International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

Self-study (1) 
Read the texts written by Bull (1966: International Theory. The case for a 
classical approach) and Kaplan (1969: The New Great Debate: Tradition-
alism vs. Science in International Relations) from the required reading list 
and then return to this unit. The texts, written in the 1960s, will give you a 
direct impression of the different understandings of science debated at this 
time. The readings will help you to better grasp the current debates on IR 
as a science. 
For the moment, let us preliminarily conceive the idea of a scientific ap-
proach to the study of International Relations as being simply and broadly 
associated with the idea of a systematic and methodical study of international 
relations. In this case, the goal is reaching general, valid knowledge about in-
terstate politics. Both the theoretical “system” and the methods of such a sys-
tematic exploration will vary according to the fundamental understanding of 
science underneath. 
Theory is key to such a systematic and methodical study, as it presents a 
“guide” to the process of gaining knowledge by formulating questions, con-
jectures or hypotheses about international politics. Theory provides the fun-
dament of the “order” of a systematic inquiry. Therefore, theory always re-
tains a central position in this process of generating “knowledge”. 
However, as will be shown, no agreement exists among scholars on the 
question of what exactly is the nature, function and position of a theory in 
scientific research. The nature and function of theory in the process of 
knowledge production itself is a highly debated issue.
It is thus worthwhile to take a closer look at the notions of theory and sci-
ence because “scientific knowledge” is considered to hold a key position in 
our societies. In the following chapters we will therefore discuss in greater 
depth both International Relations as a (social) science and the status of theo-
ry within IR. The discussion will touch on the status of “theory” within an 
academic discipline more generally while focusing on IR in particular. The 
idea of what a theory is and of which role and functions it possesses within 
an academic discipline is closely bound to that discipline’s understanding of 
the term “science”. The understanding of science is a key issue for any social 
science and, as we will learn, a matter of much debate and controversy with 
no consensus in sight. 

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Step 1: 
Philosophy of science: the “theory behind theories” 
(meta-theory)
1.1. Philosophy of science and the role of assumptions 
The legitimization of modern academic disciplines as “science” usually in-
volves a reference to a particular philosophy of science. For example, from 
your reading of the texts written by Bull and Kaplan, you already know that 
“traditional” IR refers to a different understanding of science than that of the 
“scientist” understanding that draws on the natural sciences. There are differ-
ent philosophies of science at the heart of both accounts of science. They take 
up different positions on such fundamental questions as the “nature” of the 
relevant subject to be studied by IR, how to gain knowledge about this sub-
ject, what counts as valid “knowledge” in IR and which methods should be 
used in the process of knowledge acquisition. 
As a recognizable field of study, the philosophy of science emerged in the 
1920s and 1930s with the work of the Vienna Circle and the writings of Karl 
Popper. The formation as an academic discipline can perhaps be traced back 
to the end of the 19
th
century, with the first chair of “History and Theory of 
Inductive Science” established 1895 in Vienna (the holder being the physicist 
Ernst Mach). Of course, philosophy of science as a form of philosophical 
thought about the nature of science and scientific study goes much further 
back in history and can be traced at least to ancient Greece. In Greek antiqui-
ty, this type of thought is associated above all with the work of Greek philos-
ophers such as Democritus, Aristotle or Plato – just to mention a few. In Unit 
3, we will come back to their ideas of science inherent in their philosophy in 
more detail. 
The underlying reason why philosophy of science has become so attrac-
tive to the social sciences since the early 20
th
century lies with the enormous 
success of modern natural science such as physics, mathematics, chemistry 
and biology and the prestige natural science has gained in modern societies 
(Wight 2002: 25; 41). You can easily see the prestigious status of science and 
its role in our modern world in your everyday life: imagine your life without 
the 20
th
century advances in industry and technology. Those advances – and 
your life as you currently live it – would be unthinkable without the progress 
of natural sciences.
Within the philosophy of science discipline, the object studied is the na-
ture and practice of science itself. The discipline aims to find out what is dis-
tinctive about scientific explanations and theoretical constructions. What is 

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40 
the nature of science in contrast to, say, speculation, intuition or religious 
systems of knowledge? 
Any philosophy of science consists of a range of assumptions. These are 
ontological assumptions (claims about existence and being), epistemological 
assumptions (claims about what constitutes valid knowledge and the grounds 
for such claims of valid knowledge), and methodological assumptions 
(claims about the practice of science and the specific methods of gaining 
knowledge) (Wight 2002: 41). In short, any philosophy of science is based on 
all three types of assumptions. Philosophy of science positions are also often 
referred to as “meta-theory”: the theory or philosophy that is “behind” or 
“above” a theory of International Relations and whose subject is theory itself. 
It is also important to carefully note the terminology. When talking about 
philosophy of science, we talk about “assumptions” or “claims”: propositions 
that are taken for granted and that are not subject to being proved as “true” or 
“false”. The idea and term of assumptions originates in ancient Greek philos-
ophy and logic. It is quite similar to an axiom, a premise or starting point of 
reasoning. In theory building, it serves as a starting point for deducing or in-
ferring theory, to derive a logical conclusion from this starting point. As-
sumptions are not demonstrable by proof because their very nature is to be 
“starting points”: there is nothing else from which they logically follow.
Consequently, we are talking about intellectual constructs of reality that 
are not subject to be proved as “true” or “false”. It might come to you as a 
surprise that it is the very nature of science and theory to start with something 
that is not subject to being “proved”. In fact, this is true for all systems of 
knowledge and the idea of knowledge about the world more generally, and 
not specific to science. 
From what you have learned so far about the nature of assumptions, the 
logical result is that there is always more than one account of what consti-
tutes science and therefore different philosophies of science within the phi-
losophy of science as an overall discipline. For the purpose of better under-
standing the nature of a philosophy of science, Step 2 will demonstrate the 
core elements of a philosophy of science (ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions) using a specific philosophy of science, positiv-
ism, as an example. However, before we begin exploring positivism, we will 
need a basic understanding of the core terms of a philosophy of science. 

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41 
1.2. Ontology, epistemology, methodology
Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence, or reali-
ty in general, as well as of the basic categories of being and their relations in