Foreign relations of the united states 1969–1976 volume XXXVII energy crisis, 1974–1980 department of state washington
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- 278. Memorandum of Conversation
- 279. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economic and Technology Affairs
- Ellen L. Frost
Muskie 4 On a July 2 memorandum from Owen to the President, with a draft of the letter to Fahd attached, Carter wrote: “Either delete marked passage or don’t send letter.” The passage he instructed to be deleted was: “Saudi Arabia’s policy of raising sustainable ca- pacity to 12 million barrels per day is thus a major contribution to world order. As the fu- ture unfolds, you may find that a further increase in capacity beyond 12 million barrels per day would serve Saudi Arabia’s interest in a secure international environment.” On the same memorandum, Owen wrote: “The letter was sent as a message with the indi- cated passage deleted. No hard copy will follow.” (Carter Library, National Security Af- fairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 17, Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, 6–10/80) 365-608/428-S/80010 872 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII 278. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 1, 1980. SUBJECT Highlights of Secretary Duncan’s Meeting with Venezuelan Energy Minister, Humberto Calderon Berti, Tuesday, July 1, 1980 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS U.S.: Secretary Duncan Henry Owen, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for International Economics Richard Cooper, Under Secretary, DOS Leslie J. Goldman, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, DOE Edward Fried, Consultant, NSC Bob Swandby, International Affairs Officer, Office of Energy Producing Nations, International Affairs, DOE
Perez Chiriboga, Ambassador Humberto Calderon Berti, Minister for Energy Ivan Sigurani, Minister Counsellor for Petroleum USG/GOV Energy R&D Cooperation After being welcomed by the Secretary, Venezuelan Energy Min- ister Calderon expressed his pleasure at the progress which has been made in implementing the Energy R&D Agreement signed on March 6 during his visit to Washington. The Minister indicated that despite some criticism by leftist opposition for cooperating with the U.S., the presentation of the Agreement to the Congress has gone very well.
The Minister stated that the recent OPEC meeting in Algiers, 2 was
marked by feuding, particularly between Iran and Iraq. The Secretary 1 Source: Department of Energy, Executive Secretariat Files, Job #8824, Box 3135, IA Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential. Drafted by Swandby on July 2 and approved by Goldman who signed at the bottom of the last page. 2 At the June 9–11 meeting, OPEC members established a new price structure, which sought to achieve “an equilibrium between supply and demand in order to avoid further stockpiling” that they considered “harmful to producers and consumers alike.” OPEC set the marker crude price of oil at a ceiling of $32 per barrel starting July 1, a limit that would be reviewed at an autumn meeting. OPEC also determined that the value dif- ferentials which would be added over and above the $32 ceiling “on account of quality and geographical location should not exceed in any case” $5 per barrel. (Telegram 1864 from Algiers, June 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D800285– 0481) Telegram 1838 from Algiers, June 9, and telegram 1853 from Algiers, June 10, detail the meeting’s highlights. (Ibid., D800281–1076, D800283–0407) Excerpts from the June 11 communique´ were published in The New York Times, June 11, 1980, p. D4. 365-608/428-S/80010 January 1979–January 1981 873 asked him how prices might be moving and whether there was a chance for pricing unity prior to the next OPEC Ministerial in Novem- ber. He responded that Venezuela planned to increase its prices ap- proximately $.50/BBL, effective July 1. He also stated that Saudi Arabia would probably increase their price to $32/BBL, but in two steps, pos- sibly to $30/BBL before the next OPEC meeting. He was uncertain whether such a move would help to achieve price unity. He also indi- cated that Saudi Arabia might cut production by 2 MMB/D. The Secretary expressed his concern over possible Nigerian and Algerian price increases and that the current prices of these countries were not justifiable based on historical ratios. Assistant Secretary Goldman stated that the exploration fees being charged by African countries amounted to a surcharge because few companies had de- cided to increase exploration activities. The Minister indicated that it was extremely difficult to convince the African producers and Iran that prices and production levels could not be discussed separately. The Secretary stated that the only way to convince them is for the other pro- ducers to keep substantial supplies available to the market, and that the OPEC long-term pricing formula can only work when there is unified pricing. Ambassador Owen asked what was likely to result from the November Ministerial. The Minister replied that an aid program for the developing countries was likely to be formulated, but he was uncertain whether oil price unity could be achieved.
