also be a president elected by the populace, or the Ruler can be an absolute or constitutional Monarch. No matter what type of Ruler he is, he will always find himself to be in the position of a dilettante relative to the experts, who are the Beamte in the administrative organization.
Bureaucracy and Secrecy
Furthermore, every bureaucracy seeks to enhance the superiority of its professionally educated Beamte even more by concealing its knowledge and intentions.
Every bureaucratic administration has an inclination to exclude the public.
The fact is that the bureaucracy hides its knowledge and its conduct from criticism as well as it can. For example, the Prussian church administrative bodies threatens their pastors with disciplinary punishment whenever they tell others about rebukes and reprimands they received. They did this because, if they would retell the criticism they received from the church administration, the possibility to critique them further by the administrative bodies would be forfeited.
The accounting Beamte of the Persian Shah went one step further. They turned the art of budget making into an esoteric doctrine and made use of a secret code. And generally, in the official Prussian statistics, the administration published only facts that were not detrimental to the interests of the ruling bureaucracy.
The tendency to secrecy follows in certain administrative areas naturally from the specific nature of their tasks. This is the case whenever the administration is concerned with interests of the ruling power toward the outside. This can be against economic competitors of a private enterprise or, in the case of political entities, against foreign entities that are potentially hostile.
The business of diplomacy can be publicly conducted only in a very limited fashion if it is to be successful. With the increasing importance of technology, military administration has to keep its most important measures and rules more and more secret.
Political parties do not proceed differently. Despite the ostentatious “public transparency” around the German Catholic Days or Party Congresses, they increasingly proceed with increasing bureaucratization of all party operations.
To give another example, German trade policy leads to the routine concealment of production statistics. Naturally, every “fighting position” social entities take toward outside systems and operations strengthens the position of those in power. However, bureaucracy’s interest in secrecy goes far beyond these areas where secrecy is motivated for factual reasons. More strongly, secrecy is used to sustain the power interests of the bureaucracy. Indeed, the term “official secret” is an invention of the bureaucracy. And nothing is more fanatically protected by bureaucracy than the concept that secrecy is necessary, an attitude which is not objectively warranted outside those specific areas discussed above.
If a bureaucracy is faced with a parliament that tries to get its own information using its own means (e.g., the powers of oversight and investigations), the bureaucracy’s power instincts will prompt it to resist any measures by which the parliament tries to secure professional knowledge for itself. A poorly informed Parliament is a powerless Parliament; a situation naturally welcomed by the bureaucracy, particularly when parliamentary cluelessness does not interfere with the bureaucratic interests.
The absolute monarch, as well, is especially powerless in a particular sense against the superior professional expertise of the bureaucracy. Thus, every furious attempt of Frederick the Great to deal with the abolition of serfdom “derailed,” so to say, on the path to implementation because the Beamte apparatus simply ignored his ideas as simple, whimsical ideas of an amateur and dilettante. Oddly enough, the constitutional king—wherever he finds himself in agreement with socially relevant groups of his subjects—often has more influence on administration than the absolute monarch. This is because the critique of the administration can be relatively public and is therefore controllable by him. In contrast, the absolute monarch is completely dependent on the information the bureaucracy provides.
For example, the Russian Czar of the old regime was seldom able to durably enforce even the most minor regulations if it displeased his bureaucracy or impinged on the bureaucracy’s power interests. As [Pierre Paul] Leroy-Beaulieu [1843–1916] already correctly remarked, the ministries, which reported directly to the autocratic Czar, formed a conglomerate of satrapies, fighting against each other with all means of personal intrigues possible. They constantly bombarded each other with voluminous “memorandums” against which the dilettante monarch was helpless.
Every transition to constitutionalism comes with an unavoidable concentration of power in the hand of the central bureaucracy and its placement into the hand of a monocratic leader, the prime minister. Every regulation thus must go through the hands of the same minister before it reaches the monarch. De facto, this puts the monarch under the “guardianship” of the prime minister (i.e., the “boss” of the bureaucracy). Kaiser Wilhelm II fought against this principle in his famous conflict with Bismarck, and only shortly afterward gave up the fight. Under conditions where expert knowledge dominates [Herrschaft], the monarch can exert true influence only by continuously working via the central leaders of bureaucracy and with the sufferance of the bureaucracy’s individual chiefs.
