Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Philosophical
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3 and 24. The usage of ja¯zima (“deci-
sive”) is entirely Avicennan. For Ibn Sı¯na¯’s distinction between a decisive volition ( ira¯da
Effi cient Causality,” 183; and idem, “Avicenna on Causal Priority,” 70. 28. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:112.5–8 / 2225.2–6. See al-Zabı¯dı¯ , It.ha¯f al-sa¯da , 9:62.17–21, who has yussira instead of tayassara and taqu¯dahu instead of yaqu¯dahu . Cf. Gramlich, Muh.ammad al-G
29. See also al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Iqtis.a¯d , 6.10–7.6; on this passage, see van Ess, Erkennt- nislehre , 338. 30. See above p. 133. Cf. Q 80.20 “(. . .) then [God] makes the path easy for him (. . .)”; Al-Subkı¯, T.abaqa¯t , 3:386.5–6, already remarked that al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s theory of human action is identical both to that of al-Juwaynı¯ and to that of the Mu ¶tazila. See Gimaret, Théories de l ’ acte humain , 129. 31. Ibn Tu ¯mart, Sifr f ı¯hi ja¯mi ¶, ta ¶a¯lı¯q al-Ima¯m , 214.1–5. This chain also appears in the text “al-Kala¯m ¶ala¯ l- ¶iba¯da”; ibid., 205–6. 32. See, however, a somewhat similar passage in Iqtis.a¯d , 6.10–7.6. 33. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:119.14–15 / 2235.9–11. Cf. al-Zabı¯dı¯, Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 9:72.8–11; and Gramlich, Muh.ammad al-G
34. In the Ih.ya¯ 7 , see most of all the Baya¯n f ı¯ kayfi yyat al-tafakkur f ı¯ khalq Alla¯h at the end of the thirty-ninth book on meditation ( tafakkur ); al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:540–57 / 2822–44; Ormsby, Theodicy , 45–51. On al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s al-Ma ¶a¯rif al- ¶aqliyya, see Cabanelas, “Un opusculo inédito de Algazel: El libro le las intuicones intelectuales.” 35. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:318.17–18 / 2513.9–10. Cf. ibid., 4:323.14 / 2520.4; 4:307.17– 22 / 2497.21–2498.3. 36. Ibid., 1:124. paenult. / 156.7; 1:148.16 / 189.1; Tibawi, “Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Sojourn,” 85.6, 105. 37. Frank, Creation , 18. The term appears numerous times in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Ih.ya¯ 7 ; see, e.g., 1:104.20 / 126.6; 4:58.9 / 2151. peanult .; 4:120.21 / 2237.4; 4:136.11 / 2258.11; 4:149.23 / 2277.16; 4:321.4 / 2516.20; 4:355.11–13 / 2565.6–8. For the synonymous mudabbir al-asba¯b (“the one who orders [or: governs over] the causes”), see ibid., 4:340.22 / 2545.23. See also al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Taha¯fut , 65.4 / 38.22, 182.9 / 107.19; and al-Maqs.ad , 116.13. In the Mun- qidh , 49.20, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ refers to God as the muqallib al-qulu¯b , “the one who changes the hearts,” meaning the one who determines people’s opinions and moods. 38. For the Avicennan background of musabbib al-asba¯b, see Janssens, “Filosofi sche Elementen in de mystieke Leer,” 341–42; and Frank, Creation , 18. The term appears at least twice in works of Ibn Sı¯na¯, in al-H
2.16. Based on a close study of the manuscript evidence, Bertolacci, Reception of Aris- tote ’ s Metaphysics , 489, rejects the reading of musabbib al-asba¯b in Ibn Sı¯na¯’s al-Shifa¯ 7, Ila¯hiyya¯t , 2.16, and corrects it to sabab al-asba¯b . The Latin translation confi rms this and translates causa causarum (Ibn Sı¯na¯, Avicenna latinus. Liber de philosophia prima , 1:3.2). A similar correction might be necessary for the poorly edited al-H
Juwaynı¯, al-Irsha¯d , 235.3–4, reports that the philosophers say God is the sabab al-asba¯b . In his Taha¯fut , 102.4 / 59.10, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ reports roughly the same (cf. also ibid., 97.1 / 56.2). It is possible that al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s prominent use of musabbib had an infl uence on
not e s to page s 2 2 0 – 2 2 1 3 4 5 the Avicennan manuscript tradition and prompted some copyists to change the original Avicennan sabab to musabbib . 39. Al-Makkı¯, Qu¯t al-qulu¯b , 1:209.8; 2:11.9; German translation in Gramich, Die
