Guide to Citizens’ Rights and Responsibilities
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- G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D M a g n a C a r t a interdiction
- G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D 111 M a g n a C a r t a dissident
- See also: Juries. 112 G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D M a g n a C a r t a redress
- Majoritarian Party Systems
- G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D 113 M a j o r i t a r i a n P a r t y S y s t e m s social cleavage
- G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D M a j o r i t a r i a n P a r t y S y s t e m s proportional system
- G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D 115 M a j o r i t a r i a n P a r t y S y s t e m s impunity
- See also: Political Party Systems; United Kingdom; United States. B I B L I O G R A P H Y
COMOROS Madagascar M A D A G A SC A R Bassas da India (FR.) Îles Europa (FR.) INDIAN OCEAN M o z a m b iq u e C h a n n el W S N E MADAGASCAR 200 Miles 0 0 200 Kilometers 100 100 (MAP BY MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS/ THE GALE GROUP) approved by the president, and a Council of Ministers chosen by the prime minister. The legislative branch is bicameral, consisting of the National Assembly, which is directly elected, and the Senate, two-thirds of which is elected with the remaining third appointed by the president. As of 2004 the legislative bodies were dominated by a coalition of left-of-center political parties. The judicial branch fea- tures a Supreme Court, which has broad powers of judicial review. Several other lower courts also exist, reflecting a complex legal system stressing the importance of the rule of law. Built into the constitution of Madagascar are guarantees of free- dom of the press and freedom of speech. B I B L I O G R A P H Y “Madagascar” CIA World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2005. Ͻhttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ma.htmlϾ. McEvedy, Colin. The Penguin Atlas of African History, 2nd ed. Hong Kong: Penguin Books, 1995. Gregory Johnston Magna Carta There are few documents in Anglo-American constitutional history more sanctified than the Magna Carta. On its face, the document is a medieval charter commonly used to convey land, authorized in 1215 by King John of England (1167–1216) under threat of civil war from his barons. Since that date, significant constitutional principles have been attributed to the Magna Carta, even though it was a document drawn up in the midst of a violent political crisis by selfish men gifted neither with prescience nor political genius. Yet for many centuries histo- rians and politicians have celebrated the date of its creation, and the venerable American Bar Association has erected a monument in England in its honor. Understanding the document’s true importance depends on appreciating its his- torical context and limitations. The nobles and others who met with King John and secured his agreement to sign the Magna Carta on June 15, 1215, were desperate men frustrated by repeated royal abuses and failures. Indeed, by that year King John had outraged virtually all of his most literate and important subjects, including the clergy, nobility, and merchants. He had insulted Rome by confiscating church lands, insisting that clerics accused of crimes be tried in royal courts, and resisting the selection of a new Archbishop of Canterbury in 1204. Successive popes responded to these actions by placing an interdict on England that denied the populace any sacraments except baptism and last rites. The interdict remained in effect for seven years, finally reaching a crisis point when John himself was excommunicated from 1209 until 1213. Never before had any English king allowed relations with Rome to degenerate into such a lengthy impasse. John’s barons were angry because he had abused traditional feudal con- tracts in numerous ways. Too frequently, he had charged them fees known as feudal aids and reliefs, which had previously been limited to occasional moder- ate assessments. To make matters worse, the military campaigns by which John justified these exorbitant charges were uniformly unsuccessful, including the loss of Normandy, which had been held by English kings since the conquest of 1066. He tried and failed repeatedly to reclaim it, and ultimately his rival, 110 G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D M a g n a C a r t a interdiction: a prohibitory decree, especially to halt trade between two nations ■ ■ ■ King Phillip of France, forced John’s barons, who for generations had held land in both England and Normandy, to choose between loyalty to one country or to the other, causing them to lose land and wealth. Furthermore, John had contin- ued the policy of his grandfather, Henry II (1133–1189), requiring that most civil disputes be tried in royal courts superseding baronial courts. Merchants were upset that the king’s poor diplomacy and unsuccessful wars had not only cost them tax revenue, but also had inhibited their business dealings abroad. They were further offended at his constant interference in the self-governance of London and other cities. John’s inept administration, his per- ceived tyrannies, and his excessive taxation burdened many and resulted in such a loss of prestige that the powerful and wealthy joined forces against him. Their alliance was fragile and might not have endured lengthy royal resistance to their terms, but John signed the document they proposed. Although he immediately repudiated it, his signature did save the nation from internecine war. He died soon thereafter on October 19, 1216. At his infant son’s succession, his regents felt it prudent to reissue