Foreign relations of the united states 1969–1976 volume XXXVII energy crisis, 1974–1980 department of state washington
Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting
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61. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting 1 Washington, May 12, 1975, 8–8:40 a.m. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.] [Mr. Robinson:] We also have in Saudi Arabia from Yamani a mes- sage 2
tween commodities and oil. And he is pressing us for June 9, to do 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 3, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger presided over the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. A table of contents and list of attendees are not printed. 2 This and other references to Yamani are based on a conversation that Akins had with him on May 9, which the Embassy reported in telegram 3303 from Jidda, May 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750165–0164) 365-608/428-S/80010 218 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII something before June 9, which is the date of the Dakar summit meeting of OPEC. And I have suggested a possible approach. There are some alternatives we may consider. Secretary Kissinger: What is that? Mr. Robinson: Well, that we have a ministerial level meeting in which we discuss the general issues. Secretary Kissinger: Who is “we”? Mr. Robinson: We—the ten participants in the prep-con. Secretary Kissinger: No. Mr. Robinson: Well, we have got to come up with— Secretary Kissinger: We have got to do nothing. We will not be blackmailed. What are they going to do? We may be willing to indicate a willingness to have a meeting, to have another prep-con. But we will not gear our actions to the meetings of OPEC. Let the French do it. We will not. Mr. Robinson: Well, I agree with that. But I think Yamani is ex- pecting something from us. Secretary Kissinger: Well, he can get something from us, but he cannot get a ministerial meeting before June 9. Mr. Robinson: No, no. It is an agreement to move in a direction that it seems to me we should be thinking about. Secretary Kissinger: That I am willing to do. But how would that differ from a prep-con? Mr. Robinson: Well, there would be no attempt to debate or re- solve any specific issues there. The only action item would be to set up working parties which would go off on parallel courses, one on energy and one on commodities. Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But then what would happen to the prep-con? Mr. Robinson: The prep-con would be merely preparatory to these two working party programs. Secretary Kissinger: So it would be a prep-con. Mr. Robinson: It would be a prep-con, yes. Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But I think we ought to let the French call that anyway. Mr. Robinson: I am not proposing we take any initiative. I am just saying I think we have got to have some response to Yamani to indicate we have not forgotten about our conversations here. 3 3
365-608/428-S/80010 April 1975–October 1975 219 Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But we should be a little harder to push than the French. Mr. Robinson: Right. Mr. Sober: Yamani is using us, Mr. Secretary, to take a somewhat softer view on prices again. What he is saying is this is going to be impossible— Secretary Kissinger: I know. But that is the tactic. Mr. Sober: Yes, of course it is. But on the other hand, he feels— Secretary Kissinger: I know what he feels. But we won’t let our- selves be driven like the French are. Mr. Sober: No, sir. I was going to say something else. He feels that in the conversation he had on his last stop here, he was promised some ideas from us, and we haven’t given him any. I think probably Yamani is right in that. Secretary Kissinger: That I agree with. Mr. Sober: I might say on the oil question, too, the Shah is quoted as having said at the end of his stay in Venezuela 4 that with inflation in the last eighteen months they have lost 30 percent of the value of their increase in price; and that looking at it through September also, both he and the Saudis now unfortunately seem to be zeroing in on the need for another price increase at the end of September. Secretary Kissinger: We may be able to kid the Saudis, but we sure as hell can’t kid the Shah with a prep-con. He will ask for indexation. Mr. Sober: He is on record with the Venezuelans as talking about the prep-con, but I don’t see any serious indication that he is concerned about it. Secretary Kissinger: He isn’t looking for an excuse. If he doesn’t want to raise prices, he won’t raise them. And if he does, a prep-con isn’t going to stop him. The Saudis have no interest in raising prices one way or another. They have an interest in keeping out of trouble. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.] 