ing a causalist view of events in this world with a possible occasionalist perspective on God’s actions seems to go back to al-Makkı¯; see for example his chapter on asba¯b and wasa¯ 7it. in Qu¯t al-qulu¯b , 2:10–15; German translation in Gramlich, Die Nahrung der Herzen , 2:315–29. 40. musabbibu l-asba¯bi ajra¯ sunnatahu bi-rabt.i l-musabbaba¯ti bi-l-asba¯bi iz.ha¯ran li-l- h.ikma ; al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:355.3 / 2564.16–17. 41. Ibid. 4:307.20 / 2498.2. The usage of the verb sakhkhara is Qur’anic; see for example Q 13:2, 16:14. 42. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:111.11 / 2224.3–4. 43. Ibid. 4:111.12–15 / 2224.5–8. H . alabı¯’s edition has mu¯jid instead of mu¯jib . 44. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Isha¯ra¯t wa-l-tanbı¯ha¯t , 188.17–19. Cf. Marmura, “Divine Omnis- cience,” 91–92. Abrahamov, “Ibn Sı¯na¯’s Infl uence on al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Non-Philosophical Works,” 14–16, deals with Ibn Sı¯na¯’s infl uence on some of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s views about re- ward in the hereafter. 45. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Maqs.ad al-asna¯ , 98.4–6. 46. bal [huwa] mumahhidu shart.i l-h.us.u¯l li-ghayrihi. 47. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:111.23–112.3 / 2224.19– ult . Cf. Frank, Creation , 26. 48. On al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s understanding of jawhar —which does not concur with the earlier Ash ¶arites’ understanding of jawhar as an atom—see Frank, Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the
49. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:112.11–12 / 2225.9–10. On the h.adı¯th, see al-Bukha¯rı¯, al- S.ahı¯h , jiha¯d, 144; and Wensinck, Concordance , 2:501a. 50. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:317.17–20 / 2511. paenult –2512.1; al-ra¯sikhu¯na f ı¯-l- ¶ilm is taken from Q 3:7 in which—according to al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s interpretation of this verse—those “deeply rooted in knowledge” are identifi ed as the scholars who know the meaning of diffi cult passages from revelation. On al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s understanding of Q 3:7, see Griffel, Apostasie und Toleranz , 448. 51. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:317.20–25 / 2512.3–6. See al-Zabı¯dı¯, Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 9:423.20– 26, who lacks the word azaliyya in the third sentence. 52. Gramlich, Muh.ammad al-G
53. Al-Isfara¯ 7ı¯nı¯, “al- ¶Aqı¯da,” 168, fragm. 94. Cf. al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Maqs.ad , 105.17: “God arranges them ( scil. all things) in their appropriate places and thereby He is just ( ¶adl ).” See Frank, Creation , 64–65, and particularly 56–57, where he discusses the meaning of h.aqq in a very similar passage to the one we are looking at. On h.aqq, cf. a passage in al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Iqtis.a¯d , 102.2–3, on the relationship between God’s will and his foreknowl- edge: “The divine foreknowledge is true to ( h.aqqa al- ¶ilm ) [the decision of the divine will] and contains them as they are.” 54. See above pp. 141–43 . 55. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Maqa¯s.id al-fala¯sifa , 2:82. paenult. –85.2 / 236.24–239.3; MS Lon- don, Or. 3126, foll. 237b–240a. The text in Maqa¯s.id is a free adaptation of Ibn Sı¯na¯, Da¯nishna¯mah-yi ¶Ala¯ 7-i , Ila¯
