vol4.pdf [Ivanovskiy Boris Andreyevich]

The final configuration of the N-1 

rocket (with the six extra engines on 

the first stage).

 46.   At the time, Yuriy Aleksandrovich Mozzhorin (1920–1998) was director of NII-88 (later 

known as TsNIImash), the leading research institute of the Soviet missile and space program. In 

this position he played a key role in developing long-term policy for the Soviet space program.

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

foremost, the installation of six more engines on the first stage and, unlike the 

Americans’ layout, the appearance of fourth and fifth stages—Block G and 

Block D for the boost to the Moon. The launch mass of the N1-L3, taking the 

new proposals into account, had grown to 2,750 tons. All the measures made 

it possible to increase the in-orbit payload mass from 75 tons to 93 tons. But 

we still needed to work and work on these ideas!

Under these circumstances, the deadlines specified in the decrees for the 

beginning of flight-developmental tests in 1965 looked absurd. Everyone 

up and down the chain of command understood this. We needed an official 

reason to revise the deadlines and, finally, a decision about the main mission 

for the super-heavy N-1 launch vehicle that was under development. On 

19 June 1964, the Central Committee and Council of Ministers issued a 

decree allowing the deadlines for the beginning of flight-developmental tests 

to be postponed to 1966.

Ryazanskiy had this to say about that: “Fox terriers get their tails docked 

when they’re puppies. But in our case, so that it won’t be so painful, they’re 

going to chop off a little piece every year.”

Everyone knew that shifting the deadline back a year wouldn’t save us—

common sense called for the deadlines for the beginning of flight-developmental 

tests to be moved back at least three years. But no one dared go to the Central 

Committee and then to the Politburo with such seditious proposals. This same 

decree calling for a technical and scientific expert review of controversial issues 

established a council on the N-1 complex under the chairmanship of Keldysh.

On 23 June 1964, Korolev convened the Council of Chief Designers to 

discuss operations on the N-1 in view of the latest decree. In his introductory 

speech, Korolev outlined the state of affairs, taking the opportunity to say that 

the two design schools of engine specialists had not helped in the selection of 

the type of liquid-propellant rocket engine and had delayed the design process.

Korolev informed them that there was a chance that another decree would 

come out, which would finally say that a landing expedition to the Moon was 

the main mission for the N-1. Then, going up to a poster, he briefly discussed 

and showed what the whole rocket complex would look like for the flight 

to the Moon. The three-stage N-1 launch vehicle would insert the upper 

stage—the payload—into Earth orbit. The following were installed under the 

fairing of the upper stage: Block G, which would initiate acceleration toward 

the Moon; Block D, which would accelerate and brake to make the transition 

into lunar orbit and brake to descend from lunar orbit; and two vehicles—the 

Lunar Orbital Vehicle (LOK) and the Lunar (landing) Vehicle (LK). Each of 

the vehicles had its own propulsion system. On the LOK this was Block I, 

and on the LK—Block Ye. An Emergency Rescue System (SAS) was mounted 

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N1-L3 Lunar Program Under Korolev

over the fairing.

47

 The mass of this system was also included in the total mass 

of the launch vehicle’s payload.

Keldysh, who had nodded off, woke with a start and remarked that our 

greatest shortcoming was the fact that there was no hope that the liquid-

hydrogen engine would appear in the coming year. In his opinion, the chief 

designers of engines, who had not fulfilled the preceding government decisions 

with regard to the hydrogen problem, bore the responsibility for this lack of 

progress. Korolev stood up for the engine specialists and said that we were 

already developing a hydrogen block for the upper stages. This would be the 

booster block instead of Blocks G and D to set the spacecraft on a trajectory 

toward the Moon. He noted that “We are conducting the design with reference 

to Isayev’s hydrogen engines with 7 to 8 tons of thrust. Lyulka’s OKB-165 is 

working on an engine for the third stage with up to 40 tons of thrust.” If we 

managed to build a third stage using these engines, we would get rid of all our 

mass deficit problems for the lunar expedition.

