Thesis Title: Subtitle

The Unthinking Script: Conscious and Unconscious Self-presentation

While the self presented on Facebook is inarguably consciously structured, there are also unconscious or unthinking elements present as well. This section will firstly deal with the more unconscious aspects of self-presentation, and then move on to discuss how participants understand and assess authenticity. Just as the self is consciously and unconsciously drawn from various sources, the self is also consciously and unconsciously presented both online and in face-to-face communication. While participants did not perceive themselves as engaged in deliberative performative work on Facebook, they nonetheless begin from an understanding that what is presented on Facebook is in some ways edited. Within participant accounts there is some tension between the conscious and unconscious presentation of the self. The tension between the conscious and unconscious aspect of self presentation provides a way for participants to judge authenticity by observing patterns of behaviour over time.

In some ways much of the presentation of the self can be understood as unconscious or following an unthinking script. Mark (29) is minimal and cautious with his Facebook use; he posts less than once a month, and rarely about anything from which a casual observer could glean much insight into his private life. He explains that this is a reflection of his reserved personality offline as well, as he is habitually cautious about disclosing overly personal information. After reflecting on this he laughed and stated: “I am giving away more [about myself] than I thought I was on Facebook.”

This admission is theoretically interesting, as much contemporary scholarship references Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical theory when discussing the presentation of the self on Facebook. Performative themes are indisputably different in Goffman’s (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. While this is a key component of his theory, Goffman explicitly states in his introduction that his book is concerned with

two kinds of communication – expression given and expressions given off and of these two I will be primarily concerned with the latter, with the more theatrical and contextual kind, the non-verbal, presumably unintentional kind, [emphasis added] whether this communication be purposely engineered or not (1959: 4).

He goes on to argue that while some performances may be deliberately constructed to present a particular view of the self, the impression given does not necessarily align with the impression given off. Thus, Goffman’s primary interest appears to lie somewhere between the conscious and unconscious and between what is intended and what is received. However, when Goffman’s work is used, the focus is on the performative aspect of his theory (e.g. Donath and boyd 2004) and the conscious construction of a desired impression (Zhoa et al. 2008) as well as the strategic actions individuals undertake when engaging in impression management (Rosenburg and Egbert 2011). Dominant readings of Goffman’s work appear to focus on the deliberate actions of actions of self-presentation to maintain desired, positive impressions. Goffman’s work is also used with regards to privacy settings on Facebook, utilising his metaphor of back and front regions where different identities may be shown to different audiences (Zhoa et al. 2008). Livingstone (2008) also utilises this aspect of Goffman’s work, but focuses on the potential clash of backstage and front stage selves if privacy is not adequately managed on Facebook. The examples listed here, are but a few of a dominant reading of Goffman’s work as it relates to Facebook, privacy and particularly the performance of the self.

What is lacking in the literature regarding self-presentation on Facebook is an acknowledgement of the unconscious presentation of self. That people can, as with embodied interaction, ‘give off’ impressions about themselves of which they are not fully conscious, is evident in Mark’s reflection about his presence on Facebook. Mark thought he was being careful and cautious with his online self-presentation. Over the course of our interview, I noticed that Mark repeatedly emphasised that privacy (in general) was important to him and his partner. When I noted that this seemed to be reflected in what he posted (or didn’t post) to Facebook, he was surprised to realise that despite what he thought, he was giving off cues about his personality on Facebook. Indeed, Schlenker (2003) argues that in most instances the presentation of the self is automatic, and not consciously delivered. While in the first instance self-presentation may be deliberative, for example representing oneself in a new workplace, these actions become habits, and thus automatic parts of everyday life.

Similarly in the first instance, self-presentation on Facebook may be deliberate and the initial construction of a profile causes one to consider what parts of the self one would like to represent. In this way users can be understood as initially crafting an identity on Facebook, and engaging in strategic impression management. When a user creates a new Facebook page, Facebook guides the users through various prompts, all of which are designed to elicit information about the self on a basic level, such as information concerning age, gender and location, as well as a more expressive level such as one’s favourite music, television shows and other general interests. Engaging with these prompts forces users to consider how much they are willing to disclose. However, over time Facebook becomes part of users’ daily routines and therefore engagement on Facebook is not unfamiliar enough to prompt continuous, conscious self-presentation.
Facebook use as a part of daily life is supported in the responses to the structured questionnaire. Eighty percent of respondents to the structured questionnaire indicated that they logged on to Facebook ‘multiple times a day’. A further 14.5% of respondents logged in once a day, with the remaining respondents indicating they logged in 2-3 times per week. For 80% of respondents, Facebook use appears to be a habitual part of their routine. Schlenker (2003) argues that engaging in conscious self-presentation in routine activities is not the norm and argues that individuals often unthinkingly follow self- presentation scripts after engaging in initial impression management. Sally describes her family dynamics on Facebook as following these unthinking scripts of self-presentation and interaction. The scripts that play offline also occur on Facebook.

I’m trying to think of examples where things have stood out or surprised me when people have posted them on Facebook. When I compare that to whether they would have done that in real life, I’m finding that really hard, because most people who do, they do that in real life too. So classic arguments that I see on Facebook are between my cousin and my uncle…and other random people commenting on it, and it’s usually about politics…and then my other uncle gets in, and they have these blaring ‘let’s throw food at each other’ fight on Facebook. But I know very well if we were to have a barbeque next Sunday lunch they would have to same discussion.

When attempting to locate a disjuncture between someone’s self-presentation on Facebook, and how they appear offline, Sally (F, 24) struggles, stating that it is “hard to

find a surprising example.” This further supports the claim that cues given off on Facebook are similar to those that occur offline. Like the offline environment, people may drift in and out of conscious self-presentation. Consciously representing the self in all interactions is close to an impossible task, and as Goffman (1959) highlights, individuals are not necessarily in control of how those impressions are received. As Facebook is part of participants’ daily lives it can be argued that interacting on Facebook is not unfamiliar enough to prompt conscious self-presentation.

Additionally, Facebook is a unique online environment in that it ties a disembodied self to a corporeal form. This means fewer opportunities to construct a radically different presentation of the space, as self-presentation on Facebook is attached to a body, “which persists over time and is locatable in space” (Slater 1998: 93). This is a stark contrast to many previous online environments in which an individual’s self-presentation was not falsifiable, as it is not attached to a body that is locatable in space (Slater 1998).

Therefore, what was presented online was understood as an identity, which is separate from the body, which acts as a container or guarantor of the ‘real’ self (Slater 1998).
Facebook, in part, has undone this dualistic understanding of offline and online selves by linking online self- presentation to a real and falsifiable body. The blending of offline and online life means others feel more comfortable making inferences about an individual on Facebook. This is because they have a larger amount of previous information available to them, both via Facebook and face-to-face interaction. The link between Facebook and a locatable body is also a limiting or constraining aspect on self-presentation, as interaction in a space that contains known others, including friends and family, means that the fluidity of self-presentation is limited, and therefore reads as unsurprising, which is congruent with the body and self located offline. This aspect will be explored further in the following section.