History of Civilizations of Central Asia
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Contents Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Economic development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Banking and foreign capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Relations with Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Scientific interest in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Jadidism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Interaction between the civilizations of West and East, which had developed in varying degrees for several centuries, became a steady trend of world history in the colonial period. An important role in this was played by nineteenth century industrial capitalism, which replaced the eastward trade expansion of the world’s most developed capitalist countries. Practically all the countries of the East experienced one form of dependence or another, being turned into colonies or semi-colonies of the West. Central Asia was unable to avoid this fate, being situated in the heart of Eurasia and constituting a broad intracontinental base for Russian imperial influence. Russia itself, having begun the process of Westernization in the time of Peter the Great, also received an appreciable stimulus towards bourgeois development from the more developed West, which represented not only an example to follow but also a potential external threat. These circumstances explain the different course of its capitalist develop- ment which, compared with Britain, France and Germany, was compressed in time and pursued by the state, which had difficulty in combining the more advanced technical and * See Map 1 . 121 Contents ISBN 92-3-103985-7 TSARIST RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA organizational forms with its own ‘incomplete’ pre-bourgeois structures. Russia was nev- ertheless able to join the world capitalist market system, which by the nineteenth cen- tury had not completed its formation, and to overcome its backwardness in the framework of national bourgeois development. Tsarist Russia’s greatest political achievements in the nineteenth century were the bourgeois reforms of the 1860s–80s and the economic mea- sures of the outstanding statesman Count Sergei Yulyevich Witte, who in 1897 carried out a successful monetary reform which put gold currency into circulation and permitted the free exchange of the credit rouble. However, there were still great imbalances in the economy’s development and expenditure on frequent wars placed a heavy burden on it. Russia approached the borders of Central Asia immediately after the conquest of west- ern Siberia. The Kazakh lands of the Little Horde (1731) and Middle Horde (1735) were the first to be drawn into the orbit of its political and economic interests, marking the beginning of the more than a century-long process of including the Kazakh nomads in the Russian empire. From the 1820s it introduced direct rule over all the Kazakh Zhuzs (Hordes), including the Great Horde (1847). It was around this time that a drive to the south began, accompanied by the infringement of the territorial integrity of the khanate of Kokand, deep reconnaissance across its territory and the annexation of the khanate’s strategically significant outposts and fortresses – Raim (1847), in the lower reaches of the River Syr Darya, which flows into the Aral Sea; the Kokand fort of Ak-Mechet, renamed Fort Perovsk (1857) by Gener al Perovsky, its captor; and from the western Siberian side, Kopal (1847) and Verny (1854) (now Almaty). The capture of Ak-Mechet marked the beginning of the formation of the Syr Darya strategic military line which, together with the Orenburg and Siberian lines, was the starting point for Russian expansion deep into the khanates of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva. The swift development of events in the region was all the more significant because of the international dimension – the intensified rivalry for influence in Central Asia between Russia and Britain, which by then (1857) had established control over Herat in western Afghanistan. The Russian Government saw this as a serious threat to its geographical posi- tion in the south-eastern sector. London, however, concerned about instability in India, reverted to a ‘border policy’ with Russia while St Petersburg, urged on by ambitious gen- erals, decided to consolidate its hold on the lands it had seized from the khanate of Kokand and carry out further large-scale actions. For a time the militant mood of the Russian generals was tempered by the diploma- tists of the Asiatic Department, who preferred to influence the situation through their missions, embassies and various expeditions sent into Central Asia and the neighbouring countries. In 1858 three expeditions were fitted out: a scientific expedition to Persia and the 122 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 TSARIST RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA Herat oasis headed by the orientalist N. V. Khanykov; a trade expedition to south-eastern Turkistan headed by the Kazakh ethnographer Chokan Valikhanov (1835–65); and a diplo- matic expedition to the khanate of Khiva and the emirate of Bukhara headed by the Russian military agent in London, Colonel N. P. Ignatyev. Ignatyev’s mission was considered the most important. His task was to establish friendly relations with Khiva and Bukhara, nego- tiate equal trade rights, put an end to Russian merchants being charged customs duty and taxes amounting to almost half the value of their goods, and obtain the khans’ agreement to Russian ships’ navigation of the River Amu Darya. At the same time Ignatyev was to convince the khans that their priority should be trade with Russia, not with Britain. The Aral Sea flotilla under the command of Lieutenant-Commander A. I. Butakov was sent in support of Ignatyev’s mission. The khan of Khiva, Sa’id Muhammad, agreed to practically everything in the draft treaty proposed by Ignatyev except freedom of navigation for Russian ships on the Amu Darya. He declared that the merchants of Khiva were more likely to agree to see their ‘goods rot rather than being loaded on to Russian ships’. The situation was not helped by Ignatyev’s undertaking, in the name of Russia, to set aside the previous disputes between the two states, grant the merchants of Khiva the same rights and privileges enjoyed by the merchants of other Asian countries and, finally, permit the collection of a 2.5 per cent duty on goods in transit carried on the Amu Darya and 5 per cent on goods landed in the khanate.