Glushko did not miss the opportunity to remind us that three years ago 

he had proposed developing a launch vehicle that ran on high-boiling propel-

lant components.

“Today we would already have closed-loop configuration engines with 150 

tons of thrust each for all of the stages,” he declared.

48

Keldysh suddenly pounced on Glushko: “Valentin Petrovich, you have had 

more opportunity to develop powerful oxygen-kerosene and oxygen-hydrogen 

engines than the others. Returning to conversations about high-boiling components 

for the N-1 today means killing the project completely. All the decisions on that 

matter have been made. We don’t have time for arguments about the selection of 

engines for the N-1. We must clearly define the priority objective for the launch 

vehicle—this landing expedition to the Moon. We need to immediately nail down 

the number of cosmonauts—two or three, the entire expedition plan, and revisit 

the problem of reliability. First and foremost, I’m concerned about reliability issues.”

“Reliability is exactly what I had in mind,” Glushko retorted to Keldysh 

very calmly. “The engine that we developed for the UR-500 has been optimized 

and has already been handed over for series production.”

49

 47.   SAS—Sistema avariynogo spaseniya.

 48.   A “closed-loop” or “closed-cycle” rocket engine, typically known in the West as a staged 

combustion cycle engine, provides higher efficiency than the standard “open-cycle” liquid-

propellant rocket engines because in a “closed-cycle” engine, all of the engine’s gases and heat 

pass through the combustion chamber. The first prototype “closed-cycle” rocket engine was 

developed at NII-1 in the late 1950s. The first operational engine was the 11D33 used on the 

8K78 launch vehicle’s Block I stage.

 49.   That engine was the RD-253 (or 11D43).

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

Pilyugin felt compelled to remind us that in addition to the engines there 

was also the control system: “We must unequivocally understand that we still 

have to develop a system for the flight to the Moon with controlled landing 

and return, and not simply some sort of all-purpose system. I request that 

Sergey Pavlovich provide us with comprehensive baseline data for the upper 

blocks and the vehicles. This is new work for us.”

Barmin also spoke up: “We have managed to speed up construction of 

the launch site lately. There are a lot of problems there. But keep in mind that 

we have made no provisions for hydrogen. If you decide to use it, even if only 

for the booster block, for us this will be a new assignment, new funding, and 

new deadlines.”

In closing, Korolev asked the Council to make the following decisions:

•

•

•

•

Approve the configuration proposed by OKB-1 for the N-1 heavy launch 

vehicle;

Consider a landing expedition to the Moon to be the launch vehicle’s 

primary mission;

Use liquid oxygen and kerosene as the propellant components for the 

launch vehicle’s rocket blocks, but at the same time speed up work on 

hydrogen propellant; and

Task all project participants with studying the plans and schedules stem-

ming from the decree of 19 June, and in a month convene once again to 

consider one more decree, which would be issued in conjunction with our 

proposal about the lunar expedition as a primary objective.

Everyone present nodded in approval, but Glushko, despite Keldysh’s rep-

rimand, said that if a protocol would be drawn up on this meeting, then he had 

a dissenting opinion regarding the reliability of the engines under development 

at OKB-276. This comment was directed at Nikolay Kuznetsov, who responded 

that he had never rejected the advice and assistance of OKB-456 and would 

be very grateful if, to speed up the optimization process, Valentin Petrovich 

would make available his advice and test rigs. Glushko gave no response, and 

on that note, Korolev closed the Council session.

