Foreign relations of the united states 1969–1976 volume XXXVII energy crisis, 1974–1980 department of state washington
Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to
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25. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, December 16, 1974. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–M01009A, Box 31, Folder 466. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.] 365-608/428-S/80010 100 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII 26. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting 1 Washington, December 20, 1974, 8–9:02 a.m. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.] Secretary Kissinger: Which reminds me: I would like a very clear instruction sent to the members of the IEA of what the opposition is. There will be no work whatsoever on a preparatory meeting until con- sumer solidarity is further developed. The United States will not partic- ipate in any form whatsoever in consumer-producer preparation until solidarity is further advanced. There will be no March meeting, no preparation for a March meeting—no discussion of a March meeting. Mr. Hartman: There’s a difference between preparing for that meeting and going on with the work already started with the IEA. There’s a subcommittee started dealing with consumer-producer relations. Secretary Kissinger: That does not become the only expression of consumer-producer solidarity. Apparently it is not internal. You know, among the confidential cable levels, the top level that I get. (Laughter.) There is one by Hermes, or whoever that fellow is. Mr. Hartman: Well, Hermes is a French— Secretary Kissinger: There’s not going to be any misunder- standing. There’s going to be a cable today in which everybody is clearly informed on what the opposition is on the consumer-producer subcommittee of the IEA; 2 we will not drag our feet. We will handle it in our normal bureaucratic channels. That means Hermes can’t touch it on the consumer-producer cooperation until there’s more producer [consumer] cooperation. Mr. Katz: Eward is the chairman of that group. 3 1
Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 2, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger presided over the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. 2 In telegram 279263 to Ankara, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, USEC Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Ottawa, Paris, USOECD Paris, and Rome, De- cember 20, the Department instructed: “All Missions should understand clearly that se- quential staging toward consumer/producer conference requires establishment of con- sumer solidarity prior to undertaking preparations for either preparatory meeting or for ultimate conference. The United States will not rpt not attend a preparatory meeting with producers until we have clear consumer decisions and programs with regard to conser- vation, new supplies, and financial solidarity. This position was expressed by President and Secretary to French and repeated to IEA Governing Board December 18/19.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, D740371–0467) 3 John Wilton of the United Kingdom was Chairman of the IEA’s Standing Group on Producer-Consumer Relations. 365-608/428-S/80010 August 1974–April 1975 101 Secretary Kissinger: So you’re guaranteed that nothing is said. (Laughter.) Mr. McCloskey: 48 hours. (Laughter.) Secretary Kissinger: Art, are you sure you understand the strategy? Mr. Hartman: I understand it perfectly. There’s a lot of work to be done though, and the work has to go forward. Secretary Kissinger: The work will be done after consumer cooper- ation is advanced. Anybody that wants to get energy or anything is going to work on consumer cooperation now. I better get a paper that tells me what’s going to be done in what time frame. 4 I tell you: I’ll just have to pull us out of a producer- consumer meeting until I’m satisfied there’s consumer cooperation. We will not yield on that; we will not compromise on that. Mr. Hartman: The biggest problem there is no trouble achieving progress in the conservation field, providing the U.S. has a program. Secretary Kissinger: There will be progress on the financial facility. The big problem there is not one of wanting to go to a producer meeting. It’s Schmidt and the 25 billion dollars; that will be what will hold it up. If Schmidt doesn’t yield, we’re not going to get a producer conference. It’s our best card, and we’re going to play it hard. And will you make sure that is made clear to the Germans in a tactful way (ad- dressing Mr. Hartman)? Mr. Hartman: Yes, sir. Secretary Kissinger: They will all want to substitute talk for action. And then there will be nothing but talk at the producers conference. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.] Secretary Kissinger: You better make clear to the French so that there will not be a misunderstanding. We will not participate in any- thing until there is greater consumer solidarity. We don’t want the Mar- tinique thing 5 to disintegrate. Mr. Hartman: No. Secretary Kissinger: If they want to have a March preparatory meeting, then the best road to it is to help us speed up consumer soli- darity, and then we will work with great energy on the preparatory meeting. You and EB and your shop can prepare an agenda 6 for this— Mr. Katz: Yes, sir. 4 No paper was found. 5 See Document 24. 6 Not found. 