Oecd legal Instruments


chain and provide for stock markets to function in a way that contributes to good corporate


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OECD principles

chain and provide for stock markets to function in a way that contributes to good corporate 
governance. 
In order to be effective, the legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance must be developed 
with a view to the economic reality in which it is to be implemented. In many jurisdictions, the real world of 
corporate governance and ownership is no longer characterised by a straight and uncompromised 
relationship between the performance of the company and the income of the ultimate beneficiaries of 
shareholdings. In reality, the investment chain is often long and complex, with numerous intermediaries that 
stand between the ultimate beneficiary and the company. The presence of intermediaries acting as 
independent decision makers influences the incentives and the ability to engage in corporate governance. 
The share of investments held by institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies and hedge funds has increased significantly, and many of their assets are managed by 
specialised asset managers. The ability and interest of institutional investors and asset managers to engage 
in corporate governance vary widely. For some, engagement in corporate governance, including the exercise 
of voting rights, is a natural part of their business model. Others may offer their beneficiaries and clients a 
business model and investment strategy that does not include or motivate spending resources on active 
shareholder engagement. If shareholder engagement is not part of the institution’s business model and 
investment strategy, mandatory requirements to engage, for example through voting, may or may not be 
effective and could potentially lead to a box-ticking approach. 
The Principles recommend that institutional investors disclose their policies for corporate governance with 
respect to their investments. Voting at shareholder meetings is, however, only one channel for shareholder 
engagement. Direct contact and dialogue with the board and management represent other forms of 
shareholder engagement that are frequently used. In many jurisdictions, codes on shareholder engagement 
(“stewardship codes”) have been introduced as a complementary governance tool with the aim of 
strengthening both institutional investor accountability and their role in holding company boards and 
management accountable. Where corporate governance codes apply on a “comply or explain” basis, the 
role of institutional investors as shareholders is particularly important in holding companies accountable for 
their explanations of departures from the provisions of those codes. 

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