On behalf of all the chiefs, Korolev and Keldysh asked for VPK 

Chairman Leonid Smirnov to resolve the matter about the primary objective 

at the governmental level. Smirnov was in no hurry to approach Khrushchev 

on his own. It was high time to face up to the radical decisions on a whole 

gamut of problems—deadlines, construction of the factory and launch com-

plexes, production of the lunar vehicles, and finally crew training. Korolev and 

Keldysh, with Ustinov’s support, approached Khrushchev: “Are we going to 

fly to the Moon or not?” These were Khrushchev’s instructions: “Don’t let the 

Americans have the Moon! Whatever resources you need, we’ll find them.”

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N1-L3 Lunar Program Under Korolev

The Americans prompted the decision. This appeal fell on fertile soil. 

On their desks VPK leaders had copies of “white TASS,” which had reported 

about the flight of the heavy Saturn I rocket, which inserted the main unit 

of the lunar orbital vehicle into geocentric orbit for a trial run on 28 May.

50

On 3 August 1964, a decree was issued that mentioned for the first time 

that the N-1 rocket’s most crucial objective in space exploration was to explore 

the Moon by landing expeditions on its surface and then returning them to 

Earth. The second most important item of the decree was new deadlines. The 

year 1966 remained in place as the starting date for flight-developmental tests, 

and a new date appeared for the expedition to the Moon—1967 to 1968.

This decree was the first to name the main chief designers and organizations 

that would be responsible not only for the N-1 launch vehicle, but also for the 

entire N1-L3 complex (the designation L3 denoted the part of the complex 

that was needed only for the flight to the Moon).

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

OKB-1 was the lead organization for the system as a whole and for the 

development of Blocks G and D (including the engines for Block D) and 

the lunar orbital and lunar landing vehicles;

OKB-276 (N. D. Kuznetsov) was responsible for developing the engine 

of Block G;

OKB-586 (M. K. Yangel) was tasked with developing the rocket Block Ye 

of the lunar vehicle and the engine for this block;

OKB-2 (A. M. Isayev) was responsible for developing the propulsion 

system (tanks, pneumohydraulic systems, and engine) of Block I of the 

lunar orbital vehicle;

NII-944 (V. I. Kuznetsov) was assigned to develop the control system for 

the lunar complex;

NIIAP (N. A. Pilyugin) was tasked with developing the motion control 

system for the lunar landing and lunar orbital vehicles;

NII-885 (M. S. Ryazanskiy) was responsible for the radio measuring 

complex;

 50.   This was the launch of SA-6, which put the first Apollo boilerplate spacecraft into orbit. 

“White TASS” represented one of three types of TASS news during the Soviet era. Green or blue 

TASS was intended for the public and comprised extremely sanitized versions of domestic and 

international news. White TASS—the equivalent of secret news—included very candid accounts 

of domestic and international events prepared only for governmental ministries and Communist 

Party offices. Red TASS was top-secret information, i.e., completely unexpurgated information 

from foreign news agencies, delivered only to the topmost individuals of the government and 

Party structure (including the Politburo).

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

•

•

GSKB Spetsmash (V. P. Barmin) was responsible for the L3 system ground-

based equipment complex;

51

 and

OKB MEI (A. F. Bogomolov) was tasked with developing the mutual 

measurement monitoring system for vehicle rendezvous in lunar orbit.

52

The addendum to the decree containing a complete list of all those involved 

in developing systems for the L3 was a bulky document that showed that “no 

one and nothing was forgotten.” Nevertheless, baffled questions about the 

detailed breakdown of work—who issued requirements, to whom, and for 

which systems—continued to be asked, and answers to them were written in 

all sorts of individual resolutions and protocols for another three years.

Once the text of the government decree had been received, Korolev decided 

to convene a wide-ranging technical review meeting in his office right away 

to explain to everyone what we had come up with and what we would ask of 

those involved in the project. This meeting took place on 13 August 1964. 

All the chief designers; chiefs of the State Committees’ main directorates; 

Council of National Economy (Sovnarkhoz) chairmen involved in the program; 

officials from the VPK and Central Committee; officials from the Air Force 

Command, rocket forces, and Ministry of Defense space assets; representa-

tives of the Academy of Sciences; and directors of NII-4, NII-88, and the 

firing range were invited.

