Foreign relations of the united states 1969–1976 volume XXXVII energy crisis, 1974–1980 department of state washington
Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting
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53. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting 1 Washington, April 14, 1975, 8–9:02 a.m. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.] [Kissinger:] O.K. Jules, what happened to the energy conference? 2 1
Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 3, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger presided over the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. A table of contents is not printed. 2 The preparatory producer-consumer conference opened in Paris on April 7, with Robinson heading the U.S. delegation. In his opening statement, he said: “Our purpose at this preparatory meeting is to organize the procedures for the conference that will build 365-608/428-S/80010 August 1974–April 1975 183 Mr. Katz: It’s still going. There’s quite a lot of activity over the weekend. There’s a new draft 3 which allegedly represented some progress, but what was behind it I think was Giscard’s visit to Algeria 4 in coming back and putting apparently—telephoning colleagues— Secretary Kissinger: Who are the seven? Mr. Katz: The four producers and the three LDCs—the OPEC LDC bloc. In response to this, there was an EC–US–Japan draft 5 which went very far in their direction. In fact, the linkage with energy was very slight. They did remove references to indexation. Secretary Kissinger: Well, yes, but just a minute. Why do we accept that?
Mr. Katz: Well, to keep the EC on board, and the Japanese. In any case, we were saved from ourselves because the seven rejected it. They put back the— on the dialogue initiated at this meeting. Toward this end, we need to strike a balance be- tween the immense scale and complexity of the world energy problem on the one hand and the constraint of realistic expectations for concrete results on the other.” Later, Rob- inson continued: “I feel strongly that the work program to be developed here should be concentrated on the specifics of energy and related matters, and not become diluted with parallel discussions of other issues, however important they may be.” For the full text of his statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 12, 1975, pp. 619–621. 3 On the morning of April 11, the EC presented a draft agenda for the producer- consumer conference. In response, the group of OPEC/LDC countries—including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria, Venezuela, Brazil, India, and Zaire—presented their own draft, which the U.S. delegation reported “merged and considerably softened the analytical and areas of cooperation sections of the EC agenda and then repeated earlier OPEC/LDC agenda points.” (Telegram 9291 from Paris, April 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750127–0803) 4 Giscard visited Algeria April 10–12. While he was there he made a statement “to the effect that France and Algeria have no significant differences on conference agenda.” (Telegram 9317 from Paris, April 13; ibid., D750129–0233) 5 The IEA Governing Board convened at 11:30 p.m. on April 11 at which time it re- viewed a revised EC draft agenda. While the U.S., EC, and Japanese delegates “generally approved the document,” British, German, and Danish representatives “expressed some concern” that the new agenda “moved too far toward accommodating OPEC/LDC group.” Everyone agreed, however, that the industrialized countries “should stand on” the new EC draft and “not go beyond it,” and all of the delegates “expressed disappoint- ment at apparent OPEC unwillingness to talk seriously about energy.” (Telegram 9291 from Paris, April 12; ibid.) By the afternoon of April 13, the “OPEC/LDC’s evidenced no intention to compromise by modifying their insistence that energy could only be treated either within overall rubric of raw materials or on parity with raw materials and prob- lems of developing countries,” according to U.S. representatives. The U.S. delegation in- formed the Department that it “took view (as did Japanese) that draft not repeat not ac- ceptable without substantial change,” adding that “it was agreed that three main requirements will be: A) to restore clear linkage to energy; B) to remove much of the de- tail on such issues as raw materials and development; and C) to avoid commitment to conclusions and recommendations under each of the headings [of the draft agenda].” (Telegram 9307 from Paris, April 13; ibid., D750128–1167) 365-608/428-S/80010 184 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII Secretary Kissinger: In other words, at the energy conference they no longer want to talk about energy. Mr. Katz: They no longer want to talk about energy, really. They will talk about energy, but they call it a raw materials conference. Secretary Kissinger: Look, there is to be no further American con- cession without my particular approval. Mr. Katz: All right. Secretary Kissinger: If we walk out alone from the conference, then we walk out alone from the conference. There can be no conference without us. And at every international conference from now on we’re not going to be so pushable. Mr. Katz: Well, actually, the tactics have worked very well throughout this. Secretary Kissinger: Only because the other side is irrational. Mr. Katz: I think that’s right, at the last minute; but until Saturday 6 night we had the EC out in front behaving very well. The Japanese were going along with everything. I think it was only after this push by Gis- card on returning from Algiers that the Community became rather flabby. But last night—or this morning, I guess—at 1 a.m., they were awakened by the French Chairman to be given a response. 