At the same time, constitutionalism binds the bureaucracy and the monarch into a shared Gemeinschaft of interests against the power struggles of the party chiefs in parliament. This is why the constitutional monarch is powerless against bureaucracy if he has no support in parliament.
The “renunciation” by the “Great Men of the Empire” (i.e., the Prussian ministers and its highest Beamte in November 1908) put the monarch [Kaiser Wilhelm II] in a situation similar to what happened in 1076, in times of the feudal state.56 At least, these were exceptions.
The power position of a monarch is altogether much stronger compared with that of a bureaucratic Beamte in a feudal state, even in a stereotypical patrimonial state. The reason for this is that the monarch can easily replace an uncomfortably independent Beamte with an endless supply of promotion-hungry candidates. This means only the economically independent (i.e., Beamte belonging to the propertied strata) can, under otherwise equal circumstances, risk to lose their Amt position. Thus, recruitment from the unpropertied classes increases today, as in the past, the power of the sovereign.
And only Beamte who the monarch believes to be his supporters, but who also belongs to a socially influential class (like in Prussia during the so-called Canal Rebellions57) can completely paralyze the will of the sovereign permanently and substantially.
Only the expertise of the people who are involved in the private commercial interests of the economy is superior to the expertise of the bureaucracy. This is because for them, precise factual knowledge in their area is a question of economic survival: Errors in public official statistics do not have direct personal consequences for the responsible Beamte, but mistakes in a capitalist company’s calculations causes losses and may even threaten the economic survival of the company.
In addition, “secrets,” as an instrument of power, are more safely hidden in a general ledger of private companies than in the files of the government offices [Behörde]. Therefore, during the capitalist era, the Behörde’s influence on the economy is very limited and the state’s regulations cause unintended and unforeseen “train wrecks.” Likewise, these regulations, coming from public Behörde, often are illusory because of the superior factual knowledge of the people in commerce.
Development of the Rational Bureaucratic Structure of “Herrschaft”
Once specialized knowledge increasingly became the basis for the power of the Amt-holders, a Ruler became concerned with the question of how to exploit that knowledge without compromising his own position and without abdicating in favor of such knowledge.
This happened as qualitative administrative tasks increased and expert knowledge became more indispensable; the Ruler could no longer manage by just occasionally consulting his trusted confidantes. Neither could he manage by simply calling together councilors intermittently, as they were used to doing during difficult times. Instead, the Ruler began to surround himself with permanent collegial counsel, which functioned both in an advisory and executive capacity (examples are Conseil d’Etat [France], Privy Council [England], Generaldirektorium [Prussia], Kabinett [Prussia and Germany], Diwan [Ottoman Empire], Tsungli-Yamen [China], Waiwupu [China], etc.).
“Privy Councils” [Räte von Haus] are examples of characteristic transitional phenomena toward such permanent councils. But the position of these “collegial councils” naturally varies, depending on whether they become the highest Behörde for administration itself, or whether it stands beside one or several monocratic central offices. Further, the position depends upon their procedures. In their fully developed type, they met in a de facto “convention,” which at least figuratively meets at the call of the Ruler. All important matters are taken care of after each case is heard, evidence is given by experts, and voted on by their members. A resolution then either sanctions or rejects an ordinance by the Ruler. This type of collegial Behörde is therefore the typical organizational form in which the Ruler, who increasingly becomes a “dilettante,” utilizes expert knowledge. At the same time, although this often goes unnoticed, he seeks to ward off and control the increasing superiority of expert knowledge by introducing the “collegial councils,” and tries to hold the ground of his dominant position. The Ruler does this by holding one expert in check with other experts. By using such a complicated procedure, he seeks to attain for himself a comprehensive picture of the situation and a guarantee that he will not be prompted into arbitrarily making decisions. The Ruler expects such guarantees to maximize his influence to arise less from the fact that he is chair of the council, than from the formal written votes taken there.
The impact of Frederick William I [of Prussia, 1688–1741] on the administration was actually very significant, although he almost never attended the strictly collegially ordered ministerial sessions personally. Instead, he wrote his replies to written presentations using marginal notes or he wrote edicts. Then, the notes and edicts were delivered to the ministers by a special courier [Feldjäger] from the cabinet, which consisted of officials personally attached to Frederick William I himself and those who advised him. The professional bureaucracy hated the cabinet, and in the case of failures, the governed people also mistrusted the cabinet. Such a cabinet, in a similar fashion in Russia, Prussia, and other states, developed into a personal fortress for the Ruler in which he took quasi refuge from expert knowledge and the “objectification of administration.”
