Handbook of psychology volume 7 educational psychology


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CHAPTER 16

Computers, the Internet, and New Media for Learning

RICKI GOLDMAN-SEGALL AND JOHN W. MAXWELL



393

CONTEXTS AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

393

Instructional Technology: Beginnings of

Computer-Aided Instruction

395

Cognitive Science and Research on

Artificial Intelligence

396

THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN LEARNING

397

Technology as Information Source

398

Technology as Curriculum Area

399

Technology as Communications Media

400

Technology as Thinking Tool

402

Technology as Environment

403

Technology as Partner

404

Technology as Scaffold

405

Technology as Perspectivity Toolkit

406

EXEMPLARY LEARNING SYSTEMS

407

CHALLENGING PARADIGMS AND



LEARNING THEORIES

416


Cognition: Models of Mind or Creating Culture?

416

Learning, Thinking Attitudes, and 

Distributed Cognition

418

CONCLUSION

421

REFERENCES



422

The Points of Viewing (POV) theory is the foundation upon

which this chapter is based. In the POV theory viewers and

readers actively layer their viewpoints and interpretations to

create emergent patterns and themes (Goldman-Segall,

1996b, 1998b). The purpose of understanding this theory is

to enable learners, educators, and designers to broaden their

scope and to enable them to learn from one another. The POV

theory has been used for more than a decade in ethnographic

studies to interpret video research data, but here we apply this

theory to interpret and make meaning of a variety of theories

of learning and technology, expecting that readers will rein-

terpret and resituate the theoretical positions in new configu-

rations as they read the text.

We explore how leading theorists have understood learn-

ing and teaching in relation to the use of computers, the

Internet, and new media technologies. Our goal is to envision

the directions in which the field is going and, simultaneously,

to tease out some of the sticky webs that have confused

decision makers and academics in their search for a singular

best practice. The underlying theme running through this

chapter is that many routes combining a vast array of per-

spectives are needed to shape an educationally sound ap-

proach to learning and teaching with new media technology.

We call this new approach to design and application perspec-

tivity technologies.

CONTEXTS AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

The legacy of the Enlightenment magnified the age-old de-

bate between empiricism and idealism. In the early twentieth

century the debate shifted: Science could be used not only to

observe the external world with microscopes and telescopes

but also to change, condition, and control behavior. Russian

physiologist Ivan Pavlov, most renowned for his experiments

with dogs, called his theory conditioning. Dogs “learned” to

salivate to the sound of a bell that had previously accompa-

nied their eating, even when they received no food. Pavlov’s

theory of conditioning played a central role in inspiring John

B. Watson, who is often cited as the founder of behaviorist

psychology. As early as 1913, Watson, while continuing to

work with animals, also applied Pavlov’s theories to children,

believing that people act according to the stimulation of their

nervous system and can be conditioned to learn just as easily

as dogs can. A turbulent personal turn of events—leading to

his dismissal from Johns Hopkins University—extended

Watson’s behaviorist approach into the domain of marketing.

He landed a job as vice president of J. Walter Thompson, one

of the largest U.S. advertising companies, and helped

changed the course of advertising forever (Daniels, 2000). As

media, education, and business enter a convergent course in

the twenty-first century and new tools for learning are being



394

Computers, the Internet, and New Media for Learning

designed, behaviorist theories are still a strong, silent partner

in the new knowledge economy.

The most noted behaviorist in the educational domain,

Burrhus Frederic (B. F.) Skinner, contributed the idea of

operant conditioning—how positive and negative reinforce-

ment (reward and punishment) can be used as stimuli to

shape how humans respond. With this variation, the theory of

behavior modification was born. All human actions are seen

to be shaped (caused) by the stimulus of the external world

on the body. In short, there is no mind creating reality, merely

a hardwired system that responds to what it experiences from

external sources. Infamous for designing the glass Air Crib,

which his daughter—observed, measured, and “taught” how

to behave—spent time living in, Skinner not only practiced

what he preached but led the way for even more elaborate ex-

periments to prove how educators could shape, reinforce, and

manipulate humans through repeated drills.

