History of Civilizations of Central Asia
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Contents
Early colonial rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
The revolt of 1857 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 After 1857 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
Early nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398 Nationalism and Indian capitalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
The coming of Gandhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 Mass mobilization, independence and partition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Independent India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 Early colonial rule The impact of British colonial rule in India down to the middle of the nineteenth century was marked by a general impoverishment of the peasantry and artisans as well as by the large-scale ruin of handicrafts. The decline of urban centres and recurring famines were accompanying phenomena. 1 The East India Company managed to extend and consolidate its rule in India by means of the ruthless state system it had built. The Bengal army, which, around 1857, had 139,807 native troops called sepoys, organized and equipped on modern lines under European offi- cers, was the most important coercive organ of this state. As revealed during the revolt * See Maps 4 and
5 1 See Chand, 1961 , Vol. 1, pp. 346–58, 364–79; Dutt, 1947 , pp. 76–83, 99–106, 189–95. 394 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The revolt of 1857 of 1857, the sepoys of the Bengal army (comprising largely upper-caste peasants or small landowners recruited from Bihar, Awadh and the North-Western Provinces) had the poten- tial of becoming the ‘general centre’ of Indian people’s resistance to British colonial rule. 2 A large body of the sepoys were apparently affected by the growing general disaffection in these regions during the first half of the nineteenth century. This disaffection, stemming from the economic ruin of the producing classes, acquired a cultural dimension on account of the popular impression that the colonial regime was intent on subverting the traditional values of the ‘natives’. Enlightened measures like the abolition of sati, 3 the encouragement of widow remarriage, the prohibition of female infanticide and human sacrifice, even the introduction of a rudimentary health service and a system of schools offering a modern education, were widely perceived as designed to subvert the religions and culture of the Indian people. Such a perception was reinforced by the aggressive preaching of some of the Christian missionaries patronized by the Company’s government. 4 Local uprisings during the early decades of the Company’s rule in India were the direct result of the prevailing disaffection. The Islamic militancy of the Ahl-i Hadis (people fol- lowing the Prophet’s teachings) (dubbed Wahhabis by their opponents), led by Sayyid Ahmad Bareilvi, was, perhaps, one of the more significant of these outbreaks. This move- ment emphasized the identity of the groups professing Islam in India as belonging to a sin- gle religious community, thus laying the basis of the separatist thrust that perceived Indian Muslims as a distinct nation. On the other hand, the same trend also generated among the Muslim religious elite a strong feeling of hostility towards colonial rule, encouraging them to make common cause on equal terms with the non-Muslim rebels in 1857. 5 The revolt of 1857 The revolt of 1857 was an important landmark in the history of British colonial rule in India. As pointed out by Irfan Habib, this revolt ‘proved to be the greatest armed challenge to imperialism the world over during the entire course of the nineteenth century’. 6 It was the first occasion on which different segments of the ‘native’ population in a large part of North and Central India were involved in a concerted attempt to overthrow colonial rule. 2 Marx, 15 July 1857. For the strength and composition of the Bengal army in 1857, see Habib, 1998a , pp. 6–8. 3 The practice of burning a widow on the funeral pyre of her husband, practised among some Hindu communities and abolished in 1829. 4 S. A. Khan, 1986 , pp. 119–23. 5 See Q. Ahmad, 1966 , pp. 25–98; Ashraf, 1992 , pp. 30–3; I. A. Khan, 2002 , pp. 7–19. 6 Habib,
1998b , p. 22.
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Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 After 1857 Different facets of the 1857 revolt are open to contradictory interpretations. The rebels’ tendency to rally round the figure of the last Mughal ruler Bahadur Shah II (1837–58), as well as some of their declarations promising to preserve caste distinctions and the privi- leges of the hereditary chiefs, point to the revolt being an attempt to restore the old order. On the other hand, the rebels’ attempts to mobilize public support by assuring different sections of the population that their interests would be protected clearly suggest that the sympathy and cooperation of the mass of the Indian people were seen by the rebels as the real source of power. Modern weapons and the military hierarchy often retained by the rebels of the Bengal army, and their general attitude of combining them with committees and panchayats (village councils) thrown up in the course of the revolt, or the famous con- stitution of the ‘Court [of] Administration’ at Delhi, were obviously aimed at a broad-based state structure represented by a kind of elective military rule. The well-known proclamations of the Mughal prince Feroz Shah (August 1857 and December 1858) 7 state that the ongoing struggle was between the English on one side and ‘the people of Hindustan, both Hindus and Mohammadans’ on the other. This seems to reflect a refreshingly modern concept of the Indian people, with similar connotations to those popularized later on during the struggle for independence. Such evidence suggests that the revolt of 1857 may have carried within it the seeds of the later nationalist mobi- lizations in which communal solidarity was always a cherished objective. The defence of religion was one of the rallying calls of the rebels. This appeal to reli- gious sentiment, however, did not lead to Hindu–Muslim recriminations. The rebel leaders went out of their way to promote the spirit of communal tolerance among their followers as well as among ordinary people. Even some of the so-called Wahhabis like Bakht Khan, ‘commander-in-chief ’ of the rebel forces at Delhi, are known to have agreed to a prohi- bition on the slaughter of cows on the occasion of Id uz-Zoha (the Muslim feast) in July 1857. This was obviously aimed at preventing communal dissension in the rebels’ camp. 8 After 1857 The transfer of governing authority in India to the British crown in 1858 was followed by a significant shift in the pattern of colonial rule as well as its economic implications. This change further increased the tendency for the administration to be run for the benefit of the dominant classes, including of course the newly risen entrepreneurs in Britain. After the introduction of a submarine cable in 1870, this subordination of the colonial administration 7 See Feroz Shah’s proclamations of August 1857 and December 1858, reproduced in English translation by Rizvi (ed.), 1957