Further, by establishing the principle of collegiality, a Ruler tried to unite the experts with specialized knowledge into a kind of collective unity. It is not possible to make generalizations about whether this was successful.
The phenomenon of “collegial councils” itself is common in various forms of government, reaching from the patrimonial and feudal state to the early stages of bureaucratization. This is especially typical in emerging absolutism. The “collegial councils” were one of the strongest means to demonstrate “objectivity” in the administration. Including socially influential private persons makes it possible to combine a dosage of Honoratioren authority and private business expertise with the expertise and knowledge of the professional Beamte. Indeed, such collegial entities were among the first institutions that made the development of a Behörde58 possible in the modern sense, which is as a kind of institution that is not dependent on personalities and continuously self-contained.
As long as expertise in administrative matters was gained only over a long period of empirical experience, and as long as administrative norms were not regularized but based on traditions, typically a Council of Elders emerged who had a primary consulting capacity relative to the Ruler. The Council of Elders operated often in partnership with the priests, the “eminent statesmen,” as well as the Honoratioren. However, these councils often seized the true power because they were enduring, perennial entities compared to the always changing Rulers. This was the case for the Roman Senate, the Venetian Council, as well as the Athenian Areopagus until it was overthrown in favor of dominion [Herrschaft] of the Demagogos.59 However, these types of entities need to be strictly separated from those discussed in the context of professional entities. Here, we discuss only entities that emerged on the basis of rational and professional specialization, and in which specialized professional knowledge rules, even though many transitional types of such entities may exist. They also need to be differentiated from those advisory councils comprising selected members from private interest groups, which are commonly found in the modern state. The core members in these advisory councils are not Beamte nor have they ever been Beamte before.
Lastly, they also need to be differentiated sociologically from the collegial governing boards (boards of directors) of the contemporary commercial bureaucratic corporations (e.g., common stock corporations). Notwithstanding this, it is not unusual to include Honoratioren in these boards that have no direct interest in the company, either for their professional knowledge or as a means for representation, advocacy, or publicity. Normally these kinds of entities are not bearers of special professional knowledge, but crucial stakeholders who have an economic interest. These include particularly banks financing the corporations. As such, they not only have a consulting position but also a controlling one; most often they have an actual ruling position. They can rather (however, not without some difficulties) be compared to the assemblies of the great independent fief holders (e.g., feudal lords) and bearers of Amt and other socially powerful interest groups in the patrimonial or feudal political systems. These were, however, occasionally precursors of the “Councils” that formed because of the increasing strength of administration and, more often, they were the precursors of “Stand-like” bodies.
Such bureaucratic principles of collegiality were regularly taken from the central main offices and applied to the subordinated levels of administration. As noted in the beginning, collegial administration is rooted in the domination [Herrschaft] of the Honoratioren especially in units that are close and local (e.g., city government). (At first, these consisted of elected officials but, during later stages, at least partly of co-opted “Councilors,” “Magistrates,” “Roman Dekurionen,” and “Lay Judges.”) The Honoratioren are therefore an integral part of any form of self-government and included in the execution of administrative work by local interested parties under the control of bureaucratic government authorities.
The Venetian Councils, and even more so the Roman Senate as mentioned above, are examples of Honoratioren domination [Herrschaft] that was applied to large overseas empires. Usually, this form emerged only from local political organizations. Within the bureaucratic state, the forms of collegial administration disappeared the minute transportation improved, and the technical demands on administration increased. The result of this was that demands for quick and unequivocal decisions and other pressing reasons (many have been already discussed) took center stage and edged toward an all-encompassing bureaucracy and autocracy.
The forms of collegial administration disappeared especially when the development of parliamentary institutions and, often simultaneously, increased public critique from the outside led shifts in emphasis. The thorough and consistent preparation of decisions by the administration became less important than the complete unity in administrative leadership—at least this was true from a Ruler’s viewpoint. Thus, the completely rationalized French system, with its specialized ministers and prefects, stands a good chance under these modern conditions to push back older forms of administration. This is probably complemented by the use of advisory boards consisting of interest groups from the economically and socially influential strata, which have increasingly become more common and formalized (as already discussed).
