Foreign relations of the united states 1969–1976 volume XXXVII energy crisis, 1974–1980 department of state washington
Download 8.4 Mb.Pdf ko'rish
- Bu sahifa navigatsiya:
- Kissinger 51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia
On March 6, 1975, OPEC capped a 3-day summit in Algiers by is-
suing a 14-point “Solemn Declaration.” The points most relevant to the
industrialized oil-consuming nations included: the agreement “in prin-
ciple to holding an international conference bringing together the de-
veloped and developing countries,” but one that “can in no case be con-
fined to an examination of the question of energy” and “includes the
questions of raw materials of the developing countries”; the declaration
that “their countries are willing to continue to make positive contribu-
tions towards the solution of the major problems affecting the world
economy, and to promote genuine cooperation which is the key to the
establishment of a new international economic order”; the recognition
of “the present disorder in the international monetary system and the
absence of rules and instruments essential to safeguard the terms of
trade and the value of financial assets of developing countries”; and an
expression of the belief that “an artificially low price for petroleum in
the past has prompted over exploitation of this limited and depletable
resource and that continuation of such policy would have proved to be
disastrous from the point of view of conservation and world economy.”
164 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
(Telegram 630 from Algiers, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Cen-
tral Foreign Policy Files, D750080–0645)
The next day, March 7, the International Energy Agency Gov-
erning Board addressed the last point by reaching an agreement on a
“minimum price concept” and “other elements” from Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger’s February 3 speech (see footnote 4, Document 39).
The Board also recommended to the European Community, Japan, and
the United States that they accept France’s invitation to a preparatory
producer/consumer conference, referred to as “Prepcon.” (Telegram
5952 from USOECD Paris, March 7; Ford Library, National Security
Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 4,
France—State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE–NODIS (3))
At its March 20 meeting, the Board formally adopted a
“three-tiered alternative sources policy” that included the “establish-
ment of agreed common minimum price level below which imported
oil will not be sold in domestic economies” and the “identification of
price level by July 1, 1975.” Furthermore, because the Board felt that
“satisfactory progress in the three areas of consumer solidarity” had
been made, it formally recommended that the IEA membership accept
France’s invitation to the Prepcon, which Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas Enders believed appeared “more and more likely to result in
little precise agreement.” (Telegram 7179 from USOECD Paris, March
August 1974–April 1975 165
Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, March 25, 1975, 3:45–4:05 p.m.
Tactics for Producer/Consumer PrepCon
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
The Honorable Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
The Honorable Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Honorable Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
The Honorable Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Robert Hormats, NSC Senior Staff Member
Mr. Samuel W. Lewis, Deputy Director, S/P
Mr. Lawrence R. Raicht, Deputy Director, EB/ORF/FSE
Robinson: Rather than sending you four cables, we have put to-
gether a single paper to go over with you.
We have four additional
questions requiring your decision. The issues are:
— How much we should aim to settle at the Prepcon, and whether
we should go along with a request for a second preparatory meeting;
— How to play the representation issue with the Algerians and
— What kind of press play we should aim for; and
— Our representation.
Kissinger: I think the more Prepcons we have, the better. As you
know, I have never been eager for a conference with the producers.
Enders: We are concerned about having more than one Prepcon. It
could become a continuing meeting which would eclipse the IEA and
slide into substantive matters. We want to avoid this, but if we can’t set-
tle everything at this meeting there may be a push for a second
Kissinger: Who wants another meeting?
Enders: The Europeans do to settle whether they will come as one
or nine after the UK referendum on the EC.
Robinson: I believe that’s scheduled for May.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Lot 91D414, Box
10, Classified External Memoranda of Conversations, January–April 1975. Secret; Nodis.
Drafted by Raicht on March 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference
randum that required decisions from Kissinger. (Ibid., Box 1, Nodis—Miscellaneous Doc-
uments and Telegrams)
166 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
Enders: The EC can not make up its mind whether they will be rep-
resented as one or separately. The smaller countries don’t want to be
left out and the UK has made clear that it expects to have its own seat.
The other EC countries hope that after the British referendum, the UK
will be able to agree to a single EC representative.
Kissinger: We certainly don’t need a meeting just for that.
Robinson: Yes, but we should be aware of this problem.
Enders: On the first issue, the question is how much we want to
close out at this meeting.
