International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

Methodology, finally, is the part of the philosophy of science dealing with 
the specific ways – methods – of gaining knowledge. Differently put, meth-
odology is the practice of science. 
In short, any theoretical reasoning needs a starting point provided by on-
tological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. Together they 
form the core of a particular philosophy of science.
These core elements of a philosophy of science (the ontological, episte-
mological and methodological assumptions) will now be discussed in more 
detail, using positivism as an example of a philosophy of science. Positivism 
provides the most relevant starting point, considering that this philosophy of 
science has so far been the most influential, not only in International Rela-
tions, but in all sciences – the natural as well as social science disciplines. 
Most academic work in IR – implicitly or explicitly – is based on a positivist 
philosophy of science. Step 2 therefore has a double function; first, positiv-
ism is used as an example to demonstrate the basics of a philosophy of sci-
ence. This should make what has been said so far about philosophy of science 
easier to understand. Second, at the same time, you will already be familiariz-
ing yourselves with the core assumptions found at the heart of many theoreti-
cal approaches to IR. This second aspect will make it easier to understand the 
single theories of IR presented in Part 2 of this book. At this stage, of course, 
this understanding will still be on the abstract level of philosophy-of-science-
discussions (meta-theory). Our discussions will take a more substantive form 
at a later stage when dealing with specific theoretical approaches to IR.

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43 
Step 2: 
Positivism as an example for a philosophy of science 
2.1. Positivism 
Positivism as a philosophy of science has a long history that draws on tradi-
tions of philosophical thought dating back to ancient Greece. The term “posi-
tivism” itself was only introduced in the early 19
th
century by the French phi-
losopher August Comte (Système de politique positive, 1824 and Cours de 
philosophie positive, 6 volumes by 1842). He claimed the only authentic 
knowledge was that which is based on experience obtained through the sens-
es; knowledge is based on positive evidence. “Positive” is used in the same 
way the term is used in the natural sciences: positive evidence in the case of 
an examination results in “proof”. Knowledge can only and has to be reduced 
to the interpretation of “positive results”: a positive result is the outcome of 
an experiment that provides the evidence for what has been expected/hy-
pothesized (as formulated in a theory). The opposite is when the experiment’s 
outcome has negative results which do not confirm the hypothesis – the sci-
entist does not find evidence of what he is looking for. This concept should 
be familiar to all of you from medical tests and examinations. Comte’s vision 
was to develop a science of society based on the methods of the natural sci-
ences, with observation and experiment at the core. He considered all scienc-
es, including those of society, as methodologically unified – an important 
view that shaped the development of the social sciences in the 19
th
and 20
th
century. Comte envisioned a project of positivism as a scientifically based 
world culture – the third stage in the development of mankind’s knowledge, 
following a theological and metaphysical stage (formulated in his théorie des 
troits états: theological, metaphysical and positive stage).
The work of Comte is influential due to his epistemological positions. It 
was highly significant to the natural as well as the social sciences at the end 
of the 19
th
century and beginning of the 20
th
century.
Positivism as a philosophy of science will be now introduced in regard to 
its major ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. For 
didactical reasons, this introduction will take place through two “complexes” 
of positivist philosophy of science positions. The first complex will be related 
to questions of what can be known, what counts as knowledge and what ex-