The Minister indicated that OPEC is beginning to realize that its continuous price increases are contributing to a vicious cycle of infla- tion which is eroding the economies of Venezuela and other develop- ing countries. He stated that both the perceived reduction in living standards, and in some cases, absolute decline in family income would pose increasing political problems. The Minister indicated that he be- lieved that OPEC would be broadening its role to include bilateral agreements whereby producing countries would supply oil and consuming countries would supply the producing countries with technical and other services at agreed prices. He indicated that he believes such arrangements could be beneficial to both producing and consuming countries by providing the former with badly needed technology in such areas as housing and agriculture and the latter with oil at prices which they know will not be arbitrarily increased. Ambassador Owen stated that the USG is willing to establish a USG/GOV Joint Commission to explore the implementation of such agreements. He pointed out that the USG has a similar arrangement
365-608/428-S/80010 874 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII with Saudi Arabia which has worked very well. 3 Under Secretary Cooper pointed out that, historically when barter arrangements were tried between countries, problems arose over the use of money, but he reaffirmed Ambassador Owen’s recommendation to facilitate a Joint USG/GOV Commission. Ambassador Perez pointed out that the USG and GOV already had established a number of joint agreements in the areas of agriculture, energy, science and technology, and that soon there would also be a joint agreement in health. Ambassador Owen in- dicated that the USG was flexible, and that if the GOV preferred, we could continue to pursue sectoral joint agreements without establish- ing a joint commission. Minister Calderon indicated that he would think further about these suggestions and elaborate his ideas in a month.
Country Energy Assessment Minister Calderon stated that due to domestic political consider- ations, it would be necessary for the GOV to conduct the assessment under the auspices of a Venezuelan university. Assistant Secretary Goldman stated that under U.S. law, a government-to-government agreement was required to conduct the assessment. The Secretary and Minister Calderon agreed that the cooperative country energy assess- ment was important for both countries and that a way would be found to overcome any potential legal difficulties. Assistant Secretary Gold- man suggested that DOE consult our legal counsel and thereafter fur- ther consultations could be held with GOV officials, if required.
Minister Calderon stated that President Herrera and Mexican Pres- ident Lopez Portillo will announce, before August 15, an agreement to share oil supplies for Caribbean and Central American countries. The announcement will be made in Costa Rica to show support for this democratic government. Up to 30 percent of the region’s oil purchases (up to $700 million) will be jointly financed by Mexico and Venezuela by five-year loans repayable at 5 percent, or convertible to 20 year loans repayable at 2 percent if the participating country converts the loan to energy development projects. The Minister indicated that this is the most important agreement he has negotiated with a non-OPEC country because he views it as an essential first step toward halting the deterio- rating political and economic condition in this region resulting from in- creasing oil prices. Trinidad will also be invited to join the program. He stated that even though Trinidad exports only about 10 MB/D, its ac- ceptance into the program would mean that all of the region’s oil needs 3 See footnote 5, Document 143. 365-608/428-S/80010 January 1979–January 1981 875 could be supplied by these three countries and therefore add solidarity to the pact. He also indicated that he has discussed the program with Minister Yamani and believes that a similar program could work in Asia and Africa. Western Hemisphere Energy Cooperation Ambassador Owen asked Minister Calderon how the Venezuelan/ Mexican agreement on oil sales to the Caribbean and Central America fit into the Minister’s proposal for hemispheric energy cooperation. Minister Calderon stated that he believed the former agreement to be an important first step in avoiding further political deterioration in the region, but that broader hemispheric cooperation must also be imple- mented to assist these smaller countries to develop alternative energy supplies which will reduce their dependence on imported oil. He fur- ther stated the role accorded to the Organization for Latin American Energy Development (OLADE) in the draft outline developed last March was too modest. Ambassador Owen stated that he hoped that during the drafting of the outline it was pointed out to GOV officials that the USG would not have funds for participation in such a program. Minister Calderon indicated that he could approach other countries for financial assist- ance, but that U.S. trechnical support was essential to the success of any such program. He pointed out that many of the solutions to energy supply problems in the region are probably low-cost, but that many of the countries do not know how to begin—for example, to develop their geothermal energy resources. Mr. Fried pointed out that the World Bank oil exploration program was moving in the direction of increased funding for pre-exploration and exploration activities, as well as providing governments advice on exploration contracts with private firms. Under Secretary Cooper raised the problem of funding such a program, in terms of obtaining adequate breadth and depth of technical expertise, as well as an ade- quate funding level. He indicated that one of the problems with the World Bank program is that risk sharing for dry holes is not spread among the participating countries, rather each country is responsible for funding the program within its borders. Ambassador Perez stated that there was a need for USG financial participation in a hemispheric energy cooperation program, and that the Congress might be more amenable to providing funding under the aegis of energy development rather than foreign aid. Ambassador Owen indicated that funding was not so much a problem with Congress as with the Executive Branch’s commitment to maintain an