53

 Ryabikov, Pashkov, Zverev, Afanasyev, and Tyulin 

attended the meeting.

54

In his opening comments, Korolev remarked that this was the first 

representative-level gathering for the lunar program. And the reason for this 

was the latest decree of 3 August, which challenged us with a crucial government 

mission. We, OKB-1, were the head organization, but each of us was personally 

 51.  GSKB Spetsmash—Gosudarstvennoye soyuznoye konstruktorskoye byuro spetsialnogo 

mashinostroyeniya (State Union Design Bureau of Special Machine Building).

 52.   OKB MEI—Osoboye konstruktorskoye byruo Moskovskogo energeticheskogo instituta (Special 

Design Bureau of the Moscow Power Institute). Aleksey Fedorovich Bogomolov (1913–2009) 

served as chief designer of OKB MEI from 1952 to 1988.

 53.  Sovnarkhoz—Soviet narodnogo khozyaystva. In 1957, Khrushchev introduced the 

Sovnarkhoz system, whereby governmental ministries were replaced by local economic planning 

organs all over the Soviet Union. This attempt to decentralize the Soviet economy was rolled 

back in 1965 after Khrushchev’s ouster.

 54.   At the time, these four men were senior managers of the Soviet defense industry. Their 

positions in 1964 were as follows: Vasiliy Mikhaylovich Ryabikov (first deputy chairman of the 

USSR Sovnarkhoz), Georgiy Nikolayevich Pashkov (deputy chairman of the Military-Industrial 

Commission), Sergey Alekseyevich Zverev (chairman of the State Committee for Defense 

Technology), Sergey Aleksandrovich Afanasyev (chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated 

Republic Sovnarkhoz), and Georgiy Aleksandrovich Tyulin (first deputy chairman of the State 

Committee for Defense Technology).

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N1-L3 Lunar Program Under Korolev

From the author’s archives.

These men were the principal architects behind the design of the N-1. From left to right, 

Yakov Kolyako, Sergey Kryukov, and Pavel Yermolayev. Here, they are shown looking over 

a drawing of the L-1 circumlunar spacecraft.

responsible for that part of the system specified in the decree. Next, Kryukov 

and Bushuyev, referring to posters, presented the schematic diagram of the 

N1-L3, its basic performance data, and its flight program. It was difficult for 

Bushuyev to deliver his report. The draft plan of the lunar vehicles had not yet 

been completed, the specifications had not been drawn up for the subcontrac-

tors, and the whole plan for the flight to the Moon was still very rough.

At the risk of overloading my memoirs with details, I nevertheless feel that 

I need to discuss the main issue and, in particular, provide a description of 

the lunar expedition rocket-space complex. The N1-L3 rocket space complex 

consisted of the three-stage N-1 rocket and the L3 lunar complex. The N-1 

was a three-stage rocket with transverse division of structurally similar stages. 

Intermediate trusses connected the stages, ensuring the free escape of gases 

when the engines of the subsequent stage started up.

Liquid-propellant rocket engines operating on oxygen and kerosene devel-

oped at OKB-276 were used on all three stages of the rocket. The rocket’s 

load-bearing structure was a braced shell taking up the external loads. Spherical 

propellant tanks were housed inside this frame. In all the stages, the fuel 

tanks were in front. The first-stage (Block A) propulsion system comprised 

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

24 NK-15 engines with a thrust of 150 tons each on the ground. Kryukov 

reported that we were conducting a study to see if the number of engines 

on the first stage could be increased to 30. Six engines would be mounted 

around an inner ring, and the 24 engines on the outer ring would remain in 

their places. The second stage (Block B) had eight of the same type of engines, 

but with NK-15V high-altitude nozzles. The third stage (Block V) had four 

NK-19 engines with high-altitude nozzles. All the engines would operate on 

a closed-loop configuration, i.e., with after-burning of the gas after passing 

through the turbopump assembly.