Kissinger: Before we get to that, who the hell represents us at the
Robinson: That’s covered in the 4th question. You have agreed we
should avoid substantive issues. We’ve outlined 3 alternatives on rep-
resentation on page 6. Myself, initially, with Tom to replace me, or
Tom, or Jules Katz as the representative, to emphasize our intention to
keep the prepcon strictly on procedural issues.
Kissinger: How long is this meeting going to last?
Robinson: There has been talk of a 2 week meeting.
Enders: I would guess about 1 week.
Kissinger: Well, I already told the Saudis that you (to Robinson)
would be our representative, so I think you will have to do it. Who are
the Saudis sending?
Robinson: It could be Prince Saud, or possibly Yamani after the
King’s death this morning.
Kissinger: I think Saud was scheduled to be there, not Yamani.
Robinson: That’s true, but there may be a change as a result of this
Kissinger: Well, I think you (to Robinson) should be there.
Robinson: I agree, I think it would give me some continuity in my
dealings with producer countries. I talked to Shultz about this and he
Kissinger: What is this question you have raised in here about the
US commitment to the IEA?
Enders: It’s essentially playback I got at the last Governing Board
from several European delegations, from events in the Middle
Kissinger: From whom?
King Faisal was assassinated on March 25. Faisal’s brother, Khalid, succeeded him
as King of Saudi Arabia.
See Document 48.
August 1974–April 1975 167
Enders: I don’t know from whom in the Middle East, but several
delegations asked me if we had flipped our strategy.
Enders: The German delegation, the British, and Davignon all
Kissinger: Yes, and each of them are dealing separately with the
producers on this.
Enders: Yes, that’s true.
Kissinger: We are the only IEA virgins.
Enders: Well, we have to stick with them in the IEA.
Kissinger: First, we must protect ourselves against their treachery.
I am convinced that we can expect the same kind of thing to develop in
the conference with the producers as occurred during the European Se-
However, the IEA is a major effort to achieve consumer solidarity
and we are not going to jettison it now.
Enders: I made that clear at the Governing Board meeting. I see my
role at the prepcon basically as keeping the Europeans under control.
Kissinger: OK, but I want to maintain the option of going the bilat-
eral route if they get unruly. We must not be the last to do bilaterals.
When is the conference?
Robinson: It’s scheduled to start April 7.
Kissinger: When are you going to Moscow?
Kissinger: You’re coming back before the conference, aren’t you?
Robinson: Yes, I’ll be back at the end of the week.
Kissinger: Then we can meet again before the conference.
Were you planning to go to Jordan during your Middle East trip?
Robinson: No, I wasn’t.
Kissinger: Well, I may want you to go there and to Saudi Arabia. I
think in light of today’s events we should show the flag there.
Enders: The next issue is, should we leave any of the procedural
questions open at the prepcon?
Kissinger: I want the IEA to have the same status at the meeting as
Enders: It does, in fact IEA is better positioned. It has been invited,
OPEC has not.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the last meeting of which
took place in December 1974.
168 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
Kissinger: What about a rotating chairmanship? I am attracted to
Enders: I think it’s fine; it is not effective, but it would solve a lot of
the political problems.
Hormats: But how do we solve who chairs within each of the 3
groups: LDCs, Producers, and Consumers?
Kissinger: I think we stick strictly to the Martinique formula.
Enders: That’s exactly what I told the French. They agreed.
Kissinger: Don’t the French think the formal conference is going to
be in Paris?
Kissinger: Well, I assumed it would be in Paris from the beginning
but I would prefer Vienna.
How about Geneva?
Enders: That would be better; it might also enable you to do both
the Producer/Consumer conference and the Arab/Israeli meeting.
Robinson: The French would never accept New York.
Kissinger: OK, I think we should go for Geneva.
Hormats: I wonder whether we should insist on unanimity.
Kissinger: What other options are there?
Enders: The other option is a UN-type of consensus. You recall the
problems we had with that at the General Assembly Special Session.
Kissinger: The problem with unanimity is that it would give every-
body a veto.
You know, I never felt this conference was needed. If everyone has
a veto, I don’t see what can come out of it.
Enders: I agree the unanimity approach would give everyone a
veto, but I think we need this. Essentially, this means that either the Al-
gerians or we could block decisions.
Kissinger: I don’t believe the Algerians are looking for a
Enders: Yes, but the Algerians don’t want the conference to suc-
ceed. They are using it for the same reason we are, to build LDC
Kissinger: Do we want it to succeed?
