Guide to Citizens’ Rights and Responsibilities

S O C I O E C O N O M I C   C O N D I T I O N S
The story of South Korea’s economic rise from desperate poverty to relative
prosperity has been the subject of extensive press coverage and analysis as well
as intense scholarly debate. Although no consensus exists, this much is clear:
South Korea’s economic rise began in the 1960s after the military coup. From
1945 to 1961, South Korea was one of the poorest countries on earth. In 1962,
per capita
income was still only $87, but by 1983 this had increased by almost
2,000 percent to $1,709. In 2003 (using 
purchasing power parity
, a different
basis for calculating income), per capita income had increased to $15,090.
Income equality, as measured by the United Nation’s Gini Index, is relatively
high in South Korea, at 0.31 (which is better than all Asian countries except
Japan and substantially better than that of the United States). According to the
United Nations Development Program, moreover, South Korea’s level of
“human development” is considered high and is comparable to the most
economically prosperous countries in world.
South Korea’s economic development came at a very high price, however.
Between 1961 and 1987, in particular, labor movements and strikes were often
met with brutal violence. Not surprisingly, working conditions were generally
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G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D
K o r e a ,   S o u t h
impeach: to accuse of a crime or misconduct,
especially a high official; to remove from a
position, especially as a result of criminal
activity
■ ■ ■  
per capita: for each person, especially for
each person living in an area or country
purchasing power parity: a way of measur-
ing the buying power of countries’ currencies
based on the cost of identical goods

extraordinarily oppressive. Indeed, South Korea has long had one of the worst
records for industrial safety in the world. In 1986, nearly 3 percent of Korea’s
entire industrial workforce suffered injuries requiring at least a four-day hospi-
tal stay, and 1,660 workers were killed in industrial accidents.
In addition, South Korean workers routinely worked the longest hours
among workers in all industrializing and industrialized countries, and wages
were kept artificially low to increase South Korea’s industrial competitiveness.
The focus on rapid industrialization also reflected the government’s equally
strong obsession with national security. This combination created fertile ground
for human rights abuses and political repression, both of which were serious
problems in South Korea prior to 1987.
At the same time, South Korean firms (most of which were family-owned)
had access to heavily subsidized loans through government-controlled banks
and were protected from international competition in the domestic market.
A few favored firms were also protected from domestic competition, which
encouraged them to diversify into a wide range of products and services. This
enabled many firms, called chaebol, to grow with blinding speed and develop
immense economic and social power. By the 1990s, some of these firms had
developed into major international players, including Hyundai, Samsung,
LG (originally known as Lucky-Goldstar), and Daewoo. The extreme concentra-
tion of economic power has long been considered a danger to the country’s
political, social, and even its economic development.
P R O S P E C T S
South Korea’s authoritarian past, combined with its particular pattern of
socioeconomic
development, has helped to create a vital and dynamic civil soci-
ety. Indeed, citizen organizations, both secular and religious, grew exponentially
following the establishment of democracy in 1987. Many of the largest, such as
the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, have played an important role in
ensuring meaningful citizen participation and in protecting and promoting civil
and human rights and social justice. The party system continued to evolve into
the early twenty-first century, with many reconfigurations and realignments, but
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63
K o r e a ,   S o u t h
socioeconomic: relating to the traits of
income, class, and education
■ ■ ■  
T H E   Y U S H I N   C O N S T I T U T I O N
When Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) won a third presi-
dential term over New Democratic Party (NDP) candidate Kim
Dae Jung in 1971, Park and his Democratic Republican Party
(DRP) radically changed the system of government. Declaring
martial law in October 1972, Park proceeded to remove both
the 1962 constitution and members of the legislature. In
November the new constitution, known as the Yushin consti-
tution, or Revitalizing Reform constitution, was put in place.
In effect, the Yushin constitution kept Park as president
indefinitely, granted his party a majority in the legislature,
and outlawed many activities that were perceived to be
opposed to the goals of the DRP. While the country made
rapid strides in industrialization and self-sufficiency, civil
rights were stifled.