the Magna Carta. Over the following century its main principles were absorbed into statutory laws. The document that emerged from these dissident groups reflected each of their complaints and, most remarkably, forced the king to acknowledge error. The original text was written in Latin as a solid block of run-on clauses that were not divided into convenient chapters or subjects. Contemporaries named it “magna” not because of its significance, but because of its great length. Later versions divided the text into sixty-three randomly ordered headings falling into four major categories. The first assured the liberties of the English Church, the second stipulated that land tenures were secure, the third modified the admin- istration of royal justice, and the fourth contained a variety of provisions for merchants, townspeople, and others. John promised the church that he would not interfere with its elected officials, their duties, and their lands. He acknowledged to his barons that he had violated the restraints of the feudal contract by which they held their land, and he swore that he would respect the reciprocal nature of the feudal rela- tionship by convening them to consider extraordinary revenues. John agreed to locate his major civil court in a single place rather than require it to follow him. He also promised to make proceedings of the king’s court, known as assizes, available by a regular circuit of justices. Curiously, at the very moment when the barons might have destroyed royal justice and asserted their hegemony , they maintained its viability. The barons also wrung from John’s reluctant hand an agreement whereby they might not be legally prose- cuted without the common consent of their “peers,” a phrase subsequently interpreted by many as the root of the jury system and parliamentary govern- ment. Finally, the king promised to respect the rights and privileges of urban charters and royal forests. The Magna Carta might have declined into obscurity had it not been for the violent constitutional conflicts that erupted in the seventeenth century. Beneath the surface of its sixty-three provisions is an implied bond between lord and vassal that some later observers argued created a new relationship between the king and society. In 1628 Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634), Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, maintained that the Magna Carta had established restraints on royal power, and Anglo-American polemicists asserted that it had introduced cherished individual freedoms such as trial by jury, the assurance of swift adjudication according to recognized law, and “no taxation without repre- sentation.” Furthermore, some have credited the Magna Carta with planting the seeds of constitutional government replete with representative institutions G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D 111 M a g n a C a r t a dissident: one who disagrees with the actions or political philosophy of his or her government or religion ■ ■ ■ reciprocity: mutual action or help that bene- fits both parties hegemony: the complete dominance of one group or nation over another adjudicate: to settle a case by judicial procedure that protect individuals and private property against arbitrary rule. Other schol- ars, however, acknowledge that the Magna Carta represented a dynamic seed from which much has grown, but make more circumspect claims regarding its influence. What is indisputable is that a medieval document established royal error, promised redress under the law, and did so in writing. Without question, this document created a dramatic political symbol for the future. See also: Juries. 112 G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D M a g n a C a r t a redress: to make right, or, compensation ■ ■ ■ REPRODUCTION OF THE MAGNA CARTA. Latin for “Great Charter,” the Magna Carta contains sixty-three clauses originated by King John of England who sealed it on June 15, 1215. Originally created to restrict the powers of the English monarchy, the charter set a foundation for not only England’s government but also later for the U.S. Constitution. (SOURCE: © BETTMANN/CORBIS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.) B I B L I O G R A P H Y Holt, James Clarke. Magna Carta. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Jones, J. A. P. King John and Magna Carta. London: Longman, 1971. Malden, Henry Elliot. Magna Carta Commemorative Essays. London: Royal Historical Society, 1917. Thompson, Faith. The First Century of Magna Carta: Why It Persisted as a Document. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1925. Thompson, Faith. Magna Carta: Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1948. Kathryne McDorman Majoritarian Party Systems Majoritarian party systems seem to organize the best links between people and government. They provide a choice to citizens in elections, unlike single-party systems in which decisions may be made rapidly and efficiently, but in an authori- tarian manner by an elite group. Majoritarian party systems are able to function effi- ciently without the obligation of cutting complicated deals, as occurs in multiparty systems in which no one party has a clear majority. One danger of multiparty sys- tems may be the slowness with which decisions are made; another is the fact that the people may play little part, if any, in the deals that party leaders have to make to achieve needed compromises. Majoritarian party systems thus appear to avoid the drawbacks inherent in either of the other two systems. The majoritarian party system exists in Great Britain, where it was, so to speak, invented or, perhaps more accurately, “stumbled on.” It spread to many Commonwealth nations as well as other