Guide to Citizens’ Rights and Responsibilities

party apparatus: the process used by a
political party to make decisions, nominate
candidates, choose leaders, or win elections;
the manpower, expertise, or money needed
to accomplish those goals

a successful military 
coup
in North Korea, although a planned coup was uncov-
ered and derailed by secret police in 1995.
S O C I O E C O N O M I C   C O N D I T I O N S
North Korea’s isolation and extreme secretiveness make it difficult to assess
accurately its level of 
socioeconomic
development. The economy has fared very
poorly, both in relative and absolute terms, since the early 1970s. Of course,
many developing countries experienced economic difficulties during the 1970s,
when oil prices rose sharply, but North Korea had not yet recovered by the
beginning of the twenty-first century.
North Korea’s economy was not always so depressed, however. After the
Korean War (1950–1953) North Korea embarked on an ambitious reconstruction
plan, which resulted in relatively rapid economic growth and the development of
a heavy industrial and agricultural base. Much of this growth, however, was based
on the ability of the regime to quickly and effectively marshal hitherto underuti-
lized resources (especially labor and land) in a process scholars call “extensive
economic growth.” By the 1960s, North Korea, like many of its centrally planned
counterparts, had largely exhausted this process, and economic growth slowed
significantly. Still, the economy appeared robust, especially compared to South
Korea’s, which grew very slowly after the Korean War. Indeed, to many observers
at the time, North Korea was considered the miracle economy, whereas few held
out much hope for South Korea.
Beginning in the 1970s, the North Korean leadership attempted to reinvig-
orate the economy with a large-scale 
modernization
program, and for the first
time the government turned to major Western countries for technology and
financial capital. The program was largely unsuccessful. Part of the blame can be
attributed to the oil crisis of the 1970s, which negatively affected almost all
developing countries. Scholars also blamed North Korea’s excessive military
spending and its inefficient and ill-advised economic strategies, which were
based on central planning and a rejection of free-market principles. Although
these criticisms are valid, the South Korean government from the 1960s through
the 1980s also had a disproportionately large military budget and engaged in
centralized and heavily bureaucratized economic planning but it did not suffer
the same setbacks. 
In any case, North Korea was unable to finance its debts through exports,
and the government ultimately defaulted on its loans from Western countries—
becoming the first communist country to do so. In 1979, the country renegoti-
ated its international debts, but a year later it defaulted again (except on loans
from Japan). Beginning in 1980, North Korea has generally been excluded from
international capital markets and has relied on “creative” methods to finance
consistent trade deficits (e.g., arms sales, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, over-
seas remittances, and humanitarian aid).
By the 1980s, North Korea’s 
per capita
gross domestic product, which had
once been higher than South Korea’s, was only one-third of that of its rival.
Kim Il Sung began to initiate several economic reforms. In 1982, Kim pro-
posed a plan to increase agricultural production through land reclamation and
development of the country’s 
infrastructure
. Two years later, in September
1984, he announced a joint venture law designed to attract foreign capital and
technology. This reform proved to be largely unsuccessful, however; only sixty
joint ventures were developed between 1986 and 1992. In 1991 the North
Korea government created a Special Economic Zone, or SEZ, in the northeast
regions of Najin, Chongjin, and Sonbong.
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K o r e a ,   N o r t h
modernization: the act of incorporating
new ideas or technology
per capita: for each person, especially for
each person living in an area or country
infrastructure: the base on which a system
or organization is built
coup: a quick seizure of power or a sudden
attack
■ ■ ■  
socioeconomic: relating to the traits of
income, class, and education