Growing dissatisfaction with the government came to
a head in 1979, and Park was assassinated. Under the
electoral college that had been set up by the Yushin consti-
tution, the National Conference for Unification, Prime
Minister Choi Kyu-hah became acting president, but his
brief term was marked by violent antigovernment demon-
strations. In August 1980 Chun Doo Hwan was elected
president, and within two months he spearheaded a revi-
sion to the Yushin constitution which limited the presidency
to one term of seven years’ duration.
■ ■ ■

it remained strong. The judiciary has demonstrated increasing independence
and social power, as suggested previously.
South Korea’s past, however, also means that a great deal of power has been
concentrated in two key institutions: the state and big business. The apparatus
of South Korea’s national security state has not disappeared, and the bureaucracy
remains a powerful force. From the end of the twentieth century, on the
other hand, big business felt freer to “flex its muscles,” and corruption, long a
problem, continued to plague South Korean politics. Overall, though, South
Korea has seen a greater balance of power than ever before, strengthening
prospects for democracy.
See also: 
Korea, North.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Abelman, Nancy. Echoes of the Past, Epics of Dissent: A South Korean Social Movement.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
Amsden, Alice H. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989.
Cumings, Bruce, ed. Child of Conflict: The Korean–American Relationship, 1943–1953.
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983.
Cumings, Bruce. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York: W. W. Norton, 1998.
Eckert, Carter J., Ki-baik Lee, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner.
Korea Old and New: A History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Kim, Eun Mee. Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean
Development, 1960–1990. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
Koo, Hagen, ed. State and Society in Contemporary Korea. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1993.
Lie, John. Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1998.
Oh, John Kie-Chiang. Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic
Development. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Steers, Richard M. Made in Korea: Chung Ju Yung and the Rise of Hyundai. New York:
Routledge, 1999.
Timothy C. Lim
Kosovo
Long a center for competing 
imperial
ambitions, Kosovo in the twentieth
century endured a long and bloody process of transformation. Its history is one
of subordination, ethnic conflict, and economic deprivation, which took on its
early-twenty-first-century coloration when the majority Albanian population in
1910 revolted against the 
Ottoman Empire 
(1299–1922). These revolts led to the
Balkan Wars of 1912, the military conquest of Kosovo by forces loyal to the
Kingdom of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, and the formal annexation of
Kosovo by Serbia and Montenegro in 1914.
Since both states viewed the non-Slav Albanian, Turkish, and Roma (gypsy)
populations as alien and a threat, Montenegro and Serbia established adminis-
trations in Kosovo that encouraged Slav migration and settlement while elimi-
nating
indigenous
communities and institutions. Such tactics, reminiscent of the
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K o s o v o
imperialism: extension of the control of one
nation over another, especially through
territorial, economic, and political expansion
Ottoman Empire: an empire centered in
Turkey (and defeated in World War I) that
once spanned northern Africa, the Middle
East, and parts of southeast Europe and
contemporary Russia
■ ■ ■  
indigene: a person who has his origin in a
specific region

United States’ policies in its efforts to settle the West at the turn of the twenti-
eth century, continued after the creation of the Yugoslav kingdom and also in
socialist
Yugoslavia after World War II (1939–1945). Despite its socialist rhetoric,
nationalist ambitions to sanitize Yugoslavia of non-Slav populations continued
under Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) through “population exchange” programs
signed with Turkey in the 1950s. As a result of these policies, hundreds of
thousands of Albanians and Turks 
emigrated
from the Balkans.
These policies of social engineering ended when Serbian Interior Minister
Alesander Rankovic was removed from power in 1966. Rankovic’s removal led
to Kosovo’s slow integration into greater Yugoslav society. The 1974 redrawing
of Yugoslavia’s constitution represented a serious effort by Tito’s regime to
dilute the entrenched power of Serbian interests in the federal government and
army, opening the door for Kosovo to enjoy formal political and economic
autonomy from the Serbian Republic that claimed full sovereignty over it.
Importantly, this period offered Albanians and Turks the opportunity to rise
within the Communist Party.
