Article in sais review · January 005 doi: 10. 1353/sais. 2005. 0011 citations 49 reads 3,483 authors

Military Ethics of Fighting Terror
We turn now to a brief discussion of some principles of the military ethics
of fighting terror, emphasizing an Israeli perspective because we are inter-
ested in the principles that have to be followed when a democratic nation-
state faces terror activity of the kind Israel has experienced since 2000. Gen-
erally speaking, such principles impose moral, ethical and legal constraints
on every military activity of fighting terror without thereby rendering it
ineffective or unprofessional.
The principles of military ethics of fighting terror have been devel-
oped by a team of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) College of National De-
fense, headed by Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, then commander of the college
(now Israel’s military and defense attaché in Washington, D.C., and co-au-
thor of this article). The team included commanders with much experience
in military activities against terror, as well as experts in international law
and ethics. The final document, produced by Yadlin and Asa Kasher (the
other present author), was presented to the IDF chief of staff and to gen-
erals involved in fighting terror. The document has been approved and is
currently being used for preparation of proposed explanatory guidelines for
a variety of specific situations and operations.
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Our starting point is a principle that governs the activities of a state
rather than its military forces. It serves as the first step in any argument
that justifies certain military activities of fighting terror.
Principle A.1
The Principle of Self-Defense Duty
(1) It is the prime duty of a democratic state to effectively defend its
citizens against any danger posed to their lives and well-being by acts
or activities of terror, both in the short run and in the long run.
(2) In doing so, the state discharges its obligation to protect the hu-
man dignity of the citizen, both as person and as citizen.
(3) Moreover, being a democratic state, it must fulfill its obligation
while properly respecting the human dignity of each person, as a person.
The gist of Principle A.1 is commonly accepted as governing just in-
ternational relationships between states.
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Defense of the life and well-be-
ing of citizens against danger posed by terror is commonly held to be a
prime duty of a democratic state. We take the defense of citizens from ter-
ror to be not only a prime duty of a democratic state but also, under present
circumstances, as the prime duty, since the danger posed by terror is a rela-
tively new one, at least in some major respects, and is of a special nature.
To the extent that it is a new danger, the state has to create new means of
defense or adapt those available to the new duty of defense.
Effective defense of its citizenry is sanctioned by a democratic state’s
moral principles. The means a democratic state may use in order to serve
such an end should also be justified by the same principles. The duty of

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protecting human dignity is therefore not only a source of a duty to fight
against terror but also a source of a constraint on what the state does
against terror.
At this point two clarifications should be made of clauses (2) and (3)
of the principle. First, protection of human dignity involves, indeed, pro-
tection of human rights, including protection of human life. Second, there
is a crucial distinction between human rights that every state ought to re-
spect and human rights that only a state in which one is a citizen ought to
respect. Under ideal conditions, every person is a citizen of a state that re-
spects all of one’s human rights. The difference is reflected in clauses (2)
and (3) of the Principle of Self-Defense Duty.
Whereas the Principle of Self-Defense Duty is a background principle
of military ethics, the next principle belongs to the core of military ethics
itself.