Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Philosophical


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al-ba¯t.iniyya , 38–40; cf. Ibn al-Walı¯d,  Da¯migh al-ba¯t.il , 1:131–46; and Goldziher,  Stre-

itschrift , 44–45. He accuses the Isma¯ ¶ilites of teaching a dualism of   ¶aql  and  nafs  as fi rst 

and second divine beings. For similar criticism, see al-Baghda¯dı¯’s report of the Isma¯ ¶ilite 

teachings in his  Farq bayna l-fi raq , 316.11–15. Al-Baghda¯dı¯ quotes these teachings from 

al-Nasafı¯’s lost  Kita¯b al-Mah.s.u¯l . Walker, “The Ismaili Vocabulary of Creation,” 79, con-

nects al-Baghda¯dı¯’s report to al-Sijista¯nı¯’s teachings. 

  127.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Fad.a¯   7ih. al-ba¯t.iniyya , 40.10–17; cf. Ibn al-Walı¯d,  Da¯migh al-ba¯t.il , 

1:144.4–10. 

  128.  Al-Baghda¯dı¯,  al-Farq bayna l-fi raq , 316.11–12, quotes from al-Nasafı¯’s  Kita¯b 



al-Mah.s.u¯l , which became available to non-Isma¯ ¶ilites (see Walker,  Early Philosophical 

Shiism , 55–56). Apparently, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ relied heavily on al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s lost book,  Kashf 

al-asra¯r wa-hatk al-asta¯r . In his   Ih.ya¯ ,  3:179.14–15 / 900.4–5, he takes the rare step of ac-

knowledging his reliance on that work. Al-Zabı¯dı¯,  Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da , 6:122.10, however, omits 

this passage, which prompted Goldziher,  Streitschrift , 16, to assume it is an interpola-

tion. Goldziher, however, bases his argument on grounds that are not all convincing. On 

al-Ba¯qilla¯nı¯’s book, see also al-Subkı¯,  T.abaqa¯t ,  7:18.1–5. 

  129.  See, for instance, al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  al-Munqidh , 33.11–16; or idem,  Qawa¯s.im al-ba¯-



t.iniyya , 33–34. In his  Munqidh , 29.2–6, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ mentions that “one of his colleagues” 

(?  wa¯h.id min as.h.a¯bı¯ ) attached himself to al-Ghaza¯lı¯ after he had professed the Isma¯ ¶ilite 

teachings. The former Isma¯ ¶ilite informed him of their arguments. 

  130.  Al-Kirma¯nı¯,  Ra¯h.at al- aql , 279; de Smet,  La quietude de l ’ intellect ,  279–81. 

   131.  De Smet,  La quietude de l ’ intellect ,  120–38. 

  132.  Niz.a¯mı¯,  Khamsah , 5:401–4 ( Sharafna¯mah , lines 5111–53). In what is probably 

its most well-known version in the West in Ru

¯mı¯’s  Masnavı¯ , 1:213–15, English translation 

2:189–90 (book 1, lines 3467–99), the roles of the Greek and Chinese painters are re-

versed from that in al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and Niz.a¯mı¯, and the competition is no longer unresolved. 

The Greeks are declared winners, thus expressing the superiority of mystical experience 

over acquired knowledge. 

  133.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,   Ih.ya¯ 7  , 3:28.17–29.3 / 1382.9–22; the story also appears in  Mı¯z.an 

al- amal , 37–38 / 225–26. Moosa ( Ghaza¯lı¯ and the Poetics , 254–55) and Soucek (“Niz.a¯mı¯ 

on Painters and Painting,” 14) understand the text as if the Chinese painters are judged 

superior over the Greek and that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ thus favored the Sufi  method. That is, how-

ever, not expressed anywhere in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s texts. The equality of both ways is, in fact, 

stressed in Niz.a¯mı¯’s version, which seems to be directly inspired by al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s ver-

sion. In Niz.a¯mı¯, the Greek is the best in painting ( naqsh ) and the Chinese the best in 

polishing ( s.aql ) (line 5153), yet both achieve results that are absolutely indistinguishable 

from each other and equivalent. 