The negotiations in Bukhara with Nasrullah Khan proceeded more smoothly and mutual agreement was reached on all issues. Ignatyev received assurances of Bukhara’s absolute loyalty to Russia, not to Britain. As a result of the Russian mission’s seven-month stay in Khiva and Bukhara, the tsarist government received detailed information about the political, social and economic situation in the khanates, topographic, statistical and military information about the mouth of the Amu Darya, the roads from Khiva and Bukhara to Persia and Afghanistan, through the Hindu Kush to the Indus valley, and about the military strength and resources of the Central Asian khanates. In a general evaluation of its outcome, the leader of the mission said: The most important and essential result . . . is that the fog concealing the khanate from the Russian Government has dispersed . . . The information obtained by our mission and delib- erate destruction of the former ‘mirage’ brought about a sharp change in the nature of our relations with those cunning and treacherous neighbours, promoted the establishment of a more correct view of the importance and basis of their power, their real strength, and in par- ticular regarding the position that we should and can occupy in Central Asia and equally the aims we should pursue to protect our vital interests more truly and powerfully. 1 1
1897 , p. 278. 123 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 TSARIST RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA This evaluation meant that important changes were to be expected in Russian for- eign policy. From that moment the positions of the diplomatic and military departments regarding policy in Central Asia quickly began to converge, proving that the earlier ‘dis- agreements’ amounted to nothing more than ‘politicking’. The actions of the Russian detachments of V. V. Dandevil on the Caspian shore, of A. I. Butakov on the Amu Darya and of Venyukov in Kokand’s possessions on the River Chu in the spring and summer of 1859 were crowned by the capture of the Kokand fortresses of Tokmak (1869) and Pish- pek (now Bishkek) (1862), and it was considered expedient to join together the Orenburg and Siberian strategic military lines. In 1864 tsarist troops began a broad and longterm penetration deep into the khanates of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva. On 21 November 1864 foreign states were sent a circular note from the Russian min- ister of foreign affairs, Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov (1798–1883), who said with reference to the actions ‘of the US in America, of France in Africa, Holland in its colonies and Britain in the East Indies’ that the aims of the Russian empire were ‘to ensure the security of Central Asia’, the development there of ‘a social structure, commerce, pros- perity and civilization’ and the facilitation of ‘its proper settlement’. It also contained a reference to the ‘insuperable efforts of a properly organized state’ to spread its influence to neighbouring territories lacking a ‘stable regime’. 2 In fact, the veil of tsarism’s messianic interpretation of its aims concealed a ‘triad’ that matched its true intentions much more closely: occupation, colonization and Russification of the region and the creation in the near future of a ‘new Russian Turkistan’. 3 However,
documents show that initially tsarism did not plan to eliminate the independence of the Central Asian states. This was a complex, expensive and dangerous business. While in fact subordinating them to tsarism, it was considered more advantageous to preserve their internal independence. This idea was actively put about towards the end of the 1860s, after tsarist troops’ capture of the towns of Turkestan, Aulie-Ata, Chimkent and Tashkent and the formation of a Turkistan governor-generalship in 1865. For example, according to the newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti, it was not acceptable ‘that the money from our state treasury is spent on this new borderland and local expenditure is not fully reimbursed from local funds’. 4 In 1867, however, it was decided to create Turkistan governor-generalship within the Russian empire. As a result of tsarism’s military operations, the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva lost a considerable part of their territory and were made protectorates of the 2 Tatishchev, 1911 , Vol. 2, pp. 107–8. 3 Krivoshein, 1912b , p. 30.
