The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment

THE FAIR WAGE-EFFORT HYPOTHESIS AND
UNEMPLOYMENT*
GEORGE A. AKERLOF AND JANET L. YELLEN
This paper introduces the fair wage-effort hypothesis and explores its implications. This hypothesis is motivated by equity theory in social psychology and social
exchange theory in sociology. According to the fair wage-effort hypothesis, workers
proportionately withdraw effort as their actual wage falls short of their fair wage.
Such behavior causes unemployment and is also consistent with observed crosssection wage differentials and unemployment patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the consequences of a hypothesis concerning worker behavior, which we shall call the fair wage-effort
hypothesis.' According to this hypothesis, workers have a conception of a fair wage; insofar as the actual wage is less than the fair
wage, workers supply a corresponding fraction of normal effort. If e
denotes effort supplied, w the actual wage, and w * the fair wage, the
fair wage-effort hypothesis says that
(1)
e = min (w/w*,1),
where effort is denoted in units such that 1 is normal effort. This
*We would like to thank Samuel Bowles, Daniel Kahneman, David Levine, John
Pencavel, David Romer, and Lawrence Summers for helpful comments and discussions. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Sloan Foundation
(for the first author), from the Guggenheim Foundation (for the second author), from
the Institute for Industrial Relations, and from the National Science Foundation
under grant numbers SES 86-005023 and SES 88-07807 administered by the
Institute for Business and Economic Research at the University of California,
Berkeley.
1. Akerlof and Yellen [1988] contains a summary of the results obtained in this
paper.

hypothesis explains the existence of unemployment. Unemployment occurs when the fair wage w* exceeds the market-clearing

wage.2 With natural specifications of the determination of w*, this
hypothesis may explain why skill and unemployment are negatively
correlated. In addition, it potentially explains wage differentials
and labor market segmentation.3
The motivation for the fair wage-effort hypothesis is a simple
observation concerning human behavior: when people do not get
what they deserve, they try to get even. The next section will
present five types of evidence for the fair wage-effort hypothesis.
First, it will draw on psychology, where the fair wage-effort
hypothesis corresponds to Adams' [1963] theory of equity. Numerous empirical studies have tested this theory. They are, on balance,
strongly supportive. Second, in sociology the fair wage-effort hypothesis corresponds to the Blau-Homans [1955, 1961] theory of social
exchange. Sociological studies, including studies of work situations,
show that equity usually prevails in social exchange. Third, the fair
wage-effort hypothesis accords with common sense. It appears
frequently in literature; it is considered obvious by personnel
textbooks; and it explains commonly observed taboos regarding
discussion of wages and salaries. Fourth, the fair wage-effort
hypothesis explains wage compression among individuals with
different skills. Fifth, simple models of the fair wage-effort hypothesis potentially explain empirically observed unemployment-skill
correlations; they also explain why unemployment has not fallen
with the rise in education despite lower unemployment of more
educated workers.
Having reviewed the evidence for the fair wage-effort hypothesis, Sections III and IV construct models using this hypothesis.
These models differ in the determination of the fair wage w*. In
Section III w* is exogenous. In Section IV w* depends on relative
wages as well as on market forces. These models provide efficiency
wage explanations for unemployment. Yet they are not subject to
the criticism that bonding schemes or complicated contracts will
reduce or eliminate involuntary unemployment.4 If such bonds are
considered unfair, then they will not be optimal. In relations where
fairness is important, grudges due to past events lead to potential future reprisals. In the existing literature this model most closely
resembles Summers' [1988] relative wage-based efficiency wage
theory. In Summers' model workers compare their own compensation with that of comparable groups in other firms; in our model, in
contrast, workers compare their pay with that of coworkers in the
same firm

Adolatli ish haqi-harakat gipotezasi VA

ISHSIZLIK*
JORJ A. AKERLOF VA JANET L. YELLEN
Ushbu maqola adolatli ish haqi gipotezasini taqdim etadi va uning oqibatlarini o'rganadi. Bu gipoteza ijtimoiy psixologiya va ijtimoiy sohadagi tenglik nazariyasi bilan asoslanadi
sotsiologiyada almashinuv nazariyasi. Adolatli ish haqi gipotezasiga ko'ra, ishchilar
ularning haqiqiy maoshi adolatli ish haqiga to'g'ri kelmasligi sababli harakatlarini mutanosib ravishda bekor qiling.
Bunday xatti-harakatlar ishsizlikni keltirib chiqaradi va shuningdek, kuzatilgan ish haqi farqlari va ishsizlik shakllariga mos keladi.
I. KIRISH
Ushbu maqola ishchilarning xulq-atvoriga oid gipotezaning oqibatlarini o'rganadi, biz buni adolatli ish haqi deb ataymiz.
gipoteza. Ushbu gipotezaga ko'ra, ishchilar adolatli ish haqi tushunchasiga ega; haqiqiy ish haqi yarmarkadan kamroq bo'lsa
ish haqi, ishchilar oddiy mehnatning tegishli qismini ta'minlaydi. Agar e
etkazilgan mehnatni, w haqiqiy ish haqini va w * adolatli ish haqini bildiradi
adolatli ish haqi gipotezasi shunday deydi
(1)
e = min (w/w*,1),
bu erda harakat birliklarda shunday belgilanadiki, 1 normal harakat bo'ladi. Bu
* Biz Samuel Boulz, Daniel Kahneman, Devid Levin, Jonga rahmat aytmoqchimiz
Pencavel, Devid Romer va Lourens Summers foydali sharhlar va muhokamalar uchun. Shuningdek, biz Sloan jamg'armasiga moliyaviy yordam uchun minnatdorchilik bildiramiz
(birinchi muallif uchun), Guggenxaym fondidan (ikkinchi muallif uchun), dan
Sanoat munosabatlari instituti va Milliy fan fondidan
tomonidan boshqariladigan SES 86-005023 va SES 88-07807 grant raqamlari ostida
Kaliforniya universiteti biznes va iqtisodiy tadqiqotlar instituti,
Berkeley.
1. Akerlof va Yellen [1988] bu borada olingan natijalarning qisqacha mazmunini o'z ichiga oladi.
qog'oz.

