Minds and Computers : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
particular mental states along the following lines. To be in a particu-
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particular mental states along the following lines. To be in a particu- lar mental state is to be in a state which is apt to be caused by certain stimuli and apt to cause certain behaviour. Providing a definitional taxonomy of mental states is then simply a matter of identifying the stimuli which are apt to cause each particular mental state and the behaviour each is apt to cause. To be in pain, for instance, is to be in a state which is apt to be caused by, inter alia, burning my hand and is apt to cause, inter alia, the removal of my hand from the source of heat and further hand-discriminating behaviour. The causal theory conserves, from its philosophical predecessor, the intuition that there is a crucial connection between mentality and behaviour. It does not, however, make the problematic identification between mental states and dispositions to behave. To be in a mental state is not, for the causal theorist, just to be disposed towards certain behaviour. Rather, to be in a mental state is to be in a state which is 36 apt to stand in certain causal relations mediating stimulus and behav- iour. The causal theorist is not an eliminativist about mental states. The obvious next point of inquiry is to determine precisely which states are apt to have these causal properties. In other words, now that we have characterised the role of mental states by giving a conceptual analysis of mental state terms, it is time to locate the occupants of these roles by making substantive identifications. The causal theory, as it stands, is ontologically neutral – it does not commit us to any particular ontology. One could, for instance, be a causal theorist but still maintain that the things which occupy the roles of mental states are immaterial. This would, of course, require an unusual account of causality but we have already seen that this is a problem for the dualist. Although the causal theory is, strictly speaking, ontologically neutral, the talk of causality does pave a fairly obvious path to a material identification of mental states. This is precisely what is pro- vided by Australian materialism. 5.2 THE IDENTITY THEORY Australian materialism rose to prominence in the late 1950s with the publication of two very influential papers: Place’s Is Consciousness a Brain Process? (1956) and Smart’s Sensations and Brain Processes (1959). Australian materialism makes strict identifications between types of mental states and types of neural states. In other words, to be in a certain type of mental state just is to be in a particular type of neural state. This is an analysis of mental states that aims to provide an interthe- oretic reduction. Types of mental states, according to the Australian materialists, smoothly reduce to types of neural states. They do not hold to eliminativism with respect to mental states but, rather, seek to make scientific identifications of the correct referents of our mental state terms. So the Australian materialist does not believe, as did the behav- iourist, that we are simply mistaken in using mental state terms as if they refer to substantive entities. Where the behaviourist held mental state terms to be akin to terms like ‘witches’ and ‘phlogiston’ – to be shown to be mere ‘folk’ terms by the progress of scientific discovery – the Australian materialist holds that mental state terms are akin to terms like ‘lightning’, to be identified with physical phenomena in accordance with our scientific theories. 37 At this point, the various names by which the theory is known should make a lot more sense. It is a reductive materialist theory that makes type–type identifications between mental states and certain physical states – namely, neural states, or states of the central nervous system – hence the appellations ‘reductive materialism’, ‘identity theory’, ‘type physicalism’ and ‘central state materialism’. One clear advantage of the theory is that it provides a solution to the problem of other minds. We can tell whether other people actually have mental states simply by investigating their brains. Having a type of neural state, on this analysis, just is having a type of mental state, so other minds are readily identifiable and empirically amenable. Another clear advantage of the theory is that it confers a scientific methodology for investigating mentality. If we want to know about the mind, we should do neuroscience. In particular, we should seek to determine which types of neural states obtain as which types of mental states. As a materialist – or physicalist – theory, Australian materialism also satisfies Ockham’s razor. The Australian materialist admits only phys- ical substance into her ontology. At least, qua Australian materialist, this is the case – she may well have other reasons to expand her ontol- ogy, but these won’t be reasons which pertain to her theory of mind. A final selling point lies in the theoretical fit with the causal theory of mind. To the extent that one holds that the causal theory is a correct analysis of mental states, one finds an advantage in the provi- sion, by Australian materialism, of candidates that are apt to have precisely the causal powers held to be characteristically defining of mental states. If we, then, marry the conceptual analysis of the causal theory with the substantive identification of Australian materialism, we get the following account of mental states. To be in a type of mental state is to be in a type of neural state which is apt to be caused by certain stimuli and apt to cause certain behaviour. Despite the numerous advantages of Australian materialism, there are, as always, a number of philosophical objections we can mount against the theory. 5.3 ARGUMENTS AGAINST AUSTRALIAN MATERIALISM Let’s begin with some fairly weak objections to Australian material- ism. We might argue that we have the capacity to introspect our mental states and that when we do so, we learn about our mental states. We 38 don’t, however, learn anything about our neurophysiology through introspection, so mental states can’t be identical to neural states. There is a clear reply to this objection. It straightforwardly begs the Download 1.05 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
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