Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin Project usa final Report: November 2000

7.7  Endangered Species Act Listings and NMFS Biological Opinions  
 
By the mid-1980s, concern was growing about dwindling populations of wild salmon and steelhead in 
the Columbia River Basin (see Section 3.5 for details). The pervasive weakness in wild runs prompted 
several petitions to list certain salmon populations under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), a national 
policy that protect endangered species and requires the establishment of a species recovery plan. The 
listing of three species of Snake River salmon (and to a lesser extent Snake River steelhead) has had a 
dramatic effect on project operations. Table 7.2 presents key dates in the listing timeline. 
 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
Table 7.2 Key Events in Snake River Salmon and Steelhead ESA Listings 
Date Event 
November 1991 
• 
Snake River sockeye listed as endangered by NMFS 
April 1992 
• 
Snake River spring/summer run chinook listed as endangered by 
NMFS 
• 
Snake River fall run chinook listed as endangered by NMFS 
August 1994 
• 
Snake River spring/summer run chinook listed as endangered by 
NMFS 
• 
Snake River fall run chinook listed as endangered by NMFS 
March 1995 
• 
NMFS issues Biological Opinion concerning recovery of 
endangered Snake River salmon runs 
August 1997 
• 
Snake River Basin steelhead listed as endangered by NMFS 
Sources: NMFS (Northwest Region), 1995; NMFS, 2000 
 
Collectively, these rulings require that the federal operating agencies (ie, Reclamation, BPA, and the 
Corps) consult with NMFS on annual river operating plans. This, in turn, led to a number of interim 
operating changes.  
 
During the early 1990s, federal agency responses to species listings were governed by a series of 
Biological Opinions released by NMFS. The Opinions outline what is required for species recovery. For 
example, in light of the events in 1991 and 1992, at a system-wide level, flow augmentation of up to 3 
MAF (3.7 billion m
3
) on the Columbia River was added to be stored in the winter and released in the 
spring during low runoff years. 
 
In March 1995, NMFS presented a set of revised measures aimed at species recovery over the 1994 to 
1998 time period (NMFS, 1995). After NMFS issued its March 1995 Biological Opinion, the federal 
operating agencies strove to adopted NMFS’ general recommendations in determining a preferred 
system operating strategy. The overarching goal of this plan was to store more water during the fall and 
winter to meet spring and summer flow augmentation targets and to manage other detrimental effects by 
establishing maximum summer draft limits. (See Section 3.5 for details.) 
 
7.8  Decision Not to Irrigate Second-Half Lands 
 
On 2 August 1994, Reclamation sent out a public letter to stakeholders interested in the fate of the EIS 
process related to the continued development of irrigated farmland on the Columbia Basin Project 
(USBR, 1994a).
165
 In this letter, James Cole, Manager of the Upper Columbia Area Office, stated that a 
decision had been made "to defer further action on the DEIS [Draft EIS] until more information 
concerning" the new emphasis on water conservation by Reclamation and the uncertainty regarding flow 
requirements for threatened and endangered species was available. Cole's letter resolved one of the most 
debated issues related to CBP in the last 30 years. Described below is the decision-making process that 
led to the shelving of plans for continued development of CBP. 
 
As noted in Section 3.1, CBP development proceeded rapidly during the 1950s. By the 1960s, the rate of 
irrigation block development slowed down because of a number of factors, the most important of which 
was that the irrigation facilities were operating at full capacity, making it impossible to irrigate new land 
(Pitzer, 1994: 314). The next step toward expanding CBP required construction of the Second Bacon 
Siphon and Tunnel. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress appropriated funds for construction 
of the siphon and tunnel, but the Bureau of Budget cut them. Finally, in 1976, funding was secured and 
the way was cleared for construction.
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 The Second Bacon Siphon and Tunnel was completed in 1980, 
and this provided the additional capacity in the canal system to fully irrigate the remaining CBP blocks 
(Pitzer, 1994: 322; USBR, 1976: I-127). 
 