4 Dmitriev, 1976 , p. 31.
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Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 TSARIST RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA Russian empire. Khujand, Ura-tepe (Ura-tyube), Jizak, Samarkand and Kattakurgan, which had been taken away from the emirate of Bukhara, were formed into Zerafshan okrug (region) of Turkistan governorgeneralship in 1868. The khanate of Khiva was deprived of the whole right bank of the Amu Darya, which was attached to Turkistan as Amu Darya otdel (division). Both khanates were included in the Russian customs line, which meant complete subordination of their economies to the interests of tsarism and the undivided supremacy of the Russian merchants and bourgeoisie. Russian banknotes and gold and silver coins were brought into the emirate and gradually forced the local currency out of the Bukhara market. Under the trade agreement of 1868, the khanate of Kokand was also turned into a mar- ket controlled by tsarism for the sale of Russian goods and as a source of raw materials. Kokand, however, unlike Bukhara and Khiva, was shaken by internal dissension and popu- lar rebellions against Khudoyar Khan and tsarist troops and was occupied and deprived of its political status. 5 The tsarist government, fearing a ‘second Caucasus’ (that is, a serious rebellion, as had broken out after the initial Russian conquest of the Muslim Caucasus), declared the territory of the khanate of Kokand to be an ‘inalienable part of the Russian empire’ (1876) and attached it to Turkistan governor-generalship with the name Ferghana
’. Following the elimination of the khanate of Kokand, the tsarist government firmly estab- lished itself in the central and eastern parts of Central Asia and became much more actively expansionist in its western regions. The point of departure for the troops’ further advance deep into the areas of the Turkmen tribes was the base of Krasnovodsk, which had been greatly enlarged from 1869. During the spring and summer of 1879 there were intensive preparations for the seizure of the fortress of Geok-tepe (near Ashgabat), which ended in failure, however; it was only in January 1881 that tsarist troops, under the cover of artillery fire, captured the fortress and forced the besieged Tekes (a Turkmen tribe) to surrender. In May 1881 the territory of the Akhal Teke oasis (now the city of Ashgabat) was turned into Transcaspian oblast’ as part of Transcaspian otdel (the lands east of the Caspian Sea inhabited by Turkmen tribes). On 1 January 1885 its annexation by Russia was decided by resolution of the kengnesh, the assembly of people’s representatives of the city of Merv. This marked the completion of the Russian empire’s territorial growth, whose final stage is linked with Central Asia. The sphere of geostrategic interests of the Russian state included 5 Khudoyar faced a series of insurrections until April 1875, when he sought Russian protection in Tashkent; he was exiled to Orenburg. The khanate of Kokand was absorbed into Turkistan governor- generalship and Russian control reached within 80 km of what Britain saw as the extent of its ‘sphere of influence’ in the Pamirs. [Trans.] 125
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 TSARIST RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA extensive territories from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east, from the Aral Sea steppes and Siberia in the north to the mountain ridges of the Pamirs, Hindu Kush and Tian Shan in the south. It was a specific feature of Central Asian civilization that for millennia the oases and fertile river valleys had produced flourishing towns and commerce, extensive irrigation sys- tems and trades and various religions, scripts and literatures, while the nomads who dwelt in the steppes and deserts had made their way into the oases and some settled in agricultural areas. An important role was played not only by the uniformity of geographic conditions, historical destinies and ethno-cultural processes but also by the absence of internal fron- tiers, which allowed constant large-scale contacts of tribes and nations within the region. Thus Central Asia was always a self-sufficient and integral region with clearly defined cultural-historical processes and a unique system of complementary settled agricultural and nomadic civilizations. 6 It played the role of a connecting link between East and West and was a transit zone for numerous trade routes of transcontinental significance. In addition to the geopolitical benefits of the conquest of Central Asia, the Russian empire now had its first serious contacts with the Muslim world – not the Muslim regions of the periphery, the Volga valley or the Caucasus, but with one of the historic centres of Islam, founded on a powerful religious civilization and traditional structures. It was on these factors that all other internal factors depended – the nature and orientation of Central Asian society; its philosophy and culture; its readiness for and interest in mutual relations and mutual influences; the power of tradition of that society and its readiness for changes brought in from outside; and its capacity to resist and the internal strength of society. Thus, with the conquest of Central Asia, the Russian empire assumed both a great responsibility and equally a duty towards the processes which would take place there. Primarily the new lands required a new structure of government. Let us examine how that came about. The main reference point for governing Central Asia and deriving political and eco- nomic advantages from it was the Russian structure as a whole, or more specifically, mod- ifications to it tested in the Muslim areas of the Volga valley, Siberia, the Caucasus and the Crimea. The fundamental principles for governing the minority nationality regions of Rus- sia were based on the merging of military and civilian authority and the concentration in one and the same establishment of administrative, judicial, economic and other functions. These principles were adopted, practically unchanged, as the foundation in Central Asia and this constituted a fundamental revision of the previous system of government. The basic documentation was drawn up from 1867, the determining factor being the ‘military situation’. As new territory was seized, documents were issued, generally 6
’noy Azii, 2001 , p. 5.
