International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

tution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration). Structuration theory 
puts forward an ontological perspective of a mutual constitution of agency and 
structure. It is presented as an alternative social ontology to individualist and 
structuralist approaches to the agent-structure problem. The basic theoretical 
statements of agents and structures as being mutually constituted, or co-
determined, entities can be summarized as follows (see Wendt 1987: 355-356): 
1) Agents and structures are assumed as mutually constitutive, but ontological-
ly distinct entities. There is no ontological priority of either agency or struc-
ture, but a mutual dependency/co-determination (or what Wendt calls “dia-
lectical synthesis”). Structure and agents are each an effect of the other. 
2) Structures are constitutive for actors and their interests. At the same time, 
actors constantly produce and reproduce structure. Structures of social 
systems are thus both a medium and an outcome of the practices that con-
stitute such social systems. Social structures are results of intended and 
unintended consequences of human action. On the other hand, those ac-
tions presuppose and are mediated by structural context. This is also 
called duality of structure (a term from Giddens). 
3) The constitutive rules and norms inherent in structure allow structure to 
constrain and enable action. 
4) Social structures are bound to spatial and temporal structures: they are 
space-time-specific. Specifically, time and space have to be integrated in-
to theoretical research. Social theories are not trans-historical. 
In other words, at the heart of structuration theory is the position of an onto-
logical interdependence of agents and structure. Agents and structure are as-
sumed to be ontologically distinct entities, but ontologically assumed to be 
dependent upon each other. The ontological interdependence is conceptual-
ized as “mutual constitution” or co-determination. 
Please keep in mind that structuration theory is a meta-theory, NOT a 
substantive theory. It belongs to “second order theorizing” (social theory), 
which, according to Wendt, can be used for or applied to first-order theoriz-
ing (substantive IR theory). Hence structuration theory is not about “sub-
stance” of the social world, i.e. not about particular, concrete social systems, 
agents, and structures (Wendt 1987: 355). Instead, it frames our thinking 
about it in a meta-theoretical way. 
So what are the benefits of structuration theory being applied to formulate 
a new structural theory of IR? For Wendt, structuration theory aids in going 
beyond reductionist structural theorizing because the perspective preserves 
the “generative and relational aspect” of structuralism while at the same time 
conceptually and methodologically NOT drawing on a separation of genera-

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tive structures from the self-realizations and practices of human agents (du-
ality of structure, no “reification” of structure) (Wendt 1987: 355). The rea-
sons for this lie in the different ontological perspective of the agent-structure 
problem as described above. 
The generative and relational aspect of structure can be described as fol-
lows: structure is defined as a “set of internally related elements” (Wendt 1987: 
357) such as agents, practices, technologies, territories, etc. These “elements” 
have a position within the social organization of the system. They are internally 
related; that is, they cannot be defined or conceived independently of their po-
sition in the social structure (we know this position from world-systems theo-
ry). The perspective of structuration theory when applied to IR holds that states 
(agency) are generated or constituted by the system’s internal relations. Thus, 
states can be defined or conceived as “states” only by their position in a global 
(systems) structure. Structures generate agents and their behavior; they consti-
tute the conditions of existence for states and state action and make the con-
cepts “state”, “state power”, or “foreign policy” possible. The properties of the 
elements of a relation are internal to the relation itself; they do not exist apart 
from it (Wendt 1998: 114). This position is in contrast to neorealism, in which 
structures are externally related to preexisting state agents. An example for a 
structural relation is “sovereignty” as an organizing principle of the interstate 
system; sovereignty generates and constitutes states as states.
From what has been written so far and from your self-study (all of which 
are related to the “substantive” theory of IR as the result of “applied philoso-
phy”), it becomes clear that Wendt sees “agency” as the “state”. The core 
question is thus how states (agency) are constituted by the generative and re-
lational aspect of structure. 
However, social structures do not exist independently of the activities and 
practices of agents. The deep structures of the state system exist only through