Guide to Citizens’ Rights and Responsibilities

Managua
Granada
Masaya
Rivas
León
Chinandega
Matagalpa
Puerto
Cabezas
Bonanaza
Auasbila
La Rosita
Ocotal
Estelí
Jinotega
Prinzapolka
Bismuna
Tara
Rama
Juigalpa
Boaco
Tipitapa
Bluefields
Diriamba
Corinto
Salinas
Geandes
Jinotepe
San Juan
del Sur
San Carlos
San Juan
del Norte
Somoto
H O N D U R A S
C O S T A     R I C A
W
S
N
E
Nicaragua
NICARAGUA
100 Miles
0
0
100 Kilometers
50
75
25
50
75
25
Tip
itapa
(MAP BY MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS/ THE GALE GROUP)

on repression alone through the National Guard failed to keep the regime
in power. In 1979 Somoza Debayle was overthrown by a mass-based insur-
rection, which was led by the FSLN and supported by much of the middle class.
A distinctive feature of the popular insurrection was the mobilization of the
churches and professing Christians. Even the FSLN leadership included
Christian activists and, unlike Cuba twenty years earlier, the churches broadly
supported the revolution at its outset. Because they had defeated the dictator-
ship militarily (destroying the National Guard) and because they had estab-
lished strong links to peasants, workers, women’s organizations, and 
grassroots
religious organizations, the Sandinistas were in a strong position to govern a
post-Somoza Nicaragua.
Broadly speaking, the Sandinista government pursued a mixed economy,
extensive social reforms designed to redistribute wealth and opportunity to
Nicaragua’s working class, and a nonaligned foreign policy. The United States
cautiously supported the government by offering $75 million in loans. However,
the 1980 election in the United States resulted in a change for Nicaragua;
President Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) came to office openly hostile to
Nicaragua’s new government. The administration quickly terminated all U.S. aid
to Nicaragua and undertook steps to mount a covert war against the country. 
Based on the view that the Sandinista government was “Marxist-Leninist”
and a threat to U.S. interests in Central America, the Reagan administration
organized, trained, and supported a military force known as the “Contras”
(counterrevolutionaries) to wage a “low-intensity war” against Nicaragua. That
war, coupled with an economic and credit blockade that severely limited
Nicaragua’s access to credit among Western nations, imposed enormous chal-
lenges on the Sandinistas as they attempted to carry out the aforementioned
policy initiatives. Funds that were available for investment in social programs,
such as education and health care, or to provide credit to small farmers during
the early Sandinista years, began to be absorbed by the costs of national
defense. By 1985 defense costs consumed half of the national budget. 
Over the first four years of Sandinista rule, Nicaragua achieved an average
of 7 percent annual GDP growth. However, during the second half of the 1980s
the economy, which sustained billions of dollars in damage, declined sharply.
Inflation reached intolerable levels of more than 30,000 percent by 1988, and
the government undertook strong austerity measures, such as removing price
controls, reducing government investment in the economy, layoffs of public sec-
tor employees, and sharp reductions in social spending. These policies added
to the hardships that war brought to the populace.
The Contra war in Nicaragua elicited strong international efforts in Latin
America to forge a peace settlement. During the early 1980s Mexico, Panama,
Venezuela, and Colombia initiated the “Contadora Process,” through which
they labored to bring the nations of Central America to agree to mutual nonag-
gression pacts, and to accept the withdrawal of all military advisors. The
Contadora Process eventually had the backing of Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and
Uruguay, but was unable to achieve its objective of ending the war in Nicaragua
and demilitarizing Central America. However, after the 1986 Iran-Contra scan-
dal broke in Washington, in which arms were traded for hostages and funds
were illegally diverted to support the Contras, Costa Rican President Oscar
Arias (b. 1940) initiated a new peace initiative based on Contadora. The Arias
Peace Plan was signed by the Central American nations in 1987 and the
Sandinista government used the political opening to negotiate directly with the
Contra opposition to bring an end to hostilities and pave the way for peaceful
elections in 1990.
194
G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D
N i c a r a g u a
grassroots: at the lowest level, often refer-
ring to support from members of the public
rather than from political elites
■ ■ ■  

