Minds and Computers : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence

robots – from the Czech word robata, which translates roughly as the
feudal term corvée, a term which refers to the unpaid labour provided
to one’s liege lord.
In more modern fiction, the idea of a mechanical mind has given
way to the now commonplace notion of a computational artificial
intelligence. The possibility of actually developing artificial intelli-
gence, however, is not just a question of su
fficiently advanced tech-
nology. It is fundamentally a philosophical question.
It is this question that we will be centrally concerned with through-
out this volume. In order that we might be in an informed position to
consider the possibility of artificial intelligence, we will need to
answer a number of related questions.
Firstly, we will be asking just what the human mind is. The twen-
tieth century saw a succession of philosophical theories of mind,
culminating in the currently dominant theory which accom-
modates the possibility of artificial intelligence. Our first goal, which
we will spend Chapters 1 to 10 pursuing, is to clearly articulate this
theory.
Philosophically responsible engagement with this theory requires a
sound understanding of precisely what a computer is. Consequently,
we’re going to spend three chapters developing a rigorous technical
account of computation. Although this material is technical, the
1

---

introduction is slow and gentle and will be readily accessible to a
reader with no background in mathematics or computer science.
Along the way to our target theory, we’re going to survey the space
of available philosophical theories of mind, weighing the merits and
flaws of each. This will provide a comprehensive introduction to the
philosophy of mind.
We are also going to take a couple of empirical diversions along the
way. We’re going to tell the story of the rise of empirical psychology
and we will spend a chapter developing a rudimentary understanding
of functional neuroanatomy.
Once we are armed with a sound philosophical understanding of
our target theory, the remainder of the book will be given to evaluat-
ing it. We will see that a wide range of material from the empirical dis-
ciplines bears importantly on the tenability of the theory. As such,
this book is overarchingly an exercise in cross-disciplinary analysis.
We’re going to focus on two mental capacities that are distinctively
human – our capacity for reasoning and our facility for language. Our
aim first of all in Chapters 11 to 20 will be to compare what we know
of the human rational and linguistic capacities with methods for
implementing these computationally.
We will see how computers can be programmed for strategic game
play, for reasoning about novel situations based on known inform-
ation and for certain functions implicated in language production and
comprehension. This will expose us to some introductory material in
linguistics and a tiny bit of formal logic, and we will touch on some
material from cognitive psychology.
In the final chapters of the book we will examine some more
advanced philosophical material concerning the notions of meaning
and representation. Lastly, we will introduce artificial neural net-
works and see how they can be employed in the pursuit of artificial
intelligence – again with particular respect to rational and linguistic
functions.
All told, we will be examining material from philosophy, psychol-
ogy, linguistics, neuroscience and computer science – the disciplines
which constitute cognitive science. It is to be expected that most
readers will find some of this material more approachable and some
less so; however, I have aimed for maximal accessibility to the intro-
ductory reader throughout.
Each chapter from Chapter 11 onwards engages with an issue
which by all rights deserves a dedicated volume. As such, the cover-
age is less than comprehensive and I have frequently simplified expla-
nations in the name of accessibility. There are suggestions for further
2
  

---

reading at the end of the book for readers who want to further their
understanding of the issues we cover.
Comprehensive coverage of the relevant issues, however, is not our
primary concern here. Our main aim is to develop and evaluate the
philosophical theory of mind which allows for the possibility of arti-
ficial intelligence. By the end of the book, the reader should find
themselves in a sound position from which to make informed deci-
sions concerning the possibility of developing artificial intelligence.
This book should also provide a solid foundation for philosophically
responsible engagement with cognitive science broadly.
We’re now going to begin our tour of the space of available philo-
sophical theories of mind with a theory which most people implicitly,
and pretheoretically, subscribe to: dualism.

3

---

C H A P T E R 2
DUALISM
We are going to begin our examination of the available theories of
mind with Cartesian dualism. There are at least two good reasons for
doing so. One is that the presentation of theories of mind in the fol-
lowing chapters will be broadly chronological and – at least as far as
modern philosophy is concerned – to begin with Cartesian dualism is
to begin at the beginning.
Another reason is that, by and large, people’s pretheoretic intui-
tions concerning the mind and the body are dualist in general and
Cartesian dualist in particular. Once you have read this chapter, ask
your friends and family about their intuitions and I strongly suspect
you will find as much.
Unfortunately, although a good starting place, Cartesian dualism
is beset with philosophical di
fficulties. Let us then begin the task of
making clear precisely what the Cartesian dualist is committed to and
what the problems with the theory are.
2.1 SUBSTANCE DUALISM
Substance dualism is a metaphysical view. It is the view that the uni-
verse consists of two di
fferent kinds of stuff – two metaphysically dis-
tinct substances. As such, substance dualism is a commitment to a