, Vol. 1, pp. 453–9. 8 Iqbal Husain, 1998 , p. 33, note 71. 396 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 After 1857 in India to the dictates of the ruling establishment in Britain greatly increased. There was, no doubt, an attempt to provide the appearance of legitimacy to a council presided over by the governor-general (1861) and to which a few Indians could also be nominated. The local bodies consisting of members nominated by district magistrates 9 were initially nothing but instruments to collect additional taxes in the garb of local self-government. They became somewhat more representative, however, after the reforms introduced in 1882 by Lord Ripon, the governor-general. 10 An important aspect of the changes related to the reorganization of the army. Up to 1857, Europeans in the Bengal army represented only 14 per cent of the total force. From 1859 onwards, the principle was established that Europeans should always constitute one third of the existing fighting strength of the army. Again, the artillery was placed entirely under European control. Recruitment to the army came to be increasingly influenced by the ideology of ‘martial races’ under which large numbers of new groups like Sikhs and Gurkhas were inducted into the army, leading to a radical change in its composition. The army no longer remained the preserve of high-caste men recruited from Bihar, Awadh and the North-Western Provinces. These changes helped to make the army of British India once again an effective tool for advancing Britain’s overseas imperial interests. 11 Under the post-1858 colonial dispensation, while the drain of wealth as ‘tribute’ as well as in the form of profits from trade and other investments increased many times over, there was a limited spurt of industrial growth accompanied by some degree of commercialization of agriculture. Both these processes were basically oriented towards serving the interests of British industrial capital. The expansion of the railways, from only 695 km in 1859 to nearly 40,250 km by 1900, was perhaps the most important facet of this development. The rail network was necessitated by the requirements of British industrial capital for the commercial penetration of India. However, the construction of railways was also aimed at creating a market for the iron, steel and engineering industries in England. The wide railway network facilitated the large-scale export of agricultural products, including food- grains, to England. This contributed to a general rise in the price of food-grains in India. The recurring famines of the second half of the nineteenth century, causing 28 million deaths, cannot but be seen as linked to the increasing export of food-grains after the coming of the railways. 12 9 The district magistrate (also known as the collector) was the head of the administration in the district, the smallest administrative and territorial unit of the colonial empire. 10 For a British conservative perspective on this change-over, see Keith, 1961 , pp. 164–83. 11 Sarkar,
1983 , pp. 16–17. 12 Dutt,
1947 , pp. 106, 112–15. 397 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Early nationalism The zamind¯ars (holders of hereditary superior rights over land) were generally given a free hand to increase rents as well as to exploit the cultivators in various ways. Even in ryotwari 13 areas in Bombay and Madras presidencies, 14 a sort of landlordism developed through the dispossession of the original cultivators by money-lenders and others who secured possession of their lands. This policy secured the enduring loyalty and support of large landowners all over the country for the colonial regime. 15 Most of the 662 native rulers, the so-called Indian princes, had remained firmly loyal to the British in 1857. Some of them, like Scindia of Gwalior, had actively helped the British in putting down the revolt. 16 To reward the princes for their loyalty, the policy of annexing the princely states on various pretexts was abandoned. They were now to be nurtured as a ‘bulwark’ of colonial rule in India. In 1876 Queen Victoria assumed the title of empress of India: 17
treated as agents of the British crown. The Indian princes continued to be loyal supporters of British colonial rule down to 1947. Early nationalism During the second half of the nineteenth century, the ideological ethos of the educated petty bourgeoisie in India was informed by numerous currents of thought and belief rooted in the experience of colonial rule. Foremost among them was the tendency to re-examine existing religious beliefs as well as the social customs and attitudes these promoted. The Brahmo Samaj (a Hindu reformist movement founded by Raja Ram Mohan Roy in 1829 and carried forward by Debendranath Tagore and Keshub Chandra Sen, who combined veneration for the Vedas and Upanishads with an attitude of applying reason as the ulti- mate criterion) was perhaps the earliest and most significant development of this nature. It was followed by similar but less radical ideas propagated by Paramhans Mandal (1840) and Gopal Hari Deshmukh (1840) in Maharashtra. A mystically inclined version of the same tendency was reflected in the teachings of Ramakrishna (1834–86). His disciple Vivekananda (1863–1902), who was more inclined towards social action, also advocated 13 Term for land revenue assessment system on the basis of holdings of direct cultivators called ryots; distinct from the zamind¯ari system based on the rights of zamind¯ars who generally did not cultivate directly but held superior rights on the land. 14 Presidency: special term for the three large and very composite British colonial provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras. 15 For brief comments on the Maharashtra and Andhra outbreaks, see Sarkar, 1983 , pp. 46, 50–1. 16 See Major Charles Macpherson’s report to R. Hamilton Rust, agent of the governor-general of Central India, dated February 1858, in Foreign Political Proceedings, 1–8 October: see I. A. Khan, 1998