365-608/428-S/80010 102 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII Secretary Kissinger: —to make sure of what we can achieve in a preparatory meeting so it doesn’t turn into a non-substantive meeting. Mr. Katz: How are we going to bring the French into the consumer solidarity, Mr. Secretary? Brunet told our Embassy in Paris yesterday what their guidance was, to their posts abroad; 7 and they said for those countries who are members of the IEA, consumer solidarity will be worked on in the IEA. For other countries it will be in the OECD. That, I think, is not the approach that I think we’d like to pursue. Secretary Kissinger: What road would you like to pursue? Mr. Katz: Well, somehow dealing with the French bilaterally. Ei- ther having— Secretary Kissinger: Well, there was no clear decision, but my im- pression was that the latter would be the road—that the French would, in parallel. Mr. Katz: Right. Secretary Kissinger: In fact, the French said they would make a se- cret agreement on the IEP, if necessary—if you can keep them now. Mr. Hartman: Yes. I think that’s the best way to do it—to have it formally in his hands, while we keep also our bilateral contacts with him, so we make sure we know what’s going on. Secretary Kissinger: I agree, because otherwise we’re going to have the whole problem again. Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We’ve given very hard guidance, on the basis of the phrase in the communique´. Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but there’s going to be a great desire of many people to fuzz up the issues. Mr. Hartman: Since I got back, I’ve told them that is our position; and I’ve told them in exactly what fields we want to have agreements on the program. Mr. Sonnenfeldt: But that, as a matter of fact, everything thinks is the easiest—the French. 7 In telegram 30441 from Paris, December 19, the Embassy reported the “substance” of the French Foreign Ministry’s guidance telegram on the economic elements of the Mar- tinique communique´. Its subjects included financial solidarity, the March target date for a preparatory conference, the close contact to be maintained among consuming countries between a preparatory conference and a producer-consumer conference, monetary ques- tions, and economic coordination. It noted that consumer cooperation was “a condition to which the U.S. attaches great importance and one which we will find all the easier to satisfy because, as we have proposed, the EC will participate in the conference as a single entity, thus assuring that the views of the Nine will be carefully concerted.” It also ex- plained that the forum for consumer consultation would be the IEA, and for those coun- tries that did not belong to the IEA, the OECD would serve as a coordinating body. (Na- tional Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D740369–0364)
365-608/428-S/80010 August 1974–April 1975 103 Mr. Hartman: No. We’re going to have trouble with the Germans. Secretary Kissinger: I think we can bring them around. Mr. Katz: We have a proposal for you on Schmidt. 8 Secretary Kissinger: Which is what? Mr. Katz: This is by Burns. Secretary Kissinger: But on which side of this debate is Burns? Mr. Katz: I think he’s on our side. Mr. Ingersoll: He’s on our side. He’s committed to it. Mr. Katz: But for guarantees, not for loans. Mr. Hartman: Their problem is the appropriation of funds. Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I know, but we need a mechanism for fi- nancial cooperation. Even if this one is not ideal, we can then use it for other purposes, once it exists. Mr. Hartman: You will see Walter Levy 9 on Monday. Secretary Kissinger: What makes you think I’m going to see Walter Levy on Monday? Mr. Hartman: He told me. The whole Bundy group. 10 Secretary Kissinger: Walter Levy is going to stay out of any diplo- matic negotiations. He’s an oil concern. Mr. Hartman: Well, the proposal he will put forward is that we try for something like a one-year agreement. Secretary Kissinger: You can tell Walter Levy not to advise us on oil, will you? We don’t need a negotiator. Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Giscard did tell, in the negotiations, he would talk to a U.S. representative—according to Giscard’s press conference in Martinique. Secretary Kissinger: Well, he’s your consultant (addressing Mr. Robinson). Will you tell him if he doesn’t? (Laughter.) If he gets out into the oil field again we’re going to have to cut him off. I don’t want to 8 Not found. 9 A well-known independent oil consultant who began writing about the interna- tional petroleum industry in the early 1940s. He became a White House and NSC consul- tant during the Carter administration. 10 No record of this meeting has been found. On January 10, 1975, Kissinger met with this group, which included McGeorge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation and Assistant for National Security Affairs to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; Hollis Chenery, Vice President of the World Bank; and Robert Roosa, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, to discuss consumer-producer relations and the world economy. (Memorandum of conversation, January 10; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Lot 91D414, Box 10) 365-608/428-S/80010 104 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII hear any compromises. If this thing is worth doing, it’s worth doing for two years. I think it’s just playing games. It’s like these Congressional things. If Schmidt is going to do it, he’s going to do it for two years as well as one year. His hangup is the one you’ve described; it isn’t the length of time. There’s absolutely no sense in looking for some gimmick to get Schmidt around it. Schmidt has to make some decision on whatever steps he has to take. Mr. Katz: As we presented the plan originally, it was loans by gov- ernments, or governments directly borrowing or directly guaranteeing borrowing in the markets. Secretary Kissinger: Look, Schmidt’s attitude was disgraceful. Ba- sically, he said: “Let Britain go down the drain. If the Arabs don’t help them, the hell with them.” And then he wails at the political morals of the West. And I think he’s got to come along, and he will come along. If Giscard brings pressure on him, he will come along. But we don’t need Walter Levy offering a compromise for one year. For God sakes, that we can do by ourselves: And I don’t think our decision depends on it— if we’re good at it. (Laughter.) No—it’s absolutely senseless. Do you think it depends on the length of time? Mr. Hartman: No. I think he’s got to make a basic decision. Secretary Kissinger: If Schmidt does it, he will do it for two years. If it isn’t for two years it will do it—if it gives us a financial structure. Once the financial structure exists, we can use it for other purposes. Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He’s got to try and find something to get around this extra appropriation problem. Secretary Kissinger: Well, that’s his problem—once he makes up his mind he can do it. We’re haggling over price; we’re not haggling over the principle. And it’s absolutely senseless to give too many wrong signals. Can somebody talk to Levy? Mr. Hartman: You will be the first one to see him. He’s in Florida at the moment. Secretary Kissinger: All right. Somebody better take him aside then and tell him if I catch him once more representing himself as talking for us, I’ll have to separate him from it. Mr. Katz: All right. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.] 365-608/428-S/80010 August 1974–April 1975 105 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 Washington, December 24, 1974, 0538Z. 280710. Subject: Message to Major OPEC Governments. 1. Ambassador is requested to transmit following message from the Secretary to the Shah. FYI: Separate messages along similar lines are being sent to Algiers, Caracas, Jakarta, Jidda, Kuwait and Lagos. 2 2. Begin text. Your Majesty: 3. I wish to share with you a few reflections on developments in energy which have occurred since our conversation in Tehran. 3 Since
the start of the energy crisis both producers and consumers, including my own country, have believed that at some point it would be helpful and desirable to supplement intensive bilateral contacts between pro- ducers and consumers with some form of multilateral contact. All of us sense that the time for such multilateral contact is drawing nearer. 4. During recent discussions at Martinique, we and the French reached agreement on a proposed approach to such multilateral con- tacts, an approach which has subsequently been endorsed by members of the International Energy Agency. This approach stipulates that con- sumer decisions on conservation, the development of alternative sup- plies of energy, and financial solidarity will be taken in a first phase. Thereafter will follow a preliminary meeting of representatives of pro- ducers and consumers to discuss agenda and procedure, intensive preparation of common positions, and the holding of a producer/ consumer conference. 5. We have stressed the necessity of strong consumer decisions as the indispensable first step in this process because we believe that without them the objective conditions for success of a multilateral dia- logue between producers and consumers do not exist. A failed confer- ence would be seriously detrimental to all of us. Both these points, I be- lieve, correspond to views which you have so eloquently and forcefully expressed in public and in private during the past year. 1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 13, Iran—State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE–NODIS (2). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Paul D. Taylor and Law- rence R. Raicht (EB/ORF/FSE); cleared by Enders, Sonnenfeldt, and Atherton and in AF and EA; and approved by Kissinger. 2 Telegram 280711 to these capitals, December 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Cen- tral Foreign Policy Files, [no film number]) 3 Kissinger was in Iran November 1–3. The joint communique´ issued at the conclu- sion of his visit is in telegram 9236 from Tehran, November 1. (Ibid., D740313–0826) See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, Documents 87–89. 365-608/428-S/80010 106 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII 6. That is not to say that we believe that the consumers alone can solve the energy crisis, or that we think that it can be approached most effectively on a bloc to bloc basis, or above all, that we seek a confronta- tion with the producing countries. Confrontation between producers and consumers would serve the interest of no one except the Soviets. And there is clearly no way in which the energy crisis can be solved without the full and open cooperation of all major producers and con- sumers. In this regard, I think it important that our own bilateral dia- logue be deepened and enriched in every possible way. As one step in that direction, I have asked former Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz, who has the complete confidence of the President and myself, to conduct the conversation on various aspects of the energy problem which we talked about in Tehran. He is prepared to visit Tehran, or elsewhere if that were more convenient, at a time acceptable to you. 7. Within our own government, President Ford is now completing a series of major decisions on domestic energy policy. 4 We expect these decisions to be announced towards the end of January, probably in a speech immediately after the State of the Union message. I believe they will make a significant contribution to the solution of the world energy problem.
