Crimea conference

Mr. Beverley Baxter (Wood Green) 
May I on a point of interest—
Mr. Driberg 
There is no time for points of interest.
Mr. Baxter 
May I ask the hon. Gentleman why he refers to my hon. and gallant Friend as a Ministerial spokesman, when his entire speech was in criticism of the Government?
Mr. Driberg 
I do not think that my hon. Friend appreciated the subtlety of my remark. To my mind, the most significant speech that has so far been made from that side of the House, with the exception, of course, of the Prime Minister's opening speech, was that of the hon. and gallant Member for Berwick and Haddington (Captain McEwen). While we accept and pay tribute to the sincerity with which the hon. and gallant Gentleman spoke, yet at the same time, in view of the influential position which he holds on the Conservative Benches, his speech seemed to me to be an ill-omen of the mood and of the sense of responsibility with which that great party is proposing to go to the country and confront the problems of the peace that lie ahead of us. [Interruption.] Yes, for one of the most important guarantees of the continuance of that peace must be the perpetuation of close friendship and the real implementing of our Alliance with the Soviet Union. I challenge any hon. Member to deny that and to say that it would not be disastrous if that Alliance broke down.
I was extremely interested and impressed by most of the Prime Minister's speech. I was going to say a few words about Greece, but I do not think I have time—[Interruption]—If I am challenged, then, I think that I can say at least that I thought that the Prime 1338Minister's pointed reference to His Majesty's Coalition Government was even more apt than he perhaps realised, since it is evident to those who have followed the course of events in Greece that it was the influence of the Labour Party within that Government and the Left Wing critics in this House and elsewhere that very largely contributed to the happy settlement of the Greek crisis. If I may, I will also pick up for a moment a minor point in reference to Greece—the Greek elections. It is also relevant to the problem of the Polish elections, and it is a point that may, I believe, be accepted by hon. Members on both sides of the House without dissension or derision. I can see great difficulties in the promised Allied supervision of free and unfettered elections. It is satisfactory to hear that we are to have Russian, American and British observers in Greece, and, I suppose, in Poland, but do not see how enough Allied observers can be found to keep guard over every little mountain polling booth in every remote Greek village. I do not see how we can guard absolutely against some kind of victimisation or terrorisation. I hope hon. Members will believe that I am just as anxious as they are to see that there are really free and unfettered elections both in Poland and in Greece. I should like to hear more from the Foreign Secretary about the number of observers who are to be sent and how they propose to do their work and really give some kind of effective guarantee that the elections will not be a mere formality of democracy.
There are two points on which the Prime Minister is to be especially congratulated. The first, which has not been sufficiently recognised in the speeches we have so far heard, is the substantial achievement of having overcome the Dumbarton Oaks hitch about voting procedure. That is a most important point for the future organisation of peace. The second and main achievement is having overcome the dissension about Poland, which could have poisoned the future unity of the Allied nations
Before I come to the subject of Poland, I want to deal with one or two other matters which are relevant to the White Paper report of the Crimea Conference. The first is in connection with the post-war control of Germany. It is evident that during the period of occupation and control we shall have to start that process 1339which has become a regular cliché, the process known as re-educating the German people. I wonder if the Foreign Secretary could give us any idea of how it is proposed that this should be done. I do not know whether it is hoped that we can re-educate the entire adult population of Germany. It is certain that we cannot spare the teachers to do so. It is also certain that the Germans would not take that re-education kindly from foreigners and that it will, therefore, be necessary to employ for the purpose such "good Germans" as can be found, either within Germany or among the refugees here and in America. An hon. and gallant Member below me asks "Where are they?" Even Lord Vansittart, in one of his articles or speeches, has put the possible percentage of good Germans as high as about 25, so I hope that we can take it that we shall be able to find enough Germans—perhaps among those who still survive of the former trade unionists and Left Wing opponents of the Nazi régime, and perhaps among the Catholic priests and Protestant pastors who put up a valiant fight for many years against Hitlerism. It may be that the best method of re-educating large masses of the adult population of Germany will be the reparations in kind—the reparations in human-kind—which our Soviet Allies are demanding. If several million Germans spend several years working in the Soviet Union, they may start learning a bit about politics and about life.