C O N T E M P O R A R Y   P O L I T I C A L   L I F E
The 1990 election signaled disenchantment with the country’s downward
economic spiral, and also the electorate’s keen desire to restore peace. It also
demonstrated the degree to which elections had become more meaningful as
democratic mechanisms for the transfer of power. During the Somoza era elec-
tions were relatively meaningless due to fraud and intimidation, and political par-
ties were stunted institutions lacking a popular base. One effect of new election
laws passed by the Sandinistas and greater openness in society was a 
proliferation
of “micro-parties.” The UNO coalition, which won the 1990 elections, consisted of
fourteen small parties united only in their opposition to the Sandinistas. The pro-
liferation of small parties continued in the early 1990s so that thirty-five parties
participated in the 1996 elections. However, a pact between the PLC and the FSLN
in 2001 redrew election rules to discourage third-party efforts, essentially estab-
lishing the foundations for a two-party system in Nicaragua.
When President Chamorro assumed office in April 1990 her overriding
concern was to restore peace to her war-torn country. This task implied find-
ing ways to bring about reconciliation among Nicaraguans, and especially
between former combatants on either side of the conflict. Both Contra sol-
diers and government soldiers had to be reintegrated into society as military
demobilization took place. In other words, not only did Nicaragua need a
democratic transfer of power through elections, which it achieved, but the
country also needed to consolidate the peace process. This latter goal proved
elusive. A decade later, in 2000, irregular groups of armed former combatants
were still threatening or engaging in acts of violence to press their demands
on the government.
The Chamorro government had few ties to the rank-and-file Contra soldiers
and was more focused on demobilizing them than trying to discern and articulate
their interests. Under the supervision of the Organization of American States,
a body established in 1948 to promote security and cooperation among the states
of the Western Hemisphere, more than 22,000 troops were demobilized during 
the first three months of the Chamorro administration. This demobilization was
accompanied by pledges of support (for access to land and credit, for example)
that the government, fundamentally lacking in resources, was unable to fulfill. Two
years later, in the face of the government’s failed promises to provide practical sup-
port for their effective reintegration into society, Nicaraguan officials estimated that
22,835 irregular troops (some Contras and some demobilized government sol-
diers) had remobilized. Some used the threat of armed force to demand 
redress
,
while others sank into banditry. The latter encouraged a sense of lawlessness that
threatened government legitimacy and the former encouraged a confrontational
style of politics that threatened stability and undermined the long-term continuity
of policy. When the government was seen to make a side deal with one group,
others were encouraged to resort to the same tactics.
In this respect Nicaragua’s internal peace process was seriously flawed,
both in terms of restoring political stability and of meeting pent-up social
demand. These conditions were exacerbated by the size of Nicaragua’s exter-
nal debt ($11 billion in 1994) and the degree to which it rendered the country
vulnerable to the demands of international financial institutions. The price of
gaining fresh credit was to slash government payrolls and services to the bone.
Credit for small and medium-sized farms and businesses virtually dried up.
Under these conditions the social gains achieved in the 1980s, such as access
to education and health care, were severely eroded and rising unemployment
was accompanied by a shocking rise in crime, domestic violence, homeless-
ness, and similar social ills.
G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D
195
N i c a r a g u a
W I L L I A M   W A L K E R
( 1 8 2 4 – 1 8 6 0 )
■ ■ ■
Born in Nashville, Tennessee,
William Walker received a medical
degree from the University of
Pennsylvania in 1843. Bored with the
practice of medicine, he turned to
law, which he later gave up for jour-
nalism. Walker moved to California in
1850 and became the associate edi-
tor of the San Francisco Daily Herald.
After quarreling with a local judge,
Walker became a military adventurer,
or filibuster. He first attempted to
establish an American colony in the
Mexican territory of Baja, California.
In 1853 Walker proclaimed himself
the president of the Republic of
Lower California but had to flee in
1854 when the Mexican government
sent troops.
Walker then traveled to
Nicaragua. With the help of a few
dozen supporters from America,
Walker captured the city of Granada
in 1855. He named himself president
of Nicaragua and head of its army.
Walker’s government was recog-
nized by the United States in 1856.
Walker eventually lost American
as well as popular Nicaraguan support,
however, because of his insatiable
demand for absolute power. After sur-
rendering to the U.S. Navy in 1857,
Walker was tried in New Orleans in
1858 for violating U.S. neutrality laws.
After he was acquitted, he led an expe-
dition to Honduras in 1860. Walker
was captured by the British navy and
turned over to Honduran officials, who
had him executed by a firing squad on
September 12, 1860.
proliferate: to grow in number; to multiply
at a high rate
redress: to make right, or, compensation
■ ■ ■  

