Thesis Title: Subtitle

Ontological and Theoretical Assumptions

Critical realism is the ontological position that reality has an objective existence independent of the subjective understandings of any one observer (Danermark et al. 2002). Critical realism acknowledges that this objective reality can only ever be partially understood and accessed via discourse and representation (Dyson and Brown 2006). Scott (2005) argues that while our knowledge of reality can only ever be partial this does not mean that social phenomena - which are separate to an individual’s existence and understandings - do not exist. Critical realism is an attempt to reconcile context-bound and emergent descriptions about the world with the ontological position that reality exists outside of and independent to these attempts to describe it (Scott 2005). Thus accounts of Facebook produced by this research are only ever able to partially represent the phenomena under study; they are constrained by the position of those giving the accounts, in keeping with the ontological status given to reality as only partially knowable. Therefore, the accounts presented in this research may differ from other studies as they are a reflection of the unique characteristics of the participants in this research.
The foundations of critical realism are found in the work of Bhaskar (1978) and Lukes (1974). The critical realist approach espoused by Bhaskar (1978) focuses on the relationship between reality and science. Science, as defined by critical realism, is practical research work with the knowledge produced by scientific research being regarded as separate to the practice of research itself. In an attempt to understand reality through practical research work, Bhaskar (1978) proposed that the fundamental ontological question is: “What must reality be like to make the existence of science possible?” (in Danermark et al. 2002: 18). From the existence of scientific practice it is possible to conclude that there is an independent reality that exists separately to our knowledge of it. It can also be concluded that important aspects of this reality and how it behaves are not always immediately accessible through observation. Thus, one of the key properties of reality is that it is not transparent because it acts in ways that we cannot observe directly and the ways in which we can know about this reality are conceptually mediated.
As such, Bhaskar (1978) argues that there are three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Empirical domains are comprised of direct and indirect experiences. This is distinct from what Bhaskar (1978) calls the ‘actual’ domain, in which events happen whether or not we are able to perceive them. This domain accounts for things happening in the world outside of our experience, or indeed our ability to perceive that these things occur. The third aspect of Bhaskar’s (1978: 56) “ontological map” is the domain of the ‘real’. This domain contains the objects or mechanisms that produce events in the world. These mechanisms in themselves are often unobservable; however their effects can be examined and observed. Danermark et al. (2002) argue that not only does knowledge produced in this process have meanings, but it also has different meanings to different people. Reality, according to a critical realist perspective is differentiated, structured and stratified, there are many different practices and interests, which sometimes conflict (Sayer 2000). Associated with these practices and interests are parallel, and sometimes competing interpretations and conceptual frameworks. Social constructions are constructions of a reality that exists independently to what that reality may look like.
These philosophical foundations have since been applied to social science by scholars such as Archer (1998), Sayer (1997) Cruishank (2003) and Hammersley (1992). The application of critical realism to the social sciences raises slightly different issues than its application to the natural sciences as the knowledge produced by scientific activity is fundamentally different in nature to the knowledge produced by social scientists. Natural scientists are interpreting naturally produced, but socially defined objects. In contrast, the
objects studied by social scientists are both socially produced and socially defined (Danermark et al. 2002). Although the socially produced objects studied by social scientists might not have the same stability as naturally produced objects they still have powers and mechanisms that operate independently of the social meanings and actions surrounding them.
Therefore, the object of this study (Facebook) exists beyond the meanings participants give to it. In this case, technology is a constraining factor, as the way Facebook is designed affects how and why people engage with (and through) this technology. There is a case to be made for regarding technology as an institution itself, as opposed to how it is traditionally theorised as a catalyst of cultural and institutional change (Brey 2003). This means acknowledging technology as a social entity in its own right, not merely one viewed through other regulative frameworks such as capitalism, governance or family (Brey 2003). Technology is a social phenomenon, an object and structuring force, which means to a certain extent it has a deterministic role in shaping collective behaviour. However, technology is also subject to social forces, as much as it shapes them. Practices and discourse surrounding certain technologies and their use can mean that they are used in unintended or surprising ways. This research is interested in this dialectical relationship between technology and mechanisms that produce events (or behaviour). A critical realist approach acknowledges that social mechanisms (or structures) do not have the same fixity as generative mechanisms in the natural world. This means that social mechanisms can adapt and change over time in response to qualitative transformations in behaviour. This approach is well suited the object of study, Facebook, and by extension technology more broadly, as technologies, like other social structures generate events, but are particularly prone to sudden emergence and decline which suggest that they are also shaped by behaviour.
The epistemological position that best encompasses the way that critical realism is used in in this thesis is what Hammersley terms “subtle realism” (1992: 51). Hammersley identifies realism as lying between naïve realism and relativism, and therefore avoiding some of the epistemological pitfalls of these positions. Subtle realism investigates independent, knowable phenomena, while acknowledging that research cannot directly access those phenomena. From this perspective the aim of social research is to represent (but not reproduce) reality (Hammersley 1992). Therefore, subtle realism attempts to reconcile context-dependent descriptions about the world with an independent reality that exists outside of, and is independent of, attempts to describe it (Scott 2005). However, as
research always takes place from a particular point of view of the researcher, some features of the object of the study are rendered more relevant than others. This means there can be multiple (and potentially contradictory) accounts of the same phenomenon (Hammersley 1992). As subtle realism is concerned with representing reality as opposed to ascertaining its ‘truth’, all of these representations have the potential to be valid.