On this same point, I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary, quite seriously, whether any plans are being made for the control or guidance of the Press and radio in Germany during the period of occupation and immediately afterwards. These are obviously going to be the most important public instruments of general reeducation. What is being done about them? They clearly cannot be left uncontrolled; but what plans are being made?
The second of my points concerning the immediate post-war problems relates to another process which will have to go on simultaneously with the occupation and control of Germany, and that is the repatriation of the millions of people who have been uprooted from their homes and moved about Europe, largely by the Nazis, to work in German factories and mines. There was a Debate in another 1340place a few weeks ago which, to my mind, was profoundly disquieting and depressing. It dealt with this problem of what are called, in the terrible official jargon, the "displaced and stateless non-repatriables." It has been estimated, by officials and people who are in the best position to make the estimate, that the number of people in Europe so uprooted, who will need to be sorted, identified, classified, re-assembled, and prevented from drifting along the main roads of Europe under their own steam, totals no fewer than 30,000,000 human beings. That vast problem will have to be tackled simultaneously with the other immediate post-war problems which I have mentioned, if we are to avoid tremendous chaos and the possibility of complete anarchy throughout Europe.
This Crimea declaration is the great charter of future peace for Europe and the world. But there are two danger-points in Europe to-day, two points at which Allied unity is seriously threatened. The first is Spain. Fascism has shown that it is not only intensely nationalist but also essentially international and aggressive. There cannot be any security for democracy in Europe or for British strategic interests in the Mediterranean while Spain remains Fascist. I am not, of course, advocating, and nobody would be foolish enough to suggest, an extension of the war in a military sense. It is perfectly possible to deal with Fascist Spain by applying economic and diplomatic sanctions.
The second main danger-point is the continued existence of the Polish émigré Government in London. The Prime Minister told us this morning that at any rate formal recognition is still to be extended to it for some indefinite time; but that the dissolution of the two so-to-speak rival Polish Governments will not, of course, be simultaneous. Naturally it will not—because the Lublin Government is now in Poland and is actually doing the job, whether we like it or not, of administering Polish territory, distributing food, and so forth. On the other hand, I agree with hon. Members that a large number of the Polish Armed Forces, to whose heroism I join in paying tribute, still owe allegiance to the Polish Government in London. That makes the problem a little more intractable. I do not know whether the Armed Forces of Poland, who are 1341fighting very gallantly in Western Europe, will feel that their allegiance to the Government in London is unshakable; but I am told that quite a number of them were seen in London last week, and even a few Polish officers, buying flags on the Red Army flag-day.
I am not suggesting that all the Poles in the London Government are completely devoid of wisdom or statesmanship. In one of the many Polish publications issued in this country I saw, in translation, some very interesting remarks the other day. I think the publication represented the Peasants' Party. In an article entitled "Elements of Hope," the writer was shrewd enough to say that Russia's very insistence on international recognition of the Curzon Line was itself proof that Russia had no designs on Polish territory as a whole, as has been so wantonly alleged in some of the more irresponsible anti-Soviet quarters in this country—including, I am sorry to say, the Scottish Roman Catholic hierarchy, copies of whose latest manifesto were distributed to hon. Members this morning. The article went on to point out, wisely, that the break-up of unity among the major Allies would have been in the first instance a disaster to Poland, and it praises the statesmen of Yalta for their wisdom.
Although there are these saner influences in the Polish Government in London, I am afraid it must be said that for the most part that Government has been a cause of more mischief and harm among the Allies than has any other of the foreign Governments to whom we have shown hospitality. They have, indeed, built up a much larger and more expensive bureaucratic apparatus than any of the others. I do not think that the total figures have yet been published.