7 Incidentally, these are non-papers at this point; nobody accepts any— Secretary Kissinger: Look, the French are already doing what I said we wouldn’t stand for—which is to act as a mediator between the con- sumers and the producers. Mr. Katz: That’s right. Secretary Kissinger: We absolutely will not stand for this. And the only way we cannot stand for it is to get strict instructions to Enders and Robinson that we’re going to be difficult. Mr. Katz: O.K. I think that would be helpful at this point. I think they are looking for some answer. Secretary Kissinger: What do you think, Hal? Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I don’t think you sent any instructions by telegram. Mr. Katz: No, we haven’t. 6 April 12. 7 The U.S., EC, and Japanese delegations “jointly informed the chair that [the OPEC/LDC draft] did not constitute a serious reply to the working paper submitted to the chair by the three delegations on April 13.” (Telegram 9317 from Paris, April 13; Na- tional Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750129–0233) The OPEC/LDC draft was transmitted in telegram 9329 from Paris, April 14, and the U.S./EC/Japanese draft in telegram 9315 from Paris, April 14. (Both ibid., D750129–0426 and D750129–0426)
365-608/428-S/80010 August 1974–April 1975 185 Secretary Kissinger: I want Hal to see these things. Mr. Katz: We’ve sent no instructions by telegram or otherwise. They’ve been operating on the basic scenario that you approved earlier.
8 Secretary Kissinger: The basic scenario, however, does not include agreement at all costs— Mr. Katz: That’s right. Secretary Kissinger: —and once the French understand it, we’re going to be just as difficult as the LDCs, and we can do some of the things that the French do. They can add to the Community to use the producers; it is just the beginning of the nightmare. Mr. Katz: The other issue on which they have taken a very strong position is on IEA participation at the full conference. The Algerians have said under no terms would they accept this, because IEA is a con- frontationist organization. Secretary Kissinger: In contrast to OPEC. Mr. Katz: That’s right. Of course, OPEC isn’t there as OPEC. Al- though they were invited, they declined the invitation. The Governing Board decided unanimously yesterday, with the small countries saying that they absolutely had to have the IEA there because it was their own link to the conference. And this was presented back to the French Chairman, who has declined to do anything about it. But he’s been told that that was a bottom-line issue for us. Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute. Who is the French Chairman? Mr. Katz: Guiringaud. Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute. We are going to protest about the behavior of the French Chairman today. Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You’re supposed to see the French Ambassador for the past week. Secretary Kissinger: I don’t give a goddam. I won’t see him today. Mr. Katz: They’ve distorted the way they’ve put it. Secretary Kissinger: Hal and Art—I don’t want to hear all the de- tails. Will you get the French Ambassador in and protest, in the sharp- est terms, about the behavior of the French Chairman and say it raises serious questions in our mind about our participation in any French-sponsored conference? Can you do that today, please? It doesn’t require me. Mr. Sonnenfeldt: No, but—well, there’s a separate thing. Secretary Kissinger: What does he want from me? 8 See Document 49. 365-608/428-S/80010 186 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He has instructions to explain to you there the agreement to come to an American-sponsored conference. Secretary Kissinger: That’s nonsense. Well, I’ll see him as soon as I know what my speech drafts look like—Tuesday or Wednesday. 9 Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Seriously, if you don’t do it this week, we’ll never get the other thing going. Secretary Kissinger: All right, I’ll do it Tuesday. Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We’ll prepare the ground today for this one. Secretary Kissinger: Do you disagree on doing that? Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I’d like to see a little more what happened in Paris the past two or three days. I think we should get the man in. 10 Secretary Kissinger: We should get him in and point out to him if the French Chairman continues to play the role of the intermediary, then it is obvious we have to reconsider our whole approach to the con- sumer conference because we had approached that on the basis of con- sumer solidarity, including the French. Mr. Katz: I don’t think his question on the agenda is really objec- tionable. On the IEA I think it is. Secretary Kissinger: Well, I want that pointed out. Mr. Katz: O.K. Secretary Kissinger: But I want our people to understand. Mr. Katz: Yes, I understand. Secretary Kissinger: But can you do that immediately? Mr. Katz: Yes. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.] 9 April 15 or 16. 10 Sonnenfeldt met with Minister de la Gorce on April 15 to protest de Guiringaud’s role at the Prepcon. (Telegram 85231 to Paris, April 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750130–0674) 365-608/428-S/80010 August 1974–April 1975 187 54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, April 14, 1975, 2013Z. 84578. Subject: Consumer/Producer Prepcon. For Robinson from Secretary. 