countries, such as the United States. The formula is not always pure, however, and the system has often degenerated, for instance, in many African Commonwealth countries, to a single-party system (as seen in East Africa), to military rule (witness West Africa), or to a mixture of both, jointly or successively. Nevertheless, it was not entirely by accident that Great Britain first, and many Commonwealth countries subsequently, adopted the majoritarian party system. This development resulted from the reinforcement, at times brutal, of a rather simple—indeed dichotomous—structure of social cleavage through the “first past the post” electoral system, in which a candidate wins by simply having more votes than the others. In Great Britain the original structure dictating social cleavage between the Tories and Whigs was almost tribal, but it eventually took on an ideological slant in the late seventeenth century when loyalty to a partic- ular branch of the royal family came to be at stake. A certain conception of the role of the monarch in the political system was then associated with such a distinction: This naturally evolved into opposition between conservatives and liberals in the nineteenth century. The distinction was, in turn, superseded by the division between conservatives and labor, the rapid industrialization in England during that century having contributed to the strong rise of trade unions and demands for social change. Nevertheless, passage to this last cleavage would not have taken place had it not been markedly helped by the electoral system. Under the first past the post system, a split is lethal to a party, and yet this is precisely what the Liberal Party did, partly on personal grounds, during World War I (1914–1918). The G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D 113 M a j o r i t a r i a n P a r t y S y s t e m s social cleavage: a division of membership in or voting for a political party, based on social class ideology: a system of beliefs composed of ideas or values, from which political, social, or economic programs are often derived ■ ■ ■ Labor Party was formed, and as early as 1923, it became the only realistic alternative to the Conservative Party. In contrast, on the European continent, proportional representation enabled traditional liberal parties and other “centrist” forces to remain significant: proportional representation was indeed introduced in Belgium to specifically prevent the demise of the Liberal Party and stem the rise of the Socialist Party. Great Britain exported to the Commonwealth and other countries, including the United States, the notion that a majoritarian party system, ideally a two-party model, would provide the most “responsible” form of government. It was believed that such a system would enable voters to have a say in which party wielded power. It was also expected that such a system would ensure that government policies at least broadly represented the desires of the majority of voters: If this turned out not to be the case, citizens could use the ballot box to replace one party by the other. Those parties that did not follow the “line” of the majority of the electorate would therefore pay a price. It was believed that the fear of having to pay such a price would induce all parties to behave in the “correct” manner. However, even in the Commonwealth and the United States, this idealized model did not always result in such a responsible two-party system. This was so even when the British electoral system was adopted. First, only one main cleavage could exist, and that cleavage had to be the same across the nation: If there was more than one major cleavage and if in some areas the cleavage was different from that which was relevant in other areas, the party system would not be majoritarian, even with a first past the post electoral system. This was the case when profound cultural differences existed, as in Canada. The result would be not a two-party sys- tem, but a party system fragmented geographically. As a matter of fact, the two- party system could exist in name only, if attitudes and the political culture differed sharply from one part of a country to another: This was traditionally the case in the United States, with the Democratic Party divided between North and South. It has even been suggested that at times, in the United States, almost as many parties existed as there were states. Not surprisingly, the “textbook” two-party model has tended to take roots more easily in relatively small countries, like those of the Caribbean, rather than larger countries. Nevertheless, exceptions do exist, such as Australia, if the coalition formed between the Liberal Party and the National Party is regarded as being, at the federal level at least, one party only. Significant variations from the British model, even in the Commonwealth, have thus occurred if cleavages are numerous and so profound that the system itself cannot give rise to two sizeable parties only. Variations in the other direction have also transpired, that is to say, toward a party system in which one party is so dominant that no alternative may exist. This phenomenon occurred rather widely, either when the single-party system was on the way out, as has been the case in some African countries, both within and outside the Commonwealth, or when the dominant party does not even need to impose total control, as was the case in Mexico for decades with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). In fact, a simi- lar circumstance existed for decades in eighteenth-century England when the Whigs exercised almost total dominance. Majoritarian party systems may thus not always have the “balanced” charac- teristics that come to be expected in an ideal two-party