4 The Shah was in Venezuela May 5–9. A report on the highlights of his visit is in telegram 4908 from Caracas, May 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750165–0023) 365-608/428-S/80010 220 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII 62. Telegram From the Department of State to Selected Diplomatic Posts 1 Washington, May 12, 1975, 1912Z. 110686. Subject: Secretary’s Speech on Energy and Raw Materials. 1. In speech scheduled for delivery in Kansas City May 13, 2 Secretary will state US readiness to attend new meeting of energy producer-consumer prepcon, and to initiate bilateral consultations IEA countries, France and producers to this purpose. Speech will set for- ward US ideas on ways to begin serious discussion of raw materials/ commodity problems which we hope will constitute basis for progress toward meeting concerns of many LDC’s as developed at first Prepcon in Paris last month. Text follows septel. 2. Proposals involve three main elements, which will be presented in speech along following lines: —First, since both producers and consumers want a more reliable basis on which to do business, we will propose that the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva develop new rules and procedures on such questions as freer access to supplies and markets, promotion of mining and processing industries in these countries, and settlement of disputes. —Secondly, we are prepared to consider and discuss whether cir- cumstances warrant new arrangements in individual commodities, on a case-by-case basis. —Thirdly, recognizing the importance of growth in raw material production to both producers and consumers, we will propose that the World Bank explore new ways of financing raw material investment in producing countries. We are particularly interested in exploring new ways of mobilizing capital and bringing it together with outside man- agement and skills. 3. We believe successful dialogue along these lines could be best developed by making maximum use of existing multilateral fora (e.g., MTN’s, existing commodity groups within UNCTAD framework, and 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750166–0231. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Dennis H. Kux (NEA/INS). Sent to Algiers, Ankara, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Caracas, Colombo, Copenhagen, Dublin, USEC Brussels, Jidda, Kinshasa, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, New Delhi, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Tehran, The Hague, Tokyo, Vienna, Wellington, Brasilia, and USOECD Paris. The telegram is incorrectly dated May 22 (221912Z May 1975). 2 The text of the speech, delivered to the Kansas City International Relations Council in Kansas City, Missouri, is in Department of State Bulletin, June 2, 1975, pp. 713–719.
365-608/428-S/80010 April 1975–October 1975 221 IBRD). We have open mind about whether these institutions should be seized directly with joint initiatives from interested countries involved in producer-consumer prepcon or whether it would be preferable for prepcon to agree to present these and related proposals to a broader producer-consumer conference which would then discuss a more fully developed scenario for further negotiations in other forums. While we believe former scenario likely result in getting serious discussion started earlier, we would wish to have views of our partners in IEA and P/C prepcon group before deciding on one or the other. 4. You should seek early opportunity to discuss these proposals and procedural options (per para 3 above) with appropriate officials in host government. We will raise directly with Shah during his visit here this week. 3 5. For IEA countries: Please notify all governments of Secretary’s statement. Secretary will want to discuss the best tactics for pursuing reopening of P/C dialogue along above lines during IEA Ministerial May 27. However, earlier indication of ideas from member countries would be welcome. 6. For Brussels: Notify Davignon ASAP. 7. For Paris: French Embassy already notified. You should follow up. 8. For Riyadh: Notify Yamani ASAP. Ingersoll 3 The Shah visited the United States May 15–18. He met with Ford on May 16 and told him: “The influence of oil on Western inflation is 2 percent—this is your figure. In- dustrial inflation was 14 percent but the prices to us have gone up 35 percent. But we must have some kind of agreement, based on some tangible predictable relationship. We must index, or any other proposal which keeps our purchasing power intact. Perhaps in- dexing to 20–30 commodities, although that might be difficult.” He added: “My argu- ment in Algiers was that we have to depend on the commodity trade. But what happens to the Third World, with oil and industrial prices going up? What can we do? The Saudis will follow us—they will always be a moderating element. Between us we can do some- thing interesting. That will give us time for reconvening the Prepcon.” Ford did not di- rectly respond to the Shah’s remarks but instead asked how much oil Iran produced. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11) The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, Document 127.