Especially the latter development, which seeks to put the concrete expertise of interested parties in service to the professional Beamte of a rationalized administration has, certainly, a significant future ahead and will further increase the power of the bureaucracy. It is well established that Bismarck tried to play off the plans for the “Economic Council” as an instrument of power against the [German] Parliament. In turn, he accused the opposing majority of trying to prevent the Beamte officialdom from becoming “too wise” and endangering the power of the parliament (Bismarck would have never granted the Parliament the “right to enquiry” as practiced in the English Parliament).
By the way, the question about what position these special interest boards may attain within the administrative apparatus of the future is not particularly relevant in this context.
Ultimately, only the bureaucratization of the state and law makes it possible to identify a precise terminological distinction between an “objective” legal system and the guaranteed “subjective” rights of the individuals. The same is true for the distinction between the “public” law, which identifies the relations between the Behörde with each other [and] the Behörde and the “subjects,” and the “private law,” which identifies the relations between the governed individuals and their relationships with each other. Bureaucratization requires a terminological distinction between the state as an abstract bearer of Ruling Rights [Herrenrechten] –the creator of legal norms–, and the state as the guarantor of the personal “rights” of individuals. These ideas must have been completely alien to the pre-bureaucratic structures of domination [Herrschaft], especially patrimonial and feudal ones.
Initially, this idea became possible and was de facto carried out in townships as soon as the holders of the Amt were selected through periodic elections. Thus, the individual bearer of ruling power who “practiced” Herrschaft by election, was obviously no longer identical to the person who possessed Herrschaft as a right. This even included the top positions. However, only the total “de-personalization” of the Amt management in bureaucracy and the rationalization of the legal system allowed for the full development of this distinction.
The “Rationalization” of Bildung and Training
These far-reaching general cultural effects that unfold through the advancement of rational, bureaucratic structures of domination cannot be analyzed here. These general cultural effects are independent of the area that bureaucratization occupies. Obviously, the bureaucratization of dominion [Herrschaft] leads to the advancement of rationalized lifestyles. However, this term allows for various meanings. Generally though, we can only state that the development toward rational “objectivity” and toward “professionals” and “specialists,” with all its widespread effects, is promoted by the bureaucratization of any type of governance [Herrschaft].
One integral part of this process can only be hinted at here: the effect on the form of education [Erziehung] and Bildung.
Our continental, occidental educational institutions, especially the higher ones (universities, engineering schools, business schools, Gymnasium schools, and also other middle-level schools), are under pervasive pressure to produce a specific type of Bildung for the modern bureaucracy. The specific type of Bildung breeds the increasingly indispensable system of examinations for specialized knowledge. These tests of specialized knowledge in today’s sense can be found within and outside of bureaucratic entities. For example, today they are also used to certify the “free” professions—medical doctors and lawyers—and in the context of guild-like organized professions.
Further, the tests of specialized knowledge are not always an indispensable side effect of bureaucratization. For example, for a long time, the French, English, and American bureaucracies have largely avoided them, sometimes completely. In such cases, training and service in the party replaced the subject examinations.
In fact, though, “democracy” has an ambivalent attitude toward certification exams as well, just as it does toward every product of bureaucratization that it may nurture at the same time. Such examinations mean, or at least they appear to mean, qualified persons are “selected” from every social strata instead of from Honoratioren-ruling elite. Yet, democracy fears that a privileged “caste” arises out of these exams and the Bildung certification process. Therefore, democracy fights against this.
Finally, certification exams can be found during the pre-bureaucratic and semi-bureaucratic epochs as well. Historically, they appeared first under dominions [Herrschaft] organized by prebendal principles. Prospective entitlements to sinecures were the typical reasons why people study and undergo examinations. These sinecures were first of a religious kind, for instance, in the Islamic Orient and in the Occident during the Middle Ages. Later, in China, they were of a worldly kind. However, these examinations had only partly a real “subject-specific” character.
Only modern full-blown bureaucratization lets the rational and professional nature of the specialized examination system unfold. For example, the Civil Service Reform slowly imports policies regarding the subject-specific training and professional certifications to America. Also into all other countries, it advances from its main breeding ground (in Europe): Germany.