1. Reading drafts of agenda exchanged over weekend 2 indicates that industrialized countries have shown very great and perhaps exces- sive flexibility on question of agenda. Central focus of conference on energy question is essential from our viewpoint. It is unclear how US–EC–Japan redraft of text in Paris 9306 3 meets main requirement stated para 9 of Paris 9307 4 with which we agree. Regardless of how final agenda comes out, it must be clear for public presentation purpose here that conference will be centered on world energy problems and ac- tions which producers and consumers can take separately and to- gether, to help alleviate these problems for all countries and MSA’s in particular. You should therefore reiterate our requirement of clear link- age between other agenda issues and energy. You should also note that other issues such as participation, date, site and chairmanship have not yet been resolved. On question of participation you should maintain position that invitation to IEA is absolute prerequisite our attendance conference. You should not agree on final text of agenda and other con- ference issues without my prior approval. 2. In view likely outcome of Prepcon, 5 I question whether you should not immediately reschedule visit to Tehran. I place a higher 1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 4, France—State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE– NODIS (3). Confidential; Nodis; Flash. Drafted by Katz; cleared by Hartman, Atherton, and Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Kissinger. Repeated Immediate to Tehran. 2 See footnotes 3, 5, and 7, Document 53. 3 Dated April 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750128– 1165) 4
5 After meeting from 1 to 7 a.m. on April 15 in a “last ditch effort to resolve the agenda question,” the two sides agreed that they could make no further progress on the issues that separated them, including the “scope of the full conference, indexation, main- tenance of real value,” and others. Because of the “lack of any prospect of reconciling re- spective negotiating mandates,” the delegations decided that “it would not be productive to continue the exercise of the past nine days.” At 1 p.m. that day, Chairman de Guir- ingaud tried to give the group of industrialized nations another agenda proposal on be- half of the seven OPEC/LDC countries. Robinson and the other delegation heads, how- ever, “noted that the paper was not a formal proposal and refused to accept it on an informal basis.” Furthermore, the U.S. representatives no longer wanted to permit the French Chairman to “exercise the role of an intermediary” and remarked that it seemed that only he among everyone present “refused to recognize” that the meeting was “dead.” (Telegram 9533 from Paris, April 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750131–0570)
365-608/428-S/80010 188 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII value on our bilateral relations with Iran than on rhetorical sparring with OPEC/LDC group. From Ansary’s reaction Iranians apparently regard your visit there as urgent. You could set deadline your depar- ture Paris Tuesday, 6 either leaving Enders in charge of delegation or have all of U.S. delegation depart. You should decide this on basis which course best contributes to result we seek. 3. I wish it clearly understood by our entire delegation that out- come of preparatory meeting is of greater concern to me than whether we have unanimity with other countries. In final analysis they need US participation at conference. We remain ready to attend properly pre- pared energy conference between consumers and producers as origi- nally called by French. We are not prepared to attend raw materials conference where energy issue has seen all but submerged. We will maintain this posture even at risk taking responsibility for failure of preparatory meeting. 7
6 April 15. The conference ended on April 16. 7 In his closing remarks at the end of the conference, Enders said: “We were, of course, invited here by the President of the French Republic to prepare for a conference on energy and energy-related issues. We came here ready to discuss these issues, which are of central concern to all countries. Others have insisted on a much broader confer- ence, extending to all aspects of the relationship between the industrialized countries and the developing world. We have been and will continue to be willing to discuss seriously raw materials and other development issues in forums more directly concerned with them and to attempt therein to seek mutually beneficial solutions. However, we believe that the proposed conference could achieve constructive results only if it were focused on a relatively limited number of points related to the central subject of energy.” For the full text of his remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, May 12, 1975, p. 621. 365-608/428-S/80010 Preparatory Conference II, April 1975–October 1975
