Minds and Computers : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence

particular account of the relation between mind and body which is
supplied by a theory known as epiphenomenalism. Let’s deal with
these other dualist theories seriatim.
2 . 5 . 1 PA R A L L E L I S M
Parallelism is a theistic dualist theory. The parallelist maintains the
ontological independence of mind and body but denies that they
interact causally. Once we deny causal interaction between the mate-
rial body and the immaterial mind, we need to explain the apparent
interaction in some other way. The parallelist appeals to an omni-
scient, omnipotent being to account for the connection.
According to the parallelist, when this omniscient, omnipotent
being (henceforth simply ‘God’) created the physical universe of
bodies and the non-physical universe of minds, She set things up in
such a way that although the sequence of events in the physical uni-
verse is entirely causally independent of the sequence of events in the
non-physical universe, the two sequences are in perfect harmony. This
preordained harmony accounts for the correlation between my
mental life and my physical life. Whenever I put my hand on a hot
stove, I have the mental experience of the hurtfulness of pain because
God set things up initially such that it would be so. Whenever I have
the mental experience of desiring to move my arm, the physical event
of my arm rising obtains because God set things up initially such that
it would be so. And so forth.
Although parallelism circumvents the problem of interaction by
denying any causal connection between material bodies and immater-
ial minds, it is still beset with the other objections which plague
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Cartesian dualism. We are still stuck with the epistemological
di
fficulty of a lack of access to other minds and we are still in con-
travention of Ockham’s razor. Furthermore, the theory seems no
more nor less plausible than our proposed Cartesian theistic response
to the problem of interaction.
2 . 5 . 2 O C C A S I O NA L I S M
As with parallelism, occasionalism is a theistic dualist theory which
denies interaction between the material body and the immaterial mind
and appeals to a God to explain the connection between the two.
The only di
fference, in fact, between parallelism and occasionalism
is that where the former holds that God set up the series of physical
events and the series of non-physical events in preordained harmony,
the occasionalist holds that God steps in where and as required in
order to maintain the harmony of the two series.
According to the occasionalist then, whenever I put my hand on a
hot stove, I have the mental experience of the hurtfulness of pain
because God intervenes to ensure that it will be so. Whenever I have
the mental experience of desiring to move my arm, the physical event
of my arm rising obtains because God intervenes to ensure that it will
be so. And so forth.
The particular doctrinal considerations which motivate the depar-
ture from parallelism are not of import here. For our purposes it
su
ffices to observe that occasionalism enjoys the same benefits and
su
ffers the same criticisms as parallelism.
2 . 5 . 3 E P I P H E N O M E NA L I S M
A notably more convincing dualist view is that of the epiphenom-
enalist. In fact, in contrast to the other dualist views we have covered,
you will find numerous epiphenomenalists working in contemporary
cognitive science.
The epiphenomenalist maintains propositions [D1]–[D3], rejecting
only [D4]. She maintains the ontological distinction between the
mental and the physical and also maintains the causal relation
between the material body and the immaterial mind, but only in one