Version Information

Journaling File Systems 
When a file-hosted TrueCrypt container is stored in a journaling file system (such as NTFS), a copy 
of the TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain in the free space on the host volume. 
This may have various security implications. For example, if you change the volume 
password/keyfile(s) and an adversary finds the old copy or fragment (the old header) of the 
TrueCrypt volume, he might use it to mount the volume using an old compromised password 
(and/or using compromised keyfiles using an old compromised password (and/or using 
compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume before the volume header was re-
encrypted). Some journaling file systems also internally record file access times and other 
potentially sensitive information. If you need plausible deniability (see section Plausible 
Deniability), you must not store file-hosted TrueCrypt containers in journaling file systems. To 
prevent possible security issues related to journaling file systems, do one the following: 
• Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted. 
• Store the container in a non-journaling file system (for example, FAT32). 

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95 
Volume Clones 
Never create a new TrueCrypt volume by cloning an existing TrueCrypt volume. Always use the 
TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard to create a new TrueCrypt volume. If you clone a volume and 
then start using both this volume and its clone in a way that both eventually contain different data, 
then you might aid cryptanalysis (both volumes will share a single key set). This is especially 
critical when the volume contains a hidden volume. Also note that plausible deniability (see section 
Plausible Deniability) is impossible in such cases. See also the chapter How to Back Up Securely.