International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

stituted. This is an ontologically idealist position (to be elaborated in more 
detail in Step 2) that is attached to an epistemological position of “objectiv-
ism”. This attachment allows one to think of the social world as “confronting 
the individual as objective social facts”. Wendt calls it epistemological indi-
vidualism (Wendt 1999: 75, my italics), in which “(t)he international system 
confronts the IR theorist as an objective social fact that is independent of his 
or her beliefs (…)” (Wendt 1999: 75). For Wendt, the same is true for the po-
litical decision-makers: “As lay scientists, foreign policy decision-makers 
experience a similar dualism of subject and object in their daily efforts to ne-
gotiate the world” (Wendt 1999: 75). 

---

207 
In sum, “social kinds” such as a “state” or the “states system” confront 
the researcher as natural facts, as objects. To be objects, they have to be “rei-
fied” (Wendt 1999: 76). As the result of reification, the “states system” is as-
sumed to exist independently of social scientists. It therefore becomes a legit-
imate object of scientific inquiry or for political decision-making by (foreign) 
policy-makers. The interaction with the reality of the states system regulates 
the theorizing about it (Wendt 1999: 63): ontology is before epistemology.
Moments of reflexivity: Blurring the object/subject distinction 
In contrast to the natural world, however, Wendt maintains that the subject-
object distinction varies when it comes to the social world (Wendt 1999: 73, 
my italics) because the extent to which material forces determine social kinds 
varies. The influence of material forces is treated as a variable and, as a vari-
able, can be examined empirically. Nevertheless, due to the fundamental nat-
uralist position there ultimately is a subject-object-distinction. 
Exceptions to the “rule” of an object-subject distinction occur “when col-
lectives become aware of the social kinds they are constituting and move to 
change them, in what might be called a moment of ‘reflexivity’ (Wendt 1999: 
76, emphasis original). This potential of reflexivity is unique to the social 
world as compared to the natural world. “In effect, if a social kind can ‘know 
itself’, then it may be able to recall its human authorship, transcend the sub-
ject-object distinction, and create new social kinds (Wendt 1999: 76). In such 
“moments of reflexivity”, social scientific theories can become part of their 
world. Only then is reality caused by theory and the distinction between sub-
ject and object becomes blurred. However, for Wendt, this happens only as 
an exception and is very rare. A different position would make a scientific re-
alist approach to the social world impossible; as Wendt argues, “[i]f societies 
were constantly doing this – in a sort of ‘permanent conceptual revolution’ – 
we could not be realists about society.” (Wendt 1999: 76). 
Truth of theory 
Against the background of the position “ontology before epistemology” (i.e. 
reality/ontology conditions theory/epistemology; theory as a reflection of re-
ality), the “ultimate argument for realism” is that science has been a success 
in helping to manipulate the world (Wendt 1999: 59-64). By formulating sci-
entific theories we are getting closer to the (unobservable) structures of reali-
ty and hence gradually gaining a better understanding of the world. In line 
with scientific realism, Wendt argues that a theory is “true” to the extent that 
it reflects the causal structure of the world (also called “correspondence theo-

---

208 
ry of truth”). In essence, theories are always being tested against other theo-
ries, not against pre-theoretical foundations (realism is anti-foundationalist). 
We thus cannot know for certain that a claim of reference is true, as there is 
only “approximate truth”. For this reason, scientists have to rely on “mature 
theories” that have proven successful in the world (Wendt 1999: 59).
Summary 
For Wendt, the ideational structure of the social world does not prevent a sci-
entific realist approach to the study of this world. This is because of his con-
viction that a) there is an ultimate material base for social kinds (although to 
varying degrees) and b) social kinds have intrinsic powers and dispositions 
that exist independently of the mind/discourse of those who wish to know 
them. These two core arguments establish the ontological status of unobserv-
able social structures as “real” and as legitimate objects of scientific inquiry, 
independent of the subject of inquiry itself. 
Let us now take the next step in learning about the new ontology on 
which Wendt’s social theory is based. As a social constructivist, Wendt is in-
terested in the difference that ideas make. In contrast to Waltz, Wendt feels 
that not only material factors count when it comes to the structure of the in-
ternational system. For him, immaterial, ideational factors are also essential. 
More than this, for Wendt “(…) the role of the material base in international 
politics is relatively small, even if it remains essential for preserving a causal 
theory of reference” (Wendt 1999: 73; emphasis mine). 
This discussion now brings us back to the ideational nature/ontology of 
social structures in more detail. 
Step 2: 
The ontological status of “structure” as “made of ideas”: 
Common and collective knowledge (culture) 
Wendt’s interest in the effects of ideational/social structures has led to that 
theoretical approach being called “social constructivist”. Reality is socially 
constructed, based on collective ideas (idealism of social constructivism). 
The position points to the intersubjective quality of the social world, the role 
of ideas, constitutive rules and norms, and the endogenous forming of inter-
ests and ideas. When compared to ontologically positivist theorizing, these 
aspects demonstrate different statements and assumptions about the “sub-
stance” of international politics and lead to different theoretical results about 

---

209 
such central issues of international politics as “anarchy” or “sovereignty”. 
This focus on the ideational nature of structure caused Wendt to become as-
sociated with social constructivism in the first place: in his words, “Anarchy 
is what states make of it” (Wendt 1987), a social construction that varies de-
pending on the collective ideas that constitute the structure. Both the structure 
of “anarchy” and the institution of “sovereignty” are theoretically rethought 
as “social kinds”; they are constructed by the way actors act and depending 
on which collective ideas they share.
In this section, we will learn about the idealist ontology of social con-
structivism in more detail. 
For Wendt, the structure of any social system consists of three “ele-
ments”: a material structure, a structure of interests, and an ideational struc-
ture (Wendt 1999: 139). It is only for analytical purposes that he treats them 
as separate structures. According to Wendt, “[t]he task of structural theoriz-
ing ultimately must be to show how the elements of a system fit together into 
some kind of whole” (Wendt 1999: 139).