Minds and Computers : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence

analytic view – a substantive theory of what mental states are.
Henceforth, when I make reference simply to ‘behaviourism’, I will be
referring to the philosophical variety.
Philosophical behaviourism was motivated in part by positivism
and the associated desire to produce a theory of mind which a
fforded
the possibility of empirical psychology. Behaviourism was also a reac-
tion to the serious theoretical di
fficulties plaguing dualism. Gilbert
Ryle famously accused Cartesian dualists – in The Concept of Mind
(1949) – of postulating a ‘ghost in the machine’. Behaviourists
eschewed the dualist notion that mental state terms denoted events
and processes occurring in some immaterial substance.
According to the behaviourist, the terms in our language which we
take to denote mental states are, in fact, simply convenient locutions
for referring to complex kinds of behaviour. When we say, for
instance, that Jon is in love, what we actually mean is that Jon goes
around with a silly grin on his face, is inclined to organise his time in
such a way as to see more of the object of his a
ffections, has a ten-
dency to write bad poetry, etc. When we say that Tillie has a
toothache, what we actually mean is that Tillie grimaces and moans,
has a tendency to clutch her jaw, is inclined to seek a dentist, etc.
Attributions of mental states are, according to the behaviourist, actu-
ally attributions of kinds of behaviour: the meaning of mental state
terms is properly specified in terms of behaviour.
Let’s quickly make clear here the relation between philosophical
(analytic) behaviourism and psychological (methodological) behav-
iourism. Clearly the former entails the latter. If mental states just are
kinds of behaviour then the investigation of mentality is ipso facto the
investigation of kinds of behaviour. The converse, however, does not
hold. It is not the case that a methodological behaviourist must be an
analytic behaviourist. One might think that psychology should be a
science of human behaviour but still maintain that mental states have
an existence independent of (but investigable through observing)
behaviour.
Philosophical behaviourism, properly construed, is a reductive
semantic thesis, according to which the analysis of mental state terms
involves a reduction to talk of behaviour. It is crucial that this talk of
behaviour is fleshed out in terms of dispositions to behave, not simply
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in terms of behaviour itself. After all, Tillie might have a toothache
yet manifest no associated behaviour at all – perhaps she is fearful of
dentistry and seeks to hide her pain lest she be coerced into seeing a
dentist. The behaviourist accommodates this by giving essentially dis-
positional analyses of mental states since dispositions can be inhib-
ited. In the example case, the behaviourist will argue that Tillie’s
toothache just is the disposition to groan and grimace, the inclination
to clutch her jaw, the tendency to seek a dentist, etc.; however, her fear
of dentistry inhibits these dispositions and accounts for her lack of
manifest behaviour.
Behaviourism certainly enjoys some philosophical advantages. It
solves the problem of other minds for a start, since it renounces the
commitment to inaccessible immaterial mental substance. It satisfies
Ockham’s razor in not expanding our ontology beyond explanatory
necessity, since mental states are no longer held to have any indepen-
dent existence. It accommodates the notion that mentality comes by
degrees, since the capacity for more complex behaviour just is the
capacity for more complex mental states. It can account for the
importance of the brain in mental life, given the nervous system is
the physical cause of behaviour (hence of mentality). Finally, it
confers a clear methodology for psychological investigation, in stark
contrast to dualism.
Unfortunately, despite these attractive theoretical advantages,
behaviourism faces a number of insuperable objections.
3.6 OBJECTIONS TO PHILOSOPHICAL
BEHAVIOURISM
We’ll begin with the three objections which merely problematise
behaviourism and move on to the further three objections which are
insurmountable for the behaviourist.
The first thing to note is that dispositional criteria can be satisfied
in the absence of the associated mental state. Consider the case of
actors. An actor playing a character with a toothache is disposed to
moan, grimace, clutch her jaw and so on, yet is clearly not actually
su
ffering from toothache.
Furthermore, dispositional criteria can fail to be satisfied in the
presence of the associated mental state. Consider the case of stoics. A
stoic person may have a dreadful toothache yet not be disposed to
engage in any associated behaviour. The account of the inhibitability
of dispositions is intended to go some way towards answering this
latter objection; however, even so, the behaviourist has some di
fficult
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explaining to do. Consideration of actors and stoics and the corres-
ponding ways in which dispositions and mental states can come apart
problematises an analysis which seeks to identify mental states with
dispositions to behave.
A third, and more troubling, objection to behaviourism focuses on
how, precisely, we are supposed to completely specify the lists of dis-
positions which are identified with particular mental states. In short,
the concern is that there is no way to remove the ‘etc.’ or the ‘and so
on’ from the end of the enumeration of dispositions. Behaviourist
paraphrases of mental state terms seem essentially incompletable,
since there are a very large number of ways in which a mental state
might manifest in behaviour.
Consider, for example, the statement ‘Nicole loves her children’.
What associated dispositions should we load into the paraphrased
analysis? That she is disposed to ensure they’re adequately fed, to
ensure they’re warmly clothed, to embrace them, to tell them that
they’re loved, to educate them, to be concerned for their welfare, to
attend to their upsets, to comfort them when scared, to protect them
from harm, to lie awake at nights thinking of their future, etcetera,
etcetera.
These first three objections are certainly of concern for the behav-
iourist but they might be answerable with some fancy footwork.
These next three objections, however, are su
fficient to defeat even the
most nimble-footed behaviourist.
For starters, pain hurts. Being in pain essentially involves a privi-
leged first-person qualitative experience of hurtfulness. It is precisely
this hurtfulness that characterises what it is to be in pain and distin-
guishes real pain behaviour from pretend pain behaviour. There is, in
short, something that it is like to be in pain. So it is with other mental
states. There is something that it feels like to be in love, or to be angry,
or to be excited about an upcoming holiday. Behaviourism completely
fails to capture these essential subjective qualitative aspects of mental
states.
For seconds, dispositional analyses serve poorly as explanations.
When we attribute mental states to others, we typically do so in order
to explain and understand their behaviour. If mental states, however,
are to be analysed in terms of dispositions to behave, these attribu-
tions are circular and uninformative.
If, for instance, I ask a physicist why it is that glass shatters when
struck sharply and the reply is that this is because glass is brittle,
the brittleness of glass is intended as an explanation for this behav-
iour. If I then inquire into the meaning of brittleness and am told that
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brittleness is that property that glass has such that it is disposed to
shatter when struck sharply, I have learned nothing. What I was
looking for was some explanation of brittleness in terms of the phys-
ical properties of the substance, not its dispositional properties.
Similarly, suppose I observe Wayne walking into a pizzeria and ask
Eloise what he is doing and the response is that Wayne is hungry.
Wayne’s hunger is intended as an explanation for his behaviour. If I
then inquire into the meaning of hunger and am told that hunger just