gipoteza ishsizlikning mavjudligini tushuntiradi. Ishsizlik adolatli ish haqi w* bozor kliringidan oshib ketganda yuzaga keladi

ish haqi.2 w* ni aniqlashning tabiiy xususiyatlari bilan bu
gipoteza mahorat va ishsizlik nima uchun salbiy ekanligini tushuntirishi mumkin
korrelyatsiya qilingan. Bundan tashqari, u ish haqi farqlarini potentsial ravishda tushuntiradi
va mehnat bozori segmentatsiyasi.3
Adolatli ish haqi gipotezasi uchun motivatsiya oddiy
inson xulq-atvoriga oid kuzatish: odamlar ololmaganda
ular nimaga loyiq bo'lsa, ular teng bo'lishga harakat qilishadi. Keyingi bo'lim bo'ladi
adolatli ish haqi gipotezasi uchun besh turdagi dalillarni taqdim eting.
Birinchidan, u adolatli ish haqi-harakat bo'lgan psixologiyaga tayanadi
gipoteza Adamsning [1963] tenglik nazariyasiga mos keladi. Ko'plab empirik tadqiqotlar bu nazariyani sinab ko'rdi. Ular muvozanatda,
qattiq qo'llab-quvvatladi. Ikkinchidan, sotsiologiyada adolatli ish haqi gipotezasi Blau-Homans [1955, 1961] ijtimoiy nazariyasiga mos keladi.
almashish. Sotsiologik tadqiqotlar, shu jumladan ish sharoitlarini o'rganish;
ijtimoiy ayirboshlashda odatda tenglik ustunligini ko'rsatadi. Uchinchidan, yarmarka
ish haqi gipotezasi sog'lom fikrga mos keladi. Ko'rinadi
adabiyotda tez-tez; xodimlar tomonidan yaqqol ko'rinib turibdi
darsliklar; bilan bog'liq keng tarqalgan tabularni tushuntiradi
ish haqi va ish haqini muhokama qilish. To'rtinchidan, adolatli ish haqi
gipoteza bilan shaxslar o'rtasida ish haqining siqilishini tushuntiradi
turli ko'nikmalar. Beshinchidan, adolatli ish haqi gipotezasining oddiy modellari potentsial ravishda empirik kuzatilgan ishsizlik mahoratini tushuntiradi.
korrelyatsiyalar; ishsizlik nima uchun pasaymaganini ham tushuntiradilar
ko'proq ishsizlik kamayganiga qaramay, ta'limning o'sishi bilan
o'qimishli ishchilar.
Ish haqining adolatli gipotezasi dalillarini ko'rib chiqqandan so'ng, III va IV bo'limlar ushbu gipotezadan foydalangan holda modellarni yaratadilar.
Bu modellar adolatli ish haqi w* ni belgilashda farqlanadi. In
III bo'lim w* ekzogendir. IV bo'limda w * nisbiyga bog'liq
ish haqi, shuningdek bozor munosabatlari bo'yicha. Ushbu modellar samaradorlikni ta'minlaydi

Ushbu modellar samaradorlikni ta'minlaydi

ishsizlik uchun ish haqi bo'yicha tushuntirishlar. Shunga qaramay, ular bo'ysunmaydilar
bog'lanish sxemalari yoki murakkab shartnomalar bo'ladi degan tanqid
ixtiyoriy ishsizlikni kamaytirish yoki bartaraf etish.4 Agar bunday obligatsiyalar
adolatsiz deb hisoblansa, ular optimal bo'lmaydi. Qayerda munosabatlarda
adolat muhim, o'tmishdagi voqealar tufayli bo'lgan ginalar kelajakdagi repressiyalarga olib keladi. Mavjud adabiyotlarda bu model eng yaqindan
Summersning [1988] nisbiy ish haqiga asoslangan samaradorlik ish haqiga o'xshaydi
nazariya. Summers modelida ishchilar o'zlarining tovon pullarini boshqa firmalardagi taqqoslanadigan guruhlar bilan solishtiradilar; bizning modelimizda, in
farqli o'laroq, ishchilar o'zlarining ish haqini hamkasblari bilan solishtirishadi
bir xil firm