Reclamation started work on the EIS process for developing the second half lands in January 1984. At 
scoping meetings held that month, Reclamation presented five action alternatives, including a “no 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
action” alternative (USBR, 1989a: vi). Reclamation selected the consulting firm of CH2M Hill to 
undertake the study. In November 1986, after consultations with the State of Washington, Reclamation 
delayed the EIS process while a special Water Conservation Steering Committee reviewed the existing 
alternatives and issues of water conservation (USBR, 1989a: IV-4). The committee's recommendations 
led Reclamation to retain three alternatives: Alternative 1, full development of the second-half lands; 
Alternative 2, enlargement and extension of the East Low Canal; and Alternative 3, no action (USBR, 
1989a, vii). Alternative 2, which ended up being the preferred alternative in the September 1989 Draft 
EIS, would have irrigated 87 000 acres (35 208ha), mostly in the East District. Reclamation advised 
expansion proponents that there were three prerequisites to further expansion. First, it wanted an 
expression of local interest and support, in the form of cost sharing, from the State of Washington. 
Second, it wanted a higher repayment from the irrigators of the expansion lands than is being paid by 
irrigators of first half lands. Finally, it wanted to include an enhancement plan to ensure fish and wildlife 
would be an integral part of any project expansion. 
 
The economic feasibility of continued development came up as a major issue during the EIS process. 
Professor Norman Whittlesey of Washington State University, Pullman, who had already established 
himself as opposed to the continuation through his testimony in 1984 Washington House of 
Representatives hearings, was a prominent figure in the debate during the period prior to the issuing of 
the Draft EIS (Whittlesey 1999; Pitzer, 1994: 328; Erickson 1999). Whittlesey's calculations indicated 
that the project had an unfavourable benefit to cost ratio. Although Whittlesey and CBP proponents 
debated the economic issues extensively, the two sides were unable to agree on the economic feasibility 
of expansion. 
 
Effects of development of the second half on the environment were also contentious in the EIS process. 
To address environmental concerns, Reclamation developed a fish and wildlife plan. Had the plan been 
implemented, it would have created several wildlife benefits in the CBP area with very minimal negative 
impacts. Less than 10 acres (4ha) of native shrub-steppe habitat, most of which was already degraded, 
would have been lost (USBR, 1993a: 8-1). By comparison, the plan would have created 1 487 acres 
(602ha) of new wetlands, permanent protection for 11 285 acres (4 567ha) of native shrub-steppe and 
grasslands, and planting of 7 398 acres (2 994ha) of dry farmland with native shrub-steppe vegetation 
(USBR, 1993a: 5-5, 8-2). 
 
Issues pertaining to expansion of CBP were complex and often controversial. Numerous groups were 
either for or against the notion of irrigating the second half lands, and many agencies and organisations 
were faced with lack of agreement internally. The State of Washington did not take an official position 
either endorsing or opposing the project. With unresolved cost sharing and environmental issues, 
including the salmon controversy, state agencies and officials were not able to agree on the propriety of 
continued development. Staff members within the USFWS, BPA, and even Reclamation itself held 
divergent views and struggled with the challenge of formulating a consensus. Although environmental 
groups largely opposed expansion of CBP, members of these groups worked with Reclamation during 
the EIS process to address environmental concerns. For instance, consistent with its national policy, the 
Audubon Society officially opposed expansion of CBP; however, members of local chapters provided 
valuable input in drafting Reclamation’s Fish and Wildlife Plan (USBR, 1993b). In September 1989, 
Reclamation released the Draft EIS and solicited comments on the document. 
 
By 1990, when three species of Snake River salmon began to be considered for listing under ESA, many 
of the other issues had been resolved. There was wide agreement on the advantages of Reclamation’s 
Fish and Wildlife Plan. By using existing facilities, the cost of expanding irrigation had been decreased 
so that cost sharing options were viable. Although farmers who would potentially receive CBP water had 
once objected to the high repayment costs, many of those farmers came to view the repayment costs as 
acceptable. This occurred because as the groundwater supplies continued to be depleted, pumping costs 
became greater than the cost of repayment.  
 
As the significance of economic and other previously contentious issues began to diminish, the focus 
shifted to salmon. The debate around salmon became so heated that one irrigation district manager 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
blamed the abandonment of the project on the salmon listings and the political atmosphere surrounding 
the salmon issue. Comments on the Draft EIS emphasised the need for mitigation plans for anadromous 
fish. This led Reclamation to prepare a supplement to the Draft EIS. To move the process forward, the 
irrigation districts made a major concession: they would dedicate 1.6MAF (1 973.5 million m
3
) of the 
CBP water right for in-stream Columbia River fish flows. These flows would be used for spring flow 
augmentation. This move led NMFS and USFWS to support the plan. In September 1993, Reclamation 
released its supplement to the Draft EIS, which addressed concerns that had been raised over 
anadromous fish. However, the anadromous fish plan in the supplemental document did not satisfy some 
critics who argued that irrigation of the second-half land would still be detrimental to anadromous fish. 
 