Following the constitutional challenges in 1974 to Serbian 
hegemony
in
Kosovo, Albanian members of the Communist Party began to rise in the ranks
and take on key administrative roles inside Kosovo. Among the most visible
were Azem Vllasi, Veli Deva, Mahmut Bakali, Sinan Hasani, Kaqusha Jashari,
Rahman Morina, and Husamedi Azemi. It is important to note that power was
always firmly in the hands of the Yugoslav Communist Party, yet several interior
security agencies became staffed by ambitious Albanians. Men like Tahir Zemaj
(who was assassinated in 2002) became high-ranking officers in the secret mili-
tary intelligence service (Kontra Obavjestajna Sluzba, the KOS) and would
prove to be the real power holders in Kosovar society. This 
hierarchy
still existed
in the early twenty-first century. Although public figures such as Ibrahim Rugova,
Hashim Thaci, and Ramush Haradinaj among Albanians; Oliver Ivanovic, Rada
Trajkovic, and Archbishop Artemije among Serbs; Muamir Kandic and Numan
Balic among Bosnians; and Nebehat Erdogan among Turks appear before the
public as their respective communities’ leaders, the real power lies in the hands
of men who operate anonymously, away from public scrutiny. As in all postcom-
munist countries in the Balkans, the legacy of forty years of communist rule has
been debilitating.
By the mid-1980s a nationalist backlash within Serbia led to the ascendancy
of a new politicization of ethnicity and history. The rise of the political career of
Slobodan Milosevic (b. 1941) most noticeably resulted in Kosovo becoming the
primary target for nationalist reactionary politics. By 1989 Serbian nationalists
hijacked the Yugoslav federal system and eliminated Kosovo’s constitutionally
protected autonomy from Serbia. The subsequent ten-year 
persecution
of
Albanians created the conditions that led to an armed 
insurgency
in 1996 and
ultimately to intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
1999. Belgrade’s organized persecution of Albanians in Kosovo left perhaps
1.5 million Albanians homeless and upwards of 10,000 dead by the spring of
1999. In response to these tactics, the international community imposed a
UN–mandated administration in June 1999. When Serbian military forces and
militias withdrew from Kosovo and NATO forces entered the province, many
Serb residents left, a large number of them resettling in areas bordering Serbia
proper. As a result, much as in Bosnia, Belgrade created an ethnically pure
region that has since June 1999 been militarily sealed from the rest of Kosovo.
The UN administration, formally called the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), was mandated to run Kosovo until the parties involved reach an agree-
ment on the region’s “final status.” In the early 2000s, UNMIK was working with
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65
K o s o v o
socialism: any of various economic and
political theories advocating collective or
governmental ownership and administration
of the means of production and distribution
of goods
emigration: the migration of individuals out
of a geographic area or country
■ ■ ■  
hegemony: the complete dominance of one
group or nation over another
persecute: to belittle, harass, injure, or other-
wise intimidate, especially those of a different
background or group
insurgency: a rebellion against an existing
authority
hierarchy: a group of people ranked
according to some quality, for example,
social standing

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a 
coalition
of
NATO forces, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the United States, and the European
Union (EU) to oversee the reconstruction of Kosovo’s 
infrastructure
and civil
institutions. A tense relationship existed between the stewards of Kosovo’s
interim
administration and its population, who remained the poorest and most
isolated in Europe. Some observers believe that the UN’s administrative elite
failed to fully appreciate the history of the region and underlying forces behind
the persistent tensions between Serbs, who demand that Kosovo be returned to
Serbia, and Albanians, who seek independence. This lack of understanding may
be explained in part by the high turnover of administrative staff, including the
frequent changes in UNMIK’s chief administrative position, the Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Kosovo (SRSG). Since 1999 the
following individuals have served as SRSG in Kosovo: Bernard Kouchner (hailing
from France), July 1999 to January 2001; Hans Haekkerup (Denmark), February
2001 to December 2001; Michael Steiner (Germany), January 2002 to July 2003;
Harri Holkeri (Finland), July 2003 to June 2004; and the SRSG named in July
2004, Soren Jessen Petersen (Denmark).
G E O G R A P H I C   A N D   D E M O G R A P H I C   FA C T S
Spanning an area of 10,686 square kilometers (4,126 square miles), Kosovo
shares land boundaries with Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia.
Kosovo is surrounded along its southern and western frontiers by high Alpine
mountain ranges, while the interior has hilly, fertile, and forested valleys. The
main cities of Kosovo other than the capital are Prizren, Peja (Pec), and
Mitrovica. The country is rich in natural resources, especially lead, zinc, pyrite,
gold, nickel, and brown coal, but the government has not invested in these
sectors since the war of 1998 and 1999. Kosovo’s climate is continental, result-
ing in warm summers and cold winters, with temperature extremes ranging
from 35
ЊC (95ЊF) in the summer to -20ЊC (-4ЊF) in the winter.