Late in the Chamorro presidency, the major opposition FSLN party experi-
enced a split that took much of the middle-class leadership out of the FSLN. With
the FSLN weakened by this split, the Liberal Alliance created by Managua mayor
Arnoldo Alemán waged a strong campaign based on anti-Sandinista attacks and
neo-populist appeals to the unorganized Nicaraguan 
lumpenproletariat
(unem-
ployed or underemployed urban and rural workers). Alemán won 51 percent of
the vote and the Liberal Alliance took forty-two congressional seats, compared to
thirty-six for the FSLN. Despite conducting a neo-populist campaign, however,
Alemán continued his predecessor’s neoliberal economic policies. These policies
kept inflation low and encouraged foreign investment, but left the government
with little leverage to strengthen public institutions or provide needed social serv-
ices. Thus, whereas Nicaragua ranked sixtieth on the UN’s Human Development
Index in 1990, it had fallen to 121st by 2001. Furthermore, government institutions
critical to the effective functioning of democracy, such as the judiciary, remained
weak, inefficient, and underfunded. Indeed, the tendency of the Alemán adminis-
tration to engage in pact making with the Sandinistas threatened to weaken dem-
ocratic institutions by packing the Supreme Court, the Supreme Electoral Council,
and other national institutions with party loyalists.
The Alemán government ended on a spectacularly sour note, with the presi-
dent being charged with corruption. His successor, Enrique Bolaños (b. 1924) of
the PLC, appeared to be taking matters in a more positive direction, inasmuch as
the new president strongly supported investigations into charges of embezzle-
ment and 
money laundering
against Alemán, which led to the former president’s
conviction in a court of law. In a country where impunity for high officials has
been the norm, these developments suggest that serious steps are being taken
toward the rule of law and the consolidation of democracy.
See also:
Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Dictatorship; Presidential Systems.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Booth, John A. The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution, 2nd ed.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.
Barrios de Chamorro, Violeta. Dreams of the Heart: The Autobiography of President
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of Nicaragua. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Close, David. Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1999.
Dickey, Christopher. With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1985.
Enríquez, Laura J. Agrarian Reform and Class Consciousness in Nicaragua. Gainseville:
University Press of Florida, 1997.
Gilbert, Dennis. Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution. New York: Basil Blackwood,
1988.
Kinzer, Stephen. Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: Putnam, 1991.
Millett, Richard. Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S.-Created Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977.
Spalding, Rose J., ed. Capitalists and Revolution in Nicaragua: Opposition and
Accommodation, 1979–1993. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.
Walker, Thomas W. Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 4th ed. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2003.
Michael Dodson
196
G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D
N i c a r a g u a
lumpenproletariat: the lowest stratum of
the working classes, consisting of those who
are poor and undereducated 
■ ■ ■  
money laundering: to cause illegally
obtained money to appear legitimate by
moving or converting it

Niger
The Republic of Niger covers 1.27 million square kilometers (489,000 square
miles) of arid and semi-arid territory in West Africa, spanning the transition zone
from the Sahara Desert to the Southern savannas. Most of the landlocked coun-
try’s huge northern region is a sandy and rocky desert, sparsely populated by
semi-nomadic populations. The bulk of the 11 million Nigeriens reside in the
southern strip, where agriculture is possible during the mid-year four-month
rainy season.
Niger’s economy is essentially rural, a definition that includes a sizable
group of pastoralists. 
Subsistence farming
dominates agricultural activities, but
the country exports considerable quantities of hides and skins to surrounding
countries, along with livestock, cowpeas, and onions. The majority of the urban
population is employed in the informal economy, with the formal sector being
made up of a small civil service body and a nascent private sector.
Infrastructures are notoriously inadequate not only to sustain economic
activities of a formal or modern type but also to cope with social needs. Niger’s
poor health infrastructure accounts for an exceptionally high infant mortality
rate and the very low life expectancy figure (42 years). Nonetheless, a high
fertility rate of 7 percent produces a juvenile population, only a modest portion
(34%) of which benefits from formal state schooling.
The government of Niger rests on a constitution adopted by national
referendum in 1999, the third in a decade. In 1991, Niger ended military and
single-party rule through a National Conference that was to prepare for the
democratization of the country. The process was comparable to what was
happening in neighboring countries, in particular Benin and Mali. But the
Nigerian process was marred by a series of setbacks and gridlocks, including two
G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D
197
N i g e r
subsistence farming: farming which does
not turn a profit, providing only enough food
for the farmers themselves
■ ■ ■  
G r a
n d
E r
g
d e
B i
l m
a
Mt.Gréboun
6,378 ft.
1944 m.
A Ï R     M T S .
S
A
H
A
R
A
 