Reclamation did not to issue a Final EIS for several reasons. First and foremost, given the widespread 
concern expressed by stakeholders during the EIS process, Reclamation felt that it was not timely to 
move forward with a final decision regarding CBP expansion. Reclamation considered the lack of 
resolution on several major issues: the uncertainty in the US Northwest about issues related to 
endangered species, and potential contractual and legal problems that could result from the selection of 
any of the alternatives. Concerns existed among irrigators and within Reclamation that continuation of 
the process would likely lead to Congressional involvement. If this happened, decisions about CBP 
expansion might then be further complicated by national issues such as the budget deficit and shifting 
priorities away from irrigated agriculture, as well as the possibility that Congress might have decided to 
re-negotiate the CBP repayment contracts on existing developed lands. Because Reclamation was intent 
on honouring the terms of existing contracts, it wished to avoid this result. Even environmental groups 
expressed concerns about the proposed dedication of water for the recovery of salmon. While 
enthusiastic about the offer from the irrigators, environmentalists were uncertain as to the value of spring 
flow augmentation and the benefits that would ultimately be derived from the proposal.  
 
Another consideration in Reclamation’s decision was the likelihood that the complex legal and 
contractual issue of declaring CBP complete would be raised if the Final EIS resulted in the “no action 
alternative”. Project irrigators did not want CBP to be declared complete until the full acreage was 
served because when the project is declared finished, the total repayment obligation will be distributed 
among the existing developed acres. The financial burden per acre is smaller if more acreage is brought 
into production. Thus, while the South and the East Districts would have benefited the most from project 
expansion, all three districts will benefit in the long run if more land is developed.  
 
Significant water rights issues that would have been of great concern to the State of Washington as well 
as water users further complicated the question of declaring the CBP complete. As long as the CBP 
remains incomplete, it continues to hold the water rights for the entire project. Under Washington state 
law at that time, if the right to unused CBP water returned to the state, it would have been allocated to 
other water users. The implications of this complex matter were discussed among various groups and 
agencies, including officials from the state. The consensus at the time was that Reclamation should not 
take any action that would lead to a reallocation of water rights and thereby complicate efforts to resolve 
salmon recovery efforts. Reclamation’s decision not to issue the Final EIS eliminated the need to address 
the issue of CBP completion, and it also left open the possibility of further project expansion at some 
time in the future.  
 
7.9  Direct Funding Agreements between Reclamation and BPA 
 
Two recent Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) between Reclamation and BPA have markedly 
affected financial management of the project are. These documents enable specific Reclamation projects, 
like GCD, to obtain much of their necessary capital and O&M budgets directly from BPA, instead of 
having to rely on the process of Congressional appropriations. Among Reclamation and BPA staff, these 
MOA are referred to as “direct funding agreements”. 
 
Prior to the MOAs, project budgets were subject to an annual Congressional appropriations process, 
which could be lengthy and arbitrary (Kent 1999; Clark 1999). BPA, which pays for costs related to 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
hydropower generation at Reclamation projects in FCRPS, did so indirectly, by reimbursing the US 
Treasury (Kent 1999). In 1993, BPA and Reclamation signed an MOA that allowed BPA to “directly 
fund authorised additions, replacements, and improvements allocated to power at Reclamation facilities 
in the Pacific Northwest” (MOA, 1993: 2). This agreement enabled BPA to directly fund equipment 
replacement and major capital investments at projects like GCD (Kent 1999). Several years later, another 
MOA was signed between BPA and Reclamation, this time focusing on O&M costs. Under the terms of 
this MOA, BPA is authorised to directly fund day-to-day O&M costs and small equipment replacements 
or additions using annual and five-year power budgets to guide estimates of funding (Kent 1999; MOA, 
1996). 
 
Reclamation staff we interviewed concerning direct funding included the Director of the GCD Power 
Office and a Reclamation regional manager (in Boise, Idaho) who helped broker the agreement between 
the BPA and Reclamation. Both interviewees felt that there were many advantages to this financing 
arrangement. The observations below provide insight on how the GCD Power Office Director views 
changes brought about by the agreement. 
 
This way [ie, using direct funding], it’s more efficient. It enables us to act more like a business 
and takes us out of the political arena. Congressional appropriations are a three-year process. 
Who can predict what kind of machinery you are going to need in three years? Now, we can 
make decisions more like a business, from more of a utility standpoint  
  
For example, as an improvement, we wanted to replace eighteen old turbines with ones that 
were more efficient. We showed that this would increase our power production by 400 000 
megawatts per year, resulting in an increase in revenues of 10 million dollars annually. It would 
save us 40 million dollars in seven years. Under the direct funding, this proposal has already 
gone through with BPA. Under the old practice of having to get Congressional approval, it 
would have been a much more difficult and lengthy process (Clark 1999). 
 
