O‘zbekiston respublikasida ma’muriy protseduralarni takomillashtirish

in a Nutshell» fifth edition. Thomson/West, 2006. 200-205 p). 
4.10-ilova 
«1. Property. In many administrative settings, it is easy to show that an agency 
decision has deprived someone of «property». For example, coercive regulation of 
business enterprises, almost by definition, invades their property interests, because it 
limits their freedom to engage in profitable activity. Thus, the difficult cases usually 
involve governmental benefits. In these so-called «new property» cases, Roth 
requires the court to consider whether the plaintiff had a «legitimate claim of 
entitlement» to the benefit of which she was deprived. The claim of entitlement does 
not arise from the Constitution itself; it must rest upon «existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law». Thus, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that some authoritative source of law «establishes a 
definite standard to guide the decision… rather than confiding the decision to the 

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discretion of the administering authorities». Gilbert v. Fraizer, 931 F.2d 1581 (7
th
Cir. 
1991). (Ernest Gellhorn, Ronald M.Levin «Administrative Law and Process in a 
Nutshell» fifth edition. Thomson/West, 2006. 205 p). 
«Notice that cases like Goldberg arise out of government decisions that terminate 
benefits payments to persons who are already receiving them. Cases involving initial 
applications for benefits may require a different analysis. If the state has never 
decided that an applicant is entitled to benefits in the first place , it can defer making 
payments while it makes that decision, and this deferral does not require a prior due 
process hearing. American Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) 
(involving workers’ compensation medical benefits). Assuming that the statutory 
scheme creates an entitlement, however, the state presumably could not make afinal 
decision to deny the claimant’s application without affording her a fair chance to be 
heard». (Ernest Gellhorn, Ronald M.Levin «Administrative Law and Process in a 
Nutshell» fifth edition. Thomson/West, 2006. 210 p) 
4.11-ilova 
« 2. Liberty. The conceptual unity that that the Court has reached in its definition 
of «property» is absent from its approach to the companion concept , «liberty». The 
Roth opinion itself showed the Court’s ambivalence. On the one hand, the Court said 
that the definition of liberty must be «broad», encompassing «not merely freedom 
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contact, to engage in any 
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates 
of…conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized … as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men’»(quoting Mayer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399(1923). Yet the holding in Roth belied this liberal spirit; 
at least, the Court did not explain why the opportunity to keep a teaching position at a 
state university, or another government job, was not comparable to the freedoms on 
the Mayer list. Indeed, the Court seemed to be striving to keep its options open, 

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declaring that an interest would not qualify as «liberty» merely because it was 
important to the individual: «we must look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the 
interest at stake». This unconstrained approach plainly left room for odd disparities – 
as the Court demonstrated a few years later, when it held, despite Roth, that a ten-day 
suspension from high school did implicate a liberty interest. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565 (1975). (Ernest Gellhorn, Ronald M.Levin «Administrative Law and Process in a