For instance, it is the increasing bureaucratization of administration that enhances the importance of certification examinations in England. The attempt to replace the older semi-patrimonial bureaucracy with a modern form first brought certification by exam to China (replacing the completely different and older examination system there). Finally, it is the bureaucratization of capitalism and its need for professionally trained technicians, commissioners, etc., that spreads certification exams around the whole world.
This development of a formal examination system is forcefully nurtured by the social prestige of Bildung certification. This happens all the more because the Bildung certification itself is turned into economic advantage. Thus, today, the “Bildung” certificate replaces the proof to be of noble origin, which was a requirement for equality of standing, employability by the church, and in all cases where the nobility remained socially powerful, also the qualifications for public Amt.
Today, the production of diplomas awarded by universities, engineering schools, and schools of commerce—altogether the call to produce “Bildung certifications” in every field—serves only to create a privileged stratum in the bureaus and offices. The possession of such certificates serves many purposes. This includes establishing a “connubium” with the Honoratioren (in other words, even in business offices the possession of certificates yields hopes to be favored as a husband of the boss’s daughter), admission to the circle of the “code of honor,” payment based on Stand ranking instead of payment based on output and performance, and assured promotion and pension schemes. But indeed, the holding of such Bildung certification principally promotes monopolization of socially and economically privileged positions in favor of the diploma aspirants. When we hear from all fields the desire to introduce regulated Bildung programs with subject exams, the cause, of course, is not a suddenly awakened “urge for Bildung.” It is rather the wish to restrict the supply of eligible applicants for the positions, and the desire to monopolize these positions to those who hold Bildung certificates. For this monopolization, today the “examinations” are the universal means. Therefore, the spread of these certification exams is unstoppable.
Since a Bildung program is needed to award Bildung certification, and because the costs and waiting periods associated with such a program are considerable, the pursuit of certification therefore means the repression of talent (the “charisma”) in favor of property [because money is needed to complete the program]. This is because the mental “costs” of acquiring a Bildung certification are low, and they become even easier when certifications become a mass phenomenon, not harder.
A chivalrous lifestyle, as required in the old feudal system of qualification, as in Germany, is replaced by rudimentary elements of feudalism (e.g., fraternities [Studentenverbindungen]) of the universities that award Bildung certificates. In Anglo-Saxon countries, this function is fulfilled by sports teams and social clubs.60
Furthermore, bureaucracy everywhere strives to develop a sort of “right to the Amt” by creating regulated and organized disciplinary procedures, and removing the possibility of arbitrary dismissal of Beamte by their “superiors.” Furthermore, bureaucracy seeks to secure the Beamte’s position, his regular advancement, and his provision for old age. In doing this, the bureaucracy is supported by the “democratic” attitude of the citizens who demand the minimization of Herrschaft, and support the bureaucracy in their attempts to implement the right to the Amt [by trained Beamte]. The citizens believe that every weakening of the Ruler’s arbitrary power over the Beamte is a sign that the Ruler’s absolute authority, in general, is weakened.
Therefore, bureaucracy itself becomes the bearer of specific “Stand-like” characteristics, both in private business offices and in the public sector – just like in the past the bearers of Amt, whose characteristics were total different, assumed a Stand-like character.
I already mentioned before that these “Stand-like” qualities emerged because they improved the technical capacity of the bureaucracy for its specific tasks. However, democracy reacts against such an inevitable “Stand-like” character by demanding that Beamte are elected for a short period of time instead of appointing Beamte for a longer term. Democracy also seeks to introduce plebiscites to unseat Beamte, instead of regulated disciplinary actions. In other words, democracy tries to replace the arbitrary ordinances of the superior “Ruler” with the equally arbitrary rule by the citizens, which really means replacing the Ruler with the party bosses who then dominate the citizens.
However, social prestige based on defined Bildung and education is not only a characteristic of bureaucracy. On the contrary. In different ruling systems [Herrschaft structures] social prestige rests on very different foundations. For example, there are feudal, theocratic, and patrimonial structures of Herrschaft as well as the English Honoratioren administration, the ancient patrimonial Chinese bureaucracy, and the Hellenic Demagogos Herrschaft (the so-called democracy): all had a similar educational goal that was the foundation for social prestige—it was not the expert, but the “cultivated human being” who was honored and promoted.