1 Washington, April 19, 1975. SUBJECT Meeting with Yamani—Middle East and the Paris Preparatory Conference PARTICIPANTS H.E. Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ibrahim Obaid, Personal Secretary to the Minister The Secretary Charles Robinson, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Francois M. Dickman, Director, NEA/ARP [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Paris preparatory conference.] The Secretary: What do you think of the Paris Preparatory Confer- ence? Did Robinson screw it up? Yamani: Well, the Americans screwed it up. The Europeans and even your own people said that it was the US attitude which caused the conference to fail. The Secretary: You can expect that from the Europeans. Yamani: It was a great disappointment for me. The Secretary: It was supposed to be an energy conference. Why did you try to transform it into a raw materials conference? I thought you wanted to discuss energy primarily, why did you change this to raw materials? Yamani: As I told Mr. Robinson just before our meeting, it was not my understanding that this was the US attitude. I thought the US had accepted the Saudi position of a Conference which would deal with en- ergy as well as with raw materials. Our proposal was very clear. You sent a message accepting the Saudi proposal. 2 You sent a message last 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Lot 91D414, Box 11, Classified External Memoranda of Conversations, April 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dickman. 2 See footnote 9, Document 10. 189 365-608/428-S/80010 190 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII September stating you accepted the Saudi proposal. 3 Then the French came with their invitation. At first we were reluctant but we went along after we agreed on a small number of countries. Then we had our meeting in Riyadh in February. 4 Perhaps I have misunderstood and maybe the gap is not so wide as we think. The Secretary: That is what I think. Yamani: The problem is that we have to have an agenda which deals with raw materials and not just energy alone. The Secretary: We will be glad to discuss lower oil prices too! Yamani: The Algerians wanted to solve everything at the same time. I can tell you that the Saudis, Venezuelans, and Iranians wanted and still want to discuss energy as an issue but do not expect to solve everything at the same time. What they do not want is to solve the en- ergy issue and forget about the rest. They don’t want to discuss energy and reach agreement on just that, but they expect to have some link that will guarantee your (US) presence to discuss other raw material issues. The Secretary: That is fair enough. On that basis, we can discuss energy first, and we would be agreeable to give you assurances that we will discuss raw materials at another conference. Yamani: We mean the same conference. The Secretary: Or at a continuation of the same conference. The Secretary: What we want to avoid is a special session of the General Assembly where everybody makes demands on us which we will reject. Why create an artificial forum to discuss raw materials? You know, there are some in the US Government who are opposed to this and believe free market forces should prevail. Secretary Simon says he is opposed to a raw materials conference. I recognize however that you cannot talk stability for items which interest us and not talk about sta- bility for items which are of interest to other countries. But if you discuss all at the same time, it will turn into platitudes much like the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 5 which my friend Pres- 3 Akins sent a message to Yamani in Geneva that reads: “Sorry to have missed you in Jidda. The Department has just instructed me to inform you that your ‘concept of a compact and tightly focused mini-conference’ is attractive. ‘We would want it to be in as low-key as possible to avoid raising expectations or, conversely, a sense of failure or de- spair if meeting did not result in agreement.’ The instruction goes on to say that the ‘low-key approach would also serve to diminish sense of drama of confrontation which we wish to avoid.’ I think this corresponds exactly with your suggestion.” (Telegram 5235 from Jidda, September 10, 1974; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D740251–0334) 4 See Document 41. 5 UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), December 12, 1974, proclaimed the Charter, which affirmed “the need for strengthening international co-operation for development” and declared that “it is a fundamental purpose of the present Charter to promote the establishment of the new international economic order, based on equity,
365-608/428-S/80010 April 1975–October 1975 191 ident Echeverria (of Mexico) has promoted. We want to find some prac- tical way to discuss energy issues. Yamani: We want to link energy to raw materials. The Secretary: Well, what do you mean by a link? What is your idea of a link? Yamani: We do not have an exact idea but we want your presence (at a raw materials conference). The Secretary: Physical presence is not difficult. Yamani: We want the industrial countries to agree on items of an agenda since now there is no objection to talk about raw materials. The Secretary: Well, I personally believe we will have to come to some understanding on raw materials. Robinson: We have a proposal we are considering. The Secretary: All right, we have a proposal but we have to work it out within our own government. I am prepared to tell you that I do not specialize in losing interdepartmental arguments and I usually prevail, in fact I can’t think of when I did not prevail, but I cannot give you a formal US position now. However, I would be prepared to move toward some understanding on raw materials but we would want to talk about energy on its own merits and not have it submerged with other raw materials. Yamani: Why not have the following agenda: (1) raw materials . . . The Secretary: Including energy? Yamani: Yes, we will say raw materials including energy; (2) inter- national cooperation; (3) financial flows. We will concentrate on energy.
