Volume 12. December 2011 Transcendent Philosophy

reality of existence acts as both the principle of unity and diversity 
among existents and thus does not result in composition. So, it can be 
rationally said that weak existence is composed of existence and 
weakness, but this is just a mental analysis, whereas in the extra-mental 
world, there is nothing other than existence. 
 
Up to this point, it has been proved that it is possible to assume a third 
kind of unity as mentioned above, but in order to prove its actualization, 
we should refer to a point that is proved in the section on cause and 
effect in al-Asfar in that an effect is a ray of the existence of cause and 
has no independence of its own, as, according to Sadr al-muta`allihin, it 
is the very relation to the cause. The existence of an effect in relation to 
its real cause, by which is meant the existence-giving cause but not the 
material and preparing causes, has no independence whatsoever, and it 
is the very relation to the cause but not in the sense that it is an 
independent thing that is related to another independent one, as in the 
domain of existence, there is a cause-effect relationship. Therefore all 
the contingent existents in relation to the Exalted Necessary Being, 
which is the source of emanation, are in such a state that their existence 
is the very relation. Therefore, the gradational difference which we 
have already discussed applies in this regard. The Necessary Being and 
the contingent being are both existences, but the existence of the 
Necessary Being possesses complete independence and is infinitely 
intense, while the existence of the contingent is very weak, but neither 
the Necessary Being nor the contingent being is anything other than 

134 Karim Aghili 
existence. Therefore, it can be proven that such a gradation can obtain 
between the Necessary Being and the contingent being. 
 
The Gist of Sadr al-muta`allihin’s Argument 
 
Sadr al-muta`allihin advanced this argument for the main part of his 
contention. His contention is that both existence and existent are ``one’’ 
and ``many’’-a sort of metaphysical coincidentia oppositorium. Unity 
is multiplicity and multiplicity at the same time unity. That is, in one 
respect, they are one, as they share the act of existence (mawjudiyyah), 
and in another respect many, as the degrees of existence are multiple. 
Therefore, existence is a single reality possessing multiple degrees. 
 
Thus, the main point which should be proved in opposition to the 
Peripatetics is that existence possesses a single reality, and we have 
already explained that existence is a single concept, and a single 
concept  qua single is not abstracted from the multiple qua multiple; 
otherwise, it would imply that any concept could be abstracted from 
anything. If there were no criterion, the concept of man can be 
abstracted from stone, but such is not the case. There should be a 
common aspect, and the common aspect cannot be a quiddity, as 
quiddities are distinct from one another, and the Exalted Necessary 
Being, for instance, has no quiddity, so a single concept should be 
considered from a different point of view. This is a proof of the fact 
that all existences partake of the reality of existence.  
 
This argument is controvertible, although Mulla Sadra considers it a 
cogent one, and his followers have adopted it. 
 
 
A Criticism of Mulla Sadra’s Argument 
 
There is a difference between whatish [i.e., quidditative] and secondary 
intelligible concepts. If we abstract a whatish concept from an object, it 
should be definitely abstracted in respect of an external object which is 
an instance of that concept, as its occurrence is external. For example, 
`man’ represents an existential limit which is attributed to an object in 

Mulla Sadra and the Unity and Multiplicity of Existence 135 
the extra-mental world, so that we say: Zayd is man. The occurrence of 
being-man to Zayd is in concreto, and in respect of the specific limits 
of this existence, his quiddity is abstracted from it. Therefore, these 
limits should existent in the extra-mental world even accidentally and 
should be different from other limits of existence from which another 
quiddity is abstracted. The examples which have been given are of this 
very kind. It is because of the selfsame existential limits of Zayd and 
`Amr that man is in common between them. As for the quiddity of 
animal, it is also in common between man and cow, because they both 
share a genus (i.e. being-animal) which is in common between them 
and which forms part of their existential limits, but such is not the case 
with the secondary philosophical intelligibles. The secondary 
philosophical intelligibles can never be abstracted in respect of their 
external occurrence, because the ``occurrence’ happens in the mind. 
The common aspect, i.e. genus, is mentally posited. 
 
There can be other instances of contradiction. For example, a single 
concept is abstracted from a number of things, while they have no 
common aspect. 
 
The Muslim philosophers hold that the highest genera have no essential 
common aspect. Substance and various kinds of accidents have nothing 
in common, and all the identifying factors lead to one of the 
intelligibles. We abstract a concept called genus from these quiddities 
consisting of the generic quiddity of substance and the generic quiddity 
of the nine accidental categories. The question which can be raised is if 
the abstraction of this concept, i.e. genus, which is applied to all of 
them means that they possess something in common in the external 
world or it means that it is a particular aspect of them that is posited in 
the mind. 
 