The term “cultivated” is used here as a value-free term, simply meaning that the goal of education was to produce students who would live a life with a specific lifestyle that was regarded as “cultivated.” The educational goal was not the instilling of specialized knowledge. The cultivated personality was Bildung’s ideal, which was in turn shaped by the system of Herrschaft and the social conditions that determined the belonging to a ruling strata. For example, the cultivated personal ideal could be focused on chivalric, ascetic, or, as in China, on a literary nature. In Greece, it was focused on a cultivation of gymnastic skills and the fine arts. In England, a cultivated personality was represented by the conventional English gentleman.
The qualification of the Ruling Elite itself was based on having “more” of this “cultural quality” (meant as a value-free, ever-changing term as we used it here) and not on its expert knowledge. Nonetheless, martial, theological, and juridical expert knowledge and skills were of course cultivated.
However, in the Bildung systems of Greece, the Middle Ages, and China, programs were all centered on areas other than “useful” subject-specialist expert knowledge. Behind all these current discussions about the fundamentals of the Bildung system, we will find somewhere at its roots the critical question: What type of human being do we want: a person of expert knowledge (“technocrat”) or a person with the ancient forms of cultivation? This antagonism of two ideal types reaches far into all intimate questions of culture and is caused by the unstoppable and rampant growth of bureaucracy in all kinds of public and private Herrschaft structures, and by the increasing importance of export knowledge.
Conclusion: Bureaucracy and Different Administrative Structures
The bureaucratic organization in its advance had to overcome the mostly negative inhibitions against social leveling, which was required for it to advance further. This point has been addressed several times. Also, bureaucracy crossbred and continues to do so with various administrative structures that were based on heterogeneous principles. We already touched on some of these types of administrative structures already. And while it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss all of these very real existing types of administration, the most important structural principles will be argued here with a simplified formula.
We have to consider two main questions regarding these determined structural principles.
1. Are the underlying structural principles of economic or purely political origin? Or is the structure determined by its own internal technical structure itself, which therefore produces its own chances for development?
2. The second question is, if in turn economic effects unfold at all, and if yes, which specific economic affects are there?
To understand this from the start, one must keep in mind the fluidity and blending of all these organizational principles. For example, the “pure” types are rare borderline cases and are valuable and indispensable for thorough analysis. Historical reality, in fact, wavers between hybrid versions of these pure types.
It is also apparent that general bureaucratic structures have only recently developed. The farther back in time we go, the more typical the absence of bureaucracy and Beamte officialdom is for the structure of domination and governance [Herrschaft]. The bureaucracy has a “rational” character, and it is regulations, purposes, means, and impersonal objectivity that control its demeanor. Therefore, the development and spreading of bureaucracy had, in a special sense, a “revolutionary” effect everywhere (which needs to be discussed later), just like the advancement of rationalism in general was prone to a “revolutionary” effect in all areas.
While on the move, bureaucracy eliminated all forms of governmental structures and concepts of combination [Herrschaft] which did not have a rational character in this very specific sense and content. At this point, we have to ask: Which were those forms of Herrschaft domination that were eliminated?
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1 Weber is making the point that the same bureaucratic structures are found not only in government offices (e.g., Amt and Behörde), but also in large private businesses, and in institutions such as churches and political parties. Note that in German, Amt and Behörde are often synonyms. Nonetheless, Weber maintains the distinction between the two throughout his writing.
2 Weber refers to Frederick the Great of Prussia, who famously called himself the “first servant of the state” ( der erste Diener des Staates). This claim is typical of modern monarchs. See Benedict Anderson (2006:1–40). I put it in the Bib.
3 Kunstlehre in German original. The term refers to the understanding of a science as practical and applied (i.e., economics as a science that informs political decisions).
4 Regarding this distinction, see also “Politics as Vocation,” p. XXX.
5 “The Third Element” of the technical Beamte in Russia included doctors and statisticians. This third element was radicalized as “proletariat” during the 1905 Russian Revolution.