365-608/428-S/80010 222 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII 63. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy (Dunn) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) 1 Washington, May 15, 1975. SUBJECT United States Preparedness to Withstand an Oil Embargo Our staffs have discussed several issues that deserve examination relating to our preparedness to handle another oil embargo. These issues include: a. a review of international petroleum allocation mechanisms that would be available in the event of either the absence or failure of IEA allocation mechanisms; b. an assessment of the likelihood of OAPEC using the “financial weapon” to augment any oil supply disruption, and measures we might employ to counter; c. a review of the current drawdown of worldwide petroleum stocks—causes, implications and policy options available to encourage supranormal stock levels if deemed necessary or desirable; d. a review of the current military fuel stock situation. Normal peacetime military stocks are said to be more than four million barrels short now. This review should be joined with estimates of military offtake from available national petroleum supplies in the event of an embargo. I recommend that NSC establish an adhoc group to examine gener- ally United States preparedness to withstand another embargo includ- ing the items outlined above. We feel that such a group should include representatives from DOD, FEA, Treasury, State, CIA and CIEP. 2
1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 4, Energy (9). Secret. 2 No record of this group has been found, but a reference to a similar group formed in February is in Document 72. 365-608/428-S/80010 April 1975–October 1975 223 64. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 Paris, May 28, 1975, 0300Z. Secto 2018. For Ambassador from Secretary. Subj: Message from Secretary to Prince Fahd. 2 1. Please deliver immediately following message from Secretary to Prince Fahd, during the morning of May 28; at same time you may show it to Yamani and seek his reaction and support. 3 2. Begin text: Your Royal Highness: Since the preparatory meeting in Paris ended without success, I have, as I know you have, been giving much thought to how we could overcome the impasse. Today I made public in the IEA a proposal which I hope will relaunch the dialogue. 4 It owes much to discussions which our associates have had together. I hope it will recommend itself to you. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840126–2165. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated Immediate to Washington. Kissinger was in Paris to attend the IEA and OECD Ministerial meetings. 2 Kissinger sent similar messages to Algerian President Houari Boumediene (tele- gram Secto 2020 to Algiers, May 28; ibid., P840126–2160), Venezuelan Foreign Minister Ramon Escovar (telegram Secto 2017 to Caracas, May 28; ibid., P840126–2138), and Bra- zilian Foreign Minister Antonio Francisco Azerada da Silveira (telegram Secto 2023 to Brasilia, May 28; ibid., P840126–2150). The Secretary also sent a personal message to Yamani, in which he asked him to use his “enormous influence among the producers” to ensure that successful U.S. efforts to include “the subject of raw materials within the framework of a renewed consumer-producer dialogue” be “received affirmatively and in the same spirit of cooperation with which it was made.” (Telegram Secto 2046 from Brussels, May 30; ibid., P840126–2144) 3 On May 31, Akins reported that he discussed the “new U.S. views and proposals on the preparatory conference of energy producers and consumers” with Fahd and Yamani. The Crown Prince “was pleased” but deferred “detailed comment” to Yamani, who said he was “immensely gratified,” remarking that the U.S. position “was now very close to the Saudi position.” (Telegram 3882 from Jidda, May 31; ibid., D750191–0508) Fahd formally responded to Kissinger with a letter on June 2, in which he wrote: “We support the necessity of a resumption of the preliminary meeting in Paris a second time and we consider that the objective of the meeting is an agreement on a schedule including the clauses that are agreed on for discussion.” (Telegram 4182 from Jidda, June 11; ibid., D750203–0276) 4 The text of Kissinger’s statement at the May 27 IEA Ministerial meeting in Paris is in Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1975, pp. 838–844. The IEA Ministers published a communique´ in which they “reiterated their determination that the Agency should con- tribute, as far as problems connected with energy were concerned, towards achievement” of a “regular and stable energy supply.” They further emphasized that solutions to “cur- rent economic problems” must be based on “the principles of inter-dependence of all countries, mutual support and shared responsibility, so that all countries, whatever their level of development, may be recognized as partners in the world economic system.” (Ibid., pp. 844–846) A description of the May 27 meeting is in telegram 13526 from USOECD Paris, May 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750185–0370) 365-608/428-S/80010 224 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII 3. The first step, as I see it, would be to reconvene the preparatory meeting in the same format as before. The time could be relatively soon, certainly a matter of months as I see no reason for delay. I suggest that the format remain the same to avoid a tedious, non-productive negotia- tion over who would attend and what the rules of procedure might be. Clearly we have more important business to do than that. 4. The second step would be for the preparatory meeting to agree on the creation of a number of commissions to deal with the critical issues in relationships between developing and developed countries. Thus commissions might be set up for energy, for the problems of the most seriously affected nations, and for raw materials. Conceivably there would be others. Each commission would review all aspects of the problem assigned to it: including finance, investment, trade, and production. 