 
D
E
S
E
R
T
Plate
au de Manguéni
Plateau
du
Djado
Lake
Chad
N
ig
er
Ja
m
a
a
ri
Elki
N
ige
r
Zinder
Geidam
Maradi
Niamey
Tahoua
Agadez
Dosso
Arlit
Wour
Tessaoua
Séssao
Ingal
Say
Diffa
Djado
Er Rout
Sanihida
I-n-Ezzane
Bilma
Tillabéri
Ayorou
Mangaïzé
Dogondoutchi
Birni
Nkonni
Kolo
Gwada-
Bawa
Gouré
Termit
Achénouma
Agadem
Ngourti
Nguigmi
Tasker
Ngala
Tourba
I-n-Guezzâm
I-n-Abanrherit
Téra
Tilla
Filingué
Tarka
Gaya
Mentès
A L G E R I A
L I B Y A
M A L I
N I G E R I A
C H A D
B E N I N
B U R K I N A
F A S O
Niger
W
S
N
E
NIGER
300 Miles
0
0
300 Kilometers
200
100
200
100
S
u
d
a
n
(MAP BY MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS/ THE GALE GROUP)

military coups in 1994 and in 1999. A short transition period reinstated a civilian
government in 1999 by way of free and fair elections.
The Nigerian government system is roughly tailored on that of its former
colonizer, France. It is a semi-presidential system, which means that the execu-
tive has, in fact, two heads—a president, who is elected by universal 
suffrage
,
and a prime minister, who is appointed from the majority party by the president
after legislative elections. The cabinet is also appointed by the president but is
led by the prime minister. Decisions are made in cabinet meetings presided
over by the president. Although appointed by the president, the prime minister
is responsible before a 
unicameral
(one chamber) parliament, the National
Assembly, which has 113 seats. When both president and prime minister are
from the same party, this system runs smoothly. Otherwise, collaboration is
often difficult. Among the four higher-level judicial bodies, the Supreme Court
plays a political role as an interpreter of constitution.
Niger has a vibrant civil society, animated by human rights and social rights
associations and non-governmental organizations, a sprawling and biting writ-
ten press (in French), and Islamic associations. This helps explain why citizen
rights and freedoms are better protected in Niger than in many of its equally
poor neighbors: Freedom House rated Niger as “partly free” in 2003. The main
concern is about political participation, as despite the fairness of elections, vot-
ing rates have dwindled election after election.
See also: 
Benin; Mali.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Freedom House. “Niger.” Freedom in the World 2004. New York: Freedom House, 2004.
Ͻhttp://www.freedomhouse.org /research/freeworld /2004/ countryratings/niger.htmϾ.
Fung, Karen. “Niger.” Africa: South of the Sahara.
Ͻwww-sul.stanford.edu /depts/ssrg/
africa/niger.html
Ͼ.
“Niger.”  CIA World Factbook. Washington, DC: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2004.
Ͻhttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ng.htmlϾ.
Zamponi, Lynda F. Niger. Oxford, UK: Clio Press, 1994.
Abdourahmane Idrissa
Nigeria
Nigeria is a federal republic consisting of thirty-six states and a federal cap-
ital located in Abuja. The country lies on the west coast of the African continent
and has a land mass of 923,768 square kilometers (356,700 square miles), mak-
ing it slightly larger than California. It is bordered to the north by the Republic
of Niger, to the south by the Atlantic Ocean, to the east by the Federal Republic
of Cameroon, and to the west by the Republic of Benin. On the country’s north-
east border is Lake Chad, which also extends into the Republic of Niger and
Chad and touches the northernmost part of Cameroon. Nigeria’s location
between the equator and Tropics of Cancer places it entirely within the tropical
zone, but climatic conditions vary from equatorial on the coast, to tropical in the
middle, to arid in the north.
The World Bank estimated Nigeria’s population in 1990 at 119 million with
an estimated annual growth rate of 3.3 percent, making the country the most
198
G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D
N i g e r i a
suffrage: to vote, or, the right to vote
unicameral: comprised of one chamber, usu-
ally a legislative body
■ ■ ■  

populated state in Africa and the tenth most populated nation in the world.
Although Nigeria’s population is comprised of over 250 ethnic groups, three
major ethnic groups account for over 66 percent of the total population and
primarily reside in three geographical regions: the Hausa/Fulani in the north,
the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the southeast.
These regional-ethnic alignments also correspond closely with religious
cleavages in the country. The north, dominated by the Hausa/Fulani, is predom-
inantly Muslim. The southwest, dominated by the Yoruba, is religiously mixed
between Christians, Muslims, and worshippers of traditional Yoruba religion. In
the southeast, where most Igbo live, Christians are the majority, although obser-
vance of traditional rites and ceremonies remains strong. Among these three
ethno-regional and religious identities lie a sizable number of smaller ethno-
religious groups, such as the Tiv in the Middle Belt and the Ogoni and Ijaw in
the Niger Delta area.