, pp. 67–71. 17 Sarkar, 1983 , pp. 64–67; see also Keith, 1961 , pp. 213–21. 398 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Early nationalism the coming together of ‘the two great systems, Hinduism and Islam’. The Arya Samaj of Swami Dayanand (1824–83) was equally unsparing in its re-evaluation of Hindu religious tradition. 18 Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s attempts to reinterpret Islamic tenets in the early phase of the Aligarh movement, i.e. before 1875, may also be bracketed with the above tendency. Dur- ing this phase, Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s emphasis was on there being no conflict between the ‘Word of God (the Qur’an)’ and the ‘Work of God (i.e. natural phenomena as interpreted by modern science)’. There was also an implicit suggestion that all the revealed religions hold similar values. It is worth noting that the Aligarh movement in its early phase was totally free from religious intolerance; it was in fact anxious to associate with its programme as many Hindus of aristocratic background as were prepared to join. Attempts to give the Aligarh movement a separatist orientation were successful only from 1884 onwards, when it was increasingly influenced by Theodore Beck and other Englishmen associated with Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College in various capacities. 19 An equally important element contributing to the ideological ethos of the political process in India during the second half of the nineteenth century was the spread of the ideals of the European Enlightenment. This Western impact, combined with a new sense of pride inculcated by the rediscovery of India’s ancient past (largely an achievement of European scholarship) and a growing realization that India had a distinct cultural identity, helped to define the overall world-view of the leadership of the Indian National Congress during the first two decades of its existence. The moderates among them saw the British connection as beneficial for the Indian people. They perceived it as bringing a ‘higher civi- lization’ to India. The positive assessment of the British imperial connection, however, did not prevent them from evaluating critically the impact of the colonial administration on the life and conditions of the Indian people. They did not hesitate to put forward demands aimed at larger Indian representation in the Imperial Legislative Council and the civil ser- vice as well as a reduction in the tax burden on the middle classes. They were also sensitive to the plight of the peasants and often pleaded for a reduction of land revenue demands. Calculations of the drain of wealth from India as tribute, and of the increasing burden of land tax on the peasantry, were two very significant contributions of the moderate stal- warts, Dadabhai Naoroji and R. C. Dutt – they continue to inform the nationalist critique of British colonial rule to this day. The nineteenth century also witnessed the gradual unfolding of the British policy of divide and rule. It was primarily aimed at preventing Hindus and Muslims from coming 18 Chand, 1990 , pp. 391–429; Sarkar, 1983 , pp. 65–76. 19 Chand,
1990 , pp. 352–8, 364–76; Sarkar, 1983 , pp. 76–8. 399 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Early nationalism together on a manifestly anti-colonial platform. This was encouraged by fanning commu- nal hatred between them in devious ways. One very effective instrument of this policy was the depiction of India’s history prior to the establishment of the East India Company’s rule as a series of never-ending conflicts between Hindus and Muslims. Elliot’s translation of passages selected from Persian chronicles in a tendentious manner contributed enormously to the dissemination of this highly divisive version of Indian history. 20 Under its impact, literary works with a historical bias full of communal hatred came to be written in sev- eral Indian languages, particularly Hindi, Bengali and Marathi. Some of these works were acclaimed by the radical nationalists of 1890s as carrying a cultural resonance conforming to their own historical visions. One such literary work in Bengali, Anand Math (1882) by Bankim Chandra, carried the famous patriotic hymn of Bande Mataram: during the period of agitation against the partition of Bengal (1905–11), this came to be recognized as the anthem of the freedom movement. The divisive version of Indian history officially pop- ularized through textbooks in the nineteenth century may thus be seen as contributing in a considerable measure to giving a revivalist tinge to the nationalist mobilizations of the pre-world war decades. This in turn facilitated the growth of Muslim separatism, which was systematically encouraged from about 1883 onwards by an influential lobby in the Government of India with the aim of dissuading Indian Muslims from joining the Indian National Congress in large numbers. 21 The ‘extremist’ wing of the Indian National Congress was not reconciled to the moder- ate vision of slow constitutional development. They raised the slogan of swaraj (self-rule) and were generally inclined towards swadesh (lit. ‘of one’s own country’) 22 and self-help. In Bengal (1905–8) the Swadeshi movement and the boycott became the main forms of extremist agitation linked with terrorist activity spurred on by the ‘Hindu nationalism’ preached by Aurobindo Ghosh. The extremists tended to oppose any measure they per- ceived as aiming to impose Western culture under the garb of modernization and reform. Nor did they see any harm in using religious feelings or the attachment of the masses to their traditional way of living as a pretext for political mobilization. 23 This attitude of the extremists inevitably gave a Hindu revivalist tinge to the over-all ideological ethos of the freedom movement. But the Congress extremists, despite their social conservatism and revivalist leanings, always saw Indian Muslims as an inseparable part of the Indian 20 Elliot, 1849 , original preface, p. xxii, where the purpose of the translation is stated frankly. 21 T. Ahmad, 1994 , pp. 168–78, 179–98. 22 Applied to the nationalist protest movement of 1905–11 against the partition of Bengal in 1905; also applied to protest movements of boycott of foreign goods. 23 Sarkar’s notices on ‘Roots of Extremism’ and ‘The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal’, 1983 , pp. 96–100, 111–25. 400