As of 2004, Kosovo’s population was 1.9 million, and its capital Prishtina had
an estimated 750,000 inhabitants, more than triple the population prior to 1999.
According to the Statistical Office of Kosovo, among the recognized ethnic
groups living in Kosovo, Albanians (both Muslim and Catholic) make up 88 per-
cent of the population, Serbs represent 7 percent, and smaller numbers of
Turks, Roma, Slav Muslims (Bosnians), Ashkhali, Egyptians, and Catholic Slavs
(Croats) comprise the rest. The main languages spoken in Kosovo are Albanian,
Serbo-Croatian, and Turkish, with English serving as the administrative language
of the UN and OSCE. 
Kosovo, ravaged by war and decades of economic exploitation, is the poor-
est region in Europe. Its population reportedly suffers from over 60 percent
unemployment, with 50 percent living in poverty and 15 percent in abject
poverty. Kosovo is heavily polluted as a result of industrialization and persistent
war, with little or no long-term plans having been made to address the problem.
The educational system is inadequate; more than fifty thousand young adults
enter the labor market each year without any skills. The health-care system is
barely functional. The long-term uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo and
its failed economy have resulted in continuing violence, crime, and the radical-
ization of its youth.
In the early twenty-first century, crime remained a major problem in
Kosovo. Competition over smuggling and other illegal activities led to the crim-
inalization of many parts of Kosovo. Ethnic violence occasionally surfaced, and
very little freedom of movement existed for Albanians in Serbian-populated
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K o s o v o
coalition: an alliance, partnership, or union
of disparate peoples or individuals
infrastructure: the base on which a system
or organization is built
interim: for a limited time, during a period of
transition
■ ■ ■  

regions in the north, most notoriously at Mitrovica. Contrary to media depic-
tions of Kosovo since 1999, Serbs walked the streets of Prishtina freely in 2004,
and despite the mid-March riots that year which left nineteen dead, tensions are
low in many parts of Kosovo, especially for non-Serb minorities who share no
open animosity with Albanians. However, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo’s
Albanians are likely to increase, as unrepentant nationalist parties in Serbia
retain a hold on the country’s policies and Kosovar Albanians feel threatened by
any proposal to allow Kosovar Serbs full access to the region’s civil and govern-
mental institutions.
K O S O V O ’ S   G O V E R N M E N T   A N D   I N S T I T U T I O N S   A F T E R   1 9 9 9
Viewing the tumultuous history of the region through the prism of Kosovo’s
ethnic, religious, and economic diversity perhaps best helps explain the rationale
behind the international community’s response to the conflict in 1998 and 1999.
The origins of the early-twenty-first-century government in Kosovo may be traced
back to June 10, 1999, when the UN Security Council mandated in Resolution
1244 that an interim administration be established to run postwar Kosovo. The
spirit of the 
mandate
was that 93 percent of the region’s inhabitants would
concede their long-term goals of independence in exchange for immediate
improvements to their lives. Among the improvements were the promise of
immediate security, economic development, and a scheme whereby Albanians
living in Kosovo would be permitted to enjoy substantial autonomy within the
confines of Serbia and Montenegro, the successor state to Yugoslavia.
Since June 1999, as a result, a number of incongruent and often conflicting
agencies from the international community have adopted a provisional self-
governing framework in Kosovo. In 2004 Kosovo operated under a constitution
drawn within a Provisional Framework for Self-Government that preserved
sweeping powers for the UNMIK administration, including veto power of all
legislative action. The building of local institutions in this context has been a
slow process. In January 2000, for example, the Joint Interim Administrative
Departments were created to help set up local elections that first took place in
Kosovo’s thirty 
municipalities
in October 2000. In May 2001 the new
Constitutional Framework of Kosovo was adopted; it allowed province-wide
elections to take place in November 2001, and in early 2002 resulted in the
establishment of a provisional government. Kosovo’s Serbs have resisted partic-
ipating in OSCE–administered elections in Kosovo, while loyally voting in
Serbian national elections. Among Kosovar Albanians, the first elections resulted
in widespread enthusiasm, and participation levels were above 70 percent. In
the last municipal elections, however, less than 50 percent of the electorate
voted. The three major Albanian political parties dominating Kosovo politics are
the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), the Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK),
and the Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK). Numerous smaller parties
(twenty-six in all) have little influence in the assembly. Kosovo Serbs have flirted
with the idea of participating in formal Kosovar institutions, but they have ulti-
mately elected to create their own institutions, in defiance of UN resolutions
declaring such a parallel government illegal. All minority communities have at
least one political party.