More seriously, the reforms failed to avert a severe food crisis, which hit North
Korea in the 1990s. Some observers contend that this was the worst humanitari-
an disaster of the decade. According to one estimate, from 1994 to 1998, 2 to 3
million people died of starvation and hunger-related illnesses (as with other data
related to North Korea, however, this figure is not completely reliable). Although
the proximate cause of the food crisis was severe flooding, another contributing
factor was the sharp reduction in imports of heavily subsidized food, equipment,
and crude oil from the former Soviet Union and China in the early 1990s. At the
same time, however, North Korea’s heavy reliance on external sources—and its
inability to respond adequately to the crisis—was exacerbated by deep and perva-
sive flaws in the country’s economic and political systems.
N O R T H – S O U T H   R E L AT I O N S
Relations between North and South Korea have overshadowed virtually
every aspect of political, economic, and social development in the two Koreas.
Since the end of World War II (1945), and particularly following the end of the
Korean War, the two countries have faced off as bitter and seemingly implacable
rivals. Since the 1990s, however, the relationship has shown some signs of
improvement, albeit in a very unpredictable and erratic fashion.
The most significant developments have been economic. In January 1992, for
example, the chairman of the South Korean company Daewoo visited North
Korea as the first officially invited business leader and reached an agreement on
building a light industrial complex at Nampo. In other negotiations, Hyundai
Asan, another major South Korean conglomerate, obtained permission to bring
tour groups by sea to Kumgang-san on the southeast coast of North Korea, and,
in August 2000, to construct an 800-acre industrial complex at Kaesong, near the
DMZ, at a cost of more than $1 billion. This significant project could possibly serve
as an essential building block for inter-Korean economic cooperation.
North Korea’s embrace of economic cooperation with South Korea is driven
primarily by its increasingly dysfunctional economy. It has led to important devel-
opments between the two states, including an historic summit meeting in
Pyongyang between Kim Jong Il and then-South Korean President Kim Dae-jung
(b. 1925) in June 2000. Whether or when there will be a permanent improvement
in North–South relations, fundamental reform within North-Korea, or even reuni-
fication of the two countries is very much open to debate. But, unlike previous
“breakthroughs,” North and South Korea remained engaged in a continuous
series of meetings and exchanges during the early twenty-first century. Moreover,
large-scale projects, including the Kaesong project, continued to move forward.
At the same time, North Korea pursued an increasingly aggressive stance
vis-à-vis its nuclear weapons program. In January 2003 the country withdrew
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in August of the same year,
it announced that it possessed nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.
This issue held the potential to destabilize the Korean peninsula and the entire
region for decades.
See also: 
Dictatorship; Korea, South; Totalitarianism.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Cornell, Erik. North Korea Under Communism. New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2002.
Cumings, Bruce. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1998.
58
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K o r e a ,   N o r t h

Eberstadt, Nicholas. Korea Approaches Reunification. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995.
Feffer, John. North Korea/South Korea: U.S. Politics and the Korean Peninsula.
New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003.
A Handbook on North Korea. Seoul, South Korea: Naewoe Press, 1996.
Nam, Sung-wook. “Theory and Practice: Kaesong and Inter-Korean Economic
Cooperation.” East Asian Review 13, no. 1 (2001):67–88. 
Ͻhttp://www.ieas.or.kr/
vol13_1/13_1_4.pdf
Ͼ.
Nanchu, Xing Hang. In North Korea: An American Travels Through an Imprisoned
Nation. Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2003.
Natsios, Andrew S. The Great North Korean Famine. Washington, DC: Institute of Peace,
2002.
Oh, Kong Dan. North Korea Through the Looking Glass. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000.
Palka, Eugene, and Francis Galgano Jr. North Korea: Geographic Perspectives. New York:
McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003.
Suh, Dae-Sook. Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995.
Timothy C. Lim 
Korea, South
The Republic of Korea, or South Korea, occupies the southern half of a
peninsula in the northeastern part of the Asian continent. Directly to the west
of South Korea, and across the Yellow Sea, is China; the islands of Japan lie to
the east. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (i.e., North Korea) shares
the rest of the peninsula, which is divided at the thirty-eighth parallel. South
Korea’s total area is 99,237 square kilometers (38,305 square miles), which is
slightly larger than Hungary or Portugal and a little smaller than Iceland or
Bulgaria. Overall, South Korea is ranked 107
th
in terms of geographic size out of
192 countries in 2003. Although geographically small, South Korea’s population
of 48.3 million in 2002 ranks it as the twenty-fifth largest country in the world.
Not surprisingly, South Korea has a very high population density of 491 persons
per square kilometer, which ranks eleventh among all countries (nineteenth
when dependencies are included).
South Korea is an ethnically and linguistically homogenous society,
although since the late 1980s, there has been increasing international migration.
Still, in 2004, immigrants accounted for less than 1 percent of South Korea’s
population. Despite ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, there are strong cleav-
ages in South Korean society. The strongest of these rifts derives from regional
and provincial differences, and the most pronounced is between Kyongsang
province in the southeast and South Cholla province. This cleavage is partly a
result of overt discrimination and political favoritism, which was very strong
prior to 1987. Into the twenty-first century, discrimination (in general) and
regional disparities lessened, but South Korea continued to struggle from prob-
lems associated with regionalism.
In addition to regional differences, South Korea is also divided along reli-
gious lines. Religious differences, however, have not been a major source
of conflict. About 32 percent of South Koreans are Christian (mostly
Presbyterian, followed by Roman Catholics, Pentecostals, and Methodists),
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59
K o r e a ,   S o u t h