6 English in original.
7 Weber was liberal in his use of “Caesarism” to describe the various figures who emerged out of democratic and nondemocratic circumstances (and often both within the same people). Besides American mayors, Weber also used the epithet “Caesarism” for the two Bonapartes, Lloyd George, Gladstone, Pericles, Cleon, and Lasalle. But in Weber’s estimation, Germany’s long-time Iron Chancellor Otto von Bismarck “supremely holds this title” of Caesarism (See Baehr 1991 [1988]:149).
8 Oddly, Weber does not mention charismatic leadership or Führer in this context.
9 Ministeralis (unfree knights) had vassal relationships with aristocrats. Free knights did not. The definition of such varied a great deal in twelfth-century Germany.
10 In original Latin: “ character indelibilis.” This is a reference to Christian sacraments such as the christening, which are deemed irrevocable and unrepeateable.
11 See Section VIII (pp. XX–XX) in this essay.
12 This is Weber’s one use of the term habitus, a sociological concept developed much further by Pierre Bourdieu and others later in the twentieth century.
13 Weber is referring to various forms of “tax-farming,” which involves leasing government assets to private contractors for operation. This was common in the Roman Empire and in India. Versions of it occur in the modern world (i.e., when the rights to operate a bridge and collect tolls are sold by a government to a private company).
14 Weber is referring to an older system of peasants who worked on a manor (Latin villicus) under a steward or owner. This was later changed into a lease system, in which peasants paid rents to the manor (Hof). The term Hof first appears in the eighth century, but the conversion of the Villikations system to leaseholds took many centuries after that. See Michael Mitterauer (2010), Why Europe? The Medieval Origins of its Special Path (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 29.
15 To see why this is the case, see “Discipline and Charisma,” p. XXX.
16 This is a reference to the hodgepodge of German city statelets on the one hand (like Hamburg, Frankfurt, etc.) and the larger territorial states (like Prussia, Hannover, and Bavaria). This hodgepodge reflected administration of what is now Germany before unification in 1871.
17 Weber makes clear that Beamte and Bureaucracy are not necessarily coincident (i.e., that there are Beamte without bureaucracies). See Weber’s definition of modern bureaucracy above, p. XXX.
18 Honoratioren are “notables” and other respected people/families of the community who do not hold noble status. In England, this group would come to include “the gentry.”
19 English in original.
20 Weber argues that bureaucracies generally are not able to handle tasks on a case-by-case basis, but are based on rules and regulations.
21 See pp. XXX in Weber’s essay “Classes, Stände, Parties” for a description of class and Stand in the free markets of the modern capitalist economy.
22 Probably a reference to Marx’s division of society into base and super-structure.
23 Actually, the original Latin is “sine ira et studio” (Tacitus, Annales 1.1); however “ac” and “et” both mean “and.” It means “without anger and fondness.”
24 Kunstlehre in original. See note 20 above.
25 Apparently Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786).
26 Weber is saying that the “democratic” forms of justice (i.e., using lay juries and lay judges such as those commonly found in the system of lower courts of England) do not necessarily generate the “rational” findings that would be expected of professionally trained judges.
27 Weber is referring to the absence of a national jurisdiction in Germany before unification in 1871. Before unification, Germany was a collection of statelets, which made assertion of a national jurisdiction impossible, even by the largest component, Prussia.
28 Roman Law was reintroduced in Europe in the eighteenth century in large part to codify property and inheritance rights. This was particularly relevant with the emergence of capitalist corporations.
29 Tests of endurance are well known to cultural anthropologists as methods for divining the truth in the legal systems of premodern societies.
30 Latin in original: “actiones in factum.” A jurisdiction that was created for a particular case by the Praetor.
31 Weber uses an alternative transliteration for the Arabic word Kadi.
32 See Matthew 4:4 and Matthew 5:22.
33 Alternative Arabic transliteration in Weber’s original.
34 This argument echoes the tension Weber describes between Gesinnungsethik and Verantwortungsethik in “Politics as Vocation.” See pp. XXX-XXX.
35 “Kabinettsjustiz” describes the influence of absolute monarchs and Rulers on legal proceedings/trials during the time of Absolute monarchies.
36 See “Politics as Vocation” for a discussion of how press and party leaders do this, pp. XX-XX.
37 Weber is referring to the premodern tendency for rural gentry/nobility to become military officers, rather than urban bourgeois traders. Only when technical military skills became more important did the sons of urban elites become interested in becoming military officers.