Management at Reclamation’s regional headquarters in Boise, Idaho echoed the project manager’s 
sentiments. 
 
Direct funding allows us to be more responsive. We can also move money around when we need 
to . . . Previously it was use it [by the end of the appropriations period] or lose it. Also, the 
agreement helps our long-term planning perspective. Now, we are able to look at projects with 
longer term payback periods . . . Ultimately, the [memorandums of] agreement took the politics 
out of decision-making, which is better for [BPA] ratepayers. There is still a check on BPA’s 
budget, which includes the money that they directly fund to us. (Kent 1999) 
 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
8.  Lessons Learned  
 
One of the main objectives of the WCD in conducting case studies is to identify what can be learned 
from past experience with large dams. In this section, we set out the principal lessons learned from our 
analysis of GCD and CBP. For each lesson, we highlight divergent views held by some stakeholders. 
The Annex titled “Consultative Meetings and Comments” contains a more complete compendium of the 
convergent and divergent views expressed in response to the draft version of this report. It includes 
correspondence we received from stakeholders and statements made at a stakeholder meeting held in 
Portland, Oregon on 13 January 2000. 
 
8.1  Open Planning Process  
  
Issue: 
Stakeholder participation in planning 
Components of Project Cycle: 
Planning and operations 
 
Lesson: 
An open planning process facilitates identifying and resolving 
conflicts among stakeholders; a closed process serves the opposite 
purpose. 
 
Evidence: 
Inadequacies in opportunities for Native Americans and Canadian 
First Nations to participate in decision-making has fostered 
conflicts over GCD for several decades. 
 
Views (divergent): 
If you include everyone in the planning process, you can’t make a 
decision. Also those unaffected by a proposed action may claim to 
be stakeholders and interfere with the process of reaching 
decisions. 
 
The decision to go forward with GCD was not made in a way that allowed all concerned stakeholders to 
participate in the planning process. In particular, tribes of indigenous people, both in the US and Canada, 
had virtually no opportunity to influence the decision to build the dam. This is particularly notable, since 
the adverse effects on Native Americans and First Nations have been quite significant and many of those 
effects were predictable. 
 
The case study of GCD and CBP also demonstrates how failure to involve key stakeholders in decision-
making can lead to ongoing attacks on aspects of a water resources project long after the project has 
been constructed. From the very earliest days of the project, Native Americans tribes in the US and First 
Nations in Canada have been distressed at the ways in which the loss of salmon in the upper Columbia 
River have affected social, cultural, and economic dimensions of their lives. Given the strength of their 
feelings, it is not surprising that these previously excluded groups have used every means at their 
disposal to try to redress what they consider to be a great injustice. In some cases, as described in 
Section 3.7, tribes have been at least partially successful. Indeed, court decisions in favour of Native 
Americans on questions related to anadromous fish runs in the upper Columbia River have been 
extraordinarily influential in changing the way GCD and other FCRPS dams are operated. 
 
The advantages of an open planning process are well demonstrated by procedures used to include 
stakeholders in the decision on whether or not to expand irrigation to 87 000 acres (35 210ha) of CBP 
second half lands. In this instance, EIS reporting requirements established by NEPA were used to solicit 
the views of all affected parties. As detailed in Section 7.7, there were divergent views. However, all 
stakeholders had an opportunity to be heard, and decision-makers were able to balance stakeholder 
interests. While the final decision to shelve the proposed CBP expansion onto 87 000 acres (35 210ha) 
was controversial, it has not been contested. 
 
Some people attending the stakeholder meeting in Portland on 13 January 2000 (see Annex titled 
“Consultative Meetings and Comments”) felt that if the planning process includes everyone with an 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
interest, it will be impossible to reach any decisions. In addition, those individuals felt that people 
unaffected by the project might claim to be stakeholders and interfere with the process of reaching 
decisions. 
 
One stakeholder sent us correspondence taking exception to our use of the EIS for expansion of 87 000 
acres (35 210ha) of CBP land as an example that demonstrates how stakeholder views can be considered 
in decision-making. In his opinion, Reclamation’s decision to shelve the proposed CBP expansion 
ignored the citizens affected by the proposed irrigation.