austere budget with no new funding programs at this time. Minister Calderon reiterated the importance of implementing a hemispheric energy cooperation program by pointing out Brazil’s dan- 365-608/428-S/80010 876 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII gerous position as an importer of approximately 700 MMB/D of oil, of which approximately 80 percent comes from Iraq. The Minister be- lieves that Iraq’s Government is unstable and that political instability in that country could cause a major oil supply disruption. He also reaf- firmed his commitment to funding such an initiative through an inter- national organization such as the World Bank and that the OPEC Spe- cial Fund could also be a partial source of funding. Under Secretary Cooper suggested that even though funding were through the World Bank, the U.S. would probably have to increase its contribution. The Secretary indicated that hemispheric energy cooperation was both in the interest of the USG and the hemisphere. The Secretary and Minister Calderon indicated that they would separately assess what might be next steps in implementing hemispheric energy cooperation and talk again in a few weeks after the Minister’s emissaries return from Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Colombia.
Minister Calderon asked how the North/South Dialogue was going. Under Secretary Cooper replied that while progress had been made on some issues, there were several major problem areas. A major issue was that some of the G–77 countries were demanding that IMF fund contributions be negotiated in New York. The Under Secretary stated that this position is entirely unacceptable to the USG due to po- tential Soviet subversion of the negotiations. He further indicated that the North/South Summit proposed by the Brandt Commission had been discussed at the Economic Summit, 4 but was not mentioned in the communique´ due to divisions among the industrial countries. Ambas- sador Owen indicated that the Austrian and Mexican Governments have been pushing for a North/South Summit. The Ambassador stated that he met privately with Austrian offi- cials during the Summit and indicated to them that President Carter had reservations. The President was not sure that concrete objectives could be achieved at such a meeting, and if they were not achieved, the USG would be blamed. The President also believes that the agenda for a North/South Summit would have to be carefully developed. 4 See Document 276. The Independent Commission on International Development Issues was chaired by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1980. 365-608/428-S/80010 January 1979–January 1981 877 279. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economic and Technology Affairs (Frost) to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Komer) 1 Washington, July 16, 1980. SUBJECT Security Implications of the Energy Crunch You recently asked for an analytical paper on the security implica- tions of the energy crunch 2 that might be sent to Under Secretary Newsom, along with the cover memo at Tab A. 3 Attached, next under, is a draft memorandum prepared by Don Goldstein that builds on your earlier thoughts on this issue. 4 We have coordinated the draft with Major General Boverie. Ellen L. Frost 5
ENERGY AND SECURITY
The global energy squeeze poses multiple threats to the security of the United States and the maintenance of international order. It con- tributes in a major way to international economic problems such as in- flation, balance of payments deficits, slowed growth, and rising unem- ployment. In addition to the social and political strains they cause, these effects impair the ability of the US and our allies to marshall the resources necessary for the defense of the non-communist world. The impact of rising energy prices and the concomitant economic slow- down is burdensome enough in the industrialized countries, but it is even more serious for the developing countries. The resulting instabil- ities constitute a danger to the entire Third World, including the major oil producers. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330– 82–0263, Box 1, ASD/ISA #3 Policy Files. Secret. Sent through Assistant Secretary of De- fense for International Security Affairs David E. McGiffert. 2 Komer requested the paper in a June 21 note to McGiffert. (Ibid.) 3 The unsigned and undated cover memorandum from Komer to Newsom is at- tached but not printed. 4 See, for example, Document 271. 5 Frost signed “Ellen” above this typed signature. 365-608/428-S/80010 878 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII More profoundly, the dependence of most of the non-communist world on access to Persian Gulf oil affects the way we must think about our security relationships. Because only the United States can even at- tempt to guarantee the security of the free world’s major oil supplies, new demands will fall on us. Because we cannot do that job alone, new demands will also be placed on others. We must convey the mutual re- sponsibilities growing out of the energy crunch in a clear and consist- ent way to our allies, the countries in the Persian Gulf region, and our friends in the Third World. Our basic message must be that we intend to assume much of the additional burden of safeguarding access to Per- sian Gulf oil, but we expect others to share in these burdens as appro- priate. We especially hope that those who will benefit from our accep- tance of new responsibilities will not pursue separate courses of action that make our efforts more difficult. The Threat to Supply Both the importance and the vulnerability of Persian Gulf oil can hardly be overstated. The eighteen million or so barrels of oil that flow out of the Persian Gulf every day comprise nearly forty percent of non-Communist oil production. This figure is roughly equal to the total crude oil imports of the seven largest OECD consumers. Some states, like France and Japan, depend on the Gulf for over two-thirds of their crude imports. Despite intense efforts by consumers to diversify their sources of supply, no other region could substitute totally for the loss of Persian Gulf oil. While some individual oil importers, such as the United States, may not currently depend on the Gulf for the bulk of their supplies, it would be impossible for them to insulate themselves from the direct or indirect effects of a major cutoff for any great period of time.