38 The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) was one of the most violent and influential series of conflicts of modern era Europe.
39 The treaties of Tilsit, signed in July 1807, settled the war of the Fourth Coalition against Napoleon I (1806–7). By these treaties, Prussia lost a huge area of its territory.
40 A regiment usually consists of several companies. A battalion—which Weber refers to in the next sentence—is a further unit between the regiment and the company.
41 Justus von Liebig (1803–1873), famous German chemist. He became a professor of chemistry at age 21 at the University of Gießen (today called Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen).
42 This remark about the “separation of the means of production” for the scientist is elaborated upon in Weber’s classic essay “Science as Vocation” (see e.g. Strong et al. in Weber 2004:xix-xxx) and perhaps reflects Weber’s personal struggles in academia (see Radkau 2009:487-488). Weber is also making an explicit reference to Marx’s description of capitalism in describing academic institutes/departments. The Vocation Lectures. Edited and with an Introduction by David Owen and Tracy B. Strong. Please check if Strong et al. would be correct here.>
43 This system was introduced in the Middle Ages in England to settle minor issues locally. Through colonization, the system spread to many other areas of the world and continues to exist, for instance, in the United States and Australia.
44 Weber is referring to the emergence of mass political parties in Germany, England, and the United States during the nineteenth century. References to these movements are throughout this section of Weber’s essay. The point is that the nature of power shifted from the conservative Honoratioren to mass parties organized in a bureaucratic fashion. Caucus democracies privilege party loyalists and Honratioren by giving them power over candidate selection in exclusive caucus meetings—such meetings were an innovation of the nineteenth century when former groups of Honoratioren struggled to organize rationalized mass parties.
45 Proportional representation. An electoral system where seats in the parliament are awarded based on all the votes for a party, and not based on the number of won electoral districts.
46 Demos is the population of an ancient Greek state and considered a political entity composed of the population of the common people.
47 This refers to the First Vatican Council in 1869–1870.
48 Weber’s sentence is not complete.
49 See also footnote XXX in “Discipline and Charisma” this volume.
50 See also Weber’s description of psycho-physical discipline on pp. XX of “Discipline and Charisma.”
51 Weber refers to Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), a Russian anarchist.
52 Again, this is a reference to the automaticity of norm-based habitual action.
53 This is a critical example in Weber’s argument and focused by the irony of the situation. What Weber is asserting, is that Bismarck, operating under older assumptions about administration rooted in pious obedience to the Ruler, was surprised when the rational bureaucracy he created continued to operate after his dismissal. However, the German bureaucracy was no longer reliant on the personality of its creator, Bismarck, and continued to operate as before, despite his dismissal.
54 Weber makes a passing reference to Gaius Maecenas, the political and financial backer of Augustus Caesar.
55 In this section, Weber is analyzing the situation where bureaucracy and democracy occur together. However, he points out, just because they develop together, does not mean that there is a causal relationship. Rather both bureaucracy and democracy emerge out of the conditions that precede both. One does not cause the other, even though it may seem to be the case.
56 1076 is apparently a reference to the Investiture Controversy of 1076 between the Holy Roman emperor Henry IV who maneuvered church bishops and princes to depose Pope Gregory VII.
57 The “Canal Rebellions” of 1899 occurred when conservative members of the Prussian government, with the cooperation of the Beamte, opposed the construction of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s personal project to build a canal between the Elbe and Rhine river basins. Kaiser Wilhelm II had 20 senior Beamte temporarily suspended from their Amt. See Weber (2005b) “[Erhaltung des Charisma/Disziplin und Charisma]” in Gesamtausgabe Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Teilband 22–4, ed. Edith Hanke with Thomas Kroll (220, fn. 25)
58 In this context, a good translation for Behörde might be “Commission.” The Beamte of the Behörde work for a commission that, as a group of Honoratioren, are “super-ordinate” over them. As Weber points out, this means that personalities in the hierarchy become less important.
59 By “ Demagogos,” Weber is describing the individual “demogogues” who came to rule in Ancient Greece by using force of personality. It is not meant in a negative sense here. See “Politics as Vocation,” pp. XX-XX, and “Charisma and Discipline,” pp. XX-XX.
60 At the time that Weber was writing, there were various types of fraternities, sororities, secret societies, and sports teams emerging in university settings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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