5. The way in which each commission proceeds about its work would depend in considerable measure on the nature of work already being done in the field. For the most seriously affected, there is already much activity, and the commission’s role would be essentially to mon- itor, to supplement, and to orient that work, giving it the thrust and purpose it must have. The commission on raw materials would have a similar role. In the case of energy, since there is no existing interna- tional organization in which the basic questions are dealt with, the commission should also function as a means of addressing and re- solving the underlying substantive issues. 6. In each case, I would envisage that the basic issues that have been raised be addressed. Under raw materials, for example, you would no doubt wish to raise the question of terms of trade. And we wish on our side to consider how adequate resources can be obtained for the development of raw materials and how in general raw material markets can be made to function more efficiently. Actual negotiations on commodities would remain the purview of already existing com- modity groups such as for coffee, cocoa, tin. 7. Clearly we would want to limit membership in the commissions to assure their effectiveness. I think we both are anxious to avoid a new UNCTAD. In my speech today I suggested that we seek to limit the membership by applying objective criteria. For raw materials, for ex- ample, we could include those countries for which exports or imports for food and other non-oil raw materials constitute a certain minimum percentage of their total national product, and set that threshold high enough to keep the numbers within reason. We could do the same in energy. For the most seriously affected, we would have to seek another formula, one in which representative countries with the lowest capita income were chosen along with the traditional and new donors.
365-608/428-S/80010 April 1975–October 1975 225 8. This proposed approach, Your Royal Highness, has two origins. First, our own thinking within the American administration on raw materials and other issues of the relationship between developed and developing countries has been evolving over the last several months. I expressed some of the first implications of our new thinking in a speech at Kansas City two weeks ago. 5 I will have something more to say about them tomorrow at the OECD meeting. 9. The second source is the realization that it would be difficult if not impossible to find a basis on which oil producers and consumers could discuss the new problems of energy without addressing the entire range of relationships between developed and developing countries. 10. My proposal is thus brought forward in a spirit of conciliation and innovation. In doing so, I do not think we should attempt to dictate too closely the timeframe of the work of the commissions—that they could work simultaneously or consecutively and might, depending on the difficulty of the task at hand, require a shorter or longer span of time—nor should we attempt to structure too precisely their relation- ship to each other. My intent, rather, is to find an approach which rec- ognizes both the essential unity of the developing countries in seeking an improved relationship with the developed countries, and the great diversity of interests, forums, and subjects to be addressed. 11. I hope this approach will, as it is intended, meet many of the concerns that the Saudi representative at the Paris preparatory meeting expressed. I hope, Your Royal Highness, that you will find it possible to support this concept, so that we may soon relaunch the dialogue be- tween developed and developing countries, including on the essential issue of energy. I know that that is your wish; I assure you that it is also our own. Warm regards. Henry A. Kissinger. End text. 6 5 See Document 62. 6 The telegram is unsigned. During a May 27 meeting, Kissinger, Giscard, and Sau- vagnargues discussed a possible future energy conference. The Secretary said that “France should reconvene the preparatory conference under French chairmanship” and recommended that three commissions be established “to deal with energy, other raw ma- terials, and the problems of developing countries,” all the while insisting that “energy must receive priority in emphasis over other raw materials.” He added that “he thought the U.S. and France could work together to make the conference a success” because there were “really no basic differences” between them. Sauvagnargues responded that “the goal of the conference at the next stage should not be so much to reach conclusions as to establish a structure for future discussions” and that such a meeting “should be global.” While Kissinger agreed, he re-emphasized that energy should have top priority. (Tele- gram 13581 from Paris, May 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850061–1750) 365-608/428-S/80010 226 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII Download 8.4 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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