Dependence on Persian Gulf oil is not new. What is new is the graphic and continuing demonstration of the vulnerability of access to that oil. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, whether or not it was part of a conscious strategy to increase influence in the Gulf, constitutes fair warning. The Soviets showed that they are willing to use military force in the pursuit of their interests in a region of vital importance to the West. The boldness of their action is especially sobering when consid- ered in the light of the very real prospect that the Soviets may also face a substantial oil shortfall in the coming decade. We can hardly count on the Soviets to pass up opportunities in Southwest Asia which may help improve their situation or worsen ours. Indeed, the evolving situation in Iran may provide a pretext for a new “phase” of Soviet policy in this part of the world. The shocks set off by the Iranian revolution have not yet been con- tained and still reverberate throughout the region. Perhaps the greatest effect is the heightened awareness of the fundamental weaknesses of 365-608/428-S/80010 January 1979–January 1981 879 the Persian Gulf regimes. They are susceptible to both internal chal- lenges—religious, tribal, and factional—and external threats—regional rivals and external powers. Their domestic weaknesses hamper their ability and willingness to seek the aid we can provide to help meet for- eign challenges. This makes it difficult for us to prepare to meet threats originating within the region or arising from outside of it. Even those states that are willing to cooperate with us do so in a cautious and ten- tative manner. The Threat of Rapidly Rising Energy Costs We all recognize that higher energy costs are inevitable. Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that higher oil costs may even be de- sirable over the long term. More specifically, it is suggested that high priced oil eventually will lead us to alternative fuels and more efficient energy use, and will provide additional incentives to reduce current levels of dependency on imported oil. Whether or not one accepts these propositions, it is true that increasing prices are one factor contributing to the transition away from oil—including that from the Persian Gulf. The nature of this transition is critical, however. If it does not take place smoothly (i.e. without sudden interruptions of production or jumps in price), the economies of both the developed and the developing world could sustain severe damage. The major oil producers must concern themselves with this damage since it has direct and serious conse- quences for their security. The rapid increases in oil prices (some 130 percent) over the last 18 months, far in excess of what economic conditions could justify, poses a very real strain on the global economy and ultimately international peace and security. In the first place, the economic foundation on which our defense effort rests has been hard hit by slowed growth and high rates of inflation spurred in part by surging oil prices. According to the IMF, about one-third of the total inflation affecting the major industrial- ized nations is directly attributable to higher oil prices. The indirect ef- fects on related prices is believed to raise that fraction even more. A number of strategically important LDCs find themselves in even more desperate straits. A major cause of the economic difficulties of South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey, for example, is the huge growth in their oil bills. Non-OPEC LDC debt as a whole is predicted to surge in 1980 to $109 billion, up from $58 billion in 1979. In 1981 the strain will be even worse. Even though we may be able to scrape through the enormous recycling difficulties presented—if OPEC countries are co- operative—it is clear that politically destablizing belt tightening will be necessary in many LDCs. The economic problems caused by the surge in oil prices and the accompanying wealth transfers affects international security in several ways. First, it reduces the sum of resources available to meet the Soviet 365-608/428-S/80010 880 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII challenge. It is difficult to devote increasing amounts to defense when the overall economies of the West are constrained by a rapidly rising energy tax. Also, because of inflationary effects partly derived from oil, not to mention the higher cost of fuel itself, we simply get less military strength from the nominal defense dollar. The net result is that the West’s defense effort falls short of what it should be in the face of the long-term buildup of the Warsaw Pact and more immediate crises such as Afghanistan. This is not the only reason, of course, why our military strength is not what it should be, but it helps explain the difficulties in redressing our problems. Secondly, the worsening economic plight of the non-oil producing LDCs increases the likelihood for internal instability and perhaps re- gional conflicts. The trade and finance aid efforts of the West are more than offset by rising oil import costs. As an illustration, Turkey’s oil bill in 1980 is estimated to be $2.7 billion, totally overwhelming U.S. ($295 million) and other OECD ($866 million) 1980 economic aid pledges. The entire fabric of international trade, aid, and finance is being stretched to the limit by the effects of oil price increases. It is impossible for the West, itself transferring enormous amounts of funds to the oil producers, to underwrite the oil bills of the LDCs as well. To some ex- tent the gravity of this problem has been recognized by OPEC in the creation of recycling facilities. But much more needs to be done if insta- bility is to be contained in the Third World.