system. Perhaps more troubling is the fact that the two-party system, even in its near-ideal form, does not always have, and perhaps has had less and less frequently, the consequences it was expected to have in terms of the relationship between rulers and the ruled. Scholar Anthony Downs suggested that a pure two-party system would lead to both parties proposing the same centrist policies, as each would wish to 114 G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D M a j o r i t a r i a n P a r t y S y s t e m s proportional system: a political system in which legislative seats or offices are awarded based on the proportional number of votes received by a party in an election ■ ■ ■ coalition: an alliance, partnership, or union of disparate peoples or individuals attract the support of key middle-of-the-road voters in order to obtain a major- ity. However stylized this approach seems to be, it has corresponded to the dynamics of party policy development in many two-party systems and even in party systems in which the two main parties did not occupy the entire political spectrum, as in Germany, or in those systems in which two coalitions, rather than just two parties, presented themselves to the electorate, as in France. Such an interpretation of the political dynamics of two-party systems may be somewhat one-sided in that, since the 1980s, right-wing parties have been able to move further to the Right with electoral impunity , while left-wing parties have had to move to the Right to “catch up.” This occurred in Great Britain, the United States, and parts of the European continent. Thus, both parties or coali- tions are fairly similar to each other, but as part of a common movement, in this case to the Right. It seems reasonable that in a majoritarian party system, the two parties or coalitions should remain close to each other. However, this has serious implica- tions for the role of elections and for the part that voters can play in elections. On the one hand, the majoritarian system as it develops in the Downsian interpreta- tion becomes more open to issues than the majoritarian party system based on a neat cleavage between voters and their party. On the other hand, if there is little G O V E R N M E N T S O F T H E W O R L D 115 M a j o r i t a r i a n P a r t y S y s t e m s impunity: an exemption from punishment ■ ■ ■ HOUSE OF COMMONS IN LONDON, ENGLAND. Great Britain, the first country to institute the majoritarian party system, is the home of the House of Commons. The House of Commons is the meeting place of the 646 members of the United Kingdom’s lower house of parliament, all of whom are elected officials representing a specific electoral district. (SOURCE: © JAN BUTCHOFSKY-HOUSER/CORBIS) choice between the parties, it is no longer clear whether voters are likely to be satisfied with the outcome of elections: The superiority of the responsible party system will therefore fall into question. The saving grace of the majoritarian party system may be that it never fully operates in practice along the lines of the Downsian model, partly because voting remains tied to both loyalties and issues—that is to say, voters are never truly rational. In addition, there is never, or almost never, just one cleavage and key per- sonalities, whatever their limitations, further complicate the equation. This makes it possible to claim with some justification that majoritarian party systems are the best—or least bad—means of rendering rulers at least partly accountable and of inducing these rulers to pay some attention to the views of the ruled. See also: Political Party Systems; United Kingdom; United States. B I B L I O G R A P H Y Dominguez, Jorge I., Robert A. Pastor, and R. DeLisle Worrell. Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, Economic, and Social Perspectives. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957. Dunleavy, Patrick, and Christopher T. Husbands. British Democracy at the Crossroads. London: Allen and Unwin, 1985. Finer, S. E., ed. Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform. London: Anthony Wigram, 1975. Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, rev. ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971. J. Blondel Malawi Located in southeastern Africa, the landlocked country of Malawi remained in the early twenty-first century one of the poorest in the world. In addition to constraints imposed by relatively limited endowments and high population den- sity, Malawi has one of the highest rates of HIV infection in the world, with upwards of 15 percent of its 15 million people infected as of 2004. The country also faces the challenge of sustaining and deepening the democratic system of governance inaugurated in 1994. The British formally took control of colonial “Nyasaland,” as Malawi was then known, in 1891. Anticolonial agitation began in earnest in the mid- to late 1950s. During this period Hastings Kamuzu Banda (1898–1997), a wealthy doctor, returned to his native country to lead the struggle against British rule. Malawi became an independent country in 1964. Although the new country inherited a constitutional framework that imposed limits on government officeholders, Banda crafted an authoritarian regime ensuring his political dominance. By 1970 he was constitutionally named President-for-Life, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) was the only political party, and all institutional checks on the president’s power had been removed. A highly repressive political system developed in which dissent was ruthlessly suppressed, but stability endured until the early 1990s. 116 Download 4.77 Kb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
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