O‘zbekiston respublikasida ma’muriy protseduralarni takomillashtirish

«Administrative Law: a casebook» seventh edition. Aspen Publishers, 2010. 385 p). 
«Historically, the exact content of due process protections was never made clear. 
One of the earliest cases in the 20
th
century, Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 
(1908), suggested that due process could be satisfied by the most simple procedures: 
due process of law requires that, at some stage of the procedings, the[person] shall 
have an opportunity to be heard, of which he must have notice, either personal or by 
publication, or by a law fixing the time and place of the hearing…Many requirements 
essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in procedings of this 
nature. But even here a hearing, in its very essence, demands that he who is entitled 

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to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument, however brief, and, if 
need be by proof, however informal». (William F.Funk, Richard H.Seamon 
«Administrative Law: examples 
＆
 explanations» 2
nd
 edition. Aspen Publishers, 2006. 
116 p). 
4.8-ilova 
«Goldberg listed the following requirements as necessary to provide due process: 
Timely and adequate notice of the charges against the person; Confrontation and 
cross-examination of adverse witnesses; The opportunity to present his own 
witnesses; The opportunity to address the fact-finder orally; The right to have counsel 
present; A decision on the record; An explanation of the decision; and An impartial 
decision maker». (William F.Funk, Richard H.Seamon «Administrative Law: 
examples 
＆
 explanations» 2
nd
 edition. Aspen Publishers, 2006. 117 p). 
4.9-ilova 
«The Constitution is the source of many of the procedural principles that 
administrative agencies must observe. The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the 
federal agencies, provides that no person shall «be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law,» and the Fourteenth Amendment contains a 
similar limitation on state action. The concept of procedural due process implies that 
official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, such as the 
right to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a decision is 
made. This constitutional doctrine gives federal courts a potent tool with which to 
oversee the decisionmaking procedures of federal agencies when the applicable 
statutes and regulations permit the administrator to act informally. Equally important, 
the doctrine gives the federal judiciary a measure of control over the decisionmaking 
methods of state and local agencies, which otherwise are governed almost exclusively 
by state law. Broadly speaking, judicial decisions applying the due process clauses to 

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administrative action have developed a fairly well defined analytical framework. 
Since the constitutional language refers to denials of «life, liberty, or property,» the 
threshold question is whether an adverse decision will deprive a person of one of 
these protected interests. Very few administrative decisions pose threats to life; thus, 
the usual starting point is to determine whether a protected property or liberty interest 
exists. If these and certain other threshold issues are surmounted, the question 
becomes one of determining what process is «due» under the particular 
circumstances. This question is often difficult to answer, however, because modern 
administrative law tries to take account of the enormous diversity of situations in 
which due process claims can be advanced. Regulatory decisions affect a wide 
variety of private interests, and the government’s justifications for summary action 
also differ from one setting to the next. In addition, a particular procedural right, such 
as the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses or the right to be 
heard by an impartial decisionmaker, may enhance the accuracy and fairness of the 
process more substantially in one setting than in another. Consequently, due process 
rights in administrative law can vary enormously, depending on the context in which 
in which they are asserted. Traditionally, the interests protected by the due process 
clauses were defined quite narrowly. Many government benefits and grants were 
considered mere gratuities or «privileges» rather than rights; like a private donor, the 
government could impose whatever conditions it wished on its gift, or even remove 
the benefit at will. This view was exemplified by Justice Holmes’ famous dictum, in 
upholding the firing of a police officer for political activities, that «[t]he petitioner 
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be 
policeman». McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). 
Reflecting this attitude, courts held for many years that government employement 
was not an interest protected by due process and thus could be terminated without 
any procedural protection…During the 1960s, hovewer, as the size of the 
bureaucracy grew and public concern about government’s obligations to its citizens 
became more acute, the soundness of the right-privilege distinction was questioned. 
Commentators pointed out that a wide variety of forms of social wealth, ranging from 

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TV station licenses to truck routes to occupational licenses to welfare benefits, were 
the results of government largess, and thus were «privileges». As government 
expanded, these new forms of wealth had become increasingly vital to the individual; 
often, the loss of a government job, or an occupational license, or a welfare payment, 
could deprive a person of her livelihood. Thus, to maintain the balance between 
government and individual, it was necessary to extend the protections of due process 
to this «new property». See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale 
L.J. 733(1964). Accordingly, the Supreme Court started to edge away from the right-
privilege distinction. In Cafeteria ＆ Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886 (1961), the Court held that a government employee who was stripped of her 
security clearance, and thus her ability to work at a naval base, was not entitled to a 
specification of charges and an opportunity to know and refute adverse evidence. 
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that the right-privilege distinction was «perhaps 
[an] oversimplification»; the Court used a more flexible line of reasoning, arguing 
that the government’s proprietary interest in unfettered management of a military 
base outweighed the employee’s interest in keeping her job as a short-order cook at a 
specific site. The Court finally abandoned the right-privilege distinction in Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970). In that case, welfare beneficiaries in New 
York claimed that their payments had been terminated without due process of law. 
The Court said that these claims could not be defeated by a mere assertion that the 
benefits were gratuities or privileges. (Actually, the state defendants had made no 
such assertion, but the Court’s dictum was quickly recognized ass authoritative.) The 
welfare program in question was based on a system of statutory entitlements: all 
applicants who met the conditions defined by the legislature were entitled to receive 
public assistance. Consequently, the state had to afford due process safeguards – in 
this instance, an oral hearing – before it could terminate the benefits. With the demise 
of the right-privilege distinction, the Court needed to develop a new method for 
deciding who was entitled to due process protection. The Court unveiled such an 
approach in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). There 
an untenured instructor at a state university was held to have no due process right to 

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be heard when the university refused to renew his contract. Emphasizing the language 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court noted that the requirements of procedural 
due process extend only to those who have been deprived of «liberty» or «property». 
The Court went on to explain that the loss of a governmental benefit is a deprivation 
of «property» only if the individual has a «legitimate claim of entitlement» to the 
benefit, rather than merely a «unilateral expectation» of it. Since neither state law nor 
university rules nor the contract itself had given Roth a legitimate basis for claiming 
that he was «entitled» to a renewal of the contract, he had possessed no «property» 
interest in continued employment beyond his contract year. Similarly, Roth had not 
been deprived of «liberty» in the constitutional sense, because , so far as the record 
showed, he «simply [was] not rehired in one job but remain[ed] as free as before to 
seek another». The Roth approach of examining initially whether a plaintiff has been 
deprived of liberty or property has retained its vitality down to the present day. Both 
of these two pivotal concepts, however, have been refined by subsequent case law 
developments». (Ernest Gellhorn, Ronald M.Levin «Administrative Law and Process