If it is said that genera have an external common instance, then they 
should be composite and they themselves should have another genus on 
the assumption that they are the genus of genera. Therefore, the concept 
of genus which is abstracted from them does not mean that they possess 
a common instance in the external world, because the assumption is 
that they do not possess one and are essentially distinct in their entirety. 

136 Karim Aghili 
Therefore, the unity of such a concept does not imply that it has a 
common external instance.  
 
It may be, then, asked why a single concept is abstracted. In response, it 
can be said that the concept of existence, according to Mulla Sadra, is 
one of the secondary philosophical intelligibles
18
 and represents an 
existential mode. If we assume that the external existence of an existent 
is entirely distinct from another existence and that they do not have a 
common aspect in terms of their existential modes in the external world 
either. Otherwise expressed, if it is assumed that objective realities are 
completely disparate and that they do not have a common aspect in 
terms of their existential modes, the mere abstraction of the concept of 
existence does not imply that the concept of existence can have an 
external instance in one case which completely corresponds to another 
one in another case, as the concept of existence is abstracted through a 
rational analysis. Although the concept of existence is not a purely 
subjective one, and its qualification happens in the extra-mental world, 
the unity of such a concept whose occurrence happens in the mind does 
not represent a common external instance. 
 
In other words, if a concept were of the secondary philosophical 
intelligibles which did not have an external instance, neither does its 
unity indicate a unity common among the sources of its abstraction nor 
does its multiplicity indicate their multiplicity, as the concept of unity, 
that is the concept which is of the sort of the secondary intelligibles, 
does not imply having external common instances. For example, the 
concept of quiddity is both applied to substance and to the nine 
divisions of accident, though it is a single concept and indicates an 
aspect of unity. However, it does not mean that its aspect of unity is 
external and that substance and accident have a common instance in the 
external world, as they are entirely disparate quiddities. So, when we 
perceive that the answer to the question asked about `substances’ is 
`substance’, and the answer to the question about `accidents’ is 
`accident’, we rationally conclude that they have a common aspect 
which is itself the very answer to the question asked about `What is it?’, 
therefore they are all quiddities. 

Mulla Sadra and the Unity and Multiplicity of Existence 137 
As for the concept of accident, it is not a genus, since the Muslim 
philosophers are unanimously agreed that the accidental categories are 
the highest genera and do not consider the concept of accident a 
common genus. Quantity and quality and other accidental categories 
are totally and essentially disparate from one another. The concept of 
accident does not indicate that quantity and quality have a common 
aspect in the extra-mental world. It is the intellect that abstracts the 
single concept of accident, and since quantity and quality are both are 
accidents, they need a substratum. In fine, the accidental categories are 
abstracted by the intellect, and it does not imply that they have a 
common aspect in the external world.
19 
 
The opposite is also true. Sometimes, numerous concepts are abstracted 
from a single simple reality without any multiplicity whatsoever. The 
best example is the Divine Necessary Essence, which is a Simple 
Essence. There is no sort of multiplicity, even rational multiplicity 
conceivable in the Divine Essence. That is, the Essence of the 
Necessary Being cannot be divided into quiddity and existence either, 
therefore it is said that the Necessary Being has no quiddity, but the 
concepts of existence, necessity, oneness, knowledge, power, life and 
other attributes are abstracted from that essence, and nothing other than 
the Divine Essence is considered for the abstraction of these concepts. 
 
With respect to the attributes of Divine action, it can be said that the 
relation of God with a specific act is considered, whereas the attributes 
of the Essence are abstracted from the Essence of the Necessary Being 
without considering anything else. The attributes of the Necessary 
Being are multiple concepts which are abstracted from a single reality, 
but this abstraction, which is the function of the intellect, indicates no 
multiplicity whatsoever with respect to the Divine Essence in the extra-
mental world. The multiplicity of concepts is due to the multiplicity of 
the viewpoints of the intellect. Therefore, in the same way that the 
multiplicity of concepts does not indicate the multiplicity of the 
instances of these concepts in the extra-mental world, its unity doe not 
indicate an objective common aspect of their instances. 
 

138 Karim Aghili 
The plurality and unity of secondary intelligibles is subject to the unity 
and plurality of the viewpoints of the intellect, not to real and external 
unity and plurality. 
 