and close to 24 percent are Buddhist. There are also smaller
numbers of Shamanists (those who practice traditional spirit
worship), followers of Cheondogyo (an indigenous religion
that combines elements of Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism,
and Christianity), and Islam.
Seoul is South Korea’s capital and business center.
Although it covers only 0.6 percent of the country’s total area,
its population of 10,276,968 (at the end of 2003) constituted
almost a quarter of the national population.
A   S H O R T   P O L I T I C A L   H I S T O R Y
Although Korea has a long, complex history, South Korea is
a wholly modern entity, created in the aftermath of World War
II (1939–1945), when the Soviet Union and the United States
struggled to develop spheres of influence throughout the
world. In February 1945 during negotiations at Yalta, the United
States, the Soviet Union, and Britain agreed in principle to put
Korea under an international trusteeship, an arrangement
meant to stabilize Korea before granting the country full inde-
pendence (from 1905 to the end of the war, Korea had been
under the colonial control of Japan).
The actual decision to divide Korea into two occupation
zones, however, was made in extreme haste. Shortly before the
Japanese surrender, the Soviet army had begun to sweep into
Korea and Manchuria (another colonial possession). Unable to
physically stop the Soviets from occupying the entire peninsula,
the United States proposed dividing the country roughly in half at
the thirty-eighth parallel, a decision made in only thirty minutes.
Surprisingly, the Soviet leadership accepted the American pro-
posal. Unfortunately, this proved to be one of the last signs of
cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. In fact, neither the Soviets nor the Americans
were willing to 
cede
control of Korea. Instead, both sides con-
centrated on building separate 
regimes
within their respective
occupation zones. In South Korea, this process led to the estab-
lishment of the Republic of Korea on September 9, 1948. South
Korea’s “First Republic” was based on democratic principles and
a presidential system. The country’s first elected president was Syngman Rhee
(1875–1965), who held on to the presidency until 1960.
A watershed in South Korea’s history was the Korean War, which broke out
on June 25, 1950 and lasted until July 27, 1953 (although technically it never
ended). The war was not merely or even primarily a war between North and
South Korea. Instead, it was the first major conflict of the Cold War, pitting the
United States and its allies against “international 
communism
,” led by the Soviet
Union. Although scholars engage in spirited debate about the reasons why the
war began, the conflict set the tone for South Korean political and economic
development for decades afterward. The unresolved nature of the war, in
particular, justified the establishment of a national security state in South Korea.
This military presence would prove to be an extremely important aspect of
South Korea’s postwar development.
Following the war, South Korea remained mired in poverty and corruption,
and the legitimacy of the Rhee regime quickly eroded. To stay in power, President
60
G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D
K o r e a ,   S o u t h
cede: to relinquish political control of lands
to another country; surrender
regime: a type of government, or, the
government in power in a region
communism: an economic and social system
characterized by the absence of class struc-
ture and by common ownership of the means
of production and subsistence
■ ■ ■  
Yellow
Sea
East
China
Sea
Sea of Japan
H
a
n
K
um
N
a
k
to
n
g
Ko
rea
St
ra
it
Cheju-haehyop
T
A
E
B
A
E
K
S
A
N
M
A
E
K
S
O
B
A
E
K
S
A
N
M
A
E
K
Chii Mt.
6,283 ft.
1915 m.
Demarcation Line
July 27, 1953
Halla Mt.
6,398 ft.
1950 m.
Ullung Do
Koje Do
Chin Do
Tsushima
Cheju Do 
Paengnyong-
do
Ch'ongju
Taejon
Ch'ongju
Ulsan
Masan
Kwangju
Mokp'o
Inch'on
Taegu
Pusan
Munsan
Ch'unch'on
Kangnung
Wonju
Chechon
Ch'onan
Andong
Kunsan
Kyongju
Sunch'on
Yosu
Cheju
Suwon
Anyang
Songnam
P'ohang
Chinju
Seoul
NORTH KOREA
JAPAN
South Korea
W
S
N
E
SOUTH KOREA
100 Miles
0
0
100 Kilometers
50
50
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
(MAP BY MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS/ THE GALE GROUP)

