International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

Self-study (1) 
Recap what you have learned about neorealist theorizing and about world-
systems theory. Then read Wendt 1987: The agent-structure-problem in 
International Relations, 335-349. Learn about the ontological and meth-
odological individualist status of “structure” in neorealism and the onto-
logical and methodological holistic status of “structure” in world-systems 
theory. Complement and deepen your knowledge about the philosophy of 
science positions at the heart of neorealism and world-systems theory. For 
didactical reasons, the recommendation is not to read the full text, but 
simply to focus on pages 335-349 and then return to the unit text.
Wendt’s attempt to formulate a new structural theory has its philosophical 
foundation in scientific realism (basically drawing on the work of Roy 
Bhaskar) and applies structuration theory from sociology (Giddens 1979, 
1984) to International Relations. Wendt requires the use of both scientific re-
alism and structuration theory in order to base IR theory on a new ontology. 
They are the “meta-physical foundations” of his new approach to theorizing 
international politics (Wendt 2006: 182). Adopting them thus has implica-
tions for the “substantial” IR theory he has in mind. 
Step by step, we will now learn about the ontological position on which 
Wendt’s new approach to structural theorizing is based. The starting point is 
the status of “unobservable” phenomena in scientific inquiry: in Wendt’s 
words, “we cannot see the structure of the international system, whether con-
ceptualized in material or social terms” (Wendt 1999: 49). This problem rais-
es questions and doubts as to whether unobservables such as the structure of 
the international system are legitimate objects of scientific inquiry. How can 

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we know about things we cannot observe? Wendt’s answer is to ground IR 
theory in a scientific realist understanding of science. Please note that “scien-
tific realism” refers to a philosophy of science and thus is on equal terms with 
positivism as a philosophy of science. It should not be confused with “real-
ism” as a (substantive) theory of International Relations. 
In order to learn about the “new ontology” in more detail, the next section 
will start with scientific realist assumptions about “structure”. We will then 
discuss the relevance scientific realism has for the scientific study of interna-
tional politics. 
It should be emphasized that Wendt’s decision to draw on scientific real-
ism reflects a broader movement of re-orientation in the social sciences to-
wards realist ontology. Using Wendt’s work therefore serves a double pur-
pose: it demonstrates and reflects a broader ontological reorientation (philos-
ophy of science aspect) while at the same time demonstrating its application 
to IR theory (as shown in Wendt’s formulation of a specific theory of IR). 
The question of ontology is a highly relevant question as it relates to the na-
ture, the “being” or “reality” of the subject of our studies, such as the state 
and the international system of states. 
1.1.
“Structure” is real and object to scientific inquiry 
Wendt, drawing on scientific realism as formulated by Roy Bhaskar (1979: The 
possibility of naturalism), contends that any “structure” as an unobservable en-
tity is real and knowable (Wendt 1999: 47-48). For him, this is true for the 
world of natural sciences (here examples of unobservable “structures” include 
the atom or the double helix of DNA) as well as for the social sciences (the 
structures of any social system). The ontological position of scientific realism is 
that structures are unobservable; however, it is contended that they are real and 
knowable. For the study of the international system, the assumption of struc-
tures as unobservables but real and knowables implies that the state system and 
the state are assumed to be “real structures” (ontology) (Wendt 1999: 47-48). 
The reality of structures is assumed to be independent of human thought. As re-
al structures, independent of human thought, they are also knowable, legitimate 
objects of science (epistemology). More concretely, because they are real and 
independent of the human mind, they can be approached and examined by sci-
ence despite being unobservable. The purpose of scientific theories is to refer to 
this world of observables as well as “unobservables”. Theory is thus under-
stood as a reflection of reality: “ontology before epistemology”, a position that 
is in contrast to positivism (“epistemology before ontology”). 

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To clarify these statements even further, we can compare them to the em-
piricist position of positivism. While in empiricism theoretical concepts such 
as “the international states system” or “structure of the international system” 
are only instruments, devices for the purpose of organizing our experience 
(that is, concepts that do NOT refer to the real world), in scientific realism 
the concepts of states system or structure refer to real structures (Wendt 
1999: 49). In short: In positivism, theories about unobservables are treated 
instrumentally, not realistically. As we know from the second unit in Part 1 
of the book, observation has a privileged epistemic status in positivism com-
pared to theory: “What we can claim to exist depends on what we can know, 
and we can only know what we can see” (Wendt 1999: 60). Hence, in empir-
icism, only observable reality is real and can be known through science.
Regarding the concept of “structure” in neorealism, this explanation con-
sequently means that structure has “no being”. It is not an ontological entity, 
as “structure” is a concept; a device to organize our observation. Hence in a 
positivist approach, structure is operationalized by “translation” into observ-
ables: the distribution of power, with a concept of power as the capability of 
the state (measurable). 
However, despite these differences in the treatment of theoretical terms, 
scientific realism and positivism do share an important feature: “Scientific 
realism assumes that reality exists independent of human beings – that sub-
ject and object are distinct – and can be discovered through science” (Wendt 
1999: 49). However, for scientific realism and in contrast to positivism, this 
holds true for unobservables as well. A scientific realist interpretation of sci-
ence depends on a distinction between subject and object (Wendt 1999: 50). 
At the core of Wendt’s work is an interest in the scientific inquiry into the 
unobservable “deep structure” of the international system (Wendt 1999: 49). 
He takes this approach with the intention of building an argument against the 
claim from positivist IR that structural analysis of unobservables is unscien-
tific. 
However, Wendt faces a fundamental problem: social structures are dif-
ferent to material structures. This is because of the ideational nature of social