With the advent of the computer and man-machine studies

in the postwar period, intrepid behavioral scientists designed

and used drill-and-practice methods to improve memoriza-

tion tasks (e.g., Suppes, 1966). They turned to an examina-

tion of the role and efficacy of computers and technology in

education, a subject understood in a behaviorist research

agenda that valued measurable results and formal experimen-

tal methods, as Koschmann (1996, pp. 5–6) noted in his eru-

dite critique of the period. Accordingly, a large amount of

learning research in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s asked how

the computer (an external stimulus) affects (modifies) the in-

dividual (a hardwired learning system). Research questions

focused on how the process of learning could be improved by

using the computer, applied as enhancement or supplement to

an otherwise unchanged learning environment.

The approach one takes to using technologies in the learn-

ing setting is surely rooted in one’s concept of the mind. The

mind as a site of research (and not just idealization or specula-

tion) has its modern roots in the work of Jean Piaget (b. 1896),

a natural scientist trained in zoology but most renowned for his

work as a developmental psychologist and epistemologist.

After becoming disillusioned with standardized testing

methodology at the Sorbonne in France, Piaget returned to

Geneva in 1921 to dedicate the rest of his academic life to

studying the child’s conception of time (Piaget, 1969), space

(Piaget & Inhelder, 1956), number (Piaget, 1952), and the

world (Piaget, 1930). Although the idea that children could do

things at one age that they could not do at another was not new,

Piaget was able to lay out a blueprint for children’s conceptual

development at different stages of their lives. For example, the

classic theory of conservation eludes the young child: A tall

glass contains more water than a short one even if the young

child pours the same water from one glass into the other. Until

Piaget, no one had conducted a body of experiments asking

children to think about these phenomena and then mapped into

categories the diverse views that children use to solve prob-

lems. By closely observing, recording his observations, and

applying these to an emerging developmental theory of mind,

Piaget and his team of researchers in Geneva developed the fa-

mous hierarchy of thinking stages: sensorimotor, preopera-

tional, concrete, and formal. Piaget did not limit all thinking

into these four rigid categories but rather used them as a way to

deepen discussion on how children learn.

What is fundamentally different in Piaget’s conception of

mind is that unlike the behaviorist view that the external world

affects the individual—a unidirectional approach with no input

from the individual—the process of constructivist learning

occurs in the mind of the child encountering, exploring,

and theorizing about the world as the child encounters the

world while moving through preset stages of life. The child’s

mind assimilates new events into existing cognitive structures,

and the cognitive structures accommodate the new event,

changing the existing structures in a continually interactive

process. Schemata are formed as the child assimilates new

events and moves from a state of disequilibrium to equilibrium,

a state only to be put back into disequilibrium every time the

child meets new experiences that cannot fit the existing

schema. In this way, as Beers (2001) suggests, assimilation and

accommodation become part of a dialectical interaction.

We propose that learners, their tools and creations, and the

technology-rich learning habitat are continually affecting

and influencing each other, adding diverse points of viewing

to the topic under investigation. This wider range of view-

points sets the stage for a third state called acculturation

the acceptance of diverse points of viewing—that occurs

simultaneously with both the assimilation and accommoda-

tion processes. Learning becomes an evolving social event in

which ideas are diffused among the elements within a culture,

as Kroeber argued in 1948 (p. 25), and also are changed by

the participation of the elements.

Piaget believed that learning is a spontaneous, individual,

cognitive process, distinct from the sort of socialized and

nonspontaneous instruction one might find in formal edu-

cation, and that these two are in a somewhat antagonistic

relationship. Critiquing Piaget’s constructivism, the Soviet

psychologist L. S. Vygotsky (1962) wrote,

We believe that the two processes—the development of sponta-

neous and of nonspontaneous concepts—are related and con-

stantly influence each other. They are parts of a single process:

the development of concept formation, which is affected by

varying external and internal conditions but is essentially a uni-

tary process, not a conflict of antagonistic, mutually exclusive

forms of mentation. (p. 85)



Contexts and Intellectual History

395

Vygotsky heralded a departure from individual mind to so-

cial mind, and under his influence educational theorizing

moved away from its individual-focused origins and toward

more socially or culturally situated perspectives. The paradig-

matic approaches of key theorists in learning technology re-

flect this change as contributions from anthropology and

social psychology gained momentum throughout the social

sciences. The works of Vygotsky and the Soviet cultural-

historical school (notably A. R. Luria and A. N. Leontiev),

when translated into English, began to have a major influence,

especially through the interpretations and stewardship of edu-

cational psychologists such as Jerome Bruner, Michael Cole,

and Sylvia Scribner (Bruner, 1990; Cole & Engeström, 1993;