Rhee increasingly relied on dictatorial and repressive means. During the 1960
elections, events came to a head. President Rhee’s blatant election-rigging
sparked nationwide protests, most of which were led by students. The student
movement ultimately forced Rhee’s resignation. His downfall, in turn, led to a
constitutional amendment providing for a parliamentary as opposed to presiden-
tial system. Under this system, a president was selected through a vote by the two
houses of the legislature, but the prime minister was to be the key political leader.
The first person to fill the more powerful position of prime minister was Chang
Myon (also known as John M. Chang). Less than a year later, however, Chang’s
Second Republic was overthrown in a military 
coup
led by Major General Park
Chung Hee (1917–1979).
General Park, through the Revolutionary Committee (later renamed the
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction) quickly established control of
the economy and political system. For nearly three years, Park ruled with an iron
fist, but in 1963, a new constitution, which reintroduced a presidential system,
was
promulgated
. From 1963 to 1972, a semblance of electoral democracy was
restored in South Korea. In fact, Park and his newly formed political party, the
Democratic Republican Party (DRP), won several generally fair elections. The
success of Park and the DRP, however, was based as much on a divided opposi-
tion as it was on popularity and genuine support.
Thus, when the opposition began to develop more strength and unity,
galvanized by the emergence of two outspoken critics of the Park regime—
Kim Young Sam (b. 1927) and Kim Dae-jung (b. 1925)—Park’s “tolerance” for
democracy began to wane. A changing international environment, one in which
U.S. power and commitment seemed on the decline, also contributed to Park’s
growing intolerance. Finally, in December 1971 Park abruptly declared a state of
emergency, and on October 17, 1972, suspended the constitution, dissolved the
National Assembly and all political parties, forbade “political activity,” and
imposed restrictions on civil liberties. Subsequently, the new Yushin (“revitaliz-
ing reform”) Constitution was announced, which, among many important
changes, transformed the presidency into a legal dictatorship.
The return to 
authoritarianism
sparked widespread protest and discontent,
which included one unsuccessful assassination attempt on Park in 1974
(although Park escaped, his wife was killed). In 1979, however, Park was not so
lucky. On October 26, he was fatally shot by the director of South Korea’s
Central Intelligence Agency. The assassination led to another period of intense
political instability, punctuated by a second military takeover and an extremely
bloody
insurrection
in the city of Kwangju, capital of the South Cholla province.
In 1980, a new military leader, Chun Doo Hwan (b. 1931), assumed control.
A year later, after engineering a transition from military to civilian rule (which
ensured his election as president for a seven-year term), Chun attempted to
follow the path set by Park, but his authoritarian regime met with constant resist-
ance. Near the end of his term, the situation for democratic change looked bleak.
Chun handpicked a successor, Roh Tae Woo (b. 1932), and suspended public
debate on a constitutional revision for a direct presidential election, which would
have given opposition candidates a stronger chance to win.
In an unexpected, even shocking, turn of events, however, Roh Tae Woo
announced that he would not run unless the Chun regime accepted an eight-
point program of reform, which included an endorsement of direct presidential
elections. Facing a great deal of domestic and international pressure (some
deriving from the upcoming Seoul Olympics in 1988), Chun accepted the
reform program in June 1987, thus ushering in a new, albeit imperfect, period
of democracy.
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61
K o r e a ,   S o u t h
coup: a quick seizure of power or a sudden
attack
■ ■ ■  
promulgation: an official declaration,
especially that a law can start being enforced
authoritarianism: the domination of the
state or its leader over individuals
insurrection: an uprising; an act of rebellion
against an existing authority

In the 1988 presidential election (held on December 16, 1987), Roh Tae Woo
won with only 37 percent of the vote. His victory was due in large part to the fail-
ure of the two main opposition candidates, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung,
to forge an alliance. The two Kims split the opposition vote, with the former
receiving 27 percent and the latter 28 percent (the voting pattern also reflected
the previously discussed deep-seated regional cleavages).
The parliamentary elections of 1988, on the other hand, ended with surprising
results. Not only was Roh’s ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party, unable to win
a working majority in the Assembly, but Kim Dae-jung’s Party for Peace and
Democracy became the largest opposition party, with Kim Young Sam’s
Reunification Democratic Party placing third. Significantly, this did not result in a
return to authoritarianism, but instead marked the first step in the consolidation of
democracy in South Korea. Ironically, it also led to a political compromise between
the erstwhile opposition leader Kim Young Sam and the ruling party; in 1990 Kim
Young Sam merged his party with the governing party. This alliance was instrumen-
tal in allowing him to win the 1992 presidential election over Kim Dae-jung, his
main rival. In winning the election, Kim Young Sam became the first civilian to be
elected president in South Korea since the coup in 1961.
Since Kim Young Sam’s presidency, presidential and legislative elections
have proceeded with few problems. Indeed, in 1998, Kim Dae-jung finally
became president, becoming the first chief of state elected from the opposition
party in South Korea’s constitutional history. Although Kim Dae-jung experi-
enced some serious difficulties—including the arrest of his two sons for accept-
ing bribes and charges that he secretly paid $100 million to North Korea to agree
to a summit—the democratic process remained strong.
In 2003, South Korea’s third successive civilian president, Roh Moo-hyun
(b. 1946), took office. Barely a year after taking office in March 2004, however,
Roh was 
impeached
for breaking a minor election law. Although many South
Koreans saw this as a blatant partisan maneuver by a legislature dominated by
conservatives, the Constitutional Court subsequently restored Roh (a progres-
sive human rights lawyer by trade) back to his office. The decision by the Court
helped to avert a crisis, but it also demonstrated quite clearly the increasing
strength of democracy in South Korea, both in principle and in practice.