Enders: The Algerian objective is really to expand the dialogue to
include all raw materials. We must avoid that.
Kissinger: What about the press play? What are you talking about
Enders: The Algerians will have all of their speeches in the press
immediately. They will try to dominate the producer/LDC side. How
do you want us to play it; should we deadpan?
August 1974–April 1975 169
Kissinger: I think you should give a briefing every day, but be
matter of fact and cool with the press. Make it clear that we are not
there to discuss substance, only procedure.
Robinson: I think that gives us the guidance we need on that. The
rest of the recommendations are in line with the ones I got in my con-
versations with George Shultz.
Kissinger: I would give a thoughtful procedural speech. Let the Al-
gerians dominate the substance but don’t debate them. The art here is
to look positive without getting carried away by your rhetoric.
Robinson: That’s pretty much in line with our thoughts.
Lord: Are you clear on the representation issue? The 12/6/6
Robinson: 12 consumers gets hung up with the UK representation
Kissinger: Suppose all 9 of the EC come.
Enders: That means the conference will get substantially larger,
but we may want that to happen.
Kissinger: I’m convinced that the French will do the same thing at
this conference as they did at the European Security Conference, and I
want to take out some insurance against that.
Robinson: Where do you want me to go on my trip to the Middle
Kissinger: I think you should visit Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
Robinson: OK, we can talk about that later.
The meeting ended at 4:05 P.M.
Twelve oil-consuming countries, six oil-producing countries, and six LDCs.
170 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Washington, March 29, 1975, 2003Z.
71725. Subject: Letter From Secretary Kissinger to Minister
1. Please pass the following message from Secretary Kissinger to
2. Begin text. Dear Mr. Minister: In President Giscard d’Estaing’s
letter to President Ford of February 28, 1975,
France extended an invi-
tation to the United States to attend a preparatory meeting in Paris be-
ginning on April 7 to organize an international conference on energy.
During our meeting at Martinique in December, we agreed that a
formal conference with the oil producing nations and developing coun-
tries will be necessary and that it should be carefully prepared. In this
regard, we were in agreement that a preparatory meeting should take
place only after the oil consuming industrialized countries had made
substantial progress toward cooperation in energy related financial
matters, energy conservation and the development of new energy
Satisfactory progress in the first two of these three areas was
achieved in January and February. At its meeting of March 20, 1975 the
Governing Board of the International Energy Agency agreed on the
principles and elements of a coordinated system of cooperation in the
development of new supplies.
Certain elements of that system—notably a minimum protected
price for imported oil—may fall within the competence of the Euro-
pean Community, and I understand that their application will be dis-
cussed between France and the other members of the Community, par-
ticipants in the IEA, in the near future.
As you know, Mr. Minister, our representatives have held several
discussions of the concepts of the new IEA alternative supplies policies.
From these discussions, we have formed the hypothesis that France is
not hostile in principle to these concepts. On the basis of that hypothe-
sis the United States is of the opinion that the first stage of the sequence
agreed at Martinique has now been completed.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750111–0616.
Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Enders, cleared by Preeg and Sonnenfeldt, and ap-
proved by Kissinger.
See footnote 3, Document 45.
See Document 48.
August 1974–April 1975 171
Therefore, Mr. Minister, I am pleased to accept your invitation to
attend the preparatory meeting beginning on April 7. I understand that
you intend the meeting to confine itself rigorously to procedural
matters. That is a correct approach, in my view, which US repre-
sentatives are instructed strongly to support. We very much desire a
successful meeting, and the United States delegation will be prepared
to work actively to that end. I agree that the problems which the inter-
national community now faces in the area of energy require our most
urgent attention and close cooperation.
After the preparatory meeting, we can use Martinique’s Phase
III—intensive consultation on consumer positions—to determine the
way in which alternative sources policy and other consumer positions
should be implemented.
With warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger. End text.
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Washington, April 1, 1975, 0035Z.
72746. Subject: Tactics for Forthcoming Prepcon and Consumer/
1. At earliest opportunity and prior to departure Saudi delegation
for Prepcon, you should meet with Oil Minister Yamani to convey
our views and to discuss what we see as contributing to a successful
cret; Immediate. Drafted by Dickman, cleared in EB and S/P and by Robinson and Hor-
mats, and approved by Sidney Sober (NEA).