Contents ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Nationalism and Indian capitalists people. In the first decade of the twentieth century, many Muslim young men were attracted to the militant nationalism of the Congress extremists. To Hasrat Mohani, a distinguished representative of MAO College (Aligarh)’s first generation, Balgangadhar Tilak had come to symbolize the true spirit of the freedom struggle. Nationalism and Indian capitalists The end of the First World War heralded a new phase in the history of India’s struggle for independence. Subsequently, under Mahatma Gandhi’s (1869–1948) overall leadership, the Indian National Congress registered unprecedented successes in mobilizing the masses. In its historic resolutions at its Lahore (1930) and Karachi (1931) sessions, the Congress also developed a new vision of a free, democratic and modern India. This phase ended in 1947 with the dawn of freedom accompanied by the tragedy of partition. A considerable expansion of industrial production, principally in light industry dur- ing the First World War, marked the beginning of this phase. Such expansion was possible mainly because the pressures of the war situation had obliged Britain to abandon its former policy of discouraging the growth of industrial enterprises in which Indians were emerging in strong positions. As admitted in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, the British policy of encouraging limited industrial expansion during the war was aimed at moderniz- ing India as Britain’s base in the ‘Eastern theatre of war.’ During this short spurt of indus- trial expansion, the textile and jute industries, where Indian capital had a large presence, grew rapidly. As a result, the financial and political clout of the Indian capitalist class was noticeably enhanced. On the other hand, during the same period, the exploitation of India by British finance capital tended to become a dominant feature. This developed out of the existing industrial capitalist and trading exploitation of India. As compared to the first half of the nineteenth century, by the time war broke out in 1914 the burden of total tribute had increased several times over. In this new scenario, India’s national bourgeoisie developed a perceptibly antagonistic relationship to British finance capital. 24 It is, therefore, not surprising that from 1917 onwards an important section of the Indian capitalist class should become interested in gaining influence in the affairs of the Indian National Congress so as to have their demands and aspirations articulated from its plat- form. Following the decision of the Congress in 1922 to allow the entry of Swarajists (from Swaraj, the name of a party formed in 1923 to participate in the elections) into the councils established under the Government of India Act (1919), this tendency became 24 Dutt, 1947 , pp. 122–8. Cf. Chandra, 1993 , p. 45. A considerable indigenous capitalist class had been formed which feared that it would be submerged under the superior economic strength of the foreign capitalist class.
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Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The coming of Gandhi very pronounced. 25 The financial support for many Gandhian projects by industrialists like Ghanshyam Das Birla, Jamnalal Bajaj and Ambalal Sarabai may be seen in this per- spective. This support for Gandhian projects, as well as for the Congress organization, continued throughout the succeeding phases of mass mobilizations when the Congress was usually in conflict with the colonial rulers. This was so despite the presence, from the late 1920s onwards, of a proactive leftist block within the ranks of the Indian National Congress. Evidently, neither Jawaharlal Nehru’s socialism nor Gandhi’s critique of modern industrial development and his idealization of the pre-modern social ethos of the village community adversely affected the Indian national bourgeoisie’s support for the Congress. The coming of Gandhi Gandhi appeared on the Indian political scene in 1915 when the Indian National Congress, dominated by the moderates, was not yet geared to respond to the growing distress and mil- itancy of the masses beyond resolutions and petitions in the old loyalist jargon. Around this time, general resentment at the high prices caused by the war was bolstered by an unprece- dented recruitment drive, particularly in Punjab. Muslim theologians, who had come out against the war in the face of severe repression, viewed the Anglo-French military thrust against the Ottoman empire as an assault on the Islamic world and civilization. 26 This Pan- Islamic sentiment, combined with the general anti-imperialist upsurge triggered by the October 1917 revolution in Russia and growing popular resentment at colonial rule, cre- ated an explosive situation all over the subcontinent. The rapprochement between Congress moderates and extremists in 1916, and the accompanying League–Congress pact of the same year, had geared the entire freedom movement into a state of subjective readiness to face this situation. Britain tried to calm the unrest by promulgating the Government of India Act (1919), supposedly a step towards the evolution of ‘self-governing institutions’. But this constitutional scheme did not meet the approval of even most of the moderates, though some of them were not averse to giving it a fair trial. At this juncture Gandhi emerged as a charismatic leader of the Indian people, with his distinct world-view and vision of a future India defined by his principles of ahimsa (non- violence), satyagraha (soul force) and purity of means. He perceived Indian culture as a fusion of different religious traditions and rejected its identification with one particular faith. As may be seen from his Hind Swaraj written in 1909, he rejected the model of 25 Sarkar,