A concerted response is required to meet the challenge presented by vulnerable supplies and surging energy prices that includes the in- dustralized democracies, the major producers, and the threatened LDCs. The OECD countries have taken some effective steps forward in the energy economic area, as the Venice communique´ shows. We have adopted measures aimed at reducing our energy consumption. We have established mechanisms to mitigate the effects of market disrup- tions. We have agreed to coordinate oil stock policies, and the US is moving toward renewed fill of the SPR. We are seeking to diversify en- ergy sources, including greater use of coal. But more needs to be done in the energy security arena, especially if the military dimension be- comes paramount. The United States is committed to defending the oil producing re- gion of the Persian Gulf. We have increased our presence in the region and will do more as time goes by. What is required is an equivalent commitment on the part of our allies in Europe and Asia. This means we need to urge our allies to shoulder more of the burden of European and Asian defense. Our European and Asian allies should be queried about what economic and security assistance responsibilities they could take on. Increased host nation support for regional and South-
365-608/428-S/80010 January 1979–January 1981 881 west Asian contingencies is also required. Cooperation and under- standing regarding the measures we may need to take to prepare to fight in Southwest Asia, if need be, is also necessary. For example, over- flights for ourselves or in support of our friends in the area should not be a matter of contention. Independent diplomacy on the part of our allies that pretends that their access to Middle East oil can be divorced from our ultimate guarantee of Western security should be discour- aged. In other words, we must impress upon our fellow industrialized democracies that the burden of protecting the West’s oil supplies must be responsibly shared. The friendly oil producers, particularly in the Persian Gulf, also must be constantly reminded of the mutuality of our interests and our vulnerabilities. As the Secretary of Defense has noted, it is not reason- able to believe that the oil producers could continue to profit from their most precious natural resource if the Soviet Union succeeded in using its massive military power to envelop the Persian Gulf. Given the weakness of the regimes there, they must realize they could not with- stand even serious regional threats without our help. Only the United States is equal to the task of providing for their security. No other non-Communist power or combination of powers could provide the sustained support that they would need if seriously threatened. How- ever, we need their cooperation if we are to protect them. We must pre- pare sufficiently in advance so that our efforts will be quick enough and massive enough to deter, if possible, and defend, if necessary. This means we need access to facilities, prepositioned supplies, assurances of military coordination, including assured local fuel supplies, and a general tolerance of our activities related to providing an effective defense.
As for the LDCs, we want to work with them to minimize the eco- nomic damage they are suffering. We wish to join with them and the oil producers in finding new ways to cope with the taxing effects of higher oil bills and the accompanying panoply of economic problems growing out of the energy crunch. The LDCs can help here by more forcefully bringing home their plight to the oil exporting countries. Additionally, the LDCs must realize that a Persian Gulf crisis precipitated by a re- gional conflict would have devastating effects on them. Oil prices would explode and the LDCs would be the first pushed out of the mar- ket. They have a very real and direct stake in our guarantee of the free flow of Persian Gulf oil. Therefore, they should at least show forbear- ance for our efforts to secure free access to that oil and tolerance of our attempts to maintain the necessary military presence in the area.
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