Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary

3 Subject positions, articulation and the subversion of
essentialism
1 If democratic demands are “undecidable” in abstraction—if their political value can
only be determined in specific contexts—the same is certainly not true for anti-
democratic demands. All racisms are wrong; obviously, we do not need to do a
contextually-specific analysis to arrive at this conclusion. Of course, it is always
strategically important that we ask which sorts of reactionary discourses we are dealing
with in a particular situation, but we can say unequivocally in advance that radical
democratic pluralism opposes all anti-democratic positions.
2 See, for example, Miles (1984).

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3 Hall refers to a different edition and translation of Capitol, Vol. III (London: Lawrence
& Wishart, 1974:791–2), but the differences between the translations are minimal.
4 We could note in passing that Cohen’s argument rests on an essentialist conception of
human nature, for he refers to humans’ natural interest in resolving the problem of
scarcity through rational action in his account of the productive forces’ development
(Cohen 1978:150–60).
4 Self-determination, community and citizenship
1 Rorty’s dependence upon the incitement of solidarity-oriented sentiments for the
construction of a liberal consensus could be challenged precisely on these grounds.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the promotion of specific identifications will always
remain complex and notoriously vulnerable to dysfunctional effects.
2 We could also note that Schmitt is not the only thinker who has issued a warning
about the dangers that are inherent in the construction of an illusory agnosticism
towards political differences on the part of the liberal democratic state. Marx’s own
critique of liberal democracy (Marx 1975b,1977) might have been suggestive in this
regard.