 
Therefore, if a single concept called existence is abstracted from among 
multiple objects, it does not imply that its instance has an objective 
common aspect, as existence, according to the view of Mulla Sadra, is 
of the sort of the secondary philosophical intelligibles. Therefore, this 
argument is completely rejected, because neither does the unity of the 
secondary concepts indicate the unity of the instances nor does their 
multiplicity indicate multiplicity. It is simply because the occurrence of 
these concepts is mental, whereas the occurrence of the primary 
intelligibles is external. Therefore their unity indicates unity in the 
external world just as their multiplicity indicates multiplicity in the 
external world. As the occurrence of the secondary philosophical 
intelligibles is mental, it is abstracted from different points of view. 
Neither does their unity indicate external unity nor does their 
multiplicity indicate external multiplicity. 
 
 
Therefore, with respect to the reality of existence, according to Sadra, 
there is a unity among multiple existences which is not incompatible 
with their multiplicity. That is a graded unity in that the reality of 
existence is a single graded reality. All creatures in relation to their own 
creating causes, and ultimately to the Sacred Divine Essence are the 
very relation and dependence. With respect to their own levels, they 
differ in terms of intensity and weaknesses, priority and posteriority, 
and some of them are relatively independent of some others, but they 
are the very relation and dependence vis-a-vis the Divine Essence, who 
is absolutely independent.  
 
 
Obviously, adopting the thesis of the gradation of existence does not 
mean that any existence has such a relation with another one. Therefore, 
it is necessary that there be a fifth position. 
 

Mulla Sadra and the Unity and Multiplicity of Existence 139 
The Fifth Position 
 
Wherever there is a causal or a cause-effect relationship in the extra-
mental world, there is a gradation. All the existents have such a relation 
with the Necessary Being. However, as for the effects which are 
horizontally independent of one another and among which there is no 
intensity or weakness, they are completely distinct from one another 
irrespective of whether a single quiddity applies to them and they may 
be two individuals of the same quiddity, such as two drops of water or 
their quiddities may be different from one another, such as cow and 
donkey, but existences in relation to their real cause are existentially 
graded, though they are different in terms of their quiddities, as there is 
a causal relationship among them.  
 
Of course, maintaining a fifth position is possible if we come to hold 
that the words of Mulla Sadra apparently imply that there is a 
gradational difference among all existences even where there is no 
causal relation. If that is what he means, then there will be no need for a 
fifth position. 
 
The Influence of Ibn `Arabi on Mulla Sadra 
 
There is no doubt that existence, in Mulla Sadra’s view, is a single 
graded reality in a specialized sense, because he explicitly states this 
view in certain chapters of al-Asfar
20
. However, it is somewhat 
disputable whether gradation from his point of view is applied to the 
reality of existence itself or to its manifestations.  
 
Most of his words and expressions in al-Asfar and in some of his other 
works seem to indicate that existence is graded in its manifestations. He 
most often asserts that the Necessary Being is the reality of existence 
itself and the contingent beings are the loci of manifestation or self-
disclosure of Its Being as he says: 
 
In the same way that God granted me success by His Grace and Mercy 
in becoming aware of the everlasting non-existence and eternal 
unreality of contingent quiddities and metaphorical entities, He also 

140 Karim Aghili 
guided me through the luminous demonstration deriving from the 
Throne to the straight path in that existent and existence are specific to 
the Single Individual Reality, Who is Unique in His being the Real 
Existent and Who has no like in the extrta-mental world, and there is no 
nothing in the world of being save He, and whatever is visible in the 
world of being is indeed other than the Necessarily Worshipped One 
and is a necessary concomitant of His Essence and a manifestation of 
His Qualities, which are indeed identical to His Essence as the 
mouthpiece [i.e., Ibn `Arabi] of some of the gnostics stated it explicitly 
and said:` What is other than the Real or that which is called the world 
is, in relation to God, the Exalted, like the shadow to a person, therefore 
it is the shadow of God… All we perceive is but the being of the Real 
within the essences of contingent beings, so that with reference to the 
Ipseity (huwiyyah) of the Real, it is Its being, whereas with respect to 
the variety of its forms, it is the essences of contingent beings, which 
are unreal in essence as understood and abstracted through speculative 
reason and the sense powers. Just as it is always called a shadow by 
reason of the variety of forms, so is it always called the world and 
``other than the Real’’. If what I say is true, the world is, then, illusory 
and has not a real existence
21
, and this is an account of that which is 
held by the divine gnostics and the spiritually realized saints.
22 
 