1983 , pp. 231–2. 26 T. Ahmad, 1994 , pp. 233–4, cites the Rowlatt Committee’s report, which accuses the senior Deoband divine, Maulvi Mahmoodul Hasan, of declaring a jihad against Britain and of planning to set up a provisional government headed by Raja Mahendra Pratap. 402 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Mass mobilization, independence and partition modern industrial society and idealized the Indian village community as well as the small- scale handicraft production identified with it. The future India of Gandhi’s vision was not necessarily to be a part of the British empire; being free of the British connection, it would also be cleansed of the accompanying modernism. 27 By 1919, when Gandhi first became involved in the mass protests against the Rowlatt Act, 28 was already an All-India figure. He formed the Satyagraha Sabha to oppose the government repression. The movement caught the imagination of the people, who, for the first time, had an opportunity to participate in the struggle beyond attending meet- ings and demonstrations. The people enrolled in the Satyagraha Sabha took a pledge to disobey the repressive Rowlatt Act, to court arrest and to undergo imprisonment will- ingly. It was a new form of struggle that created a tremendous spirit of empowerment among the common people. 29 They could now act against the government from a high moral ground. As the people responded wholeheartedly to Gandhi’s call for satyagraha, the Indian National Congress fell into step with him. The movement was instantly trans- formed into an organization of mass political action. This was reflected in the new con- stitution of the Congress (adopted at the Nagpur session in 1920), which introduced mass membership and provincial 30 committees based on linguistic divisions. Mass mobilization, independence and partition From this time onwards down to the late 1930s, the history of the freedom struggle through- out its successive stages of Non-Cooperation 31 and Khilafat 32 (1920–2), as well as Civil Disobedience 33 (1930–4), carried the stamp of Gandhi’s vision. It was during this period of mass mobilizations led by Gandhi that the idea of all the inhabitants of the Indian sub- continent being one nation with equal rights and a common destiny materialized. 27 Parel (ed.), 1997 , pp. 62–5, 88–99, 107–111. 28 A notoriously repressive set of British colonial legislation in 1919, which provoked a major nationalist mobilization against it. 29 In Jawaharlal Nehru’s words, the Gandhian form of struggle involved ‘enormous suffering’ for the par- ticipants in the struggle, ‘but that suffering was self-invited and therefore strength-giving’: see Nehru, 1960
, p. 368.
30 Commenting on the new constitution of the Congress, Gandhi observed that it was aimed at ensuring that it would function ‘on a country-wide scale’ which would ensure the establishment of swaraj without delay: see The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 1990 , Vol. 19, p. 461. 31 The name given to the nationalist mobilization led by Gandhi against colonial rule, 1920–2. 32 A movement coinciding with the Non-Cooperation movement of 1920–2, it was formally a protest against the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate, but it merged with the nationalist upsurge known as Non- Cooperation during those years. 33 The name given to another phase of the Gandhian nationalist mobilization against colonial rule, 1930–1; it is also a general term for these forms of non-violent protest movements. 403
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Mass mobilization, independence and partition During the same period, the growth of the left within the Indian National Congress, as well as outside its ranks, seems to have contributed significantly to shaping the overall character of the freedom movement. The increasing participation of the peasantry in the nationalist mobilizations, particularly during the 1930s, may be related partly to the emer- gence of the left. In the 1930s, the peasant aspirations came to be increasingly reflected in the leftist advocacy of the abolition of semi-feudal land tenures and usages from the Congress platform as well as through the newly formed Kisan Sabha movement. 34 Some idea of the strength of pro-left sentiment within the Congress as early as 1926 can be seen from the fact that, despite Gandhi’s opposition, a resolution to extend condolences on the death of Lenin was lost in the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) by just 63 votes to 54.
In the late 1920s, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and Subhas Chandra Bose (1897– 1945) came to be recognized as the spokesmen of the emerging left within the Congress. Their advocacy of the radical demand of purna swaraj, 35 as well as of a programme to establish a federal republic based on universal suffrage and the state’s control of key indus- tries, led to the radicalization of the Congress to an extent which would have been difficult to attain within the parameters of the Gandhian approach. However, to the abiding credit of Gandhi, one must concede that down to 1938 he did not allow his disapproval of social- ist doctrines to interfere with his agreeing on many vital questions with the left within the Congress. Gandhi’s support for the Karachi resolution (1931), embodying a socialistic blueprint for a free India advocated by Jawaharlal Nehru, illustrates the manner in which the ideologically opposed tendencies represented by Gandhi and the left would often coop- erate during this period of mass mobilizations and heightened nationalist fervour. 36 In 1934 the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was formed. It included a large number of Congress activists influenced by Marxism, Jai Prakash Narayan and Acharya Narendra Dev being the outstanding figures among them. Following advice from the Comintern to the Indian communists in August 1935 to ‘treat the Congress as a part of the anti-imperialist front’, they dropped the facade of a Peasants’ and Workers’ Party and started operating through the CSP. The nomination of Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose as suc- cessive presidents of the Indian National Congress for the years 1936–7 and 1937–8 was an indication of the growing influence of the left within the Congress organization. It also 34 In 1936, the U.P. Congress leadership was advocating the abolition of the zamind¯ari system: see Nehru, 1960 , p. 375. 35 Meaning complete independence, to distinguish it from Dominion Status, the position of Australia and Canada within the British empire and Commonwealth. 36 Habib, 1998b , pp. 105–11; see also Sarkar, 1983 , pp. 331–6. 