  134.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mı¯za¯n al- amal , 37.18–38.1 / 226.6–8. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ uses the word 

“heart” as a synonym to the philosophical usage of the word “soul” ( nafs ); see Griffel, 

“Al-G

.

aza¯lı¯’s Concept of Prophecy,” 142, n. 132. 



  135.   kufr s.ura¯h. ;  al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Fays.al al-tafriqa , 198.5–8 / 66–67. See also  Fad.a¯  7ih. al-

ba¯t.iniyya , 39.5–11; cf. Ibn al-Walı¯d,  Da¯migh al-ba¯t.il ,  1:134.15–20. 

  136.  Baffi oni, “Contrariety and Similarity in God,” 4. 

  137. Frank,  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the Ash arite School ,  91. 

  138.  There seems to have been a development about what al-Ghaza¯lı¯ considered a 

 fa¯ il . See pp.  184–85 . 

 

not e s   to   page s   2 6 2 – 2 6 6  



3 5 5

  139.  The passage is also discussed by Frank in  Creation and the Cosmic System , 

44–45, 75–77, and in  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the Ash arite School , 19. For Frank, this passage is 

a major textual evidence supporting his conclusion that al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s God has no free 

choice in his creation and creates out of necessity, without free will ( Creation and the 



Cosmic System , 75). Frank, however, reports and translates only a small part of a longer 

argument. 

  140.  MS Istanbul, S

¸ehit Ali Pas

¸a 1712, fol. 32b. See Bouyges,  Essai de chronology ,  81, 

in which the date of the colophon on fol. 32b is incorrect. 

  141.   wa-yuqa¯lu innaha¯ a¯khiru mu  7allafa¯tihi ; MS Berlin, Petermann II 690, fol. 1a. 

See Ahlwardt,  Handschriften-Verzeichnisse , 2:527–28 (no. 2301). 

  142.  See above pp.  56–57 . 

  143.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm , 3 / 53–54. The text of this work, which is poorly 

edited, has been compared to the manuscripts MSS Istanbul, S

¸ehit Ali Pas

¸a 1712, foll. 

1a–32b; and Berlin, Petermann II 690. The Istanbul manuscript has been edited by 

Sa¯mih. Dughaym (Beirut: Da¯r al-Fikr al-Lubna¯nı¯, 1993), and the edition reproduces the 

original folio division in its margins. 

  144.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm , 13 / 70. 

  145.  Ibid., 8–9 / 64–65. 

  146.   baya¯nu ma na¯hu ba da iza¯lati z.a¯hirih ; ibid., 10.12–13 / 66. ult . The two MSS 

have  z.a¯hirihi . 

  147.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm , 11.9–10 / 68.5–6. 

  148.  Ibn  Sı¯na¯,  al-Shifa¯    7 ,   al-Mant.iq ,   al-Burha¯n ,  51.2–52.8. 

  149.  Griffel,  “Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Concept of Prophecy,” 124. 

  150.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Fays.al al-tafriqa , 41–60 / 184–94. 

   151.  (. . .) min ghayri tarjı¯h. ;  al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm , 11.11–13 / 68.8–9. 

  152.  Ibid., 11.9–11 / 68.5–8 (   farq  in line 6 is to be amended by  fawq ). Cf.  Fad.a¯  7ih. al-



ba¯t.iniyya ,  155.11–12. 

  153.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm ,  155.12–14. 

  154.  Ibid., 11.18–20 / 68.16–18. 

  155.  The  Rasa¯   7il Ikhwa¯n al-s.afa¯    7 , 2:22.10–3 / 2:26.13–5, teaches that the next to outer 

sphere is the “bearing (or the throne)” or the “pedestal” ( kursı¯ , cf. Q 2:255) and the outer-

most sphere is the “throne.” According to al- ¶A

¯mirı¯,  Kita¯b al-Fus.u¯l fi -l-ma a¯lim al-ila¯hiyya , 

ed. Khalı¯fa¯t 84. ult –87.1 / ed. Wakelnig 364.12–13, the  fala¯sifa  use the word “throne” to 

refer to the “straight sphere ( al-falak al-mustaqı¯m ) and the  primum mobile   (    falak al-afl a¯k ),” 

which is the outermost sphere. On the identifi cation of  al- arsh  as the highest being and 

the starless sphere, see Heinen,  Islamic Cosmology , 77–81, 83; and Wakelnig,  Feder, Tafel, 

Mensch , 167, 392. In his  Taha¯fut , 261.3–8 / 157.1–7, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ reports and criticizes the 

teachings of the  fala¯sifa  with regard to the “preserved tablet” ( al-lawh. al-mah.fu¯z. )  and  the 

“pen” ( al-qalam ), but he never mentions those with regard to “the throne.” See Frank, 

 Creation ,  45. 

  156.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm , 11.20–23 / 68.19–21. 

  157. Ibid., 11. ult.  / 68.23. 

  158.  See particularly the twenty-sixth and thirty-fourth epistles of  Rasa¯  7il Ikhwa¯n 

al-s.afa¯  7 , 3:3–36 / 2:456–79, 3:211–26 / 3:212–30. Cf. Nasr,  Introduction to Islamic Cosmo-

logical Doctrines , 66–74, 96–104. 

  159.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mishka¯t al-anwa¯r , 67.5–7 / 153.9–11; 66.8 / 152.16. This idea is also 

present in  Rasa¯   7il Ikhwa¯n al-s.afa¯    7 , 3:3–4 / 2:456–57. 

  160.   al-adna¯ bayyina  ala¯ l-a la¯ ;  al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Jawa¯hir al-Qur   7a¯n , 51.5; Ormsby,  Theod-



icy ,  45. 

  161.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  al-Maqs.ad , 152.11–13; Frank, Creation, 60. 

3 5 6  

not e s   to   page s   2 6 6 – 2 6 9



  162.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,   Ih.ya¯ 7  , 4:146.6–7 / 2272.9–10. 

  163.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mih.akk al-naz.ar ,  124.14–16. 

  164.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm ,  11. ult. –12.3 / 68. ult .–69.2. 

  165.   la¯ yumkinuhu min al-tadbı¯r , following MS Berlin, Petermann II, 690, fol. 6b. 

  166.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm ., 12.3–9 / 69.2–9. 

  167.  The usage of  tas.arrafa  in this context also appears in al-Ghaza¯lı¯ (?),  Ma a¯rij al-



quds , 198.14–15:  tas.arrufu l-a¯damiyyu f ı¯  a¯limihi a nı¯ badanahu yashbihu tas.arrufa l-kha¯liqi 

f ı¯ l- a¯lami l-akbar.  

  168.   natı¯jatu l-wa¯jibi wa¯jibun (not: wa¯jibatun) ; ibid., 12.7 / 69.8; following the 

MSS. 

  169.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mi ya¯r al- ilm ,  221.21–22;  idem, al-Iqtis.a¯d , 43.3; Frank,  Creation ,  72, 



81–82. Frank points to another passage in  al-Iqtis.a¯d , 78.4–9, but the necessity there is of 

the sort that follows as a consequence of earlier creations; it is necessity from something 

else, a sort of necessity that does not pose the kind of problems currently discussed. 

  170.  Cf. Ibn Sı¯na¯,  al-Shifa¯    7, al-Ila¯hiyya¯t , 328.2;  al-Naja¯t , 228.17 / 553.9–10. 

   171.  The implications of the statement that God is  wa¯jib al-wuju¯d min jamı¯  jiha¯tihi  

are clearly spelled out in al-Ghaza¯lı¯, MS London, Or. 3126, fol. 198b. 

  172. Griffel, “MS London, British Library Or. 3126,” 21–29. See also Marmura, 

“Ghazali and Demonstrative Science,” 184, 189. 

  173.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mi ya¯r al- ilm,   25.1–26.10. 

  174.  Frank,  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the Ash arite School , 93–94; Marmura, “Ghazali and De-

monstrative Science,” 192. 

  175.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mi ya¯r al- ilm , 221.21–222.1. The corresponding passage in MS 

London, Or. 3126, contains a long discussion of God’s essence in book 6, chapter 1 of 

that text (foll. 197b–207a). 

  176.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  al-Iqtis.a¯d ,  42.11–43.3. 