Elsewhere in the Asfar, he says:  
 
The gnostics have agreed on applying the absolute existence and 
determined existence to that which is not commonly used among the 
people of speculation [i.e., the philosophers]. Verily, existence from 
the perspective of the gnostics consists in being that which is not 
limited to [the limit of] a determined entity and to a specific limit, and 
in contrast to it, determined existence consists of such (existents) as 
humans, the planet, the soul, and intellect. Therefore, absolute 
existence embraces all things in its simplicity, and thus it is the agent 
(fa’il) of every determined existence and its perfection and the Origin 
of every excellence to which it is more entitled than that which 
derives its existence from the Origin. Therefore, the Origin of all 
things and of their effusion should be itself all things at a higher and 
loftier level as is the case with intensive blackness in which are found 
all weak limits of blackness whose levels are lower than that of that 

Mulla Sadra and the Unity and Multiplicity of Existence 141 
intensive blackness in a most simple manner. [Also] as is the case 
with the great quantity in which are found all the quantities which are 
less than it in respect of their quantitative nature, not in respect of 
their determinations having the nature of non-existence, such as the 
extremities [of a line]. Therefore, a single line which is, for instance, 
ten meters long, includes one, two, and nine meters of it in a 
continuous inclusive manner. Though it does not include their 
extremities [i.e. limits] which have the nature of non-existence and 
which occur after their separation from that all-inclusive existence, 
and those extremities having the nature of non-existence are not 
intrinsic to the nature of the line which is the absolute length, which, 
even if assumed to be the existence of an infinite line, would be 
[considered] more appropriate and worthier, because it is a line 
[consisting of] these limited lines, and surely the extremities having 
the nature of non-existence are intrinsic to the nature of these 
imperfect limitations, not in respect of their linear nature but in 
respect of the imperfections and deficiencies which are their 
concomitants. As is the case with all-intensive blackness and its 
inclusion of the blacknesses which are of a lower degree than it. The 
same is true of intensive heat and its inclusion of weak heat. The same 
holds true of existence itself and the encompassment of the Necessary 
all-comprehensive existence than which nothing is more complete by 
analogy with the determined existents which are limited to certain 
limits. The non-existences and imperfections included in it are 
extrinsic to the reality of the absolute existence and intrinsic to 
determined existence.
23 
 
Summary 
 
As a summary of the foregoing, we can say that the issue of the unity 
and multiplicity of existence which is one of the oldest philosophical 
issues has passed through a harmonious path of development both in 
philosophy and gnosis. Essentially, four major and remarkable theories 
have been put forward in this regard: 
 
1.
 The extreme individual unity of existence 
2.
 The transcendent unity of existence 
3.
 The pure multiplicity of existence 
 

142 Karim Aghili 
4.
 The graded unity and multiplicity of existence 
 
Some of the Sufis maintain that pure unity requires that there should be 
no multiplicity at all in the world, therefore, they tended towards a 
naïve unity of existence and consider all the multiplicities to be illusory. 
The naivety of this theory is due to the fact that they disregard the 
observable multiplicity of existence altogether, and without an 
interpretation of their data of consciousness or a proof, they tended 
towards a pure individual unity and sacrificed multiplicity for the sake 
of unity. 
 
The gnostics who are attracted to Unity and who also value the data of 
consciousness and rational proof regard as perfect the reconciliation 
between these two realities. However, they were not negligent of other 
data other than inner witnessings. Therefore, they established 
theoretical gnosis as a cosmological system based on mystical 
unveiling and reason, and thus, they interpreted the world. 
 
Even, in certain cases, they recognize reason as the arbiter or criterion 
for evaluating inner witnessings. Since love plays a pivotal role in 
gnosis, and since love revolves around Unity and knows no duality, 
from the perspective of a gnostic, the unity of existence is imperative. 
 
The question is that either multiplicity cannot be absolutely put forward 
or it should be interpreted in such a manner as not to damage unity. 
Thus, the gnostics interpreted multiplicity and at most they regard 
multiplicities as the loci of manifestations and modes of the One in 
which they are annihilated. 
 
However, philosophy like any other exoteric science starts from 
multiplicity, and multiplicity is of an observable nature and confirmed 
by reason and revelation. If there is a unity, it is not observable but 
rather it is hidden and should be extracted from within multiplicity. 
This is not an easy task. Therefore, most of the ancient philosophers