International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

structures. This nature calls into question the argument of an independence of 
social (ideational) structures from the human mind and raises doubts that sub-
ject and object are distinct – the precondition for being knowable through 
both positivist and realist science. A scientific realist position about natural 
science seems to be unproblematic because it is based on a materialist ontol-
ogy where an object-subject distinction is possible. But what about scientific 
realist social science? Here the core question is: How can social kinds remain 
“objective” despite their basis in shared ideas? (Wendt 1999: 72). How can 

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they be claimed to be legitimate objects of science the same way that natural 
kinds are?
In Wendt’s words the central question is: “How is it possible to adopt an 
idealist and holist ontology while maintaining a commitment to science, or pos-
itivism broadly understood?” (Wendt 1999: 47). Is the ontology of the social 
world consistent with scientific realism? Wendt is convinced that it is. Let us 
therefore continue on to the line of argument for this affirmative position. 
1.2.
Social structures are also real and legitimate “objects” of 
scientific inquiry 
We have learned that Wendt’s aim is to formulate a scientific realist perspec-
tive about the structure of social systems. In his writings he uses the term 
“social kinds”, a term derived from John Searl (1995: The Construction of 
Social Reality). It refers to the “things in the social world”, such as “society”, 
the “state”, “money”, the “family”, the “school” etc.: It is the nature of “so-
cial kinds” that they are “made of ideas” (Wendt 1998: 103). We will read 
and learn about the social (that is, inherently ideational) nature of “social 
kinds” in more detail later (Step 2). For didactical reasons, we will first start 
with the arguments to establish the status of social structures as legitimate 
objects of science, i.e. as objects of scientific inquiry for which a fundamental 
subject/object distinction is claimed to be possible (in line with scientific re-
alism). To recall the “problem of social kinds”: If social kinds are made of 
ideas, then we can hardly claim an independent existence from human beings 
and their minds, language etc. At a more general as well as abstract and phil-
osophical level, this problem is known as the mind/body or mind/matter 
problem: are the material/nature and the ideational distinct entities or not? 
Philosophical materialism/physicalism
Wendt’s solution to this problem is to claim a final, ultimate fundamental basis 
of the social world in nature (materialism). He holds that society is not reduci-
ble to nature, but nature is perceived as the material foundation of society 
(Wendt 1999: 51, my italics). In other words, Wendt’s position is rooted in the 
belief that the world is ultimately made of material things: at the most basic 
level, sub-atomic particles (matter/material nature to be studied by physics). 
This position is called philosophical materialism or physicalism. In a nutshell, 
Wendt commits to a social science that is not distinct from the natural sciences 
(Wendt 1999: 52). The underlying assumption is that the world ultimately con-
tains “natural kinds”, or material entities with “causal power” due to intrinsic 

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thought-independent structures. The material entities hence have the effect of 
“reality constraints”. In other words, social science theories should conform to 
the findings of natural science regarding natural kinds (matter) (Wendt 1999: 
58). In the second unit of Part 1, this positivist position has also been called 
“naturalism” (a materialist or physicalist position). 
So how can “social kinds” remain “objective” despite their basis in shared 
ideas? The answer is a metaphysical argument that points to an ultimate ma-
terial base of society and/or the social world in physical, material properties. 
Human beings are thus perceived as “natural kinds” with “intrinsic material 
properties” such as brains or genetic predispositions (Wendt 1999: 72). The 
mind (ideas/theories/the social etc.) ultimately rests in the material world 
(body/matter/ material, physical world): “In the last analysis a theory of so-
cial kinds must refer to natural kinds, including human bodies and their phys-
ical behavior, which are amenable to a causal theory of reference” (Wendt 
1999: 72). For Wendt, there is a need for a theory that takes account of the 
contribution of mind and language “yet is anchored to external reality.” 
(Wendt 1999: 57, my italics). Wendt sums up his materialist position with the 
words “Constructivism without nature goes too far!” (Wendt 1999: 72, em-
phasis mine). 
Epistemological individualism 
A naturalist position or “constructivism with nature” allows one to think 
about “social kinds” as “objective” and hence able to be known by human 
subjects. However, there is a second step in Wendt’s argument that makes the 
thesis of an object-subject-distinction for social kinds too strong: “Even 
though social kinds are not mind/discourse-independent of the collectivity 
that constitutes them, they are usually independent of the minds and dis-
course of the individuals who want to explain them” (Wendt 1999: 75, italics 
in the original). It is the nature of social kinds that they are collectively con-