  177.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm , 12.9–12 / 69.9–12. 

  178.  Ibid., 12.10–11 / 69.11. 

  179.  Ibid., 12.13–14 / 69.14–15. 

  180.  In  al-Ghaza¯lı¯ (?),  Ma a¯rij al-quds , 198–99, the author explains that while in 

the microcosm of the human body, production is mediated fi rst through the animal 

soul ( al-ru¯h. al-h.ayawa¯nı¯ ) and then through the brain ( al-dima¯gh ), so too does God cre-

ate in the macrocosm “through the mediation of moving the heavens and the planets.” 

He specifi es that the relationship between the human heart and the brain is equivalent 

to the relationship between the throne ( al- arsh ) and the stool or pedestal ( al-kursı¯ ).  The 

senses ( al-h.awa¯ss ) are to the human what the angels, that is, the celestial intellects, are 

to God. 


  181.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Ilja¯m al- awa¯mm , 11.20–22 / 68.19–21. 

 conclusion 

  

1. 


Ibn 

T.ufayl,  H.ayy ibn Yaqz.a¯n ,  16. ult. –17.10. 

  

2. ¶Ayn al-Qud.a¯t,  Na¯mah-ha¯ , 1:79.7–10. More precisely,  ¶Ayn al-Qud.a¯t says that 



al-Ghaza¯lı¯ did not explain the level of meaning in the Qur’an that is geared to the intel-

lectual elite. 

  

3. 


Frank, 

 

Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the Ash arite School ,  100–101. 

   4.  For a recent example in more popular literature about the history of science, 

see Steven Weinberg’s comments on al-Ghaza¯lı¯ in his review article, “A Deadly Cer-

titude.” In what is partly a response to Weinberg, Robert Irwin, “Islamic Science and 

the Long Siesta,” largely accepts Weinberg’s view of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s devastating  effect, 

 

not e s   to   page s   2 6 9 – 2 7 6  



3 5 7

a view that is indeed widespread among current historians of the sciences and of 

philosophy. 

  

5. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Taha¯fut , 277.2–3 / 166.1–2. 



   6.  Kukkonen, “Possible Worlds,” 496, 499. 

   7.  See above pp.  128–32 . 

   8.  Ibn Rushd,  Taha¯fut al-taha¯fut , 523.2–16, 531–32, complains about al-Ghazali’s 

use of the word “habit” (  ¶



a¯da ). If al-Ghaza¯lı¯ means that existing things have a “habit,” 

he should use “nature” instead since “habit” is only applicable to animate things. If the 

“habit” exists only in our judgment, he should instead use the world “intellect” (  ¶

aql  ) 

because that is the agent (   fa¯ il ) of such a habit. 

  

9. Marmura, “Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Second Causal Theory.” 86. Marmura, however, be-



lieved that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ is committed only to the fi rst theory that represents an occasional-

ist view of causal connections. 

  10.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,   Ih.ya¯ 7  , 1:50.7–10 / 56.11–14; al-Zabı¯dı¯,  Ith.a¯f al-sa¯da¯ , 1:236–37, with 

 lam yaqu¯mu¯ bihi  as a variant to  lam yatas.iffu¯ bihi . 

  

11. In al-Ghaza¯lı¯ (?),  Ma a¯rij al-quds ,  14.16– 



ult,  the active intellect is described as 

“the substrate of the cognitions, of revelation, and of inspiration ( ilha¯m ).” The active 

intellect is also referred to as “the spirit” ( al-ru¯h. ) as well as “the pen” and “the creation 

that fl ows out of God’s command ( al-mubda  al-s.a¯dir min amr Alla¯h ). 

  12.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mı¯za¯n al- amal , 107.8–15 / 331.1–13. 

  13. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ (?),  Ma a¯rij al-quds , 16.1–2. The Arabic  mubda  al-awwal  or maybe 

even  mabda  al-awwal   (“fi rst invention”) seems almost a pun on the philosophical name 

for the same being,  al-mabda  7 al-awwal  (“the fi rst principle”). 