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Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Administration provisional in nature. 7 It was only in 1886 that a permanently effective law was brought in, the ‘Regulations on the Government of the Turkistan Region’. Administration Initially Turkistan governor-generalship was divided into two oblast’s, Syr Darya oblast’ (centre: Tashkent) and Semirechye oblast’ (centre: Verny). The following were formed from territory conquered later: Zerafshan okrug (centre: Samarkand; 1868); Amu Darya
(centre: Petroaleksandrovsk; 1874); and Ferghana oblast’ (centre: Novy Marghilan; 1876). In 1882 Semirechye oblast’, was removed from Turkistan governor-generalship and placed in Steppe kray (peripheral territory), which included Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Uralsk and Turgay oblast’s. In 1886, in accordance with the new Regulations, changes were made to the administra- tive territorial divisions of Turkistan. The principle of unification of component units was pursued more consistently. For example, Zerafshan okrug was transformed into Samarkand oblast ’, and Amu Darya otdel became part of Syr Darya oblast’. Contemporaries began to call Syr Darya, Ferghana and Samarkand oblast’s ‘indigenous’. In 1899 Semirechye
’ was returned to Turkistan governor-generalship and a new Transcaspian oblast’ (the fifth of that name) was added; from 1881 to 1899 it had been part of the Caucasian vice-regency. The lowest-level unit in the system of territorial organization was the volost’ (jurisdic- tion of several parishes), the mid-level unit was the uezd (district) and the upper-level unit the oblast’. In nomadic regions, aqsaqalstvos (councils of elders) were set up as well as
’s. Generally these divisions did not take into account the particular natural, histori- cal, economic or national features of the region. For example, they did not correspond to the centuries-old arrangements for the use of pasture, and the summer and winter pastures of the Kazakh clans often finished up in different administrative units. The powers of the local aristocracy were weakened and this affected their legal, economic and political status. The new system of government was called military-popular (from 1886, military- administrative) and reflected the establishment of a military regime in the form of the tsarist generals and senior army officers who regulated every aspect of the political, 7
‘upravlenii v Semirechenskoy i Syrdaryinskoy oblastyakh 1867 g.’; Vremennye pravila
’yu; Vremennoe polozheniye ot 21 maya 1874 g. po upravleniyu Amudaryinskim otdelom [Regulations on ‘The Government of Semirechye and Syr Darya oblast’s of 1867’; Provisional Rules for the Govern- ment of Zerafshan okrug of 1868; Provisional Regulations of 1873 for the Government of Ferghana oblast’; Provisional Regulations of 21 May 1874 for the Government of Amu Darya otdel]. 127
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Administration economic and social life of the local community and, at the same time, the introduction of local self-government – Muslim judges, village, volost’ and town elders (aqsaqals), tithe collectors (zak¯atchis, from zak¯at, alms-tax), etc., elected by the population. This kind of ‘compromise’ with the traditional social and legal institutions was forced on the colonial authorities by the military situation from the 1860s to the 1880s and the pressing need to draw the conquered peoples into Russia’s sphere of socio-economic inter- Download 8.99 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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