404 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Mass mobilization, independence and partition shows Gandhi’s readiness to accommodate the left, his ideological hostility to socialism notwithstanding. 37 This uneasy arrangement between the left groups and right-wing Congress leaders iden- tified as followers of Gandhi came under serious strain during 1937–9, when Congress was running governments in a number of provinces. As the trade unions and Kisan Sabhas led by the communists raised issues relating to workers’ and peasants’ livelihoods, they clashed with Congress leaders running governments in the provinces. The communists were accused of fanning ‘a class war by violent means’. 38 Henceforth, the Communist Party of India (CPI) struck out on an independent course which led to its separation from the CSP. Eventually, the CPI stoutly opposed the Quit India movement (the third and greatest nationalist upsurge led by Gandhi against colonial rule) of 1942 (in which the CSP were very active) on the grounds that it amounted to undermining the people’s war against fascism in which the Soviet Union was at the forefront. The CPI’s indirect justification of the Muslim League’s separatist demand for Pakistan in terms of the Leninist thesis on the right to national determination led to its total isolation from the rest of the left forces, including followers of Jawaharlal Nehru within the Congress. The growth of a strong separatist sentiment among Muslims during the 1930s and 1940s points to the tragic failure of the nationalist mass mobilizations of this period. Apparently, these mobilizations did not fully overcome the divisive tendencies that were being fostered systematically by the colonial authorities from as early as 1905. 39 The separatist movement grew despite Gandhi’s bold espousal of communal amity and the Congress’s drive, during 1936–8, to establish mass contacts with the Muslims. 40 The Non-Cooperation and Khilafat movements (1920–2) represented the high-water mark of Muslim participation in the free- dom struggle. The October 1920 boycott of MAO College, the premier educational centre of Indian Muslims, by a majority of its students, along with a large number of teachers, as a response to the college’s accepting financial support from government, was illustrative 37 Habib,
1998b , pp. 111–17; Sarkar, 1983 , p. 344, however, considers the left advance during 1935–7 as ‘somewhat illusory and verbal’. According to him, right-wing consolidation was a more important develop- ment.
38 Sarkar,
1983 , p. 352. 39 Nehru,
1960 , pp. 357–8, regards the introduction of a separate electorate, proposed by the Simla Depu- tation (1905), as the beginning of Muslim separatism. 40 The rise of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, closely allied with the Indian National Congress as a dominant political force in the Muslim-majority North-West Fontier Province during the 1930s, was an honourable exception to this general trend. Nehru, 1960 , p. 386, characterizes the success of the Khudai Khidmatgars in mobilizing the Pathans in a non-violent movement as ‘little short of miraculous’. 405
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Mass mobilization, independence and partition of the enthusiastic response of Indian Muslims to Gandhi’s call for non-cooperation. 41 But the sudden withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation movement in 1922 after the Chauri-Chaura incident, 42 without consulting the Khilafat Committee, left many Muslims bewildered and confused. Increasing communal tension during 1922–7 was reflected in a sharp difference of opin- ion within the Swaraj Party as well as between the All-India Muslim League and the Congress on the question of constitutional safeguards for the Muslim minority. During the boycott of the all-white Simon Commission (appointed by the British Government in 1927 in order to draw up a new constitution), an informal agreement was reached between the Congress and the All-India Muslim League on the stipulated constitution of India. It envis- aged the Muslim League’s eschewing a separate electorate in return for a joint electorate with reserved seats in the provincial and central legislatures. However, the final report of an All Parties Conference prepared by Motilal Nehru failed to confirm this accord. The author of the report, a nationalist stalwart with unimpeachable credentials, was browbeaten by the stringency of the Hindu Mahasabha’s 43 contrary arguments endorsed by Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lala Lajpat Rai. It was a serious setback to the efforts that were being made to persuade the Muslim political leadership to agree to a joint electorate in the future con- stitution of India. 44 Again, the Muslim League had fought the 1937 elections to the provincial assemblies in an alliance with the Congress. But the differences between the two bodies, arising from the League’s insistence on joining the government in Uttar Pradesh only as a coalition partner, led to a final break-up. Subsequently, the Muslim League resorted to a vicious campaign portraying Congress governments as discriminating against Muslims as well as undermining their culture. The League worked systematically to play on the insecurities of Indian Muslims over the constitutional arrangements for the future Dominion Status of India. 41
1990 , Vol. 18, p. 369. In his letter to the trustees of MAO College dated 24 Oct. 1920, Gandhi admits that he was the ‘originator of the idea of disaffection’, leading to the establishment of a parallel Muslim University (Jamia Millia) at Aligarh. 42 A violent incident during the Non-Cooperation movement, when 22 policemen were killed at Chauri- Chaura in 1922. Gandhi called off the Non-Cooperation movement on the ground that he was committed to non-violence, or ahimsa. 43 The All-India Hindu Mahasabha, a strongly Hindu nationalist organization, formed in 1915, but effec- tively active from 1922 to 1923. 44 Sarkar, 1983 , pp. 262–5. 406 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Independent India These differences were further accentuated during the negotiations between the Cripps Mission