UNMIK formally handed over key governing responsibilities to the Kosovo
parliament in 2002 amid the underlying tensions between the majority of the
population and Serbs whom UNMIK hoped to reintegrate into daily political life.
Despite gestures to grant Kosovars greater responsibilities, UNMIK still controls
Kosovo’s key institutions. The unelected SRSG presides over the work of the
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67
K o s o v o
mandate: to command, order, or require;
or, a command, order, or requirement
■ ■ ■  
municipality: local governmental units,
usually cities or towns

main arms of Kosovo’s government, has full control over Kosovo’s budget, may
intervene and veto any initiative drawn up by the elected Kosovo Assembly, and
has
absolute
control over Kosovo’s foreign relations.
To implement its mandate, UNMIK initially brought together four “pillars”
under its leadership. At the end of the emergency stage, Pillar I (humanitarian
assistance), led by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), was phased out in June 2000. In May 2001 a new Pillar I was
established. As of 2004, the pillars are:
Pillar I: Police and justice, under the direct leadership of the UN
Pillar II: Civil administration, under the direct leadership of the UN
Pillar III: 
Democratization
and institution-building, led by the OSCE
Pillar IV: Reconstruction and economic development, led by the EU
In this matrix, the four pillars have considerable power to overstep elected
officials associated with the Kosovar government. The government includes an
assembly with 120 seats, ten of which are guaranteed to Serbs and ten to other
minorities, which far exceeds their actual percentage of the population. The
assembly elects a president (in 2004, Ibrahim Rugova), who in turn nominates
the prime minister (in 2005, Ramush Haradinaj) who proposes a list of minis-
ters to fill the ten ministry portfolios. In another attempt to guarantee minor-
ity rights, Serbs have a permanent hold on the Ministry of Agriculture, and a
rotating portfolio in the Ministry of Health has been given to other minority
communities. Each ministry is expected to draft laws relevant to their fields of
authority. The assembly then undertakes a review of proposed laws, mitigated
by the prime minister’s office, and if the assembly approves a law, it seeks final
sanction
by the SRSG.
Much as with the legislature, politics also dominates the selection and
staffing of government bureaucracies, with European and U.S. governments
wrangling over the appointment of key executive positions. As for the positions
held by Kosovars, 
nepotism
is rampant, resulting in a highly ineffective, corrupt
bureaucracy. In addition, ethnic quotas have been established, creating tensions
within these bureaucracies over the extent to which Serbs are given conces-
sions. The prospects of any serious reform seem unlikely as long as salaries
remain low, with top bureaucrats making less than 250 euros a month.
In regard to Kosovo’s judiciary, the SRSG appoints all judges and prosecu-
tors in Kosovo, a process that has resulted in many public battles between the
Kosovar government and the international community. The courts are struc-
tured into four divisions—minor offense courts, municipal courts, district
courts, and the Supreme Court of Kosovo—and, much as with all other govern-
mental institutions, Kosovo’s Serbian population has been able to successfully
circumvent participating in the system. The creation of Pillar I is UNMIK’s struc-
tural response to not only counter organized crime but also contain interethnic
violence.
As far as Kosovo’s once thriving, if largely illegal, civil society is concerned,
much of the activism that had historically existed in Kosovo has dissipated as
the result of the war and postwar changes. Many former civic leaders have
found a niche in either political parties or non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). The Serb community has been particularly adept at drawing from
resources provided by Belgrade to maintain parallel structures that keep the
pressure on UNMIK. Albanian organizations, especially veteran groups, have
come under increasing scrutiny as growing violence between some Albanian
groups has taken place. UNMIK and KFOR forces have resorted to breaking up
demonstrations with antiriot forces imported from Pakistan and Jordan. This
68