  14. Ibid., 15.5–7; al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Fays.al al-tafriqa , 182.6–12 / 36.8–37.7; idem,   Ih.ya¯  ,  

1:115.17–18 / 142.1–2. The  h.adı¯th  that the fi rst creation is the pen is reported by al-Tirmidhı¯, 

 Ja¯mi  al-s.ah.ı¯h ,   tafsı¯r su¯rat 68 . See Wensinck,  Concordance , 1:135a. The  h.adı¯th  that this fi rst 

creation is the intellect is not considered sound. An even longer version of the spurious 

  ¶aql-h.adı¯th,  containing a short cosmogenic narrative, is quoted by al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mı¯za¯n al-

 amal , 107.10–12 / 331.4–9. 

  15.  kha¯zinun li-anfusi khaza¯   7inihi ;  al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mı¯za¯n al- amal , 107.6 / 330.16–17. 

  16.  In the twenty-fi rst book of his  Ihya¯  7 , 3:27.3–7 / 1380.5–9, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says that 

the creator writes His plan for creation on the “well-guarded tablet” just as the architect 

writes his plan for a house on paper (see Nakamura, “Ghaza¯lı¯’s Cosmology Reconsid-

ered,” 35–36). Frank,  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the Ash arite School , 26–27, argues that the well-

guarded tablet “designates the angel (separated intelligence) that is associated with the 

outermost celestial sphere.” That intelligence, however, exists even beyond the outer-

most sphere. 

  

17. Craig,  



Kala¯m Cosmological Argument , 12, 15, 150–51; idem,  The Cosmological Ar-

gument , 56, 58. 

   18.  See  p.   142 . 

  19.  Baneth, “Jehuda Hallewi und Gazali,” 35; idem, “Rabbi Yehudah ha-Levi we-

Algazzali,” 320. 

  20.  See above pp.  253–60 . 

   21.  See above pp.  256–57 . 

  22.  Baljon, “The ‘Amr of God’ in the Koran,” 15–16. On modern Western as well as 

Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite and Muslim philosophical interpretations of what the word  amr  stands for in 

the Qur’an, see Wakelnig,  Feder, Tafel, Mensch ,  159–62. 

  23.  See above pp.  260–64 . 

  24. At least four years lie between the composition of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s  Fa

d.a¯   7ih. al-

ba¯t.iniyya —our main source for his knowledge of Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite cosmology,—and his  Mishka¯t 

3 5 8  


not e s   to   page s   2 7 6 – 2 8 2

al-anwa¯r . They allow for an improvement of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s understanding of Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite 

theology. 

  25.  On  the  non-Fa¯t.imid Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite background of the  Rasa¯  7il Ikhwa¯n al-s.afa¯  7,   see 

Wilferd Madelung in his article “Karmat.ı¯,” in  EI2 ,  4:663a 

  26.  See above pp.  199–201 . 

  27.  In the early parts of the Veil Section in  Mishka¯t al-anwa¯r,   al-Ghaza¯lı¯ draws on 

material from the long forty-second epistle in the  Rasa¯  7il Ikhwa¯n al-s.afa¯  7 , “The Differ-

ent Beliefs and Religions” ( Fı¯ l-a¯ra¯    7 wa-l-diya¯na¯t ); see Landolt, “Ghaza¯lı¯ and Religion-

swissenschaft,” 29–31. 

  28.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  al-Munqidh ,  33.19–22. 

  29.  Stern, “Authorship of the Epistles,” 368. 

  30.  Diwald,   Arabische Philosophie und Enzyklopädie , 313–14, connects al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s 

division of the two worlds to a similar one in  Rasa¯   7il Ikhwa¯n al-s.afa¯  7 ,  3:282.3–7  / 

3:293.19–24. The resemblance, however, remains general and unspecifi c and takes no 

account of the third Ghazalian realm,   ¶a¯lam al-jabaru¯t . 

  31. Ibn Taymiyya, “Sharh. al- ¶aqı¯da al-is.faha¯niyya,” 117–18. Ibn Taymiyya rejects al-

Ma¯zarı¯’s view that there was also an infl uence from Abu

¯ H


. ayya¯n al-Tawh.ı¯dı¯. Cf. Laoust, 

 Essai sur les doctrines ,  82–84. 