The instruments of the control and telemetry systems were arranged in 

special compartments in their respective stages. The main instruments of the 

control system for the three stages were in the third-stage instrument com-

partment. The accepted aerodynamic layout made it possible to minimize 

the requisite control moments and to control pitch and yaw by using the 

principle of thrust offset of opposing engines on the first and second stages. 

Special control nozzles would be used for roll control. The special KORD 

diagnostic system was being developed to monitor engine operation.

55

 This 

system would issue an engine shutdown command when signs of possible 

failure occurred. The diametrically opposite engine would shut down simul-

taneously. Unlike all contemporary rockets, the electric energy source was an 

alternating current turbo generator.

The rocket’s stages and compartments were very large. For that reason, the 

factory/manufacturers would produce only transportable parts. The welding 

of tanks and blocks and the assembly of the entire rocket were to be carried 

out in the Assembly and Testing Building, which was then under construction 

at the firing range. There would actually be a branch of the Kuybyshev-based 

Progress Factory—the main rocket manufacturing plant—at the firing range.

In order to insert a payload with a mass of 90 to 93 tons into Earth orbit 

at an altitude of 200 kilometers, we were undertaking a series of measures, the 

most important of which was mounting six more engines on the first stage. 

The height of the rocket including the L3 nose cone was 105.3 meters. The 

launch mass was 2,820 tons. The mass of the oxygen was 1,730 tons, and the 

mass of the kerosene was 680 tons. The L3 system consisted of the rocket 

booster Blocks G and D; the LOK (the vehicle itself and the rocket Block I) 

and the LK (the vehicle itself and the rocket Block Ye); the payload fairing, 

 55.  The expansion for the KORD system has been variously described as Kontrol i 

otklyucheniye rabotayushchogo dvigatelya (Operating Engine Monitoring and Shutdown) and 

Ko

ntrol raboty dvigateley (Engine Operation Monitoring).

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N1-L3 Lunar Program Under Korolev

which would be jettisoned upon reaching specified acceleration loads; and the 

emergency rescue system propulsion system.

56

The LOK consisted of the Earth-descent module and the habitation 

module, on which were mounted a special compartment containing the 

docking and attitude control engines and the docking system assembly, the 

Instrumentation System Compartment (PAO), and the power compartment, 

containing the rocket Block I and a power plant (EU) and three electrochemical 

generators (EKhG) for the power supply system using hydrogen-oxygen fuel 

cells.

57

 The LOK habitation compartment would serve simultaneously as an 

David R. Woods

This shows the LOK’s Habitation Compartment (or Orbital Module) at the Moscow 

Aviation Institute (MAI). The Compartment was cut in half for the benefit of engineering 

students at MAI. The left half shows the circular hatch where the LK pilot would exit 

and return for the surface phase of the mission. To the left of that is a large-format 

camera for photography during the lunar orbital phase. The large rectangular opening is 

where one of the two spacesuits would be carried. The other half shows the rack for the 

other suit, controls for the various camera systems on the right, and the rendezvous and 

docking control panel at the top.

 56.  It was common terminology to refer to each propulsion stage of a complete rocket 

system as a “block.” Thus, in the case of the N1-L3 system, the first three stages of the N-1 

were known as Block A, Block B, and Block V (A, B, and V being the first three letters of the 

Cyrillic alphabet). The L3 payload itself comprised several propulsion stages. These were Block 

G (a stage for translunar injection), Block D (a stage for lunar orbit insertion and powered 

descent from lunar orbit), Block I (the propulsion stage of the lunar orbiter), and Block Ye (the 

propulsion stage of the lunar lander).

 57.  PAO—Priborno-agregatnyy otsek; EU—Energoustanovka; EKhG—Elektrokhimicheskiy 

generator.

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

RKK Energiya and David R. Woods