The Secretary: The trouble with you is that every time you come and see me, you always manage to convince me (laughter). Yamani: I can tell you that this will be the position of the Iranians, Venezuelans, and Saudis, though not the Algerians, to focus on energy but at the same time to see that the shade of our discussions also falls on other raw materials. The Secretary: Well, what do you want to discuss with the other raw materials? Yamani: We do not expect to reach agreement on the price of tea, coffee, rubber, etc.; we are prepared to separate things. But unless we are assured that you will discuss other raw materials and there is a link, we cannot just discuss energy alone. sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems.” For the full text, see Yearbook of the United Nations , 1974, pp. 403–407. 365-608/428-S/80010 192 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII Since you say that you will discuss other raw materials with good will, we take this seriously. I will talk to my other colleagues. We will form a strong front. In the meantime, we hope you will do your homework (on raw materials) soon so that we can have another meeting. The Secretary: Another Preparatory Conference? Yamani: Yes, it has to be, and soon. The Secretary: Why? Yamani: The Algerians are already pressing very hard to have an- other OPEC meeting at the end of this month. They are concerned over their declining earnings. They sent a cable to OPEC countries asking that we link oil prices to SDRs or a basket of currencies. This in fact is a fair thing, but I know this is only a first step in raising prices. The sec- ond step might not be something we look for. So, the sooner the better. Your friends in Iran are also very keen to have another price in- crease. They want a quick one, since they think inflation is going higher. They want another increase this year. The Secretary: You realize that another oil price increase would have unfortunate repercussions, particularly on the Arab-Israel problem. It is not because of your position but the Israelis are trying to link the two—higher oil prices with Arab pressures. Yamani: I know that, and we want to avoid that. The Secretary: We are having the Shah in May and we will have a chance to talk. Yamani: The Iranians have already issued their statement. The Secretary: Who issued it? Robinson: It was Mr. Yeganeh, he is the Governor of the Iranian Central Bank and represented Iran at the Preparatory Conference. Yamani: The Iranians have said in their statement they wanted indexation. Therefore, we would like to have another meeting early in May. We can have another Paris meeting to work out an agenda. Even if the Algerians don’t want to come, we are prepared to move with our friends—the Venezuelans and Iranians. The Secretary: Our friends tell us that we broke up the Conference. In fact I even saw reports that accused Robinson and members of his staff of not attending the meetings. Robinson: That was the night that I let the staff leave at 11:00 pm. The report the next day was that the US was not attending the meetings. The Secretary: We did everything we could to keep the Paris meeting going. At the last moment, we sent an instruction to our dele- 365-608/428-S/80010 April 1975–October 1975 193 gation telling it to take an even more active role. 6 I am not saying that you would have liked everything we said but I will take responsibility for those actions where we took the lead with the consumers. Yamani: Did you organize the consumers? Robinson: The consumers were unified. The Secretary: It really does not make any difference. They (con- sumers) will say that the Americans made them do it. Yamani: What about the number of countries attending a confer- ence. As I told you in Riyadh, we want a limited group. The prevailing idea in Paris was that 24 countries should attend a producer/consumer conference. Did you agree? Robinson: We agreed, we did not object, but the issue was aca- demic since the conference broke down. Yamani: I understood that you would not have any objection if we talked about 20 countries. Once we went to the Paris Conference, there were pressures for representation from the major industrialized coun- tries and the developing countries to widen the representation. We think the smaller the conference, the better is the atmosphere for bilat- eral talks. The Secretary: We do not have strong views on increasing the number to 24. It is not a breaking point for us. Yamani: I had strong views to hold the number to 20 but France and the LDCs wanted more. The Algerians wanted 30! But I do not want another UN. The Secretary: How do we have concrete discussions so that we understand each other better on this issue? Through Akins? Yamani: Yes. Besides, if we have another meeting in Paris, I can come and meet behind the doors with you. The Secretary: I will keep this in mind. Yamani: What we do not want is for OPEC to meet and take action against you. The Secretary: Let us agree that when there is another meeting, we will coordinate our positions more closely. Yamani: But we need more definitive information from you on how you stand on raw materials. The Secretary: But we need more information from you on what you mean by a link between energy and other raw materials. Yamani: It is the timetable, the sequence. 6 Document 54. 365-608/428-S/80010 194 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII The Secretary: The differences do not seem that great. You don’t want to fix a price for energy without a guarantee that we will discuss raw materials and we don’t want to discuss raw materials without a guarantee from you that energy issues will be decided first. Robinson: We have to be careful when we talk about links. All basic resources are related to energy. We are prepared to talk about other resources as they relate to energy. The Secretary: Let us do some thinking about this and we will get word to you. I have never thought that this was an insoluble problem. We will see what we can do. (At this point, the Secretary asked if he could speak to Minister Yamani alone for a few minutes.) Download 8.4 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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