45 and Indian leaders (March 1942). The Muslim League had succeeded in per- suading the British to include in their proposal of Dominion Status for post-war India a proviso allowing the provinces to secede from the stipulated federal union. This amounted to giving official approval to the Muslim League’s demand for the creation of Pakistan, a demand first raised two years earlier at its Lahore session. Henceforth, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah’s advocacy of Pakistan became increasingly strident. The Muslim League’s politi- cal clout further increased after it was able to form governments in Assam, Sind, Bengal and North-West Frontier Province (1942–3) with the help of British governors. This was possible as the majority of Congress members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) were in gaol in connection with the Quit India movement (May 1942). These circumstances enabled the Muslim League to rally a large majority of Indian Muslims round their demand for Pakistan by the time the elections took place in 1946. They captured most of the Muslim seats outside Punjab and North-West Frontier Province. 46 The
phenomenal growth of Muslim separatism had created a situation where the demand for Pakistan could have been ignored only if the post-war anti-imperialist upsurge revealed by popular support for the Indian National Army (INA) 47 and the rebellious cadets of the Royal Indian Navy, as well as by the peasant insurgency of Telangana, had been allowed to develop into a regular insurrection. This was, however, a prospect condemned by the entire Congress leadership. They had no option but to agree to the Mountbatten 48 Plan that envisaged the partition of the country along religious lines. 49 Independent India The transfer of power on 15 August 1947 no doubt marked the fulfilment of a long- cherished goal of the freedom movement. But the accompanying partition along religious lines was a severe reversal of the idea of Indian nationhood as defined in the course of the freedom struggle. Gandhi’s assassination on 30 January 1948 by a Hindutva fanatic was symptomatic of the tragedy that had occurred. However, the success of the central govern- ment headed by Jawaharlal Nehru in checking the riots and also in limiting the population 45 A committee sent out by the British Government in March 1942 under Sir Stafford Cripps to negotiate with Indian political parties. 46 Sarkar, 1983 , pp. 385–8, 408–10. 47 An anti-British force led from 1943 by a major nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, to fight for independence, but by using Japanese support. 48 The last colonial governor-general of India. 49 Cf. Sarkar, 1983 , p. 421, where Wavel is quoted as suggesting that popular demonstrations in Calcutta on the INA during November 1945 were a ‘turning-point’ goading the Congress leaders to agree to ‘at least a temporary detente’. 407 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Independent India transfer to Punjab, as well as the largely peaceful absorption of the princely states into the Indian dominion, speak of the firmness with which the Congress leadership faced the chal- lenging situation of the early years of freedom. It testified to the resilience of nationalist fervour nurtured during the preceding three decades. The same spirit was magnificently reflected in the constitution of India, promulgated in 1950. In spite of partition along com- munal lines, the Indian constitution provided for the separation of religion from state. The Government of free India was drawn, from the very beginning, towards establish- ing special relations with the emerging Asian nations having a common history of struggle for freedom from the domination of the imperialist powers of the West. In April 1947 in New Delhi, an Asian Relations Conference was convened to which the representatives of post-war national governments as well as of popular movements were invited. At this conference the Provisional General Council of Asian Relations Organization was created, pledged to tackling the problem of Asian poverty with the cooperation of the United Nations Organization (UNO). 50 This proved to be the beginning of the process leading to India’s emerging as a prominent member of the nonaligned bloc of nations whose common stand was defined by anti-colonialism and opposition to military alliances of the Cold-War period. India continued to play a leading role in the non-aligned movement down to the late 1980s. During the 1950s, the developmental efforts of Congress governments, at the centre as well as in the various states, were geared to promoting industrial growth and the expan- sion of agricultural production. There was an attempt to establish state control over vital industrial sectors, giving rise to a mixed economy in which the public sector came to play a crucial role. For the first time, India developed a respectable heavy industry. Steel pro- duction and power generation increased 2.4 and 2.5 times respectively. Although the land reforms had an uneven course in the different states, they helped to weaken the rent-based landlordism, giving a boost to the rich peasant economy in many parts of the country. This economic upsurge led to a noticeable increase in the per capita availability of cloth and food-grains, and the average life expectancy increased from 32.5 to 41.2 years. The expan- sion of education during the same period was also remarkable: school enrolment increased from 25.5 to 44.7 million and that of universities from 10.4 to 10.5 million. 51 From the late 1950s, however, a rightward shift became visible in the policies of the Indian National Congress. An early sign of this shift was the anti-communist rhetoric of the agitation leading to the dismissal of the E. M. S. Nambudiripad government in 50 See Nehru’s interview with the press on 26 Sept. 1946 (Hindustan Times, 27 Sept.), where he talks of developing ‘An Independent Foreign Policy of India’, and also his speech at the Asian Relations Conference on 2 April 1947: Gopal (ed.), 1984 , Vol. 1, pp. 492–504; Vol. 2, pp. 512–38. 51 Habib,
