Thinking, Fast and Slow

30: Rare Events
wish to avoid it: George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K.
Hsee, and Ned Welch, “Risk as Feelings,” 
Psychological Bulletin 127
(2001): 267–86.
vividness in decision making: Ibid. Cass R. Sunstein, “Probability
Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,” 
Yale Law Journal 112 (2002):
61–107. See notes to chapter 13: Damasio, 
Descartes’ Error. Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, “The {r, n>: C. A Affect Heuristic.”
Amos’s student: Craig R. Fox, “Strength of Evidence, Judged Probability,
and Choice Under Uncertainty,” 
Cognitive Psychology 38 (1999): 167–89.
focal event and its: Judgments of the probabilities of an event and its
complement do not always add up to 100%. When people are asked
about a topic they know very little about (“What is your probability that the
temperature in Bangkok will exceed 100° tomorrow at noon?”), the judged
probabilities of the event and its complement add up to less than 100%.
receiving a dozen roses: In cumulative prospect theory, decision weights
for gains and losses are not assumed to be equal, as they were in the
original version of prospect theory that I describe.
superficial processing: The question about the two urns was invented by
Dale T. Miller, William Turnbull, and Cathy McFarland, “When a
Coincidence Is Suspicious: The Role of Mental Simulation,” 
Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 57 (1989): 581–89. Seymour Epstein
and his colleagues argued for an interpretation of it in terms of two
systems: Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Seymour Epstein, “Cognitive-Experiential
Self-Theory and Subjective Probability: Evidence for Two Conceptual
Systems,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63 (1992): 534–
44.
judged it as more dangerous: Kimihiko Yamagishi, “When a 12.86%
Mortality Is More Dangerous Than 24.14%: Implications for Risk
Communication,” 
Applied Cognitive Psychology 11 (1997): 495–506.
forensic psychologists: Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor, “Violence Risk
Assessment and Risk Communication.”
“1 of 1,000 capital cases”: Jonathan J. Koehler, “When Are People

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Persuaded by DNA Match Statistics?” 
Law and Human Behavior 25
(2001): 493–513.
studies of choice from experience: Ralph Hertwig, Greg Barron, Elke U.
Weber, and Ido Erev, “Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare
Events in Risky Choice,” 
Psychological Science 15 (2004): 534–39.
Ralph Hertwig and Ido Erev, “The Description-Experience Gap in Risky
Choice,” 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (2009): 517–23.
not yet settled: Liat Hadar and Craig R. Fox, “Information Asymmetry in
Decision from Description Versus Decision from Experience,” 
Judgment
and Decision Making 4 (2009): 317–25.
“chances of rare events”: Hertwig and Erev, “The Description-Experience
Gap.”