University of world economy and diplomacy of ministry of foreign affairs of republic of uzbekistan

1.Importance of “think tanks” in Asian countries.

1.1 History of development the Chinese “think tanks”

The astonishing economic growth of the past twenty years for years, China has been making incredible changes. Inside the China is progressively the context of these transformations, face some daunting and complex obstacles issues important both domestically and in foreign policy. For this cause, as the demand for sound and creative policy proposals rises in China, think tanks are growing and becoming more visible and seemingly more powerful. Scholars around the world are paying more attention, exploring their features, their operating modes, and, more importantly, their position in the apparatus of policymaking.

Because of the dynamic and complex nature of China's foreign policy problems, China's leadership has started to rely on the scope and complexity of the issues involved specialists' support and experience. The effect of think-tanks on the Chinese foreign policy mechanism is growing under Jiang and Hu, where numerous networks have been developed not only between the core and the periphery, but also between decision-makers from separate think tanks and think tanks. China's foreign policy think-tanks have contributed greatly to Chinese foreign policy making and policy guidance over the past twenty years. Their position is expected to continue and expand as there is more scope for policy input in policy circles in the coming years.¹

There were only a few international relations research institutes in Mao's China, including the China Institute of International Relations, established in 1956 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Afro-Asia Research Institute, established in 1961 under the CCP International Liaison Department, and the China Institute of Contemporary Honesty, established in 1961. However, for three reasons: ideological bias, the bureaucratic establishment, and the perceived position of the research institutes, these Foreign Relations Research Institutes were not permitted to perform policy research.

Foreign policy experts were also not permitted to perform any studies that could diverge from the Marxist ideology of class struggle, not only in China's foreign and domestic policy-making, but also in the analysis of social science topics, including international relations, (under the close supervision of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought). While there were a number of intellectuals who promoted "a degree of pluralism and intellectual participation in political decision-making in the 1950s,"² the central government condemned those views, considering the suffocating political condition and because of ideological roots. Therefore, prior to the late 1970s, the study of foreign affairs was confined to international communist movements, and national independence movements and policy research other than those promoting or developing official policies were not permitted to see the light of day.

As the new wave of leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping took power in the late 1970s after Mao China, they added greater weight & importance to institutional decision making procedures. For two reasons, international affairs think tanks have grown in number and in the nature of their involvement: first, unlike Mao, the new leadership did not enjoy charisma and authority; thus, personal importance had to give way to the bureaucratic process. And secondly, economic growth was given first priority as realistic views replaced theological interests in post-Mao Chinese foreign policy. Therefore, it has been difficult for the current administration to make sound choices on foreign policy without further competent guidance. Under these circumstances, in China's foreign policy phase, Chinese research institutes, particularly those dealing with foreign relations, international economic cooperation and national security, have begun to play a role as think tanks. The foreign affairs think tanks permitted the Chinese foreign policy-making process to be distinguished by stability, clarity and moderation by providing a wider variety of advice with more imaginative suggestions. Numerous foreign relations research institutes and strategic studies were founded or re-established in China in the late 1970s in order to provide intelligence and policy guidance on foreign affairs to the top Chinese leaders.

These newly resumed foreign policy research institutes were largely subordinated, under the Ministry of State Security and the China Institute of International Studies, to the central government agencies, such as CICIR (CHS, formerly the China Institute of International Relations). New international study institutes, including the Development Research Centre (1981) under the State Council, the China Centre for International Studies (1982 and merged with the CIIS in 1998) and the Center for International Trade and Economic Cooperation (1997 and later) under the Chinese Academy for International Trade and Economic Cooperation, have also been created (Ministry of Commerce from 2003 onwards). The China Center for International Strategic Studies, a semi-private think tank, was also founded in 1979 and was led by former PLA Deputy General Staff Chief Wu Xiuquan. The Centre for Peace and Development Studies was founded in Beijing in December 1984; it was affiliated with the China Association for International Friendly Interaction, but also had relations with the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) General Political Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of State Security.

Several academic departments and institutes have also been revived and developed at different universities, such as the Foreign Policy Departments at Peking University, the People's University in Beijing and Fudan University in Shanghai, and IR research institutes such as the Institute of International Relations and the Centre for American Studies at the Universities of Beijing and Fudan, and the Institute of International Relations and the Centre for American Studies at the Universities of Beijing and Fudan. These university departments and institutes, however, concentrated largely on scholarly research and education prior to the early 1990s, with only a limited role in China's foreign policy operation.

Modern Chinese thank tanks are increasing. There are top ten current ‘think tank’ which developed and influence in foreign policy of state.³