Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary

partially of our choosing—could have been taken in a different way; none of them
express absolute necessity. Where one alternative is chosen instead of others, this
decision is ultimately based on force rather than rational necessity. The force in
question may be quite minimal, such as the suppression of a given set of alternatives
when a choice is made, or it may involve the most brutal forms of exclusion (Laclau
1996b:112).
In other words, social change is achieved not because the arguments of some
historical groups are morally better than others when measured according to a
universal standard, and not because the triumphant group’s discourse expresses a
necessary moment in the unfolding of reason. For Laclau, the very notions of
universal standards and historical necessity are strategic myths. In contemporary
complex societies, social change is achieved because some political struggles and
historical forces strategically prevail over the opposing groups and forces. We have
seen that Laclau tends to argue that the success of a hegemonic strategy depends
on its form—its provision of an orderly space for the inscription of political
demands. Differing slightly with Laclau on this point, I would argue that a
hegemonic force prevails to the extent that it deploys a combination of tactics—
involving violence, exclusion, articulation and redefinition, persuasion, the general
framing of the political terrain, institutionalization and so on—that allows it to
exploit the unique opportunities that are available in a given historical
configuration. It should also be noted that in both this formulation and Laclau’s
theory, the hegemonic agent is not a concrete subject; it is instead an historical
force. As Nietzsche and Foucault argue, historical forces are always prior to the

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formation of subjects. Hegemony and power are not instruments that can be wielded
by individuals or groups; they are the conditions of possibility of any subjectivity.
The permanence of power relations is not, however, a fatality for radical
democratic pluralism. The political aim of radical democratic pluralism is not the
elimination of power, but the transformation of the prevailing forms of power,
such that they become more compatible with democratic principles (Mouffe
1995:502). The space for contestation will have to be kept open against all sorts
of closure strategies; new decisions must always be taken; and alternative
possibilities will have to be suppressed (Laclau 1996b:115). Perhaps an egalitarian
policy will have unforeseen consequences with respect to the limitations of some
individuals’ freedom; perhaps a progressive conception of civil liberties and civil
rights will have serious inegalitarian effects in a new context; or perhaps an
apparently innocent identification with radical principles is actually influenced
by an unspeakable demonization. While democracy tends to enhance an awareness
of contingency and to create the space in which difference in identity can be
affirmed, it also creates the potential for a reactive politics of dogmatic
identitarianism (Connolly 1991:193). By creating and defending the space for
contestation, and by keeping the tension between the principles of equality and
liberty alive, radical democratic pluralism seeks to sustain the conditions in which
these sorts of problems could be brought to light and addressed (Mouffe 1992a:13).
Further, there is no reason to assume that an awareness of the contingency of
decision-making would necessarily lead to political paralysis. Laclau contends that
to the extent that we become aware of contingency, we are much more likely to
submit a given formation to democratic contestation and to grasp the vulnerability
of the democratic revolution’s historical gains. Awareness of historicity can enhance
a sense of social responsibility for the “consciousness of the historicity [of
values]…will make us more responsible citizens, more ready to engage in their
defense” (Laclau 1996b:123). Mouffe similarly writes, “When we realize that, far
from being the necessary result of a moral evolution of mankind, liberal democracy
is an ensemble of contingent practices, we can understand that it is a conquest
that needs to be protected as well as deepened” (1993b:145).
2
Fish would be
somewhat more pessimistic. Criticizing what he calls the “anti-foundationalist
theory hope,” Fish asserts that every political discourse necessarily closes off some
set of differences as legitimate, and necessarily fails to express a complete
consciousness of contingency and historicity (1994:172–9).