  32.  Ibn  Rushd , al-Kashf  an mana¯hij al-adilla ,  183. ult. –184.3; see also  Taha¯fut al-

taha¯fut , 117.6–8. In the notes to his Hebrew translation of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s  Maqa¯s.id al-fala¯sifa , 

the Jewish Averroist Issac Albalag (fl .  c . 1290) discusses Ibn Rushd’s and al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s po-

sitions on the relationship between the mover of the  primum mobile  and God. See Vajda, 

 Isaac Albalag , 31–32, 95–98; and Steinschneider,  Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen ,  1:303. 

Throughout his career as a writer, Ibn Rushd held different opinions about whether the 

mover of the highest sphere is identical to God or whether God is the creator of this 

mover; see Kogan, “Averroës and the Theory of Emanation,” 396–97. 

  33.  Ibn T.ufayl,  H.ayy ibn Yaqz.a¯n , 17.10–18.3. Ibn T.ufayl did not share this view. 

  34.  (. . .)   wa-ha¯dha¯ min jinsi kala¯mi l-ba¯t.iniyya ; Ibn al-Jawzı¯,  Talbı¯s Iblı¯s ,  166.3–7. 

Cf. Ibn Taymiyya,  Minha¯j al-sunna ,  4:149.19–20. 

  35.  Frank,  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the Ash arite School , 87, 101. 

  36.  Frank, “The Non-Existent and the Possible in Classical Ash ¶arite Teaching,” 

16–17. 

   37.  See, for instance, al-Juwaynı¯,  Irsha¯d,   110.3. 



  38.  Ibid., 210.3–4. 

  39.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Munqidh , 23.11–13. “Elemental natures” ( al-t.aba¯   7 ¶) seems to refer 

to the four prime elements ( ust.uqusa¯t ). 

  40.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  al-Munqidh ,  45.3–9. 

  41.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,   Ih.ya¯ 7  , 1:115–16 / 142.34–37. 

  42.  Gianotti,   Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ ’ s Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul ,  168. 

  43.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,  Mishka¯t al-anwa¯r,  42.2–3 / 120.8–9, 51–52 / 133.7–13, 60.2–3 / 

133.11–12, 67.15–16 / 153.3–4. On emanation in al-Ghaza¯lı¯, particularly in the  Mishka¯t al-



anwa¯r , see Davidson,  Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect , 135–36, 151; and Frank, 

 Creation ,  83. 

  44.  Lazarus-Yafeh,   Studies in Al-Ghazzali , 307–12. Gairdner, “Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Mishka¯t 

al-Anwa¯r,” 138–39, had developed a similar argument based on the use of prepositions 

by al-Ghaza¯lı¯. 

  45.  In the often-quoted passage from  Mı¯za¯n al- amal , 161–64 / 405–9, in which 

al-Ghaza¯lı¯ describes three different levels of outspokenness a scholar might have with 

regard to his teachings, he actually rejects the described attitude. He refers to a group 

of scholars who express one set of teachings in public disputations, another group who 

 

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3 5 9

express their teachings while instructing their students, and a third group who keep it 

secret between themselves and God. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ contrasts this attitude with the posi-

tion to thoroughly investigate the subject in question, to develop  one  position, and to 

teach that in all circumstances to all people. The latter is the attitude to be favored. Ibn 

T.ufayl’s remark ( H.ayy ibn Yaqz.a¯n , 16.2–6) that the attitude described in this section is 

the root of some apparent contradictions in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s works has had a very mislead-

ing infl uence on many later interpreters. 

  46.  Al-Ghaza¯lı¯,   Ih.ya¯ 7  , 1:44–61 / 49–70. 

  47.  See, for instance, Strauss,  Persecution and the Art of Writing ,  38–78. 

 bibliogr aphy 

   1.  Only the fi rst part of the  Nas.ı¯h.at al-mulu¯k  (pp. 1–79 in Huma¯  7ı¯’s edition) is 

authored by al-Ghaza¯lı¯; the second part (pp. 81–287) is by another, unknown author 

of the sixth/twelfth century. See Crone, “Did al-Ghaza¯li Write a Mirror for Princes?”; 


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