1997 , pp. 5–6; see also Chandra, 1993 , pp. 43–5. 408 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Independent India Kerala (1959). Growing tension with the People’s Republic of China over Tibet was another indication of the same trend. The process was hastened by the border conflict with China in 1962. It gave rise to a jingoist sentiment which was used by Hindutva forces to make common cause with right-wing political bosses within the Congress to put Nehru and his leftist supporters on the defensive. After Nehru’s death in 1964, this situation worsened. The brief war with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965 gave another opportunity to the Hindu right to further their chauvinist anti-Muslim plank under the garb of patriotism. Following the general elections of 1967, the Jan Sangh (People’s Congregation) emerged as a coali- tion partner in governments formed by the opposition parties (including the pro-Soviet CPI) in a number of states; this contributed to the emergence of the Hindutva as one of the mainstream tendencies of Indian politics. 52 Another leftward turn in the political and economic policies of the Congress gov- ernment occurred after Indira Gandhi (1917–84) became prime minister in 1966. Indira Gandhi was able to catch the imagination of the people by appealing simultaneously to the patriotic fervour aroused by conflicts with China and Pakistan during the 1960s and the widespread discontent of the poor and marginalized sections of the people, comprising minorities, dalits, 53 backward agrarian castes and tribals (or members of tribes). Her tri- umph in the 1971 general election, fought on the slogan of garibi hatao (remove poverty), was a vindication of this tactical line. The nationalization of banks (1969), the election of V. V. Giri as president against a candidate put up by Congress bosses (1970), India’s sup- port for Bangladesh’s independence (1971) in defiance of the US threat of military inter- vention, the abolition of privy purses (1971) and the nationalization of insurance (1971) and coalmines (1972–3) were the landmarks charting the unfolding of this leftward shift. 54 The impact of Indira Gandhi’s radical measures, however, tended to lessen during the second half of the 1970s. The rampant corruption and ineffective implementation of poverty alleviation programmes, combined with the general impression that an authoritarian regime was being created by sidelining constitutional proprieties, gave rise to a powerful protest movement. In this protest movement, under Jai Prakash Narayan’s inspiration, the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or National Volunteer Corps) and the Jan Sangh were accommodated as moving spirits. The ‘Emergency’ imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975 to counter Jai Prakash Narayan’s ‘total revolution’ was a severe blow to parliamentary democ- 52 for an attempt to justify the participation of the CPI in the non-Congress governments with the Jan Sangh as a coalition partner, see Political Resolution adopted by the Eighth Congress of the C.P.I., 1968
, pp. 7–11. 53 Dalits are the lowest and most oppressed castes in the caste system. They are known as ‘Scheduled Castes’ in the Indian constitution and were called Harijans by Mahatma Gandhi. 54 See Niran, 1985 , pp. 110–17, where the focus is on Indira Gandhi’s economic policies ‘that had no philosophical underpinning’. Cf. Habib, 1997
, pp. 6–7. 409
Contents Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 Independent India racy. Two years of the Emergency, marked by the severe repression of opposition groups including a large segment of the left represented by the CPI (M) 55 and its allies, led to Indira Gandhi’s political isolation and she lost badly in the general elections of 1977. The experience of Janata Party rule (1977–80), however, failed to alter the popular sentiment in favour of socialism created by Indira Gandhi’s radical measures of the pre-Emergency years. Even the Bharatiya Janata Party, created in 1979 to carry forward the Hindutva agenda of the erstwhile Jan Sangh, paid lip service to ‘Gandhian socialism’. 56 The massacre of a large number of innocent Sikhs in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassination (1984) by hoodlums posing as Congress supporters, and the failure of Rajiv Gandhi (prime minister, 1984–9) to unequivocally condemn this brutality, brought into disrepute the Congress’s role as a party of national consensus. Rajiv Gandhi’s subsequent concessions to Muslim conservatism over Shah Bano’s case 57 and to majority sentiment in regard to the Ayodhya dispute 58 also dented the Congress’s image as a defender of sec- ular values enshrined in the Indian constitution. The Congress Party and its government headed by Rajiv Gandhi were seen in the popular perception as totally divorced from the socialist legacy of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Although ‘the economy, running with structures already created, showed considerable strength’, this did not affect the basic standards of life of the poor. The problem with Rajiv Gandhi’s economic measures, accord- ing to Bipin Chandra, was that these ‘were not part of any long-term framework or policy’. The Congress under Rajiv Gandhi came to be identified with the corruption and oppor- tunism of the neo-rich. 59 It was with this changed image that Congress faced a loose con- glomerate of political forces (including the Bharatiya Janata Party), led by V. P. Singh, in the 1990 general election. V. P. Singh’s electoral plank of ‘social justice’ and an end to official corruption evoked wide support. Even the left parties had entered into an under- standing with the non-Bharatiya Janata Party components of this alliance. 55 Communist Party of India (Marxist). It was a product of the split in the CPI in 1964. The other segment of the original party retained the name CPI. 56 Habib, 1997 , p. 7.
57 Shah Bano was a Muslim woman who was divorced and claimed maintenance from her exhusband in 1981 under the Indian constitution; her suit was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in 1985, but certain leaders of the Muslim community objected that she was not entitled to it under Muslim personal law. It led to an acrimonious public debate and political mobilizations around Indian secular law versus Muslim personal law. The prime minister conceded the point to conservative Muslim opinion and effectively overturned the Supreme Court judgment through a new law on Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce), which made the natal family responsible for the maintenance of a divorced Muslim woman. 58 Ayodhya, a small town in Uttar Pradesh, said to be the birthplace of Rama, the god of the epic Ramayana. The town contained a mosque known as the Babri Masjid; certain Hindu groups claimed that the mosque had been built on the site of a temple erected to commemorate the birthplace of Rama; their movement led to the demolition of the mosque; the ownership of the site is still in dispute. 59 See Chandra, 1993 , pp. 121–3; Habib, 1997 , p. 7.
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