nal examples. For the Avicennan texts used in the passage of the London MS, see Griffel, “MS London, British Library, Or. 3126: An Unknown Work,” 15. 56. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, MS London, Or. 3126, foll. 238a.8–238b.9. 57. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Shifa¯ 7 , al-Ila¯hiyya¯t , 339.4–8; al-Naja¯t , 284.12–13 / 668.14–16, quoted in al-Ghaza¯lı¯, MS London Or. 3126, fol. 238a.5–8. 3 4 6 not e s to page s 2 2 1 – 2 2 6 58. Al-Juwaynı¯, al-Sha¯mil (ed. Alexandria), 621.21–22 and 622.3–8 (with the example—also used by al-Ghaza¯lı¯—that a well-written manuscript gives necessary evidence to the skills of the scribe); al-Makkı¯, Qu¯t al-qulu¯b , 2:35–36. The motif that God’s creation is skillfully arranged goes back to the Qur’an, in which in various con- texts it says that God’s creation contains “signs ( a¯ya¯t ) for those who can understand.” The idea that certain divine attributes show in His creation is also Qur’anic. The usual proof for God’s oneness and unity in kala¯m literature is by mutual hindrance ( tama¯nu ¶). It appears already in Q 23:91, 17:42–3: Because this creation shows no signs of the activity of more than one divine creative force, which would necessarily com- pete with and hinder one another, there is only one God. See also the story of Abra- ham’s conversion to monotheism in Q 6:75–79, discussed below. 59. Kukkonen, “Plentitude, Possibility, and the Limits of Reason,” 545–46; David- son, Proofs , 226–27, 234; Goodman, “Ghazâlî’s Argument from Creation,” 69. On argu- ments from design in the thirty-second book of the Ih.ya¯ 7 , see van den Bergh, “Ghazali on ‘Gratitude Towards God,’ ” 86–88, 97–98. 60. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Iqtis.a¯d , 99–100. 61. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 37, 75. For a discussion of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s po- sition, see ibid., 39–74; Frank, Creation , 60–66; and idem, Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the Ash ¶arite School , 20–21.
62. The debate is documented and analyzed in Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 92–265, and al-Zabı¯dı¯, Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 9:434–60. 63. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:322.1–3 / 2518.5–8; English translation in Ormsby, Theod- icy in Islamic Thought , 40–41. Cf. al-Zabı¯dı¯, Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 9:433. These words seem to be inspired by the beginning paragraph of Ibn Sı¯na¯’s Risa¯la Fı¯ sirr al-qadar, in which all ele- ments in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s passage (the obscurity of the matter, the deep sea, the prohibition to teach it to the ¶a¯mma ) also appear. See the text of the Risa¯la Fı¯ sirr al-qadar in Hourani, “Ibn Sı¯na¯’s ‘Essay on the Secret of Destiny,’ ” 27–31; and in ¶A ¯ s.i, al-Tafsı¯r al-Qur 7a¯nı¯ , 302–5. 64. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Imla¯ 7 f ı¯ ishka¯la¯t al- Ih.ya¯ 7 , 50–51 / 3083–85; MS Yale, Landberg 428, pp. 55–56. For an English synopsis of this passage, see Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 75–81. The available editions of al-Imla¯ 7 f ı¯ ishka¯la¯t al- Ih.ya¯ 7 , printed at the end or on the margins of many editions of the Ih.ya¯ 7 ¶ulu¯m al-dı¯n and on the margins of al-Zabı¯dı¯, Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 1:192–204, are of very poor quality, with some textual passages (likely some lines in the underlying manuscript) missing. They also represent a recen- sion of the text that is not original. In this recension, the order of the fus.u¯l does not match the description of the contents given by al-Ghaza¯lı¯ at the beginning of the work on pp. 19–20 / 3038–39. A more original recension and a much better text is available in manuscripts such as MS Yale, Landberg 428 (once owned by al-Murt.ada¯ al-Zabı¯dı¯), and, with slight variations in the order of the text, MS Berlin, Petermann II 545 (Ahlwardt 1714).
65. On al-Makkı¯’s Qu¯t al-qulu¯b, see the very helpful German translation by Rich- ard Gramlich, Die Nahrung der Herzen , which includes notes and an analytical index. 66. See above p. 222. 67. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:321.1–16 / 2516.17–2517.13. English translation in Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 38–39. 68. Al-Makkı¯, Qu¯t al-qulu¯b, 2:35–36. Cf. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 41, 45, 81. 69. Al-Makkı¯, Qu¯t al-qulu¯ b , 2:35. paenult. – ult . English translation in Ormsby, The- odicy , 58; German translation in Gramlich, Die Nahrung der Herzen , 2:396; and idem, Muh.ammad al-G . azza¯lı¯ ’ s Lehre , 549.
