F eminist and g ender t heories

participating in the existing relations of ruling. This point is illustrated in Figure 7.1.
7
In her most recent book, Smith (2005) updates her terminology by replacing the notion of “a sociol-
ogy for women” with that of “a sociology for people.” In other words, the notion of “a sociology for 
women” can be understood as reflecting a particular historical era in which feminists called attention 
to the fact that the standpoint of women was absent in the academy. Today, however, the more perti-
nent (and more postmodern) point is that we must begin wherever we are—that is, in terms not only 
of “gender,” but also of class, race, sexual orientation, ablebodiedness, and so on. This is institutional 
ethnography.
1
Nonrational
Rational
Institutional
ethnography:
Walking the dog
Figure 7.1
Smith’s Concept of Institutional Ethnography: Walking the Dog
Collective
Individual
Habituated experiential
reality and consciousness
Relations of ruling/
Institution of
private property
Relations of ruling/
Complexes of discourses
Notion of “private property”
Relatively conscious
practices for avoiding
sanctions
Figure 7.1
Smith’s Concept of Institutional Ethnography: Walking the Dog

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Feminist and Gender Theories  
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Smith’s theoretical approach is explicitly multidimensional, as can be readily seen in 
her central concepts (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). For instance, as discussed above, the 
term “institutional ethnography” explicitly reflects Smith’s dual emphasis on collec-
tive structures of ruling/the institutionalization of power and their actual workings at 
the level of the individual in everyday life. In terms of action, as shown in Figure 7.1, 
institutional ethnography can be said to reflect a rationalistic emphasis on practical 
action both at the level of the individual and at the collective level of the institution; 
however, clearly Smith’s phenomenological roots lead her to appreciate the nonra-
tional motivation for action, as well. Above all, Smith emphasizes that taken-for-
granted, subjective categories provide the backdrop for the pragmatic performances 
that constitute the everyday world and, in doing so, reaffirm the existing structural 
order. For instance, in the example above, it is only because of her internalization of 
taken-for-granted notions of class and private property that Smith knows how and 
where to walk her dog. In Schutz’s terms, she uses specific “recipes” (see Chapter 6) 
and taken-for-granted habits, which, by definition, work at the individual/nonrational 
level.
So, too, the term “standpoint” reflects Smith’s dual rational and nonrational approach to 
action and individual and collective approach to order, in that “standpoint” refers both to our 
objective (rational) position and our subjective (nonrational) position in the (collective) 
social hierarchy, and to our unique biographical (individual) situation. For instance, as shown 
in Figure 7.2, my “standpoint” as a mother is rooted at once in the meaning (including social 
status or honor) accorded to “mothers” in general in our society, as determined by the com-
plexes of discourses that are part of relations of ruling (collective/nonrational), and the spe-
cific reward structure accrued to that position by the (collective/rational) institutions