8. Your Majesty, in conclusion let me say how pleased we are to learn of the important new measures you plan to help meet the world food crisis. Ambassador Helms informs me of your decision to pursue vigorous measures, notably in the field of fertilizer production in the region, to help alleviate the threat of famine in neighboring countries. This cooperative effort can become a central feature of the work of the Joint Commission in forthcoming months. 9. With warm regards, sincerely, Henry A. Kissinger. End text. Kissinger 4 Following a December 14–15 meeting of Ford’s economic and energy advisers at Camp David, Enders reported to Kissinger: “Group agreed to recommend to President three phased policy: (A) By end 1977 achievement of two million barrel a day savings, through demand restraint and demand management measures (this goal would overtake but not replace the one million barrel a day goal for end 1975; under most of the recom- mended scenarios we could come relatively close to but not achieve the one million barrels a day by end 1975, depending on how rapidly Congress acted); (B) By end 1985 achievement of capacity for full national self-sufficiency (this would mean the basic goal of no more than one million barrels a day imports set in your Chicago speech, augmented by storage capacity equivalent to up to three million barrels a day for a year). (C) Before the end of the century, reestablishment of the U.S. position as a net energy exporter both through new technology and through hydrocarbons.” (Telegram Tosec 21 to Kissinger in Martinique, December 16; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 4, Energy (5))
365-608/428-S/80010 August 1974–April 1975 107 28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in West Germany 1 Washington, December 24, 1974, 2228Z. 281378. Subject: Presidential Message to Chancellor Schmidt. Em- bassy requested transmit following message from President Ford to Chancellor Schmidt: 1. “Dear Mr. Chancellor: As I mentioned in my previous letter, 2 we
ments of consumer country collaboration necessary before we can move on to subsequent steps. Progress on financial cooperation is of particular concern to us at this time. In all frankness I must tell you that I do not believe that the United States will be in a position to participate in a consumer-producer meeting until the consumers have established their solidarity in the financial field. 2. The Group of Ten Working Group has made some progress on resolving the issues necessary to enable us to make a final decision on financial cooperation among participating OECD countries. As I men- tioned in Washington, however, I am convinced that a satisfactory out- come depends very much on the fullest possible exchange and under- standing of views between your government and mine. 3. I hope, therefore, that we can remain in close contact on the re- maining major issues that need to be resolved to assure that any new facility meets its objective of underpinning the economic health and co- operation of the industrial democracies. I have particularly in mind the questions relating to the size of the facility, the respective national quotas and the form of national commitments (loans, guarantees or some combination of the two). 4. I would like to have Arthur Burns discuss these questions with you on my behalf and would be grateful if you could meet with Arthur in Bonn for this purpose during the early part of January. 3 With regard to this task of effective financial cooperation, as well as related en- 1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 2, Germany (FRG)—Chancellor Schmidt (1). Secret; Imme- diate; Nodis. Drafted by Katz and approved by Kissinger. 2 On December 16, Ford sent a letter to Schmidt to inform him about his talks with Giscard in Martinique. (Telegram Secto 21 to Bonn; ibid.) The memorandum of the De- cember 15 meeting between Ford and Giscard is Document 24. 3 Burns met with Schmidt in Hamburg on January 11, 1975, and reported that the Chancellor accepted entirely the political concept underlying the U.S. plan for a financial safety net and would endorse it. Schmidt also felt that “speedy movement” on the plan was necessary. (Telegram 42 from Hamburg, January 11; National Archives, RG 59, Cen- tral Foreign Policy Files, P850104–1539) 365-608/428-S/80010 108 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII deavors to secure the strength of our economies and our alliance, you can be assured of my fullest cooperation in the pursuit of solutions that serve our mutual interests. With warm regards, Gerald R. Ford.”
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