not e s to page s 2 2 6 – 2 2 8 3 4 7 70. wa-laysa f ı¯-l-imka¯ni as.lan ah.sanu minhu wa-la¯ atamma wa-la¯ akmala ; al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:321.16–18 / 2517.13–16. Cf. al-Zabı¯dı¯, Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 9:430.18–26. See the English translation in Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 39. 71. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 3:73.10–13 / 1446–47. 72. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:321.20–26 / 2517.18–2518.2. See the English translation in Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 40, and his commentary on pp. 64–69. 73. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 257. 74. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Isha¯ra¯t wa-l-tanbı¯ha¯t , 186.5–6. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought , 257, says that according to Ibn Sı¯na¯, harm appears accidental when good is created. This is, however, a misunderstanding that seems to be based on Ibn Sı¯na¯’s wording in al- Isha¯ra¯t , 186.1 and 187.1–3. Frank, Creation , 61, shares this misunderstanding. Creating good, however, necessarily requires the creation of harm. 75. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Isha¯ra¯t wa-l-tanbı¯ha¯t , 185–87. On Ibn Sı¯na¯’s teachings on harm or evil ( sharr ), see Steel, “Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Evil,” 173–86. 76. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Shifa¯ 7 , al-Ila¯hiyya¯t, 342.4–5. Steel, “Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Evil,” 179–81. 77. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Shifa¯ 7
“Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Evil,” 174–77. This seems to be a premise not shared by al-Ghaza¯lı¯. In his Imla¯ 7 , 50.10–11 / 3083.20–21; MS Landberg 428, p. 55.20, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ counters the objection that the idea of the best of all possible worlds is incompatible with the position of the world’s creation in time. His brief response makes sense only if existence is not regarded as better than nonexistence. On the apparent incompatibility of the best of all possible worlds and creation in time, see Ormsby, Theodicy , 76–77; and Frank, Creation , 66. 78. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Shifa¯ 7, al-Ila¯hiyya¯t , 339.13–15; al-Naja¯t , 284.18–19 / 669.9–10. 79. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Shifa¯ 7, al-Ila¯hiyya¯t , 341.8–10; al-Naja¯t , 286.4–7 / 672.9–13. The posi- tion that species are unaffected by harm does not seem to have been shared by al-Ghaza¯lı¯, who considers the species of beasts ( baha¯ 7im ) harmful ( Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:321.24–25 / 2518.1). 80. Ibn Sı¯na¯, al-Shifa¯ 7, al-Ila¯hiyya¯t , 341.8–9; al-Naja¯t , 286.5 / 667.9–10. Cf. Aristo- tle, Metaphysics , 1010a.25–30. 81. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 4:124.21–125.2 / 2242.17–2243.2. It is here that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says: “An ignorant friend is worse than an insightful foe.” Van den Bergh, “Ghazali on ‘Gratitude Towards God,’ ” 92, remarks that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ “may have read it” in Kalı¯la wa-
such sentence in that work. 82. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Maqs.ad al-asna¯ , 68.1–5. 83. Ibid. 68.6–8. 84. Ibid. 68.15–16; 69.15–16. For the h.adı¯th, see al-Bukha¯rı¯, al-S.ah.ih. , tawh.ı¯d 15, 22, 28, 55; or Muslim ibn al-H . ajja¯j, al-S.ah.ı¯h. , tawba 14–16. Cf. Wensinck, Concordance , 4:526a.
85. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, MS Yale, Landberg 428, p. 56.4–7. In the printed text in al-Imla¯ 7 , 50.16–18 / 3084.6–8, and in the margins of al-Zabı¯dı¯ , Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 1:201, this sentence is corrupted. See also the translation in Ormsby, Theodicy , 78, based on MS Berlin, Pe- termann II 545, fol. 16b. 86. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Imla¯ 7 , 50.20–21 / 3083.10–11; idem, MS Yale, Landberg 428, p. 56.9–10. Cf. the text in the margins of al-Zabı¯dı¯ , Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 1:201. 87. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Imla¯ 7 , 50.23–51.7 / 3084.14–3085.5. This passage is not in MS Yale, Landberg 428. It is this reasoning that likely lies behind al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s decision only to write about the world’s perfection in two comparatively brief passages in his Ih.ya¯ 7 ¶ulu¯m al-dı¯n and in his al-Imla¯ 7 f ı¯ ishka¯la¯t al- Ih.ya¯ 7 . The subject is not explicitly discussed 3 4 8
not e s to page s 2 2 8 – 2 3 1 in other books of the Ih.ya¯ 7 circle, such as al-Arba ¶ı¯n or Kı¯miya¯ 7-yi sa ¶a¯dat . Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, however, alludes to it in Taha¯fut al-fala¯sifa , 289.4–6 / 172.17; al -Iqtis.a¯d , 165–66; al-Maqs.ad al-asna¯ 7 , 47.12–13, 68.6–8, 105–6, 81.12–13, 109.8–15, 152.11–13; and probably many other passages of his works. 88. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Imla¯ 7 , 50.13–16 / 3084.2–6. Corrected according to MS Yale, Landberg 428, pp. 55. ult. –56.4, which varies in the following readings: wa-l-yatah.aqqiqa ; wa-anna dha¯lika ¶ala¯ gha¯yati l-h.ikma ; and burha¯n
89. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,
9:423–24. This passage is translated and its language discussed in Frank, Creation , 56– 61. See also Gramlich’s German translation in Muh.ammad al-G
90. See p. 225 . 91. See p. 228 . 92. Frank, Creation , 55–63. 93. Ibid., 69. 94. This is most forcefully expressed in al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Taha¯fut , 96–103 / 56–60; 155– 60 / 91–94. See also above, pp. 184–85 . 95. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Taha¯fut , 64.5–66.6 / 38.12–39.13. Logically impossible means “conjoining negation and affi rmation” ( al-jam ¶ bayna l-naf ı¯ wa-l-ithba¯t ). 96. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, Ih.ya¯ 7 , 1:148.16–18 / 189.1–3; Tibawi, “Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Sojoun,” 85.6–7, 105. Kukkonen, “Possible Worlds,” 480, concludes that al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s innovations to the philosophy of Ibn Sı¯na¯ “have their root in the idea of God freely choosing (arbitrating) between alternatives equal to him.” 97. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Iqtis.a¯d , 129–39. This category came to be used by the Nishapu- rian Ash ¶arites, most probably in conscious response to the fala¯sifa ’s teachings. ¶Abd al-Qa¯hir al-Baghda¯dı¯’s Us.u¯l al-dı¯n, 117–18, 121–22, refers to a group of divine names that are derived from God’s essence and to a second group that “are derived from an attribute that He has residing within Him” ( mushtaqq min s.ifa lahu qa¯ 7imat an bihi ). A third group is derived from God’s actions. On al-Baghda¯dı¯’s division, see Gimaret, Les noms divins en Islam , 107–8. Ibn Sı¯na¯ already refers to this concept and says in al-H . ikma al- ¶arshiyya , 9.9, that God’s knowledge is not za 7id ¶ala¯ l-dha¯t. On al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s conception of the di- vine attributes, see Frank, Creation , 47–52. 98. ghayru maqdu¯rin ¶ala¯ ma ¶na¯ anna wuju¯dahu yu 7addı¯ ila¯ stih.a¯la ; al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al- Iqtis.a¯d , 85.8–86.4. Marmura, “Ghazali’s Chapter on Divine Power,” 301–2. On this sense of necessity in al-Ghaza¯lı¯, see Kukkonen, “Causality and Cosmology,” 41–42. chapter 9
1. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯, al-Maqs.ad , 98.6–102.14; idem, al -Arba ¶ı¯n , 13.6–18. ult. / 12.5–14. ult. The passage in al-Arba ¶ı¯n is often left out from manuscripts of the book. In fact, among the fi ve manuscripts I looked at—two in Berlin (Sprenger 763 and 941; see Ahlwardt, Handschriften-Verzeichnisse , nos. 1715–716), two in Princeton (Yahuda Collection, nos. 3893 and 4374; see Mach, Catalogue , no. 2161), and one at Yale’s Beinecke Library (Ara- bic MSS suppl. 425)—none contained this passage, and two of them (Sprenger 763 and Yahuda 3893) have heavily abbreviated sections on God’s will ( ira¯da ), opening the pos- sibility that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ published more than one version of al-Arba ¶ı¯n . Cf. the English translation of the passage in al-Maqs.ad in Burrell and Daher, The Ninety-Nine Beauti- ful Names of God , 86–88. On this passage, see Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System , 42–44; and Abrahamov, “Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Theory of Causality.” Download 4.03 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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