On April 2, Akins reported that he had met with Yamani before receiving the in-
structions contained in this telegram, but that “many of the points were, however, dis-
cussed with the Minister.” Yamani informed him that Prince Saud would not attend
Prepcon and had not yet decided who would go to the meeting. Yamani stated that Saudi
Arabia “would like to cooperate with the United States,” but was “not sure how close or
overt this cooperation should be.” Regardless, he assured Akins that Saudi Arabia would
“oppose any dramatic moves on the part of the OPEC radicals,” and that “above all Saudi
Arabia wishes to avoid confrontation” between the producers and the consumers. Be-
cause Akins had met with Yamani before the latter left for Beirut and Europe, he pre-
pared a paper summarizing this telegram and left it with Yamani’s office, which assured
the Ambassador that Yamani would receive it before his departure. (Telegram 2391 from
Jidda, April 2; ibid., D750115–0559)
172 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
2. First express our pleasure that Yamani will continue as Minister
of Petroleum under King Khalid and ask if Prince Saud is still sched-
uled to represent SAG at the Prepcon. Because of the very special rela-
tionship between our two countries, our position as the world’s largest
oil importer, and Saudi Arabia’s position as a producer with consider-
able discretional ability to swing its production up or down, we believe
we will jointly benefit through close consultation and cooperation. We
are well aware that Saudi Arabia will play a very significant role and
we want to maintain close contact with the Saudi delegation in Paris.
3. You should mention to Yamani that we are also well aware of
Saudi interest in making a producer/consumer conference a success.
We assume the Saudis (like ourselves) do not want to see the confer-
ence degenerate into polemics or end up in a producer-consumer con-
frontation. We feel this is even more important now with the new lead-
ership in the Kingdom following Faisal’s assassination. As Yamani
knows, we have been reluctant to go along with any producer/
consumer conference until both sides were very well prepared because
we thought it would fail otherwise. If the Prepcon and a future confer-
ence are to succeed, much will depend on whether we can agree on an
agenda both sides can live with.
4. As Yamani knows from his last meetings with the Secretary in
we intend the American approach to be cooperative. The Sec-
retary in his latest press conference on March 26 said: “We believe that
the consumer-producer conference is being conducted in the interests
of both sides for the common benefit, for the interest of a developing
and thriving world economy, which is in the interest of producers as
well as consumers and should not be tied to the situation in the Middle
East. Therefore, we are proceeding with our preparations for the
consumer-producer conference, and progress is being made in that di-
rection, and we find it essentially on schedule.”
5. You should tell Yamani that we think we are close on basic ap-
proaches to the conference: We agree that (A) we should keep the rep-
resentation limited to a relatively few key countries; (B) we both have
obligations toward the MSAs, including promotion of the production
of fertilizers; (C) stable economic conditions in the Western world are
needed to allow Saudi Arabia to pursue its goal of rapid economic de-
velopment in the next decades and for the West to fend off Commu-
nism/radicalism; (D) measures for conservation and the search for al-
ternative sources of petroleum must be accelerated; (E) we must work
within and not outside of existing international monetary mechanisms;
See Document 41.
The text of Kissinger’s press conference is in Department of State Bulletin, April 14,
1975, pp. 461–470.
August 1974–April 1975 173
and (F) whatever the causes of the present energy problem it can be
turned into an opportunity for producer/consumer collaboration. We
do not want to use a conference to assess blame on any particular par-
ties because this would be unproductive and could lead to a confronta-
tion. Rather, we want to look to the future on how, through close bilat-
eral cooperation, we can bring about general cooperation between
producers and consumers.
6. As we see it, Prepcon is beginning of a process which will give
us a better basis for relating to each other on issues of mutual concern.
To avoid misunderstandings, we would like to set forth to Yamani our
hopes for the Prepcon which we hope Saudis could support: (A) an
agenda which covers recycling, industrialization of producer econ-
omies, aid to LDCs, inward investment, and pricing and security of
supply; (B) recognition of need for dialogue on other raw materials but
maintaining focus of this conference on energy and leaving other com-
modities for discussion in more appropriate forums such as forthcom-
ing UNGA Special Session; (C) holding participation in producer/
consumer conference to manageable proportions so that it does not de-
teriorate into a circus; (D) a neutral site for future conference; and (E)
agreeing in principle that conference should be held as soon as practi-
cable but leaving actual date open to ensure that we are all adequately
Download 8.4 Mb.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham:
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling