Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary

Socialism as a necessary moment within radical democracy
Capitalism, by its very nature, systematically denies large sections of the population
access to the resources necessary for self-determination. Those who are
disempowered under capitalism—the workers and the unemployed who do not
own the means of production—are locked in exploitative conditions not, as
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) argue, because of some sort of psychological,
intellectual or genetic abnormality on their part, but because of the institutionalized
structures of inequality that are integral to the capitalist system. Brown contends
that Laclau and Mouffe have not given sufficient emphasis to their critique of
capitalist exploitation.
While thinkers such as Bowles and Gintis, Laclau and Mouffe, and the
analytical Marxism school are certainly critical of capitalism’s inequities,
they are less concerned with capitalism as a political economy of
domination, exploitation, or alienation, precisely those terms by which
the problem of freedom is foregrounded as a problem of social and
economic power and not only a matter of political or legal statutes. It is
as if the terrible unfreedom and indignities attendant upon “actually
existing socialisms” of the last half-century persuaded such thinkers that
free enterprise really is freer than the alternatives, that alienation is
inherent in all labour, and that freedom, finally, is a matter of consumption,
choice, and expression: an individual good rather than a social and
political practice.
(Brown 1995:13)
For their part, Laclau and Mouffe do state that the socialist struggle to overcome
capitalist exploitation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the advance
of the democratic revolution: “Every project for radical democracy implies a socialist
dimension, as it is necessary to put an end to capitalist relations of production,
which are at the root of numerous relations of subordination” (Laclau and Mouffe
1985:178). Brown nevertheless rightly indicates that the authors have not fully
developed the political economy implications of their position. In what follows, I
will attempt to respond to Brown’s challenge by outlining the radical democratic
perspective on political economy.
The socialist demand for the radical transformation of the fundamentally
inegalitarian socio-economic structures that are integral to every capitalist formation
should be seen not as a rejection of the democratic revolution, but as an internal
moment within its general extension to new areas of the social. Liberal democratic
theorists from Mill to Dahl have addressed the tensions between democracy and
economic inequality (Green 1993b:9; Mill 1972:210–11, 216, 276–92; Dahl
1956:113, 126, 137, 139–40; 1982:108–37, 170–87; 1989:108–14). Rousseau held
that liberty cannot exist without equality and defined equality such that it would
preclude the development of exploitation (Rousseau 1973:204). Some of the French

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Revolutionists believed that the true realization of the revolution’s aims—“liberty,
equality and fraternity”—depended not only on securing formal legal equality for
every citizen but on establishing some sort of basic equality through the
redistribution of wealth as well (Watkins and Kramnick 1979:43). Indeed, Marx
himself was greatly influenced by the democratic discourse of the Enlightenment
and the French Revolution. The Marxist image of society as divided into two
totally encompassing camps locked in a decisive struggle, the workers versus the
capitalists, is derived from the revolutionary struggle between “the people” and
the ancien régime (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:156). The Marxist demands for economic
equality and human freedom from the tyranny of the capitalist system were
adaptations of the liberal democratic demands for political equality and freedom.
Capitalist societies only allow for the self-development of the privileged few.
The small minority that does gain access to the resources necessary for self-
development only does so thanks to the exploitation and oppression of the majority.
Marx envisioned, by contrast, a society in which every individual would have a
truly equal right to realize freely her own potential (Marx 1975a; Elster 1989:140;
Wood 1981:53). Marx and Engels explicitly defined communism as a society in
which “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of
all” (Marx and Engels 1969:127). For C.Gould and Mostov, not only is it not true
that socialist theory is anti-democratic; the socialist conception of the collective
control over the means of production—a collective control that would empower
diverse individuals—is a necessary condition for the realization of democracy
(C.Gould 1981:51–4; Mostov 1989:212). While Marx was highly critical of liberal
democracy’s false promise that it alone could deliver genuine rights and freedoms,
he advanced his critique of liberal democracy in the name of democracy itself.
Both Marx and Engels held that democracy is the highest possible form of political
organization (Harrington 1981:12; Avineri 1970:35–6, 47).
Harrington insists that it is Luxemburg, rather than Lenin, Trotsky or Stalin,
who captures the spirit of Marx’s democratic theory. Luxemburg argues that “it is
the historic task of the proletariat when it seizes power to replace bourgeois
democracy with the creation of socialist democracy [,] not to do away with any
kind of democracy” (Harrington 1981:18). Socialism should not, therefore, be
seen as a struggle that is opposed to democracy per se; socialism should be viewed
instead as a struggle that aims to complete the democratic project that was begun
in the liberal democratic revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
(Hunt 1980:17). As such, Laclau and Mouffe’s support for the contemporary
movements on the Left that attempt to appropriate, deepen and expand liberal-
democratic principles is entirely consistent with their inclusion of the socialist
struggle within radical democracy (1985:176).
If liberty is broadly defined as the capacity for genuinely free self-development,
and equality is similarly defined as the equal right to pursue self-development,
then the condition of possibility of liberty and equality is free and equal access to
the material resources that are necessary for self-development. Furthermore, the
individual’s right to self-determination entails the right to participate in the

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collective determination of all the social activities in which that individual is
engaged, including economic relations. Only a socialist transformation of the
capitalist system would bring about these conditions. Progress towards socialism
would entail, for example, a large-scale transformation in property ownership and
the decision-making authority that flows from such ownership. In a truly socialist
society (as opposed to the authoritarian bureaucratic collectivist societies that
called themselves “socialist”), everyone would enjoy access to the basic material
resources that are needed for the exercise of individual freedoms. It would establish
a “floor”—everyone would receive sufficient opportunity for work, income,
education and security—and a “ceiling”—no class would be able to accumulate so
much wealth that it could opt out of the public provisions for ecological
management, security, transport, military and policing, and education by
substituting its own private goods (Connolly 1995:81). Equal access to material
resources would take away the economic weapons that are currently used by the
privileged to maintain the undemocratic status quo, and would provide those
individuals who wished to challenge an oppressive familial, cultural, social or
political situation with the means to do so (Cunningham 1987:124–5).
The meaning of the socialist transformation of capitalism has changed a great
deal since Lenin’s day. Contemporary leftists now generally recognize that economic
decisions in our complex societies cannot be made solely by a central command
structure. The combination of democratic participation, some degree of central
planning, extensive state intervention, substantial redistributive programs and a
highly regulated market would facilitate efficient decision-making, consumer choice
and the decentralization of power, without reintroducing the capitalist problems
of structural inequality and social costs.
The real debate among leftists now revolves around the question of the balance
between different types of economic institutions. Some theorists, such as C.Gould,
insist that democracy necessitates the total displacement of private property in
favor of collective ownership and workers’ self-management. They would allow
only for a free market in the exchange of commodities (C.Gould 1981:56–8).
Others, such as Bay, insist that an ideal society would establish a regulated sphere
of private property ownership and market relations and would allow individuals
to accumulate the social privileges that would flow from relations in that sphere.
Regulation of the market would be determined by majority rule while the primacy
human rights would be absolute (Bay 1993:292–4).
In Nove’s “feasible” socialist economic model, state- and co-operative-owned
property would predominate and only small-scale private ownership would be
allowed. The economy would be managed according to the democratic decisions
of the people. Individuals would be free to choose the nature of their work and
their location within the state, cooperative and private entrepreneurial sectors
(Nove 1983:197–230). Following Nove, other theorists have proposed models of
“market socialism” that would combine state management, worker cooperatives,
small-scale entrepreneurism, income supplements and progressive taxation
(Blackburn 1991:223).

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Connolly outlines an egalitarian program that includes a steep progressive tax
and extensive state subsidization for what he calls inclusive consumption. Exclusive
consumption takes place wherever more popular access to a good leads to a decrease
in its value for those who already enjoy access to it; an increase in the private
costs incurred because of its use; higher social costs; and larger per capita state
expenditures either for subsidizing the good or for addressing the socio-ecological
problems that are caused by its use. Connolly cites automobile-centered
transportation systems, single-family suburban housing policies, and high-
technology, profit-driven medical systems as examples. Wilderness management
programs that are designed to suit the interests of the very wealthiest outdoors
enthusiasts would also fit into his category of exclusionary goods. With inclusionary
goods, by contrast, an increase in popular access brings about an increase in its
private value and a decrease in its social costs. State subsidies should therefore be
directed towards inclusionary goods such as rapid transit systems and universal
health care programs rather than their privatized counterparts (1995:81–5).
10
Walzer contends that free market relations should not necessarily be ruled out,
but that no one should be allowed to exercise “market imperialism” by converting
private wealth into political influence and social privilege (1993:244). Elson
suggests that the best way to check the social costs of the market, such as inequality,
exploitation and disenfranchisement, would be to expand the rights of citizens to
include the rights to basic goods and services, and the rights to participation and
accountability (1991:311). Indeed, environmentalist activists in the United States
are currently seeking to amend the Constitution to enshrine the right to live in a
clean environment, thereby addressing one of the market’s “externalities.”
Democratization would also require extensive measures to check the rise of
technological, scientific, medical, legal, administrative and security (police, secret
service and military) elites, such that the newly democratized economic sphere
would not be allowed to deteriorate into bureaucratic aurhoritarianism (Harrington
1981:19–21). Miliband contends that the best way to check the authority of these
elites would be to promote “popular power” at multiple sites outside the state
(1991:15).
For all their disagreement on the specific details, there is a strong consensus
among leftists today that real progress towards democracy would require
fundamental social change—including the democratization of the economy such
that basic economic decisions would reflect the will of the people rather than the
will of the most powerful. The aim here should be to work towards a combination
of different economic institutions that would best suit the structural changes
necessary for the progress of democratization in a specific historical context. In
every case, however, many of the same basic problems will have to be addressed,
namely the greatest possible decrease in the exploitation of labor, the
democratization of resource allocation decision-making, the redistribution of
wealth, and reforms that would block the conversion of economic wealth into
political and social privilege, and that would limit the market’s oligopolistic
tendencies.

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Radical democratization would also have to address the urgent problem of
environmental destruction. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, one of Marx’s approaches
to history entails a stagist theory in which capitalist property relations would
eventually become a fetter on the productive process. Miliband notes that this
prediction has not been borne out by history. He nevertheless maintains that the
capitalist system has “come to be a fetter upon the most beneficent use of the
immense resources it has itself brought into being” (1994:13). The productive
process has to be radically transformed such that it begins to serve humane and
ecological ends rather than the dictates of profit (Miliband 1994:13).
Brown cautions that an exclusive emphasis on the redistribution of goods can
impoverish leftist politics; the pragmatic focus on feasible goals in the present
should not be allowed to displace more fundamental aims, such as the
transformation of political subjectivity and the radical democratization of power
(1995:5). Laclau and Mouffe would also add the following warning note to these
discussions. The rules and norms that lay the foundations for radical democracy
will always have to be re-examined in the light of new conditions and struggles.
For Laclau, the very conception of a universal blueprint for radical democracy is a
contradiction in terms.
In order for the demands on which the socialist myth has been based to
regain validity and acquire new historical possibilities, it only needs them
to be inscribed in a discourse different from that of “social management”—
by which we mean an abstract universality that must be embodied. But
this means moving in the opposite direction to the discourse of
eschatological universality.
(Laclau 1990a:77–8)
In the eschatological dimension in Marxist thought, it is assumed that the socialist
revolution would resolve all fundamental antagonisms, give birth to a whole new
human being and establish a power-free social space. Eschatological Marxism also
claims that the working class is the only subject that can emancipate all of humanity
from virtually every form of domination, because it alone is destined to become a
universal subject, a pure human essence without a trace of particularism (Laclau
1996a; Balibar 1994:xv; Aronson 1995:91–7). For Laclau and Mouffe, these
eschatological assumptions are dangerous illusions. They insist that we should
imagine radical democratic pluralism as inciting an infinite series of contestations
instead. Following Lefort, the authors contend that an “empty space” at the center
of a truly democratic society would always be preserved (Laclau and Mouffe
1985:186–8). In Lefort’s terms, democracy in modern societies thrives on the
contradiction between its two founding principles: power rests with “the people,”
but the site of popular sovereignty must remain “an empty place, impossible to
occupy, such that those who exercise public authority can never claim to
appropriate it” (Lefort 1986:279). In other words, “the people” must rule in a
modern democratic society, but it is self-destructive for a democratic society to

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allow political actors and institutions to define shared values, common ends and
the identities of the citizen in a substantive and permanent manner.
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Democracy
is destroyed wherever this tension is canceled out.
Radical democratic theory rejects teleologies, “scientific” predictions and
eschatological prophecies. Radical democratic pluralism requires a fallibilist
approach that abandons every kind of prediction (Miliband 1991:29). This does
not mean, however, that Laclau and Mouffe endorse the view that anything is
possible, that every social formation is utterly unique and monadically isolated,
and that there are no discernible institutionalized continuities that structure the
social across time. The authors do in fact provide tools that we can use to assess
power relations at a given moment in time and across different genealogical
moments. Their theory does allow for a certain degree of generalizing descriptions
and estimations about future probabilities. Because contingency always limits and
interrupts the operation of necessity, however, prediction in the full sense is
impossible; indeed, the strategic dimension of every prediction-claim should be
revealed.
In this sense, Laclau and Mouffe’s position echoes Luxemburg’s argument that
a “one-size-fits-all” plan for socialism is a contradiction in terms, and that no
social movement should operate as if it did in fact have exclusive access to such a
plan. Luxemburg was active in the German socialist movement until her death in
1919. A critic of both Bernstein’s revisionism and the Bolsheviks’ despotism, she
held that socialists should state what they are against in specific and practical
terms, but should only offer general descriptions of their alternative societies.
Taking issue with Lenin, she declared that “socialism, in its very nature, cannot be
decreed, introduced through ukases [edicts]” (Harrington 1981:18). Luxemburg
rejected the Leninist vanguard party approach to revolution, arguing that unless
the revolution encouraged dissent and maintained democratic institutions such
as elections, the right to free speech and freedom of assembly, it would lose its
popular energy and degenerate into a bureaucratic dictatorship. Instead of imposing
a vanguard leadership from above, Luxemburg believed that socialists ought to
sustain and to encourage the workers’ self-organized revolutionary energy during
strikes and uprisings. For Luxemburg, it is only through the workers’ own praxis,
their concrete experience in constructing a new society, that they will liberate
themselves from their past and achieve a higher form of cultural existence and
morality (Wright 1986:87, 107; Löwy 1981:73).
For all her opposition to dogmatic theory, the predominance of scientific
socialism in Luxemburg’s day was such that she herself subscribed to the view
that the collapse of capitalism was objectively necessary. Ultimately, she could
only think of politics in terms of the class struggle (Wright 1986:45–6; Laclau
and Mouffe 1985:11–12; Kolakowski 1978:61–97). While she did not reject the
concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, she nevertheless insisted that this
leadership had to involve—in an open and profoundly democratic manner—
the workers as a mass movement. Against the authoritarian tendencies that
were already emerging during the first years of the Soviet Revolution, she asserted,

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“Freedom only for the government supporters, only for the members of the