Cole & Wertsch, 1996; Scribner & Cole, 1981). Vygotsky

focused on the role of social context and mediating tools

(language, writing, and culture) in the development of the in-

dividual and argued that one cannot study the mind of a child

without examining the “social milieu, both institutional and

interpersonal” in which she finds herself (Katz & Lesgold,

1993, p. 295). Vygotsky’s influence, along with that of prag-

matist philosopher John Dewey (1916/1961), opened up the

study of technology in learning beyond individual cognition.

The ground in the last decade of the twentieth century thus be-

came fertile for growing a range of new media and computa-

tional environments for learning, teaching, and research

based on a socially mediated conceptualization of how people

learn. But the path to social constructionism at the end of the

twentieth century first took a circuitous route through what

was known as computer-aided instruction (CAI).



Instructional Technology: Beginnings of

Computer-Aided Instruction

An examination of the theoretical roots of computers in

education exposes its behaviorist beginnings: The computer

could reinforce activities that would bring about more effi-

cient learning. For some, this meant “cheaper,” for others,

“faster,” and for yet others, it meant without needing a

teacher (see Bromley, 1998, for a discussion). The oldest

such tradition of computing in education is CAI. This

approach dates back to the early 1960s, notably in two re-

search projects: at Stanford under Patrick Suppes (1966), and

the Programmed Logic for Automated Teaching Operations

(PLATO) project at the University of Illinois at Urbana-

Champaign (UIUC) under Donald Bitzer and Dan Alpert

(Alpert & Bitzer, 1970). Both projects utilized the then-new

time-sharing computer systems to create learning opportuni-

ties for individual students. The potential existed for a time-

sharing system to serve hundreds or even thousands of

students simultaneously, and this economy of scale was one

of the main drivers of early CAI research. A learner could sit

at a terminal and engage in a textual dialogue with the com-

puter system: question and answer. As such, CAI can be situ-

ated mostly within the behavioral paradigm (Koschmann,

1996, p. 6), although its research is also informed by cogni-

tive science.

The Stanford CAI project explored elementary school

mathematics and science education, and the researchers

worked with local schools to produce a remarkable quantity

of research data (Suppes, Jerman, & Brian, 1968; Suppes &

Morningstar, 1972). Suppes began with tutorial instruction as

the key model and saw that the computer could provide indi-

vidualized tutoring on a far greater scale than was economi-

cally possible before. Suppes envisioned computer tutoring

on three levels, the simplest of which is drill-and-practice

work, in which the computer administers a question and

answer session with the student, judging responses correct or

incorrect and keeping track of data from the sessions. The

second level was a more direct instructional approach: The

computer would give information to the student and then quiz

the student on the information, possibly allowing for differ-

ent constructions or expressions of the same information. In

this sense, the computer acts much like a textbook. The third

level involved more sophisticated dialogic systems in which

a more traditional tutor-tutee relationship could be emulated

(Suppes, 1966). Clearly, the simple drill-and-practice model

is the easiest to implement, and as such the bulk of the early

Stanford research uses this model, especially in the context of

elementary school arithmetic (Suppes et al., 1968).

The research results from the Stanford experiments are

hardly surprising: Students improve over time and with prac-

tice. For the time (the 1960s), however, to be able to automate

the process was a significant achievement. More interesting

from our perspective are the reflections that Suppes (1966) of-

fered regarding the design of the human-computer interface:

How and when should feedback be given? How can the sys-

tem be tailored to different cognitive styles? What is the best

way to leverage the unprecedented amount of quantitative

data the system collects about each student’s performance and

progress? These questions still form the cornerstone of much

educational technology research.

The PLATO project at UIUC had a somewhat different

focus (Alpert & Bitzer, 1970). Over several incarnations of the

PLATO system through the 1960s, Bitzer, Alpert, and their

team worked at the problems of integrating CAI into

university teaching on a large scale, as indeed it began to be

from the late 1960s. The task of taking what was then enor-

mously expensive equipment and systems and making them

economically viable in order to have individualized tutoring

for students drove the development of the systems and led



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